1

Andrew Page has referred this Decision Notice to the Upper
Tribunal where the parties will present their respective
cases. Any findings in this Decision Notice are therefore
provisional and reflect the Authority’s belief as to what
occurred and how it considers the behaviour of Andrew Page
should be characterised. The Tribunal will determine what (if
any) is the appropriate action for the FCA to take, and will
remit the matter to the FCA with such directions as the
Tribunal
considers
appropriate
to
give
effect
to
its
determination. The Tribunal’s decision will be made public on
its website. No allegation of wrongdoing is made against
Hennessy Jones Limited, Mark Stephen, James King or City
Administration Limited in this Decision Notice.

DECISION NOTICE

and

To:
Financial Page Ltd (in liquidation)

(as an interested party pursuant to section 63(3) of the Act)

Address:
The Fort Offices
Artillery Business Park
Garrison Avenue
Park Hall
Oswestry
Shropshire
SY11 4AD

Date:
6 December 2018

2

1.
ACTION

1.1. For the reasons given in this Notice, the Authority has decided to:

(1)
impose on Andrew Page a financial penalty of £321,033 pursuant to

section 66 of the Act;

(2)
withdraw the approval given to Mr Page to perform the controlled functions

of CF1 (Director), CF10 (Compliance Oversight), CF11 (Money Laundering

Reporting Officer) and CF30 (Customer) pursuant to section 63 of the Act;

and

(3)
make an order, pursuant to section 56 of the Act, prohibiting Mr Page from

performing any function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by

an authorised person, exempt person, or exempt professional firm.

2.
SUMMARY OF REASONS

2.1
The Authority has determined that Mr Page acted dishonestly and recklessly

between 9 April 2014 and 1 February 2016 and that between 3 July 2014 and 1

February 2016 (the “Relevant Period”) Mr Page breached Statement of Principle 1

(Integrity) of the Authority’s Statements of Principle for Approved Persons by

acting dishonestly and recklessly when performing his controlled functions in

relation to Financial Page Limited’s (“FPL”) pension advice business.

2.2
Pensions are a traditional and tax-efficient way of saving money for retirement.

The value of someone’s pension can have a significant impact on their quality of

life during retirement and, in some circumstances, may affect whether they can

afford to retire at all. Customers who engage authorised firms to provide them

with advice in relation to their pensions place significant trust in those providing

the advice. Where a firm fails to act with integrity and puts its interests above

those of its customers, it exposes its customers to a significant risk of harm.

2.3
Further, where elements of a pension advice process are outsourced to a third

party service provider, the authorised firm remains responsible for the advice

given and all decisions and actions in relation to regulated activities provided in

its name. It is therefore essential that, in such circumstances, the authorised firm

maintains control of the advice process and provides effective oversight of the

activities carried out by the service provider on its behalf.

3

2.4
Mr Page is an approved person at FPL, a small firm that, during the Relevant

Period, was authorised by the Authority with permission to conduct regulated

activities, including advising on investments (excluding Pension Transfers) and

arranging (bringing about) deals in investments. Mr Page was the sole approved

person at FPL during the Relevant Period, with approval to perform the controlled

functions of CF1 (Director), CF10 (Compliance Oversight), CF11 (Money

Laundering Reporting) and CF30 (Customer). FPL also had a de facto director,

2.5
During the Relevant Period Mr Page was responsible for FPL adopting and using

the Pension Review and Advice Process. This process was based on a pension

switching advice model, the development of which was initiated and influenced by

a third party, HJL. The Pension Review and Advice Process:

(1)
involved HJL sourcing leads from lead generation companies and

introducing customers to FPL;

(2)
involved HJL and CAL (a third party service provider which was closely

connected to HJL) being provided with FPL’s logo and letterhead and the

electronic signature of Mr Page (the Firm’s qualified financial advisor) so

that they could perform functions (the Outsourced Functions) on FPL’s

behalf, including:

(a)
contacting customers that had been introduced to FPL by HJL;

(b)
conducting fact-finds with these customers;

(c)
inputting the results of those fact-finds into the Software (an

automated client management system designed to produce

Suitability Reports);

(d)
sending the Suitability Reports to the customers; and

(e)
calling the customers to ask whether they wished to proceed in

accordance with FPL’s advice;

(3)
was structured to result in customers who met certain pre-set criteria

approved by Mr Page being advised to switch their pensions to SIPPs

investing in high risk, illiquid assets not regulated by the Authority (the

Loan Notes and, from November 2014, the Bond). HJL had a material

financial interest in the Loan Notes, which was not disclosed to customers;

and

(4)
involved little meaningful oversight by FPL of HJL’s activities as an

introducer and of the Service Providers’ performance of the Outsourced

Functions.

2.6
Mr Page was aware of what the Pension Review and Advice Process involved and

how it was structured. Nevertheless, he caused FPL to hold itself out to

customers as providing bespoke, independent investment advice based on a

comprehensive and fair analysis of the whole market. Mr Page knew this was

misleading to customers as it did not reflect the reality of the service that FPL

would provide using the Pension Review and Advice Process. In causing FPL to

hold itself out in this way, Mr Page acted dishonestly. The Authority considers this

to be particularly serious because customers were not made aware of the true

nature of the service being provided, including the fact that HJL’s involvement in

the process and financial interest in the Loan Notes created a conflict of interest.

Customers were therefore denied the opportunity to make an informed decision

on whether to use the Firm’s services and on whether to invest in the products

recommended to them by the Firm.

2.7
Mr Page’s actions during the Relevant Period in relation to FPL’s adoption and use

of the Pension Review and Advice Process, summarised in paragraphs 2.8 to 2.18

below, were reckless. The Pension Review and Advice Process put FPL’s

customers at serious risk of receiving unsuitable advice and therefore at serious

risk of investing in products that were not suitable for them, but Mr Page closed

his mind to these risks and unreasonably exposed FPL’s customers to them by

deciding that FPL should adopt and use the Pension Review and Advice Process.

2.8
Mr Page allowed FPL to recommend the Loan Notes and the Bond to customers in

circumstances where he had failed to carry out adequate due diligence on them to

ensure that he had a proper understanding of them, including their risks and

benefits. In particular:

(a)
Mr Page relied mainly on documents provided to him by HJL, despite

knowing that HJL had a material financial interest in the Loan Notes, and

did not take any actions to address the risk that the information provided

by HJL could be misleading or incomplete;

5

(b)
Key parts of Mr Page’s due diligence were not completed until after advice

had already been given to customers to switch their Pensions to SIPPs

investing in the Loan Notes;

(c)
Mr Page did not perform adequate due diligence on the insurance policies

that were intended to provide a capital guarantee for the Loan Notes. As a

result, he did not understand how the insurance policies would operate in

practice, the extent of the protection that they would provide or that the

insurer was controlled by the issuer of the Loan Notes; and

(d)
Mr Page only reviewed a summary of the features of the Bond, which did

not include a full description of the risks and incorrectly concluded that the

Bond was equivalent to cash.

2.9
In any event, it should have been obvious to Mr Page from the limited information

that he considered that the Loan Notes and the Bond were high risk investments

that were unlikely to be suitable for FPL’s customers, except in very limited

circumstances. However, Mr Page failed to give due consideration to the risk that

the Underlying Investments were unsuitable.

2.10
Mr Page knew of HJL’s involvement in the Pension Review and Advice Process,

that the process was structured to result in customers switching their pensions to

SIPPs investing in the Loan Notes (and later the Bond), and that HJL had a

material financial interest in the Loan Notes. Further, Mr Page knew that two of

the directors of HJL during the Relevant Period (Mark Stephen and James King)

were directors of the company issuing the Bond, and that Mr Stephen was also a

director of the company issuing the Loan Notes. However, Mr Page took no steps

to manage these conflicts of interest or to ensure that the common directorships

and how HJL was remunerated were disclosed to customers.

2.11
Mr Page was an experienced and qualified financial adviser. It therefore should

have been obvious to him that he needed to give due consideration to the

documents to be used in the Pension Review and Advice Process, and to how the

process would operate in practice, before FPL started to use the process.

However, Mr Page failed to do so and therefore allowed FPL to adopt and use the

Pension Review and Advice Process having failed to identify significant, obvious

deficiencies in the process, including that: the fact-find contained leading

questions intended to steer customers towards the features of the products that

would be recommended; the Suitability Reports did not include sufficient

6

information to provide customers with a compliant personal recommendation; and

information provided to customers about the Loan Notes, and later also the Bond,

did not adequately inform them of their costs, benefits and risks.

2.12
In any event, it should have been obvious to Mr Page from the information

available to him that the Pension Review and Advice Process did not comply with

the Authority’s rules. Mr Page was aware that FPL would have no meaningful

involvement in the advice to be given and that the documents to be used in the

process would mislead customers about the service that would be provided.

However, Mr Page failed to give any meaningful consideration to whether or not

the Pension Review and Advice Process was compliant.

2.13
Mr Page failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that FPL maintained control of

the Pension Review and Advice Process and allowed important parts of the

process, such as the conduct of fact-finds, to be performed in a way that failed to

obtain and/or take into account relevant information about FPL’s customers.

Further, he failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that FPL reviewed in a

meaningful way advice given through the Pension Review and Advice Process, for

which it was responsible, whether before recommendations were sent to

customers or at all.

2.14
Mr Page failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that FPL put in place

appropriate systems and controls and compliance arrangements to oversee and

monitor the Pension Review and Advice Process.

2.15
Mr Page allowed FPL to work with the Service Providers in circumstances where he

had failed to carry out adequate due diligence on them and had failed to give any

proper consideration to whether they were suitable to perform services on FPL’s

behalf. He conducted some due diligence on HJL, but only completed key parts of

it after FPL had commenced business with HJL, and did not conduct any due

diligence on CAL.

2.16
Mr Page failed to take any steps to establish that the lead generators used by HJL

generated their customer introductions in an appropriate manner and did not use

cold calling. The Authority has evidence suggesting that one of the firms used by

HJL generated introductions through cold calling. This was brought to Mr Page’s

attention by the Authority in September 2014, but he took no steps to amend the

lead generation process and did not conduct any further due diligence on HJL.

7

2.17
FPL engaged an external compliance consultant to provide compliance support. Mr

Page suspected that the Pension Review and Advice Process might not be

compliant, but withheld his suspicions and even the fact that FPL was using the

process from the compliance consultant. Even after concerns were raised with him

by the compliance consultant following a review of four customer files (including

concerns about the inadequate and leading fact-find questions and the role of the

Service Providers), Mr Page disregarded those concerns and continued to allow

FPL to use the Pension Review and Advice Process.

2.18
Mr Page failed to have regard to customers’ interests when advising customers to

switch the cash in their SIPP into the Bond and also when reinvesting customers’

interest payments in the Loan Notes:

(1)
FPL’s customers’ pensions were initially invested in a SIPP with a portfolio

made up of the Loan Notes and cash. From November 2014 Mr Page, on

behalf of FPL, contacted customers to advise them to switch the cash

element of their portfolio into the Bond. Although Mr Page sought to

contact all customers by telephone and in writing, he failed to assess

whether the switch was suitable for each customer and, when speaking

with customers on the telephone, failed to explain the risks of the Bond.

(2)
Mr Page subsequently sent those customers that he had not been able to

contact by telephone an ‘opt out’ letter, which appears to have

recommended that they switch the cash in their SIPP into the Bond and

informed them that they could contact him if they required further advice.

Customers were informed that if they did not respond, FPL would complete

the switch for them, but were not given a deadline to respond to the letter.

From April 2015, Mr Page started instructing the SIPP Provider to switch

customers’ cash to the Bond.

(3)
Mr Page adopted a similar process when FPL decided in January 2015 to

reinvest all interest payments from the Loan Notes received by customers

back into the Loan Notes. Mr Page appears to have used the same ‘opt out’

letter to inform customers that their interest was going to be reinvested.

Whilst customers were informed generally that they could contact FPL if

they required further advice, they were not told that they had a choice

whether to reinvest the interest payments or that they would need to

inform FPL if they did not want their interest payments to be reinvested.

The ‘opt out’ letter was used even though not all customers had ongoing

servicing arrangements with FPL.

2.19
Mr Page’s reckless actions in relation to FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension

Review and Advice Process, in particular the fact that he allowed the Service

Providers to perform the Outsourced Functions on FPL’s behalf without adequate

supervision, failed to review in a meaningful way advice given through the

Pension Review and Advice Process, and failed to ensure FPL put in place and

operated appropriate systems and controls in relation to the process, exposed FPL

to the risk of breaching section 20 of the Act by carrying on a regulated activity

without the relevant permission, as in fact happened. The Pension Review and

Advice Process failed to distinguish properly between Pension Transfers (which

include the transfer of deferred benefits from an occupational pension scheme

into a SIPP) and Pension Switches (which involve the movement of funds from

one personal pension scheme to another where no safeguarded benefits are

involved). As a result, despite FPL not having the necessary permission to

provide advice on Pension Transfers, in at least 22 cases advice about Pension

Transfers was given to customers by FPL in breach of section 20 of the Act.

2.20
In addition to the clear deficiencies in the Pension Review and Advice Process, the

Authority has identified that unsuitable advice was provided to FPL’s customers in

all 20 FPL customer files it has reviewed. Further, each of the 20 customer files

failed to comply with applicable Handbook rules. As the same advice process was

used for all customers who were advised to invest in the Loan Notes and/or the

Bond (the “Underlying Investments”), the Authority considers it is likely that the

advice provided to most, if not all, of FPL’s advised customers was unsuitable.

2.21
During the Relevant Period, 985 FPL customers invested over £33 million in SIPPs

investing in high risk, illiquid assets that were unlikely to be suitable for them,

thereby exposing them to a significant risk of loss. 860 FPL customers switched

or transferred their pension funds through the Pension Review and Advice Process

and 675 customers were advised by Mr Page on behalf of FPL to switch the cash

element in their pension into the Bond, which included 125 customers novated to

FPL from another financial services firm.

2.22
Mr Page decided that FPL should adopt the Pension Review and Advice Process for

financial gain from the fees it generated and in order to increase the number of

customers that the Firm could advise about other products, such as life assurance

or other investments, and thereby generate further fees. In doing so, Mr Page put

his and FPL’s own interests before those of FPL’s customers.

2.23
Mr Page also acted dishonestly or recklessly in several other ways connected to

the Pension Review and Advice Process between 9 April 2014 and 1 February

2016, as described in paragraphs 2.24 to 2.28 below.

2.24
Mr Page acted dishonestly by providing false and misleading information in FPL’s

application for authorisation which was received by the Authority on 9 April 2014,

and by failing, after FPL was authorised, to correct the misleading impression that

had been created by FPL’s application for authorisation.

2.25
Mr Page deliberately either omitted to provide information or, where it was

provided, gave false and/or misleading information to the Authority about FPL’s

business arrangements, on more than one occasion. Mr Page did so to try to

prevent the Authority from identifying misconduct by him and by the Firm, and

thereby acted dishonestly.

2.26
Mr Page dishonestly provided false information to the SIPP Provider when he

informed the SIPP Provider that the Authority had instructed him to disinvest his

pension from the Loan Notes. This was not true and Mr Page has admitted he lied

to the SIPP Provider in order to disinvest his pension funds more quickly.

2.27
Mr Page recklessly entered into an agreement with Mr Ward which granted Mr

Ward custodianship of FPL customers in the event of FPL ceasing trading. The

Authority considers that the agreement was not in the best interests of customers

but was made in order to protect Mr Page and Mr Ward’s financial interests in FPL

following administrators being appointed.

2.28
Mr Page recklessly dealt with FPL’s assets in breach of the Asset Retention

Requirement which, on FPL’s application, had been imposed on FPL by the

Authority on 10 July 2015 (see paragraph 2.30(2) below).

2.29
The Authority considers Mr Page’s failings to be serious because:

(a)
they related to a large number of customers (including some who were

vulnerable due to their age, their inability to replace capital, their medical

conditions or other personal circumstances);

(b)
it should have been obvious to Mr Page that the involvement in the

Pension Review and Advice Process of HJL, which had a material financial

interest in the Loan Notes, created a conflict of interest, yet he took no

steps to manage the conflict or to ensure that HJL’s financial interest was

disclosed to customers;

(c)
as an experienced and qualified financial adviser, it should have been

obvious to Mr Page that the Loan Notes and the Bond were unlikely to be

suitable for retail customers, except in very limited circumstances; and

(d)
on 7 August 2014 and 3 September 2014, the Authority wrote to Mr Page

and drew his attention to alerts released by the Authority relating to firms

advising on Pension Switches or Pension Transfers into unregulated

products through SIPPs, the risks of non-mainstream products being

unsuitable and the need to protect customers. Despite this Mr Page did not

take steps to protect FPL’s customers.

2.30
FPL’s provision of pension advice was subject to examination by the Authority in

June 2015. The Authority had serious concerns with respect to the adequacy of

FPL’s pension advice and, at the request of the Authority, FPL applied for

requirements to be imposed on it. The requirements were imposed on 10 July

2015, and included that FPL was not permitted to:

(1)
conduct Pension Switches and/or Pension Transfers to any SIPP scheme,

until independent verification was provided to the Authority confirming

that a robust and compliant advice process was in place. (That verification

was subsequently provided on 26 October 2015 and this requirement was

amended); and

(2)
in any way dispose of, deal with, or diminish the value of any of its assets

without the prior consent of the Authority (the Asset Retention

Requirement).

2.31
On 16 July 2017 FPL entered liquidation. The FSCS declared FPL in default on 22

March 2017 and is investigating claims made by FPL’s customers. As at 17 May

2018, the FSCS had paid over £1.7 million in compensation to FPL customers as a

result of loss suffered upon transferring or switching their pensions to the

Underlying Investments.

2.32
The Authority considers that Mr Page’s dishonest and reckless conduct between 9

April 2014 and 1 February 2016, including his breach of Statement of Principle 1

during the Relevant Period, demonstrates that he lacks integrity and is not a fit

and proper person. Accordingly, the Authority considers it is appropriate to

withdraw his approval to perform controlled functions and to impose a prohibition

order on him, as described at paragraphs 1.1(2) and (3) of this Notice.

2.33
Further, the Authority considers it appropriate to impose a financial penalty on Mr

Page for his breach of Statement of Principle 1. For limitation reasons, the

Authority has decided to impose a financial penalty only in respect of Mr Page’s

breach of Statement of Principle 1 between 25 July 2014 and 1 February 2016

(the “Penalty Period”). Accordingly, the Authority has decided to impose a

financial penalty of £321,033 on Mr Page in respect of his breach of Statement of

Principle 1 during the Penalty Period. This is explained further at paragraph 6.1

and at paragraphs 4 to 8 of Annex B.

3.
DEFINITIONS

3.1
The definitions below are used in this Notice.

the “Act” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000

the “Asset Retention Requirement” means the requirement imposed on the Firm

on 10 July 2015, not to in any way dispose of, deal with, or diminish the value of

any of its assets without the prior consent of the Authority

the “Authority” means the body corporate previously known as the Financial

Services Authority and renamed on 1 April 2013 as the Financial Conduct

the “Bond” means the 10-year bond issued by an unquoted UK company

incorporated in November 2014 into which FPL’s customers’ pensions were

invested

“CAL” means City Administration Limited, the third party service provider that

performed the Outsourced Functions on behalf of FPL between October 2014 and

“COBS” means the Conduct of Business Sourcebook, part of the Handbook

“DEPP” means the Authority’s Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual

“EG” means the Authority’s Enforcement Guide

“FOS” means the Financial Ombudsman Service

“FPL” or “the Firm” means Financial Page Ltd

“FSCS” means the Financial Services Compensation Scheme

“GABRIEL” means the Authority’s online system for collecting and storing

regulatory data from firms

the “Handbook” means the Authority’s Handbook of rules and guidance

“HJL” means Hennessy Jones Limited, now known as Reditum Capital Limited. Mr

Page signed a contract with HJL on 6 December 2013 for HJL to become an IAR of

FPL, and HJL was registered with the Authority as such between 11 September

2014 and 2 July 2015. HJL introduced customers to FPL between July 2014 and

July 2015. HJL also performed the Outsourced Functions on behalf of FPL between

July 2014 and October 2014

“IAR” means Introducer Appointed Representative

“Loan Notes” means the assets, which consisted of 10-year loans to funds

incorporated in Mauritius and managed by a Mauritian company, into which FPL’s

customers’ pensions were invested

“Mr Page” means Andrew Mark Thomas Page

“Outsourced Functions” means the functions outsourced by FPL to the Service

Providers under the Pension Review and Advice Process, including the functions

described in paragraph 2.5(2) of this Notice (but not including the functions

carried out by HJL in its role as introducer)

“Penalty Period” means 25 July 2014 to 1 February 2016 inclusive

“Pension Review and Advice Process” means the process described in paragraph

2.5 of this Notice that FPL used between July 2014 and 10 July 2015

“Pension Summary Report” means the report given to FPL’s customers indicating

whether and by how much the customer could potentially benefit from a Pension

“Pension Switch” means the movement of funds from one personal pension

scheme to another where no safeguarded benefits are involved

“Pension Transfer” has the meaning given in the Handbook and includes the

movement of funds from an occupational pension scheme to a personal pension

scheme (in this case a SIPP)

“Person A” means the individual who had an influential role at HJL, referred to in

paragraph 4.41 of this Notice

“Person B” means an individual with whom FPL signed a loan agreement on 21

“Relevant Period” means 3 July 2014 to 1 February 2016 inclusive

“Service Providers” means collectively HJL and CAL

“SIPP” means self-invested personal pension

“SIPP Provider” means the firm providing the SIPP account

“Software” means the automated client management system that was used by the

Service Providers during the Pension Review and Advice Process to manage

customer information and generate Suitability Reports for customers

“Suitability Report” means the report which a firm must provide to its client under

COBS 9.4 which, among other things, must explains why the firm has concluded

that a recommended transaction is suitable for the client

“SYSC” means the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls

Sourcebook, part of the Handbook

“the Tribunal” means the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber)

“Underlying Investments” means the Loan Notes and/or the Bond

“the Warning Notice” means the warning notice given to Mr Page dated 12 March

4.
FACTS AND MATTERS

Background

4.1
FPL is a small firm based in Oswestry, Shropshire. It was incorporated on 21

September 2011 and was initially registered with the Authority as an Appointed

Representative in a network. FPL applied to the Authority for authorisation on 9

April 2014 and was authorised on 3 July 2014 with permission to conduct

regulated activities, including advising on investments (excluding Pension

Transfers) and arranging (bringing about) deals in investments.

4.2
During the Relevant Period Mr Page was the only approved person at FPL. He was

an experienced and qualified financial adviser and was approved, from 3 July

2014, to perform the controlled functions of CF1 (Director), CF10 (Compliance

Oversight), CF11 (Money Laundering Reporting) and CF30 (Customer).

4.3
Whilst Mr Page was the only approved director at FPL, the Authority considers that

FPL also had a de facto director, Thomas Ward. A de facto director is an individual

who acts as a director without having been appointed to that position validly, or

at all.

4.4
FPL also had an Investment Committee which met three times during the

Relevant Period. There were three members of the Investment Committee: Mr

Page, Mr Ward and another individual.

4.5
From July 2014 until 10 July 2015, Mr Page allowed FPL to use the Pension

Review and Advice Process, which involved:

(1)
HJL sourcing leads from lead generation companies and introducing

customers to the Firm;

(2)
the Outsourced Functions being performed on behalf of FPL, initially by

HJL, and then, from October 2014, by CAL, which was closely connected to

HJL; and#

(3)
little meaningful oversight by FPL of HJL’s activities as an introducer and of

the Service Providers’ performance of the Outsourced Functions.

4.6
The Pension Review and Advice Process was structured to result in customers who

met certain pre-set criteria approved by Mr Page being advised to switch their

pensions to SIPPs investing in high risk, illiquid assets not regulated by the

Authority (the Loan Notes and, from November 2014, the Bond). Mr Page was

aware that HJL had a material financial interest in the Loan Notes, and that it was

not disclosed to customers.

The business proposition

4.7
Mr Ward introduced Mr Page to HJL in December 2013. On 6 December 2013, Mr

Page, on behalf of FPL, signed a contract with HJL under which it was agreed that

HJL would act as an IAR of FPL and introduce customers to FPL for Pension

Switches. At that time it was proposed that Pension Switches would be conducted

on an execution-only basis. The intention was that HJL would provide a pre-

packaged customer file to FPL, which FPL would then put its name to as the

authorised person. However, an execution-only process was not subsequently

implemented.

4.8
On 8 March 2014, Mr Ward informed Mr Page in an email that HJL had moved to a

pension switching advice model. Mr Ward explained that, were FPL to apply this

model, he would provide packaged customer files with all supporting

documentation and that it would ‘simply be a case of [Mr Page] putting [FPL’s]

name to it’. The customer files and supporting documentation were to be

provided to Mr Ward by HJL.

4.9
Mr Page was told by Mr Ward that FPL could expect over 150 cases per month

which could generate ‘ridiculous’ amounts of income for FPL each month. Mr Page

responded that this had ‘just made my day’.

4.10
Mr Page (together with Mr Ward) decided that FPL should adopt this pension

switching advice model and that, in order to do so, FPL needed to be directly

authorised by the Authority. He therefore signed FPL’s application for

authorisation on 25 March 2014 and it was received by the Authority on 9 April

2014. FPL began to use the Pension Review and Advice Process once its

application was approved by the Authority, in July 2014.

The Underlying Investments

4.11
The Pension Review and Advice Process resulted in customers’ pensions being

switched or transferred to SIPPs with a portfolio of underlying assets which

consisted of (i) 10-year loans to funds incorporated in Mauritius and managed by

a Mauritian company (the Loan Notes), and (ii) from November 2014, a 10-year

bond issued by an unquoted UK company incorporated in November 2014 (the

Bond).

4.12
Customers’ SIPPs were invested in three portfolios which were misleadingly

described as being ‘cautious’, ‘moderate’ and ‘adventurous’, and which were made

up of differing proportions of Loan Notes, the Bond and, in some cases, a small

percentage of cash. The portfolios were meant to align to a customer’s attitude to

risk, but in practice there was little difference between the risks and returns of the

‘cautious’ portfolio when compared to the ‘adventurous’ portfolio. As such, the

terms used to describe the three portfolios failed to reflect the reality that

customers would be exposed to high levels of risk whichever portfolio their SIPP

was invested in.

4.13
Customers were told that the portfolios offered fixed returns and a capital

guarantee. In fact, the Underlying Investments within the portfolios are high risk,

illiquid and unlikely to be suitable for retail investors except in very limited

circumstances due to:

(1)
the investment strategies of the companies issuing the Loan Notes and the

Bond, which include investing in distressed residential and commercial

property and other speculative investments, including unlisted equities;

and

(2)
the limited regulatory oversight of the issuing companies, which are not

subject to the Authority’s rules governing, for instance, investment and

borrowing powers, disclosure of fees and charges, management of conflicts

of interest, a prudent spread of risk and other investor safeguards.

4.14
For the Loan Notes a “capital guarantee” was meant to be provided by way of

insurance, but this insurance was not (and, as far as the Authority is aware, is

still not) in place for all of the funds. None of the insurance policies have been

provided to the Authority and it has therefore not been possible to confirm the

extent of cover provided by the policies which have been put in place or even

whether the insurance is valid. Where insurance is in place it may be of limited

value to customers in that it is not directly for the benefit of the customers

investing in the Loan Notes. Further, the insurance company is based in Saint

Kitts and Nevis and is subject to significantly less stringent regulatory

requirements than insurance companies within, for example, the UK. Customers

were not told about any of the above important risk factors.

4.15
Although customers may request the repayment of their funds, this is subject to a

minimum 12 months’ notice period and the board of directors of each fund has

the discretion to refuse to repay the funds in certain circumstances. Further, the

Loan Notes are not regulated by the Authority and are not covered by FOS or

FSCS protection, and in the event of insolvency customers will be unsecured

creditors, a fact that customers were not told about either before or after they

agreed to switch or transfer their pensions.

The Bond

4.16
For the Bond, capital protection was meant to be provided by way of floating

charges on the assets of the issuing company and by a cash amount, to be held in

a separate segregated account and invested in cash instruments.

4.17
The Bond is listed on an overseas exchange and the value of the Bond is

dependent on whether there is a market for it. As such, customers may realise

less than their original investments if they sell them prior to the redemption date.

Repayment of the principal sum and interest is also dependent upon the company

generating sufficient income and returns. Further, the Bond is not regulated by

the Authority and is not covered by FOS or FSCS protection.

Failures in the Firm’s due diligence on the Underlying Investments

4.18
A firm is required to take reasonable steps to ensure that the investments that

are recommended to its customers are suitable for those customers (COBS

9.2.1R). In order to determine whether an investment is suitable for a customer,

a firm needs to undertake due diligence on the investment to understand how it

works. This is the process a firm carries out to assess, among other things, the

nature of the investment and its risks and benefits.

4.19
Mr Page was responsible for carrying out the Firm’s due diligence on the Loan

Notes and the Bond to ensure that they were suitable for FPL’s customers.

Although Mr Page was aware of the need to undertake adequate due diligence,

the due diligence that he carried out was inadequate. In particular:

(1)
Mr Page relied mainly on documents provided to him by HJL. Despite the

fact that HJL had a material financial interest in the Loan Notes, which was

obvious from the information provided to FPL, Mr Page did not take any

actions to address the risk that the information provided by HJL could be

misleading or incomplete;

(2)
key parts of Mr Page’s due diligence were not completed until after advice

had already been given to customers to invest in the Loan Notes;

(3)
Mr Page told the Authority in interview that insurance limited the risk of

the Loan Notes. However, Mr Page did not perform adequate due diligence

on the insurance policies. As a result, Mr Page did not understand how the

insurance policies would operate in practice and was unaware that the

policies did not cover all the funds. Mr Page also appeared to be unaware

until August 2015 that the insurer was controlled by the issuer of the Loan

Notes; and

(4)
Mr Page only reviewed a summary of the features of the Bond, which did

not include a full description of the risks. Mr Page considered that the Bond

was equivalent to cash despite it being obvious, even from the limited

information he was provided with, that the Bond was higher risk and less

liquid than cash assets.

4.20
Even on the limited information considered by Mr Page it should have been

obvious to him, as a qualified and experienced financial adviser, that the

Underlying Investments were high risk investments which were unlikely to be

suitable for FPL’s customers except in very limited circumstances (for example, in

some circumstances they may be suitable for high net worth investors or

sophisticated investors looking for some exposure to less traditional investments).

However, Mr Page failed to give due consideration to the risk that the Underlying

Investments were unsuitable.

The Pension Review and Advice Process

4.21
The development of the pension switching advice model, upon which the Pension

Review and Advice Process was based, was initiated and influenced by HJL. HJL

had been seeking an efficient process, to be adopted by an authorised financial

adviser, for advising customers who met certain criteria to switch their pensions

to SIPPs investing in the Loan Notes. FPL was not the first authorised financial

adviser to adopt a process based on the pension switching advice model; another

authorised financial adviser had done so earlier in 2014. FPL was responsible for

the advice given to customers through the Pension Review and Advice Process.

However, HJL sourced leads from lead generation companies and introduced

customers to FPL, and significant parts of the process (the Outsourced Functions)

were outsourced to the Service Providers.

4.22
Under the Pension Review and Advice Process, leads were sourced by HJL from a

number of lead generation companies. Customers were invited to request a free

pension review. If a customer made such a request, they would be contacted by

a Service Provider, which would obtain information about the customer’s existing

pension arrangements. The Service Provider would input the information into the

Software, which would generate a Pension Summary Report. The Pension

Summary Report would give the customer an indication of whether they might

save costs if they changed their pension arrangements. The Service Provider

would attend a face-to-face meeting with the customer to present the Pension

Summary Report and promote FPL’s advice service.

4.23
If the customer signed a service proposition confirming that they wished to

receive advice from FPL, the Service Provider would collect relevant documents

from the customer and conduct a scripted fact-finding exercise. The Service

Provider would input the results of the fact-find into the Software, which would

determine, based on pre-set criteria approved by Mr Page, whether the customer

should be advised to invest in the Loan Notes (and, from November 2014, the

Bond as well) and produce a Suitability Report containing a personal

recommendation. The Service Provider would send the Suitability Report to the

customer and call the customer to ask them whether they wished to proceed in

accordance with the advice they had received. Customers were not always told

that they were being contacted by a third party, so some customers may have

been under the impression that they were dealing with staff from FPL itself.

4.24
Mr Page allowed the Service Providers to perform the Outsourced Functions with

little or no oversight. Although the Suitability Reports were issued in FPL’s name,

Mr Page had no involvement in the assessment of suitability for individual

customers or in the production of the Suitability Reports. Mr Page’s electronic

signature and the Firm’s letterhead and logo were simply added to documents

provided by the Service Providers to customers, including the Suitability Report.

As such, Mr Page did not control the advice given in his name.

4.25
During the Relevant Period, FPL advised 860 customers to switch or transfer their

pensions to a SIPP investing in the Underlying Investments through the Pension

Review and Advice Process. This amounted to approximately £31 million of

customer funds.

4.26
FPL received an advice fee of 3% of a customer’s pension assets when a Pension

Switch or Pension Transfer to the SIPP was completed. For any customer who

opted to have ongoing servicing, FPL would also receive an annual fee of 0.4% to

0.5% of the customer’s pension assets paid by the SIPP Provider from the

customer’s pension assets. Between September 2014 and January 2016, FPL

received £1,154,692 in advice or ongoing servicing fees. FPL paid over £52,000 of

its fees to HJL and over £679,000 to CAL for their roles in the Pension Review and

Advice Process. Mr Page’s relevant income for this period was £139,765.

Conflicts of interest

4.27
A firm must take reasonable steps to identify whether a conflict of interest exists

between itself and its appointed representatives (and certain other people

connected with the firm) on the one hand and clients of the firm on the other

(SYSC 10.1.3R). When considering if a conflict of interest exists firms should take

into account whether, among other things, the firm or its appointed

representative has an interest in the outcome of a service provided to a client or a

transaction carried out on behalf of the client which is distinct from the client’s

interest in that outcome (SYSC 10.1.4R(2) and SYSC 10.1.4AG). This is to ensure

that the firm is aware of any undue influence which could impede it from acting in

the interests of its customers. Where a conflict of interest is identified a firm must

manage the conflict appropriately (SYSC 10.1.7R). Where a firm cannot ensure

that the interests of a client will not be damaged as a result of a conflict, the firm

must disclose the nature or sources of the conflict and the steps taken to mitigate

it (SYSC 10.1.8R).

4.28
HJL’s involvement in the Pension Review and Advice Process created an obvious

conflict of interest because the process was structured to result in customers

switching their pensions to SIPPs investing in the Loan Notes, in which HJL had a

material financial interest.

4.29
Mr Page knew that HJL’s motive for introducing customers to FPL was that it

wanted customers to invest in the Loan Notes (and later also the Bond), and knew

that HJL received 5% of the sums invested in the Loan Notes. Further, Mr Page

knew that two of the directors of HJL during the Relevant Period (Mark Stephen

and James King) were also directors of the company issuing the Bond, and that

Mr Stephen was also a director of the company issuing the Loan Notes. However,

Mr Page took no steps to manage these conflicts of interest and FPL’s customers

were not made aware of how HJL was remunerated or of Mr Stephen’s and Mr

King’s common directorships.

Failures relating to the Firm’s adoption and use of the Pension Review

and Advice Process

4.30
Before FPL was authorised by the Authority, Mr Page reviewed and approved

templates of various documents used in the Pension Review and Advice Process,

including fact-find scripts and template Suitability Reports, and approved the pre-

set criteria which would be the basis for the Software’s determination of whether

a customer should be advised to invest in the Underlying Investments.

4.31
Mr Page allowed FPL to adopt and use the Pension Review and Advice Process

despite knowing that customers would be given misleading information about the

service they would receive. For example, the template documents that Mr Page

reviewed and approved included the service proposition which customers had to

sign to confirm that they wished to receive advice from FPL and that they agreed

with the terms of the service offered. The service proposition stated, “…we offer

an Independent advice service. We will recommend investments based on a

comprehensive and fair analysis of the market. We will place no restrictions on

the
Investment
Markets
we
will
consider
before
providing
investment

recommendations, unless you instruct us otherwise. We will however only make a

recommendation when we know it is suitable for you…We operate independently

and therefore provide investment services from the whole market”. Mr Page knew

these statements were untrue. He knew that advice would be given through an

automated process without any meaningful assessment of individual customers’

needs, that the only products that were intended to be recommended to

customers through the Pension Review and Advice Process were the Underlying

Investments and that the Outsourced Functions would be performed on FPL’s

behalf by HJL, which had a material financial interest in the Loan Notes, or by

CAL, which was closely connected to HJL.

4.32
There were other significant obvious deficiencies in the Pension Review and

Advice Process which Mr Page, as an experienced and qualified financial adviser,

should have identified had he given due consideration to the documents to be

used in the Pension Review and Advice Process, and to how the process would

operate in practice, including:

(1)
The fact-find script contained leading questions which were intended to

steer the customer towards the features of the Underlying Investments

that would be recommended.

For example, customers were read a statement which included the

following: ‘Pension money can be held in a range of different investments

offering different features. Some will experience highs and lows while

others may perform in a much less volatile manner.’ They were then

asked if they would prefer their pension fund to ‘Grow at a fixed and

known rate each year?’ or to ‘Go up and down in value depending on the

underlying investments’ performance?’

Customers were also asked ‘If it could be guaranteed that the value of your

pension fund at the end of an agreed term could not fall below the amount

invested – would you want to incorporate this feature?’ and given the

option of answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

These questions were likely to lead customers to say they would prefer

fixed returns and a capital guarantee. Where customers stated either or

both of these preferences, they were advised to invest in the Loan Notes,

and later also the Bond. The customers’ stated preferences for fixed

returns and/or a capital guarantee were used to justify recommending the

Loan Notes, and later also the Bond, which customers were told offered

fixed returns and ‘an element of capital protection’. Customers were not

asked any other questions about their investment objectives.

(2)
The fact-find also only allowed for certain specified information to be

gathered from the customer, which was insufficient to establish the

suitability of recommendations. The fact-find was conducted by staff of the

relevant Service Provider, working from a script, who were not permitted

to depart from the script and probe for further information. Even when a

customer did disclose additional relevant information, it was not taken into

account as a result of the way in which the Suitability Reports were

prepared. Further, a suitably qualified financial adviser should oversee the

fact-find process. However, Mr Page did not supervise the conduct of fact-

finds, and did not have any meaningful involvement in the individual

assessment of customers’ circumstances.

(3)
Customers were not given a compliant personal recommendation as the

Suitability Report did not explain why the Underlying Investments were

suitable for a customer’s demands and needs. The Suitability Report also

did not include an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the

recommended products compared to the customer’s existing pension.

(4)
The information provided to customers about the Underlying Investments

did not fully inform customers of their costs, benefits and risks. In

particular:

(a)
important information about the risks of the Underlying Investments

was either not disclosed to the customer or, where it was disclosed,

was contradictory or unclear;

(b)
the three portfolios that customers invested in were described as

‘cautious’, ‘moderate, and ‘adventurous’. However, these terms failed

to reflect the reality that customers would be exposed to high levels

of risk whichever portfolio their SIPP was invested in;

(c)
customers were told that the Loan Notes provided a fixed return and

a capital guarantee. However, it was never explained or disclosed to

customers that there was a risk that they would not get all their

capital investment back. If the issuer of the Loan Notes performed

poorly, it might not be able to make interest payments to customers

and/or repay capital. Further, any request for early repayment of

capital was at the discretion of the issuer. It was particularly

important that customers were made aware of these risks given the

issuer had no track record and the underlying assets were illiquid and

high risk;

(d)
customers were told that the Bond provided a fixed return and capital

protection, and could be converted into cash in a very short time.

However, it was never explained or disclosed to customers that there

was a risk that they would not get all their capital investment back. If

the issuer of the Bond performed poorly, it might not be able to make

interest payments to customers and/or repay capital. It was

particularly important that customers were made aware of these risks

given the issuer had no track record and the underlying assets were

illiquid and high risk; and

(e)
whilst the advice provided would be covered by the FOS and the

FSCS, customers were not told that if the Loan Notes or the Bond

failed, they would be unable to make a complaint or claim to the FOS

and/or the FSCS, as the issuers and the Underlying Investments were

not regulated by the Authority.

(5)
The conflicts of interest continued for the duration of the Relevant Period,

throughout which HJL maintained a material financial interest in the Loan

Notes and Mr Stephen remained a common director of HJL and of the

issuer of the Loan Notes, and for most of which Mr Stephen and Mr King

were also directors of the company issuing the Bond. However, Mr Page

took no steps to manage these conflicts of interest, and customers were

not made aware of how HJL was remunerated or of the common

directorships.

4.33
Mr Page told the Authority that he believed that the Pension Review and Advice

Process was compliant as he had been told that HJL had received legal advice. In

fact, the legal advice that Mr Page was referring to did not relate to the

compliance of the Pension Review and Advice Process with the Authority’s rules

and Mr Page did not check whether HJL had received other advice. Mr Page’s

statement is also not consistent with his deliberate actions to mislead and

disregard FPL’s compliance consultant (see paragraphs 4.45 to 4.51 below) and

his deliberate actions to provide false and misleading information to the Authority

(see paragraphs 4.70 to 4.84 below).

4.34
The Authority considers that the Pension Review and Advice Process was wholly

and, to an experienced and qualified financial adviser, obviously inadequate and

exposed customers to a significant risk of loss from investments that were

unlikely to be suitable for them. It should have been obvious to Mr Page from the

information available to him, that the Pension Review and Advice Process was not

compliant with the Authority’s rules. However, as a result of his inadequate

consideration of the documents to be used in the Pension Review and Advice

Process, and of how the process would operate in practice (as well as his

inadequate due diligence on the Underlying Investments and, as detailed below,

the Service Providers), Mr Page allowed FPL to adopt and use a non-compliant

process without giving any meaningful consideration to the interests of

customers.

Mr Page’s limited role in the Pension Review and Advice Process

4.35
As the person at FPL approved to perform the CF30 (Customer) controlled

function, Mr Page was responsible for the advice given to all of FPL’s customers

through the Pension Review and Advice Process. In that position he should have

exercised control of and supervision over the process. However he, and therefore

FPL, had negligible involvement in it. For example:

(1)
He had no involvement in contacting the customer’s existing pension

provider.

(2)
He had no involvement in conducting the fact-find with the customer.

Occasionally, he reviewed the information that was recorded on the

Software by the Service Providers. However, he thought he did not need to

be involved in considering the suitability of the recommendation to the

customer because the Software assessed the information provided as it

was ‘an automated system’.

(3)
He had no involvement in preparing the Suitability Report for the

customer. Mr Page told the Authority that he reviewed a number of

Suitability Reports either before or after they had been provided to the

customer. However, to the extent that he did carry out such reviews, he

did not give any meaningful consideration to whether the personal

recommendation was suitable for the customer as he considered the

product was suitable for all customers who received a personal

recommendation through the Pension Review and Advice Process.

(4)
He had no involvement in any follow up calls or meetings with a customer

after the Suitability Report had been issued or in completing or checking

the paperwork to enable the customer to switch or transfer their pension.

As a result, he did not know which customers completed Pension Switches

or Pension Transfers.

(5)
He had no contact with the customer during the Pension Review and

Advice Process unless specifically requested.

4.36
The only time when Mr Page routinely contacted customers was after the Pension

Switch or Pension Transfer had been completed. Mr Page called all customers to

welcome them to the Firm. However, these calls did not involve an assessment of

the suitability of the customer’s investment or the provision of advice. The

welcome calls were also used as an opportunity to identify whether the customer

might have any demands and needs for other financial advice that FPL offered, for

example in relation to insurance.

4.37
FPL did not have access to its customer records other than through the Software

or if it requested CAL to provide copies. After CAL appointed a voluntary liquidator

on 27 August 2015, Mr Page was unable to access its customer records through

the Software.

Failures in Mr Page’s due diligence on the Service Providers

4.38
Principle 3 of the Authority’s Principles for Businesses provides that a firm must

take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively,

with adequate risk management systems. Further detailed rules and guidance are

set out in SYSC. In particular, firms such as FPL, which are common platform

firms (as defined in the Handbook):

(1)
must take reasonable steps to identify risks relating to the firm’s activities,

processes and systems (SYSC 7.1.2R);

(2)
when relying on a third party for the performance of operational functions

which are critical for the performance of regulated activities, must ensure

they take reasonable steps to avoid additional operational risk (SYSC

8.1.1R);

(3)
must exercise due skill, care and diligence when entering into, managing

or terminating any arrangement for the outsourcing to a service provider of

critical or important operational functions or of any relevant services and

activities (SYSC 8.1.7R); and

(4)
must take the necessary steps to ensure that any service providers have

the ability, capacity and any authorisation required by law to perform the

outsourced functions, services or activities reliably and professionally

(SYSC 8.1.8R(1)).

4.39
Mr Page agreed to HJL acting as introducer and to the Service Providers

performing the Outsourced Functions on FPL’s behalf during the Relevant Period,

without giving any proper consideration to whether they were suitable to perform

those activities. Mr Page conducted some due diligence into HJL. However key

parts of this due diligence were only completed after FPL had commenced

business with HJL. Mr Page carried out no due diligence in relation to CAL.

4.40
During the Relevant Period, FPL corresponded regularly with Person A, an

individual who had an influential role at HJL. Person A had been convicted for

blackmail and offences under the Insolvency Act 1986 and at that time remained

an undischarged bankrupt due to having hidden assets from his creditors. Mr Page

did not conduct any checks of his own on Person A’s background. Mr Ward

identified Person A’s background, through an internet search, the day after he

first met him in November 2013. Mr Page has told the Authority that he was not

aware of Person A’s background until 2015.

Failures in the Firm’s due diligence on the lead generation process

4.41
HJL was registered with the Authority as an IAR of FPL between 11 September

2014 and 2 July 2015. HJL introduced customers to FPL from around the time that

FPL was authorised by the Authority on 3 July 2014. As the principal of an IAR,

FPL had responsibility for HJL’s conduct as an introducer.

4.42
At no point, either before starting the introducer relationship with HJL or

afterwards, did Mr Page take any steps to establish that the lead generators used

by HJL generated their customer introductions in an appropriate manner and, in

particular, to ensure that they did not use unlawful cold calling.

4.43
In fact, the Authority has evidence suggesting that one of the firms used by HJL

used cold calling to generate customer introductions in breach of relevant

legislation. Mr Page was made aware of this in September 2014, when prompted

by a call from the Authority, but took no steps to amend the lead generation

process and did not conduct any further due diligence on HJL.

Misleading the Firm’s compliance consultant

4.44
FPL engaged an external compliance consultant to provide compliance support in

relation to its business arrangements and the compliance of the advice that it

provided to customers. The compliance consultant was also responsible for FPL’s

reporting of data to the Authority. It was therefore important that Mr Page

provided the compliance consultant with complete and accurate information about

FPL’s business to ensure that FPL was complying with the Authority’s

requirements.

4.45
Mr Page did not, however, provide all relevant information to FPL’s compliance

consultant and in fact sought to conceal the extent of FPL’s business with HJL. Mr

Page sent an email to Mr Ward on 13 June 2014, stating that he believed it would

be best if they kept the Pension Review and Advice Process ‘off [the compliance

consultant’s] radar’. On 8 September, two days before the compliance consultant

was due to visit, Mr Page sent an email to Mr Ward, saying that he would ‘just

keep quiet’ about the Pension Review and Advice Process. These emails indicate

that Mr Page suspected that the Pension Review and Advice Process might not be

compliant. On 10 September 2014, the compliance consultant visited FPL and Mr

Page did not fully inform the compliance consultant about the business that FPL

was conducting.

4.46
On 18 September 2014 Mr Page emailed a former employee of the compliance

consultant and stated `I now have Introducer Appointed Rep based in London

who package up leads for Pension switches, does it matter how many I do with

the same product and provider. I was wondering about my KPIs if all my business

was with one provider…’. Mr Page did not ask the same question of his compliance

consultant.

4.47
On 29 September 2014 Mr Page asked the compliance consultant when he would

need to submit his first GABRIEL report to the Authority detailing the business

that FPL had done. The compliance consultant replied that it would need to be

submitted in November, but that it would only cover the few months between July

and September. The compliance consultant also stated that after November the

report would only need to be submitted every six months. Mr Ward reacted to this

by stating in an email to Mr Page, ‘That may be great news as we will have only

completed on small numbers and that then gives us six months until may next

year’, to which Mr Page replied, ‘I’m glad we can get this sorted then have a good

run at it’.

4.48
As a result of Mr Page’s actions, the compliance consultant was unaware of the

Pension Review and Advice Process and the inherent conflicts of interest for most

of the Relevant Period. The compliance consultant only became aware of these

matters in June 2015, when Mr Page reported them to it following a notification

from the Authority that it would be conducting a short notice visit to FPL.

Disregarding the compliance consultant’s file review findings

4.49
During the Relevant Period, the compliance consultant reviewed four customer

files, all of which were initially failed for compliance issues. The first file was failed

in draft form in December 2014 and subsequently received a minimum pass score

when additional documentation was provided by FPL. The other three files were

reviewed in May 2015 and failed with the lowest rating possible, which was

described as ‘customers require compensation’. The compliance consultant raised

a number of concerns about FPL’s advice process, notably the inadequate and

leading fact-find questions and the role of the Service Providers in the advice

process. Notwithstanding, FPL’s Investment Committee determined that FPL’s

Pension Review and Advice Process was compliant. However, only Mr Page and Mr

Ward had seen the compliance consultant’s findings as they were not provided to

the third member of the committee. As the person at FPL approved to perform

the CF1 (Director) and CF10 (Compliance Oversight) controlled functions, Mr Page

was responsible for ensuring that the Firm’s processes were compliant.

4.50
As a result of the disagreement over these findings, Mr Page informed the

compliance consultant on 27 May 2015 that pension files would no longer be

provided to the compliance consultant for review. Mr Page was ultimately

responsible for the decision to disengage the compliance consultant from its file

review role.

The Authority’s review of 20 customer files

4.51
Given that all of FPL’s customers were told that they were receiving a personal

recommendation based on a comprehensive and fair analysis of the whole market

when in fact they were not, and given HJL’s material financial interest in the Loan

Notes which was undisclosed to customers, the Pension Review and Advice

Process clearly put FPL’s customers at serious risk of receiving unsuitable advice

and therefore at serious risk of investing in products that were not suitable for

them.

4.52
Nevertheless, the Authority has reviewed the advice given to 20 of FPL’s

customers during the period from 5 August 2014 to 24 March 2015 using

recordings of calls and meetings, where they were available, and copies of the

customer files maintained by the Service Providers.

4.53
The advice given to the customer was clearly unsuitable in all 20 files. As the

same process was used for all advice relating to the Underlying Investments, the

Authority considers it is likely that the advice provided to most, if not all, of FPL’s

customers was unsuitable.

4.54
In all 20 files the Authority considers the gathering of information from the

customer, the product recommendation, the Suitability Report and the disclosure

of information about the product breached the Authority’s requirements, including

30

(1)
insufficient information was gathered from customers in order to ensure a

suitable recommendation was given to them. For example, the fact-finding

script was limited and key information was not requested from customers,

including about their investment objectives (other than with respect to

fixed returns and a capital guarantee) and their knowledge, experience,

understanding and ability to accept the risks of speculative investments

(COBS 2.1.1R, 9.2.1R and 9.2.6R);

(2)
the Underlying Investments were not suitable due to the illiquid and high

risk nature of the investments made by the issuers of the Loan Notes and

the Bond, and the limited regulatory oversight of the issuing companies

(COBS 2.1.1R, 9.2.1R and 9.3.1G);

(3)
the Suitability Reports failed to give customers a compliant personal

recommendation as they did not explain why the SIPP and the Loan Notes,

and later also the Bond, were suitable for a customer’s demands and needs

and also did not adequately explain the possible disadvantages of the

recommendation to customers (COBS 2.1.1R and 9.2.1R); and

(4)
fact sheets provided to customers about the Underlying Investments did

not adequately explain the risks and possible disadvantages of investing in

the Underlying Investments and did not disclose to customers that HJL

would receive an initial fee of up to 5% of the funds raised from the Loan

Notes (COBS 2.1.1R and 9.2.1R).

4.55
In addition, the Authority identified:

(1)
one case where investment advice had been given about a Pension Transfer

outside of FPL’s permission;

(2)
four cases where the recommendation was not suitable as the customer lost

existing benefits (guaranteed annuity rate or guaranteed interest rate)

(COBS 2.1.1R and 9.2.1R(1));

(3)
five cases where the recommendation was unsuitable for the customer’s

personal
circumstances,
financial
circumstances
and/or
investment

objectives (COBS 2.1.1R and 9.2.1R(1)). For example, a customer stated

that he wished to have variable rather than fixed returns but the

recommendation was justified on the basis that his capital should be

guaranteed. Conversely another customer stated that she did not want

capital guaranteed products but the recommendation was justified on the

basis of the fixed return;

(4)
12 cases where the recommendation was unsuitable as the SIPP was more

expensive than one, or more, of the customer’s existing pensions and there

was no justification for the additional cost (COBS 2.1.1R and 9.2.1R(1)). For

example, a customer was recommended to switch to the SIPP and invest in

the Loan Notes even though this would be £4,184 more expensive at the

medium return level than remaining in their existing pension and the

customer had less than nine years to his desired retirement age;

(5)
14 cases, where audio recordings of the advice process were available for

review by the Authority, where oral statements were made to the customer

during the advice process that were factually inaccurate, unclear, unfair or

misleading (COBS 4.2.1R). Those statements included that:

(a)
after the fact-find an independent financial adviser would spend two

days
reviewing
the
customer’s
circumstances
to
make
a

recommendation, when in fact the advice process was automated

with typically no involvement from a qualified financial adviser;

(b)
an adviser would search the market for a recommendation tailored to

the
customer’s
circumstances,
when
in
fact
the Underlying

Investments were the only products that were available for

recommendation to the customer;

(c)
in respect of the Loan Notes, the customer’s capital would be

guaranteed and the returns were fixed, without explaining that

income and/or capital might be lost if the Mauritian funds (and the

assets they purchased) did not perform adequately, and that any

request for early repayment of capital was at the issuer’s discretion;

and#

(d)
the advice was covered by FSCS, without making it clear that any

losses incurred by the failure of the Underlying Investments would

not be covered by the FSCS; and

(6)
18 cases where the information suggests the customer waived their right to

cancel within 30 days (COBS 4.2.1R). There is no evidence that customers

were informed of the implications of waiving their rights and they may not

have been given sufficient time to reflect on the suitability of the

investment.

Cash to Bond switches

4.56
In November 2014 Mr Page began contacting customers who had already invested

in a portfolio of the Loan Notes and cash to advise them to switch the cash

element of their portfolio into the Bond. At this stage the Bond was not listed on

any stock exchange. The Bond was later listed on an overseas exchange and the

switches to the Bond were completed from April 2015 onwards.

4.57
Mr Page attempted to contact all customers by telephone and then followed up

the call in writing, both to those he had contacted and those he had not. These

communications were inadequate as Mr Page did not:

(1)
ask about any changes in the customer’s circumstances and/or assess

whether the switch would be suitable given the customer’s demands and

needs; or

(2)
explain the risks of the Bond during the telephone call. In fact, FPL stated:

`We now have a cash bond paying 3% and it is our recommendation we do

an internal transfer within the portfolio to take advantage of this extra

growth. There is no charge, it does not affect the risk of the portfolio…’ This

was misleading as the Bond did not have the same risk level as cash and

is, in fact, an illiquid, high risk investment.

4.58
From around February 2015, Mr Page sent those customers he was unable to

contact by telephone an ‘opt out’ letter. The ‘opt out’ letter was used even though

not all customers had ongoing servicing arrangements with FPL. Mr Page has only

been able to provide the Authority with a draft version of the ‘opt out’ letter that

was sent to customers and has not been able to confirm the number of customers

that were sent the letter. The draft letter informed customers that they could

contact FPL if they required further advice about the switch but, if they were

happy with the proposed course of action, they did not need to do anything and

FPL would complete the switch for them once the Bond was issued. The draft

letter did not set a deadline for customers to respond should they not wish to

switch. Mr Page has confirmed that the ‘opt out’ letter sent to customers was a

‘negative response’ letter.

4.59
The ‘opt out’ letter was not an appropriate method of advising customers as there

was no opportunity for Mr Page to ask about the customer’s circumstances or

ensure that they understood the risks, benefits and costs of the proposed course

of action.

4.60
The ‘opt out’ letter was also not an appropriate method of seeking customers’

consent, especially as Mr Page was proposing to move a customer’s cash into a

high risk, illiquid investment. There was a risk that some (if not all) customers

might not read the ‘opt out’ letter, understand its contents or appreciate the

consequences of not responding. As such, by switching customers’ cash to the

Bond on the basis of non-responses to the ‘opt out’ letters, there was an obvious

risk that customers did not consent to the switch.

4.61
Mr Page did not provide adequate details of the features and risks of the Bond to

any of FPL’s customers who switched to the Bond. For example, the application

form for the Bond required investors to sign a declaration confirming that they

understood that the Bond was a high risk investment and that they were seeking

a high risk profile for that part of their investment strategy. However, FPL’s

customers were not provided with the application form as the telephone call or

‘opt out’ letter were considered by Mr Page to be sufficient to facilitate the

transfer.

4.62
In total 675 customers moved over £2 million of their pension assets from cash to

the Bond as a result of Mr Page’s advice. This included 125 customers who had,

on the advice provided by another financial services firm, already invested in a

portfolio containing the Loan Notes with a small percentage of cash and who were

subsequently advised by FPL to switch the cash element into the Bond.

4.63
The Authority considers the process adopted by Mr Page to recommend customers

to switch their cash assets to the Bond was wholly inadequate and exposed

customers to a significant risk of loss from investments that were unlikely to be

suitable for them. Mr Page did not have regard to the interests of FPL’s customers

when advising customers to make this switch. He also did not have regard to

whether the advice process FPL adopted, and in particular the use of the ‘opt out’

letter, was an appropriate method of seeking a customer’s consent or otherwise in

the customer’s best interests.

Reinvestment of interest into the Loan Notes

4.64
On 9 January 2015 FPL held an Investment Committee meeting where it was

decided that all interest payments from the Loan Notes received by customers

should be reinvested into the Loan Notes. This decision was made despite the fact

that not all customers had ongoing servicing arrangements with FPL. From around

February 2015 Mr Page began writing to customers to inform them that their

interest payments would be reinvested into the Loan Notes. Customers were

informed of this in the same ‘opt out’ letter used to inform customers about the

proposed switch of the cash in their SIPP into the Bond (see paragraph 4.59

above). In the draft version of this ‘opt out’ letter provided to the Authority,

customers were informed generally that they could contact FPL if they required

further advice, but were not told that they had a choice whether to reinvest the

interest payments or that they would need to inform FPL if they did not want their

interest payments to be reinvested.

4.65
The ‘opt out’ letter was not appropriate for similar reasons to those explained

above in relation to the cash switch, in particular that customers might not have

consented to FPL investing their interest payments in this way.

Acting outside the Firm’s permission

4.66
The Firm was not authorised to advise on Pension Transfers. However, in allowing

the Service Providers to perform the Outsourced Functions on FPL’s behalf without

adequate supervision, failing to review in a meaningful way advice given through

the Pension Review and Advice Process, and failing to ensure FPL put in place and

operated appropriate systems and controls in relation to the Pension Review and

Advice Process, Mr Page exposed the Firm to the risk of breaching section 20 of

the Act by carrying on a regulated activity without the relevant permission.

4.67
This in fact happened. During the Relevant Period FPL gave advice to at least 22

customers to transfer their pensions from an occupational pension scheme to a

SIPP. As a result, at least 21 customers transferred total funds of over £407,000.

4.68
Mr Page was informed by CAL on 7 February 2015 that Pension Transfers had

been conducted. In response Mr Page requested that all Pension Transfer cases be

referred to him for approval in future. Mr Page did not identify that the Firm did

not have permission to conduct Pension Transfers. He was unaware that FPL had

acted outside its permission by conducting Pension Transfers through the Pension

Review and Advice Process until this was identified by the Authority.

Misleading the Authority

4.69
Mr Page repeatedly and deliberately provided the Authority with incomplete and

misleading information about FPL’s business arrangements. Mr Page also provided

the Authority with information which he knew was untrue. If Mr Page had not

provided misleading information the Authority would have intervened in FPL’s

business earlier.

Application for authorisation

4.70
As mentioned at paragraph 4.10 above, on 25 March 2014 Mr Page signed FPL’s

application for direct authorisation and it was received by the Authority on 9 April

2014. The information in FPL’s application to the Authority was in parts false and

misleading. Mr Page has admitted that the application reads as though it is a

‘little one man band working in a bedroom’. Following FPL’s authorisation, Mr Page

failed to correct the false and misleading impression of FPL’s business that had

been presented to the Authority, despite having a number of opportunities to do

so.

4.71
The application was deliberately misleading as it:

(1)
stated that the only function that would be outsourced would be the

compliance support provided by FPL’s external compliance consultant.

In fact, Mr Page knew that HJL would carry out the introducer role and

would perform the Outsourced Functions on FPL’s behalf, and FPL’s website

had already been updated to include HJL’s details;

(2)
stated that advice would be independent and the product solution would be

independently chosen.

In fact, Mr Page knew that, at that time, it was intended that the Loan

Notes would be the only product recommended for investment to

customers introduced by HJL;

(3)
stated that all advice would be provided on a face-to-face basis by FPL.

In fact, Mr Page knew that none of the customers would have a face-to-

face meeting with him even though he was the named adviser;

(4)
did not detail any bespoke software systems that would be used by FPL.

36

In fact, Mr Page had signed a licence agreement to use the Software on 21

March 2014 and had been given a demonstration of how the Software

worked on the same day;

(5)
stated that in most cases FPL would be paid on a rate per hour by the

customer.

In fact, Mr Page knew from at least 8 March 2014 that FPL would be

remunerated by a 3% advice fee charged on a customer’s pension assets;

(6)
stated that FPL was expecting to have the same number of customers (50)

in a year’s time as it did at the point of application.

In fact, Mr Page knew from at least 8 March 2014 that HJL was expecting

to introduce over 150 customers to FPL each month;

(7)
stated that most business would be generated by existing customers and

new customers would be received through referrals from existing

customers rather than marketing.

In fact, Mr Page had signed an introducer agreement with HJL on 6

December 2013 and knew that most new business would be generated

through those introductions; and

(8)
stated that FPL’s expected profit a year after authorisation would be

£36,000.

This figure was lower than FPL’s trading in the previous year (£50,000)

and Mr Page’s main driver for FPL adopting the Pension Review and Advice

Process was to increase FPL’s profits.

20 August 2014 New Business Register

4.72
The Authority contacted Mr Page by telephone and email on 7 August 2014. In the

email, the Authority drew Mr Page’s attention to two alerts that had been issued

by the Authority relating to Pension Switches and SIPPs. Mr Page was also asked

in the email to provide a detailed new business register setting out ‘all business’

the Firm had arranged via a SIPP, including confirmation of whether advice had

been provided.

4.73
By 18 August 2014, Mr Page knew that advice had been given by FPL to 15

customers through the Pension Review and Advice Process to switch or transfer

their pension funds into SIPPs investing in the Loan Notes, and that applications

for the switch or transfer of each customer had been received by the SIPP

Provider. Despite this, on 20 August 2014 Mr Page deliberately provided the

Authority with a new business register which did not contain any information

regarding these 15 customers. Instead the new business register only contained

information relating to six cases where SIPP advice had been provided by Mr Page

between September 2012 and March 2014, before FPL had become directly

authorised.

4.74
It was clear from the Authority’s correspondence with Mr Page, including the

email containing its request for information and links to the two alerts, that the

Authority was interested in FPL’s advice in relation to SIPPs. However, the

Authority considers that Mr Page deliberately omitted relevant information from

the new business register in an attempt to mislead the Authority about the type of

business the Firm was conducting, and in particular to prevent the Authority from

finding out that customers were being advised to switch their pensions to SIPPs

investing in the Loan Notes.

4.75
On 1 September 2014 the Authority called Mr Page to discuss information that the

Authority had received which suggested that customers were being cold called on

4.76
During the course of his call with the Authority, Mr Page emailed Mr Ward to ask

about a lead generation company mentioned by the Authority. Mr Ward sent

several emails in reply confirming that the lead generation company provided

leads to HJL. Mr Ward’s emails included the following:

(1)
‘Don’t know [the lead generation company]. Checking now but I would say

(2)
‘They are a lead provider and provide leads to [HJL]. Not direct to us – so

don’t use this info yet!!!!! I am still digging!!!!’

(3)
‘WE have not – our introducer may have – again im [sic] still digging so

don’t open to them yet!!!!!’

38

(4)
‘This is ok I believe. As its [sic] not us so we can deflect the flak!!!! If

Needed!!!! But its [sic] not life threatening issue I don’t think mate!!!! Are

they being bastards or ok?’

(5)
‘…[the lead generation company] DO COLD CALL Clients/prospects

apparently.’

(6)
‘We can say that we will check with our introducer [HJL] to see if they use

this company and if they do we will investigate further and if we do not

receive an acceptable reply we will drop them immediately.’

(7)
‘But try and work it that [HJL] use a large number of lead providers and we

don’t always have details of all of them! DONT [sic] SAY THAT THEY COLD

CALL MATE.’

4.77
Mr Page confirmed to the Authority during the telephone call that the lead

generation company did introduce to HJL, but he did not tell the Authority, either

during the call or afterwards, that it apparently cold called. Further, the Authority

has not been provided with any evidence to suggest that Mr Ward or Mr Page took

any steps to confirm whether the lead generation company mentioned by the

Authority actually did cold call or to ensure that it did not do so.

4.78
The Authority warned Mr Page that it would be concerned if FPL was conducting

its business in a similar manner to that described by the Authority’s alerts. Mr

Page deliberately did not say anything to suggest that FPL was conducting its

business in such a manner.

4.79
The information provided by Mr Page during the call also did not correct the

misleading impression given to the Authority by the new business register.

5 September 2014 email

4.80
On 3 September 2014, the Authority emailed Mr Page a link to an alert issued by

the Authority that advised customers to ignore any cold calls they receive from

firms offering a free pension review. The alert warned that these reviews are

typically used to persuade customers to move their pension into SIPPs invested in

unregulated investments. On the same day, the Authority sent Mr Page an email

containing links to the two alerts that it had drawn to his attention on 7 August

2014 (see paragraph 4.73 above).

4.81
Mr Page emailed the Authority on 5 September 2014, stating that he was

responding to the 3 September 2014 emails, having reviewed the alerts and

having given some thought to the issues raised in the 1 September 2014

telephone call. The email was misleading as it:

(1)
stated that FPL did not use lead generation companies as part of its

business model and, despite the alert drawn to FPL’s attention on 3

September 2014 which specifically mentioned cold calling concerns, failed

to mention that one of HJL’s lead generators apparently used cold calling;

(2)
stated that FPL did not use the services of unauthorised firms. In fact, Mr

Page knew that HJL was not authorised, at the time was not an IAR of FPL,

and played a key role in the Pension Review and Advice Process;

(3)
stated that ‘Under no circumstance would I consider investments in

unregulated products such as overseas property, forestry or store pods

among other things’. In fact, Mr Page knew that the Pension Review and

Advice Process was structured to result in customers being recommended

to switch their pensions to SIPPs investing in the Loan Notes, which were

issued by a company in Mauritius, and that the Loan Notes were not

regulated by the Authority;

(4)
stated that ‘Only after a full review of [a customer’s] circumstances do I

issue the initial report’ and ‘I follow the Principles and Conduct of Business

Rules in the giving of any and all advice and first take time to familiarise

myself with the wider investment and financial circumstances before

making any recommendations.’

In fact, Mr Page knew that, at that time, the Software was used to review

customers’ circumstances, with little or no oversight from Mr Page;

(5)
stated
that
‘the
provision
of
suitable
advice
generally
requires

consideration of other investments held by the customer’.

In fact, Mr Page knew that the fact-find script did not ask customers for

information about any other investments they held; and

(6)
stated that ‘when advice is given on a product which is a vehicle for other

products (such as SIPPs and other wrappers), consideration of the

suitability of the overall proposition is taken into account’.

In fact, the Suitability Report template that had been approved by Mr Page

did not include consideration of the suitability for the customer of both the

SIPP wrapper and the underlying assets.

4.82
The information provided by Mr Page in the email also did not correct the

misleading impressions given to the Authority by the new business register and

the 1 September 2014 telephone call.

4.83
As a result of the information provided by Mr Page, in August and September

2014 the Authority considered FPL to be a ‘low risk’ firm and FPL was not

scheduled for further contact for a number of months. If the information provided

to the Authority had been accurate and not misleading, the Authority would have

asked for further information about FPL’s pension advice process and the Loan

Notes, and would have intervened at an earlier time.

Misleading the SIPP Provider

4.84
Mr Page deliberately provided inaccurate and misleading information to the SIPP

Provider.

4.85
On 20 October 2014 Mr Page invested his personal pension into the Loan Notes.

After the Authority’s intervention, on 14 August 2015 he asked the SIPP Provider

to disinvest his pension from the Loan Notes immediately. When the SIPP Provider

asked Mr Page to explain in writing why he wished to disinvest before the usual

12 month period, Mr Page informed the SIPP Provider that the Authority had

instructed him to do so with ‘immediate effect to test the process’. Mr Page had

not received any such instruction from the Authority. Mr Page has admitted he

lied to the SIPP Provider in order to disinvest his pension funds more quickly.

Breach of the Asset Retention Requirement

4.86
On 10 July 2015, at the request of the Authority, FPL applied for requirements to

be imposed on it. Accordingly, requirements were imposed on the Firm on the

same date. These included the Asset Retention Requirement, which has not been

varied or lifted since it was imposed.

4.87
Mr Page signed the Asset Retention Requirement and was fully aware of its terms.

However, Mr Page, on behalf of FPL, twice acted in breach of the Asset Retention

Requirement by dealing with FPL’s assets:

(1)
On 21 August 2015 Mr Page, on behalf of FPL, signed a loan agreement

with Person B. Under the terms of the agreement, Person B would lend

£25,000 to FPL with Mr Page as guarantor of the loan. In consideration for

the loan, FPL would give rights to its entire client base to Person B from

the date of the agreement. Whilst the agreement was in force FPL would

not be able to contact the client base without the permission of Person B.

The client base would be returned to FPL if the loan was repaid by 31

January 2016 or, if it had not been repaid, the client base would be owned

by Person B from 1 February 2016.

At no time did Mr Page contact the Authority either before, or after,

making this agreement or when, in December 2015, he emailed Person B

in order to extend the loan repayment date. The Authority was not made

aware of the loan agreement until 10 October 2016.

(2)
On 27 January 2016, Mr Page, on behalf of FPL, signed an introducer

agreement with a claims management company. Under the terms of the

introducer agreement, FPL would provide the claims management company

with details of FPL’s customers that FPL believed had been mis-sold

Pension Transfers, Pension Switches and SIPP investments. In return for

these introductions, FPL would receive 15% of all fees generated by the

claims management company resulting from a successful claim.

On 1 February 2016, Mr Page provided the claims management company

with a list of 219 customers along with their addresses and phone

numbers. These customers had originally received advice from the

authorised firm that had, prior to FPL, adopted a process based on the

same pension switching advice model. The customers had then

subsequently been novated to FPL for provision of ongoing services. Mr

Page had not contacted these customers to obtain their consent to disclose

their information to a third party.

The contact details were provided so that the claims management

company would focus on contacting the novated customers, rather than

customers who had been advised by FPL where FPL would be liable for any

claims. Mr Page suggested to the claims management company that it

should tell the novated customers they had been given ‘tainted’ advice but

were now with a ‘very competent IFA’ in FPL.

4.88
In entering the loan agreement with Person B and the introducer agreement with

the claims management company, the Authority considers Mr Page recklessly

disregarded the Asset Retention Requirement.

Agreement with Mr Ward

4.89
On 22 June 2017, ahead of FPL being placed into administration, Mr Page

provided a written agreement to FPL’s proposed administrators that had been

drawn up between FPL and Mr Ward. The agreement is dated 14 January 2015

and is unsigned but Mr Page subsequently indicated that both he and Mr Ward

considered it to be binding.

4.90
The agreement states that in the event of a cessation of FPL’s business, including

if FPL entered administration, Mr Ward would have custodianship of all FPL

customers with fund values in their SIPPs over £50,000 and Mr Ward could

introduce those customers to an alternative financial adviser.

4.91
Mr Page told the Authority that the purpose of the agreement was for succession

planning of FPL’s business. The Authority considers that the agreement was made

in order to protect Mr Page and Mr Ward’s financial interests in FPL following

administrators being appointed. The Authority considers the agreement was not

made in the best interests of customers because Mr Ward was not an appropriate

person to act as custodian. As Mr Page was aware at the time, Mr Ward was not

an approved person or a qualified investment adviser and had criminal convictions

for obtaining money transfers by deception.

5.
FAILINGS

5.1
The statutory and regulatory provisions relevant to this Notice are referred to in

5.2
Statement of Principle 1 required Mr Page to act with integrity in carrying out his

controlled functions. A person may lack integrity where he acts dishonestly or

recklessly.

5.3
During the Relevant Period, Mr Page breached this requirement in that:

(1)
He acted dishonestly by causing FPL to hold out the Pension Review and

Advice Process to customers as FPL providing bespoke, independent

investment advice based on a comprehensive and fair analysis of the whole

market. This was dishonest because Mr Page knew that this was

misleading to customers as it did not reflect the reality of the service that

FPL would provide using the Pension Review and Advice Process.

(2)
His actions in relation to FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension Review and

Advice Process to provide advice to FPL’s customers were reckless. The

Pension Review and Advice Process put FPL’s customers at serious risk of

receiving unsuitable advice and therefore at serious risk of investing in

products that were not suitable for them (which in fact happened), but Mr

Page closed his mind to these risks and unreasonably exposed FPL’s

customers to them by allowing FPL to adopt and use the Pension Review

and Advice Process. In particular:

(a)
Mr Page allowed FPL to recommend the Underlying Investments to

customers in circumstances where he had failed to carry out

adequate due diligence on them. In any event, it should have been

obvious to Mr Page from the limited information that he considered

that the Underlying Investments were high risk investments that

were unlikely to be suitable for FPL’s customers, except in very

limited circumstances. However, Mr Page failed to give due

consideration to the risk that the Underlying Investments were

unsuitable.

(b)
Mr Page knew of HJL’s involvement in the Pension Review and

Advice Process and that the process was structured to result in

customers switching their pensions to SIPPs investing in assets in

which HJL had a material financial interest. Further, Mr Page was

aware of Mr Stephen’s and Mr King’s common directorships.

However, Mr Page took no steps to manage these conflicts of

interest or to ensure that the common directorships and how HJL

was remunerated were disclosed to customers.

(c)
Mr Page allowed FPL to adopt and use the Pension Review and

Advice Process in circumstances where he had failed to give due

consideration to the documents to be used in the process, and to

how the process would operate in practice, and had therefore failed

to identify significant obvious deficiencies in the process. In any

event, it should have been obvious to Mr Page from the information

available to him that the Pension Review and Advice Process did not

comply with the Authority’s rules. However, Mr Page failed to give

any meaningful consideration to whether or not it was compliant.

(d)
Mr Page failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that FPL

maintained control of the Pension Review and Advice Process and

allowed important parts of the process (for example, the conduct of

fact-finds) to be performed in a way that failed to obtain and/or

take into account relevant information about FPL’s customers.

Further, Mr Page failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that FPL

reviewed in a meaningful way advice given through the Pension

Review and Advice Process, whether before recommendations were

sent to customers or at all.

(e)
Mr Page failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that FPL put in

place
and operated appropriate systems and controls and

compliance arrangements to oversee and monitor the Pension

Review and Advice Process.

(f)
Mr Page allowed the Firm to work with HJL and CAL during the

Relevant Period in circumstances where he had failed to carry out

adequate due diligence on them and had failed to give any proper

consideration to whether they were suitable to perform services on

behalf of the Firm.

(g)
Mr Page failed to take any steps to establish that the lead

generators used by HJL generated their customer introductions in

an appropriate manner and did not use cold calling.

(h)
Mr Page suspected that the Pension Review and Advice Process

might not be compliant, but withheld his suspicions and even the

fact that FPL was operating the process from FPL’s compliance

consultant. Mr Page also disregarded concerns raised by FPL’s

compliance consultant and continued to allow FPL to use the

Pension Review and Advice Process.

(i)
Mr Page failed to have regard to customers’ interests, when advising

customers to switch the cash in their SIPP into the Bond. Mr Page

either failed to assess whether switching the cash in a customer’s

SIPP into the Bond was suitable for the customer or, when speaking

with customers on the telephone, failed to explain the risks of the

Bond. He also failed to have regard to customers’ interests, when

reinvesting customers’ interest payments in the Loan Notes.

(3)
Mr Page deliberately provided false and misleading information, or omitted

to provide relevant information, to the Authority about FPL’s business

arrangements. The Authority considers this was done intentionally to try to

prevent the Authority from identifying misconduct by the Firm and Mr

Page, and that Mr Page thereby acted dishonestly.

(4)
Mr Page acted dishonestly by deliberately providing false information to

the SIPP Provider.

(5)
Mr Page recklessly entered into an agreement with Mr Ward granting him

custodianship of FPL clients in the event of FPL ceasing trading. This was

not in the best interests of customers because, for reasons known by Mr

Page at the time, Mr Ward was not an appropriate person to act as

custodian.

(6)
Mr Page recklessly allowed FPL to breach the Asset Retention Requirement.

It should have been obvious to Mr Page that FPL would breach this

requirement by entering into a loan agreement with Person B and selling

customer data to a claims management company. However, he recklessly

disregarded the Asset Retention Requirement.

Lack of fitness and propriety

5.4
In addition to the findings of dishonesty and recklessness by Mr Page set out at

paragraph 5.3 above, the Authority has concluded that Mr Page acted dishonestly

between 9 April 2014 and 1 February 2016, in that he:

(1)
provided false and misleading information on FPL’s application for

authorisation which was received by the Authority on 9 April 2014; and

(2)
after FPL was authorised, failed to correct the misleading impression that

had been created by FPL’s application for authorisation.

5.5
The Authority has concluded based on the matters set out at paragraphs 5.3 and

5.4 above that Mr Page lacks integrity and is not fit and proper.

6.
SANCTION

Financial penalty

6.1
The Authority considers it appropriate to impose a financial penalty on Mr Page

under section 66 of the Act in respect of his breach of Statement of Principle 1.

For limitation reasons, the financial penalty is imposed only in respect of Mr

Page’s breach of Statement of Principle 1 during the Penalty Period. This is

explained further at paragraphs 4 to 8 of Annex B. As FPL adopted the Pension

Review and Advice Process prior to the Penalty Period, the Authority considers

that Mr Page’s reckless actions in respect of FPL’s adoption of the process do not

form part of Mr Page’s breach of Statement of Principle 1 during the Penalty

Period. The Authority therefore considers that Mr Page breached Statement of

Principle 1 during the Penalty Period on account of his reckless actions in respect

of FPL’s use of the Pension Review and Advice Process and for the reasons given

in paragraphs 5.3(1) and (3) to (6) of this Notice.

6.2
The Authority’s policy for imposing a financial penalty is set out in Chapter 6 of

DEPP. In respect of conduct occurring on or after 6 March 2010, the Authority

applies a five-step framework to determine the appropriate level of financial

penalty. DEPP 6.5B sets out the details of the five-step framework that applies in

respect of financial penalties imposed on individuals in non-market abuse cases.

Step 1: disgorgement

6.3
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.1G, at Step 1 the Authority seeks to deprive an individual

of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach where it is practicable to

quantify this.

6.4
Mr Page derived direct financial benefit from the advice fees and ongoing servicing

fees generated from customers who switched their pensions to SIPPs investing in

the Underlying Investments. The amount received by Mr Page during the Penalty

Period was £139,765. In addition, Mr Page received £10,378 after the Penalty

Period that is directly attributable to Mr Page’s misconduct during the Penalty

Period.

6.5
The Authority has charged interest on Mr Page’s benefit at 8% per year from

receipt to the date of this Notice, amounting to £36,790.

6.6
Step 1 is therefore £186,933.

Step 2: the seriousness of the breach

6.7
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.2G, at Step 2 the Authority determines a figure that

reflects the seriousness of the breach. That figure is based on a percentage of the

individual’s relevant income. The individual’s relevant income is the gross

amount of all benefits received by the individual from the employment in

connection with which the breach occurred, and for the period of the breach.

6.8
The period of Mr Page’s breach of Statement of Principle 1, for the purpose of the

financial penalty, was from 25 July 2014 to 1 February 2016. The Authority

considers Mr Page’s relevant income for this period to be £139,765.

6.9
In deciding on the percentage of the relevant income that forms the basis of the

Step 2 figure, the Authority considers the seriousness of the breach and chooses a

percentage between 0% and 40%. This range is divided into five fixed levels

which represent, on a sliding scale, the seriousness of the breach; the more

serious the breach, the higher the level. For penalties imposed on individuals in

non-market abuse cases there are the following five levels:

Level 1 – 0%

Level 2 – 10%

Level 3 – 20%

Level 4 – 30%

Level 5 – 40%

6.10
In assessing the seriousness level, the Authority takes into account various

factors which reflect the impact and nature of the breach, and whether it was

committed deliberately or recklessly. The Authority considers the following factors

to be relevant:

Impact of the breach

6.11
Mr Page caused FPL to use the Pension Review and Advice Process motivated by

the prospect of making significant financial gain for doing very little (DEPP

6.5B.2G(8)(a)).

6.12
Mr Page’s breach of Statement of Principle 1 caused a significant risk of loss to a

large number of consumers who switched or transferred their pensions to SIPPs

investing in the Underlying Investments (DEPP 6.5B.2G(8)(c)).

6.13
A large number of customers were given advice by FPL through the Pension

Review and Advice Process, including some who were vulnerable due to their age,

their inability to replace capital, their medical conditions or other personal

circumstances (DEPP 6.5B.2G(8)(d)).

Nature of the breach

6.14
Mr Page breached Statement of Principle 1 over an extended period of time (DEPP

6.5B.2G(9)(b)).

6.15
Mr Page failed to act with integrity because he acted dishonestly and/or recklessly

throughout the Penalty Period (6.5B.2G(9)(e)).

6.16
Mr Page, as the individual approved to perform the CF1 (Director) and CF10

(Compliance Oversight) controlled functions, held a senior position in the Firm

(DEPP 6.5B.2G(9)(k)).

Reckless misconduct

6.17
Mr Page acted recklessly in respect of FPL’s use of the Pension Review and Advice

Process as described in paragraph 5.3(2) of this Notice (DEPP 6.5B.2G(11)(a)).

6.18
Mr Page acted recklessly in allowing FPL to breach the terms of the Asset

Retention Requirement (DEPP 6.5B.2G(11)(a)).

Deliberate misconduct

6.19
Mr Page deliberately provided false information to the SIPP Provider (DEPP

6.5G.2G(10)(b)).

6.20
Mr Page knew that the Firm deliberately misled customers by holding itself out to

customers as providing bespoke, independent advice based on a comprehensive

and fair analysis of the whole market when, as Mr Page knew, this did not reflect

the reality of the service that FPL would provide using the Pension Review and

Advice Process (DEPP 6.5B.2G(10)(c)).

6.21
Mr Page deliberately provided false and misleading information to the Authority

about FPL’s business arrangements (DEPP 6.5B.2G(10)(d)).

Level of seriousness

6.22
DEPP 6.5B.2G(12) lists factors likely to be considered ‘level 4 or 5 factors’. Of

these, the Authority considers the following factors to be relevant:

(1)
Mr Page’s breach of Statement of Principle 1 caused a significant risk of

loss to a large number of customers (DEPP 6.5B.2(12)(a));

(2)
Mr Page failed to act with integrity (DEPP 6.5B.2(12)(d)); and

(3)
Mr Page’s breach of Statement of Principle 1 was committed deliberately

and recklessly (DEPP 6.5B.2(12)(g)).

6.23
DEPP 6.5B.2G(13) lists factors likely to be considered ‘level 1, 2 and 3 factors’.

The Authority considers that none of these factors apply.

6.24
Taking all of these factors into account, the Authority considers the seriousness of

the breach to be level 5 and so the Step 2 figure is 40% of £139,765.

6.25
Step 2 is therefore £55,906.

Step 3: mitigating and aggravating factors

6.26
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.3G, at Step 3 the Authority may increase or decrease the

amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any

amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which

aggravate or mitigate the breach.

6.27
The Authority considers that the following factors aggravate the breach:

(1)
on 18 January 2013, 28 April 2014 and 26 August 2014 the Authority

issued alerts to firms advising on Pension Transfers with a view to

investing pension monies into unregulated products through SIPPs. Mr

Page was aware of these alerts but did not take steps to protect consumers

(DEPP 6.5B.3G(2)(k)); and

(2)
in August and September 2014 the Authority specifically sent copies of the

alerts referred to above to Mr Page and highlighted the Authority’s

concerns. Mr Page failed to bring the Pension Review and Advice Process

to the attention of the Authority or to implement changes to the process

(DEPP 6.5B.3G(2)(a).

6.28
The Authority considers that there are no factors that mitigate the breach.

6.29
Having taken into account these aggravating factors, the Authority considers that

the Step 2 figure should be increased by 20%.

6.30
Step 3 is therefore £67,087.

Step 4: adjustment for deterrence

6.31
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.4G, if the Authority considers the figure arrived at after

Step 3 is insufficient to deter the firm who committed the breach, or others, from

committing further or similar breaches, then the Authority may increase the

penalty.

6.32
The Authority considers that the Step 3 figure of £67,087 does not represent a

sufficient deterrent to Mr Page and others, and so has increased the penalty at

Step 4 by a factor of 2.

6.33
Step 4 is therefore £134,174.

Step 5: settlement discount

6.34
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.5G, if the Authority and the individual on whom a penalty

is to be imposed agree the amount of the financial penalty and other terms, DEPP

6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have

been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the Authority and the

individual reached agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the

disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step 1.

6.35
No settlement discount applies.

6.36
The Step 5 figure is therefore £134,100 (rounded down to the nearest £100).

6.37
The Authority therefore has decided to impose a total financial penalty of

£321,033 (including the Step 1 disgorgement figure of £186,933) on Mr Page for

breaching Statement of Principle 1 during the Penalty Period.

Prohibition Order and Withdrawal of Approval

6.38
The Authority has had regard to the guidance in Chapter 9 of EG in considering

whether to withdraw Mr Page’s approval to perform controlled functions and

whether to impose a prohibition order on him. The Authority has the power to

prohibit individuals under section 56 of the Act.

6.39
The Authority considers that Mr Page is not a fit and proper person to perform any

function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by an authorised person,

exempt person or exempt professional firm. The Authority considers that it is

therefore appropriate and proportionate in all the circumstances to withdraw the

approval given to Mr Page to perform the CF1 (Director), CF10 (Compliance

Oversight), CF11 (Money Laundering Reporting Officer) and CF30 (Customer)

controlled functions at FPL, and to impose a prohibition order on him under

section 56 of the Act in those terms. This follows from the Authority’s findings

that Mr Page lacks integrity, by acting dishonestly before and during the Relevant

Period in respect of FPL’s application for authorisation, and by breaching

Statement of Principle 1 by acting recklessly and dishonestly during the Relevant

Period.

7.
REPRESENTATIONS

7.1
Annex B contains a brief summary of the key representations made by Mr Page,

and by HJL, Mark Stephen, James King and Person A as persons given third party

rights in respect of the Warning Notice under section 393 of the Act, and how they

have been dealt with. In making the decision which gave rise to the obligation to

give this Notice, the Authority has taken into account all of the representations

received in respect of the Warning Notice, whether or not set out in Annex B.

8.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

8.1
This Notice is given to Mr Page under sections 57, 63 and 67 of the Act and in

accordance with section 388 of the Act.

Decision maker

8.2
The decision which gave rise to the obligation to give this Notice was made by the

Regulatory Decisions Committee.

The Tribunal

8.3
Mr Page has the right to refer the matter to which this Notice relates to the

Tribunal. Under paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper

Tribunal) Rules 2008, Mr Page has 28 days from the date on which this Notice is

given to him to refer the matter to the Tribunal. A reference to the Tribunal is

made by way of a signed reference notice (Form FTC3) filed with a copy of this

Notice. The Tribunal’s contact details are: Upper Tribunal, Tax and Chancery

9730; email: fs@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk).

8.4
Further information on the Tribunal, including guidance and the relevant forms to

complete, can be found on the HM Courts and Tribunal Service website:

8.5
A copy of Form FTC3 must also be sent to the Authority at the same time as filing

a reference with the Tribunal. A copy should be sent to Helen Tibbetts at the

8.6
Once any such referral is determined by the Tribunal and subject to that

determination, or if the matter has not been referred to the Tribunal, the

Authority will issue a final notice about the implementation of that decision.

Access to evidence

8.7
Section 394 of the Act applies to this Notice.

8.8
The person to whom this Notice is given has the right to access:

(1)
the material upon which the Authority has relied in deciding to give this

Notice; and

(2)
the secondary material which, in the opinion of the Authority, might

undermine that decision.

Third party rights and interested party rights

8.9
A copy of this Notice is being given to each of Thomas Ward, HJL, CAL, Mark

Stephen and James King as third parties identified in the reasons above and to

whom in the opinion of the Authority the matter is prejudicial. Each of those

parties has similar rights to those mentioned in paragraphs 8.3 and 8.8 above, in

relation to the matters which identify him/it.

8.10
This Notice is also being given to FPL as an interested party in the withdrawal of

Mr Page’s approval pursuant to section 63(4) of the Act. FPL has the right to:

(1)
access evidence pursuant to section 394 of the Act, as described above;

and

(2)
refer to the Tribunal any decision to withdraw Mr Page’s approval, pursuant

to section 63(5) of the Act.

Confidentiality and publicity

8.11
This Notice may contain confidential information and should not be disclosed to a

third party (except for the purpose of obtaining advice on its contents). In

accordance with section 391 of the Act, a person to whom this Notice is given or

copied may not publish the Notice or any details concerning it unless the

Authority has published the Notice or those details.

8.12
However, the Authority must publish such information about the matter to which

a decision notice or final notice relates as it considers appropriate. The persons to

whom this Notice is given or copied should therefore be aware that the facts and

matters contained in this Notice may be made public.

Authority contacts

8.13
For more information concerning this matter generally, contact Helen Tibbetts

(direct line: 020 7066 0656) at the Authority.

Chair, Regulatory Decisions Committee

ANNEX A

1.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1.1
The Authority’s objectives are set out in Part 1A of the Act, and include the

operational objective of securing an appropriate degree of protection for

consumers (section 1C).

1.2
Section 56(1) of the Act provides that the Authority may make a prohibition order

if it appears to it that an individual is not a fit and proper person to perform

functions in relation to a regulated activity carried on by (a) an authorised

person, (b) a person who is an exempt person in relation to that activity, or (c) a

person to whom, as a result of Part 20, the general prohibition does not apply in

relation to that activity.

1.3
Section 56(2) of the Act provides that a ‘prohibition order’ is an order prohibiting

the individual from performing a specified function, any function falling within a

specified description or any function. Section 56(3)(a) provides that a prohibition

order may relate to a specified regulated activity, any regulated activity falling

within a specified description or all regulated activities.

1.4
Section 63 of the Act provides that the Authority may withdraw an approval given

under section 59 if it considers that the person in respect of whom it was given is

not a fit and proper person to perform the function to which the approval relates.

1.5
Section 66 of the Act provides that the Authority may take action against a

person if it appears to the Authority that he is guilty of misconduct and the

Authority is satisfied that it is appropriate in all the circumstances to take action

against him. A person is guilty of misconduct if, whilst an approved person, he

has failed to comply with a statement of principle issued under section 64 or

section 64A of the Act.

2.
RELEVANT REGULATORY PROVISIONS

Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons

2.1
The Authority’s Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons

have been issued under section 64 of the Act.

2.2
During the Relevant Period, Statement of Principle 1 stated:

‘An approved person must act with integrity in carrying out his accountable

functions.’

2.3
‘Accountable functions’ include controlled functions and any other functions

performed by an approved person in relation to the carrying on of a regulated

activity by the authorised person to which the approval relates.

2.4
The Code of Practice for Approved Persons sets out descriptions of conduct which,

in the opinion of the Authority, does not comply with a Statement of Principle. It

also sets out factors which, in the Authority’s opinion, are to be taken into

account in determining whether an approved person’s conduct complies with a

Principles for Businesses

2.5
PRIN 1.1.2G states that the FCA’s Principles for Business are a general statement

of the fundamental obligations of firms under the regulatory system.

2.6
During the Relevant Period, Principle 3 of the FCA’s Principles for Businesses

‘A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly

and effectively, with adequate risk management systems.’

2.7
EG sets out the Authority’s approach to exercising its main enforcement powers

under the Act.

2.8
Chapter 7 of EG sets out the Authority’s approach to exercising its power to

impose financial penalties and other disciplinary sanctions.

Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual

2.9
The Authority’s policy for imposing penalties is set out in Chapter 6 of DEPP.

Conduct of Business Sourcebook

2.10
The Authority’s rules and guidance for Conduct of Business are set out in COBS.

The rules and guidance in COBS relevant to this Notice are 2.1.1R, 4.2.1R,

4.8.2R, 9.2.1R, 9.2.6R, 9.3.1G and the rules in 9.4.

Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls Sourcebook

2.11
The Authority’s rules and guidance for senior management arrangements,

systems and controls are set out in SYSC. The rules and guidance in SYSC

relevant to this Notice are 7.1.2R, 8.1.1R, 8.1.7R, 8.1.8R(1), 10.1.3R, 10.1.4AG,

10.1.7R and 10.1.8R.

ANNEX B

REPRESENTATIONS

Representations received from Mr Page

1.
Mr Page’s representations (in italics), and the Authority’s conclusions in respect of

them, are set out below:

Procedural fairness

2.
Mr Page has concerns with the manner of the Authority’s investigation, including:

the Authority had a closed minded approach to the investigation; he was not

provided with documents in a timely fashion in advance of his interviews and so did

not understand fully the context for evidence handed to him in the interviews; the

paperwork has been overwhelming; Mr Page was not provided with the Authority’s

preliminary findings; and the Authority provided Mr Page with corrupted disks and

erroneous transcripts. These matters affected the fairness of the investigatory

process.

3.
The decision to take the action set out in paragraph 1.1 of this Notice has been

taken by the Regulatory Decisions Committee (“the RDC”), a committee of the

Authority which is independent of the case team in the Authority’s Enforcement and

Market Oversight Division that carried out the investigation. It is not the RDC’s

role to investigate the fairness of the investigatory process, but it notes that the

case team denies that Mr Page was subject to any procedural unfairness during the

investigation. The RDC is satisfied that any concerns Mr Page had in respect of the

disclosure of documents have either been rectified or not pursued by Mr Page, and

considers that Mr Page’s submissions do not undermine the evidence relied upon by

it in reaching its decision. If Mr Page wishes to pursue these matters, he may

make a complaint using the Complaints Scheme established under the Financial

Services Act 2012, and the Authority does not address their substance in this

Notice.

4.
The limitation period started to run in August 2014, when Mr Page provided

information about his business and his involvement with HJL to an individual at the

Authority. The Authority therefore knew of Mr Page’s alleged misconduct more than

three years before it gave him the Warning Notice and so, in accordance with

section 66(4) of the Act, the Authority is time-barred from imposing a financial

penalty.

5.
Mr Page accepts that, from 25 July 2014, the limitation period was extended from

three years to six years. However, certain of Mr Page’s alleged failings only

occurred prior to 25 July 2014, for example, his alleged failure to exercise due

diligence in relation to the Underlying Investments and his alleged failings in

relation to FPL’s adoption of the Pension Review and Advice Process. These failings

should therefore be disregarded from the penalty calculation for limitation reasons.

6.
The Authority does not agree that it was possible to infer Mr Page's misconduct

from the information provided by Mr Page to it in August 2014. However, following

Mr Page’s representations, the Authority identified material which it received on 19

February 2015, more than three years prior to the date of the Warning Notice. The

Authority considers that, on the basis of this material, it could possibly be inferred

that Mr Page had committed the misconduct described in this Notice. Accordingly,

the Authority has taken the view that the limitation period for the imposition of a

financial penalty started to run from 19 February 2015.

7.
In accordance with section 66(5ZA) of the Act, a limitation period of three years

applies to misconduct occurring prior to 25 July 2014 and a limitation period of six

years applies to misconduct occurring on or after 25 July 2014. Accordingly, as a

result of the limitation period starting to run from 19 February 2015, the Authority

is not permitted to take any disciplinary action in respect of Mr Page’s breach of

Statement of Principle 1 prior to 25 July 2014. The Authority has therefore instead

only taken into account Mr Page’s breach of Statement of Principle 1 during the

Penalty Period in calculating the financial penalty, as is explained in section 6 of

this Notice.

8.
As FPL adopted the Pension Review and Advice Process prior to the Penalty Period,

the Authority considers that Mr Page’s reckless actions in respect of FPL’s adoption

of the process do not form part of Mr Page’s breach of Statement of Principle 1

during the Penalty Period. This includes any due diligence that Mr Page carried out

prior to the Penalty Period. However, the Authority considers that Mr Page

nevertheless acted recklessly in allowing FPL to use the Pension Review and Advice

Process in circumstances where he had failed to carry out adequate due diligence.

The Authority therefore considers that Mr Page breached Statement of Principle 1

during the Penalty Period on account of his reckless actions in respect of FPL’s use

of the Pension Review and Advice Process and for the reasons given in paragraphs

5.3(1) and (3) to (6) of this Notice.

HJL’s financial interest in the Loan Notes

9.
The Suitability Report included an information memorandum which detailed HJL’s

financial interest in the Loan Notes. The Authority is requested to particularise the

rule regarding the extent of the duty of an independent financial adviser with

regards to declaring internal fund management charges.

10.
It is not correct that the Suitability Report included the information memorandum.

Instead, it enclosed a fact sheet for the product being recommended and the

customer could only obtain a copy of the information memorandum if they

specifically requested it. The Authority did not identify copies of the information

memorandum in any of the 20 sample customer files it reviewed. As explained in

paragraph 4.27 of this Notice, the Authority’s expectations regarding the

management and disclosure of conflicts of interest are set out in chapter 10 of

SYSC. Given HJL’s role in the Pension Review and Advice Process, its conflict of

interest should have been brought specifically to the attention of FPL’s customers

so that they could make an informed decision on whether they wanted to proceed

with the switch of their pension into the Loan Notes in the light of HJL’s conflict.

However, Mr Page failed to manage HJL’s conflict of interest or to ensure that it was

disclosed to FPL’s customers.

FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension Review and Advice Process

11.
Neither the pension switching advice model nor the Software were designed by HJL.

The advice model that was adopted by FPL, which resulted in Mr Page

recommending the Loan Notes and the Bond to certain customers, was designed by

HJL’s lawyer, who was an expert in financial structures and systems. The Software

was designed by a third party.

12.
The Software was sophisticated and sifted customers so that the Underlying

Investments were considered only for those for whom they were considered

suitable. It provided for a series of variables, including the size of pension

investments, the number of years to retirement and whether the customer was in a

defined benefit scheme.

13.
Mr Page had control of and insight into how the Software dealt with the leads and

was satisfied it was fit for purpose. As he judged it fit for purpose, that was

sufficient for compliance purposes. Only a minority of cases (about 35%) that

came through the Software were suitable for a switch into a SIPP investing in the

Underlying Investments. The rest were either not suitable for a switch or were

suitable only for bespoke advice, in which case bespoke advice would be given by

the IFA.

14.
HJL’s role was one of fact finding, administration and back office support, supported

by the Software which sorted customers into categories, according to certain pre-

set variables. Customers were advised if the Software’s analysis was that it was

unlikely that better performance could be achieved by a switch. It was CAL that

sent summary reports and final reports out on behalf of Mr Page and FPL. At no

time did HJL do so, and HJL was not involved, administratively or otherwise, in the

preparation and sending of advice to customers.

15.
FPL’s compliance consultant conceded that the role undertaken by HJL and the

Software was no different to paraplanner services offered to IFAs.

16.
Mr Page has not provided the Authority with evidence indicating that HJL’s lawyer

designed the pension switching advice model upon which the Pension Review and

Advice Process was based. Mr Page referred to two legal opinions provided by HJL’s

lawyer relating to the Pension Review and Advice Process, but neither addresses

the design of the model. In the Authority’s view, HJL initiated and were involved in

the development of the pension switching advice model, including instructing a

third party to design the Software in accordance with its own specifications. HJL

notified Mr Ward about this model, who in turn informed Mr Page. In any event,

even if HJL’s lawyer had designed the model, this would not have been a sufficient

basis for FPL to adopt and use the Pension Review and Advice Process. It would

still have been necessary for Mr Page to give due consideration to the documents to

be used in the Pension Review and Advice Process, and to how the process would

operate in practice, and to carry out appropriate due diligence on the underlying

products being offered and the third parties that were to perform the Outsourced

Functions, in order to satisfy himself that the process treated customers fairly and

that FPL had appropriate systems and controls to implement it in a compliant

manner and with appropriate oversight.

17.
The Authority does not agree with Mr Page’s description of the Software. In

practice, the filtering criteria that were adopted through the Software appear to

have been limited to identifying customers who expressed a preference for fixed

returns and/or guaranteed capital. Applying these criteria could not, and did not,

effectively identify or filter out customers for whom the Underlying Investments

were unsuitable.

18.
Few customers were advised against switching their pensions to invest in the

Underlying Investments. Instead, the vast majority of customers who did not

proceed with the transaction did so because they decided themselves not to

proceed, could not be contacted or were not eligible to switch. Further, even if the

filtering criteria had been more sophisticated, it would have been necessary for Mr

Page to maintain strong oversight and appropriate controls to ensure the advice

was suitable for the individual customer.

19.
The Authority disagrees that HJL’s role was limited to fact finding, administration

and back office support. Instead, HJL sourced leads for FPL from lead generation

companies and, until October 2014, performed the Outsourced Functions on FPL’s

behalf, which meant it conducted most aspects of the advice process on behalf of

FPL, including contacting customers. CAL only took over performing the

Outsourced Functions on behalf of FPL in October 2014.

20.
The Authority considers that Mr Page misled FPL’s compliance consultant about

FPL’s business and its use of the Pension Review and Advice Process. As a result,

the compliance consultant was not aware of the true position regarding the

business FPL was conducting with HJL or of Mr Page’s lack of involvement in the

Pension Review and Advice Process. In any event, notwithstanding the incomplete

information it received from Mr Page, the compliance consultant still managed to

identify concerns in the customer files it reviewed.

Mr Page’s oversight of the Pension Review and Advice Process

21.
Mr Page was actively involved in the whole Pension Review and Advice Process and

denies he had insufficient oversight. He did not simply hand over his logo and

wash his hands of the process. His involvement in the process was not

insignificant, for example: he had direct access to the Software and so could

inspect the progress of customer files; he did random file checks to establish

whether standards were being maintained; he had access to, and listened to, voice

recordings of the fact-finding process; and he called customers to check they had

received and understood the information memorandum. He did not call every

customer or inspect every file because he placed reliance upon the Software, which

was designed by a third party, not by HJL or CAL.

22.
Mr Page attempted to address the Authority’s concern that his oversight may be

insufficient by engaging the services of another consultant and by signing voluntary

requirements on 10 July 2015.

23.
The Authority considers the evidence shows Mr Page’s involvement in the Pension

Review and Advice Process was far more limited than he alleges. Although Mr Page

used spreadsheets which enabled him to track the level of business being

undertaken, they did not provide the level of detail needed to oversee the Pension

Review and Advice Process. For example, they did not contain information about

the specific advice given to customers, details of the customers’ financial or

personal circumstances, or what information had been given about the Underlying

Investments or the Pension Review and Advice Process. Although Mr Page

informed the Authority in interview that he inspected customer files, he explained

that as it was an automated process he did not check for anything in particular.

The Authority has seen no evidence that Mr Page carried out random checks to

establish whether the standards were being maintained. Indeed, the fact that the

Authority identified failings in each of the 20 customer files it reviewed, suggests

that any checks were ineffectual as they did not prevent FPL’s customers from

receiving unsuitable advice. The email evidence also suggests that in practice Mr

Page had little involvement in dealing with customers, and that he referred any

queries raised by customers to the Service Providers to deal with. The Authority

therefore does not consider that Mr Page’s explanations about his level of oversight

are credible.

24.
The Authority considers it should have been apparent to Mr Page, as an

experienced and qualified financial adviser, that the oversight he provided was

insufficient before the Authority pointed this out to him. Further, Mr Page had

previously failed to act on concerns raised by FPL’s compliance consultant relating

to the Pension Review and Advice Process. Mr Page’s use of compliance

consultants, both before and after the Authority had raised concerns, appears to

have been out of self-interest, rather than in order to act in his customers’ best

interests.

Leads generated by cold calling

25.
Neither FPL nor HJL were involved in cold calling. The lead generator alleged to

have cold called has confirmed that it did not do so. Mr Page is not aware of any

client who has complained of having been cold called.

26.
The lead generator alleged to have cold called stated it did not do so in an undated

letter that appears to have been created specifically for the purposes of Mr Page’s

representations. Accordingly, it does not provide independent, objective evidence

that the lead generator did not engage in cold calling. In contrast, the Authority

has received independent reports suggesting that the lead generator was cold

calling, and Mr Ward’s email of 1 September 2014 also shows that he believed the

lead generator was apparently cold calling. The Authority has therefore concluded

that Mr Page failed to take steps to establish that the lead generators used by HJL

generated their customer introductions in an appropriate manner and, in particular,

to ensure that they did not use cold calling.

Mr Page’s due diligence on HJL

27.
Mr Ward was not a director or a de facto director, and his knowledge of Person A’s

background does not mean that Mr Page also had that knowledge. Mr Page had

little direct contact with Person A. He was informed that Person A was a consultant

to HJL with no official role other than being a property expert, and he was not

alerted to any matters that would cause him concern.


28.
The Authority has not concluded that, because Mr Ward was aware of Person A’s

background, Mr Page must necessarily also have had knowledge of his background.

Rather, the Authority considers that it was Mr Page’s responsibility to satisfy

himself that HJL was suitable to perform its role as an introducer and to carry out

the Outsourced Functions. This included carrying out due diligence on HJL’s

directors and persons who had influence over the business, such as Person A. The

fact that Mr Ward identified Person A’s background immediately after meeting him

demonstrates that it was not difficult to find this out.

The Underlying Investments

29.
The Underlying Investments are not high risk, illiquid investments. The

investments constituted structured loan notes with a capital guarantee backed by

insurance. This is supported by a legal opinion from HJL’s lawyer.

30.
Mr Page genuinely believed that the Underlying Investments were suitable for all

those customers whose objectives were (i) low cost investment; (ii) fixed returns;

and (iii) security for capital. Mr Page tested the market and the Underlying

Investments promised and, until this year, delivered the best return available to

such customers. The Authority has not directed him to any alternative products

that were available at that time that offered a better expectation of capital

preservation and income. Mr Page’s genuine belief in the suitability of the

Underlying Investments is demonstrated by the fact he invested his own entire

pension fund in them.

31.
As is explained in paragraph 4.13 of this Notice, the Authority considers that there

was a high risk that the Underlying Investments would not be suitable for FPL’s

customers because of the combination of the investment risk of the underlying

assets and the limited regulatory oversight of the issuing companies. The

information memorandums for the Underlying Investments also made it clear that

they were high risk and illiquid. For example, the information memorandum for the

Loan Notes referred to risks including that the issuing company was a newly

incorporated entity with no previous trading or business history; loans are

unsecured; and withdrawal was subject to a minimum 12 months’ notice and was

subject to the issuing company’s board’s discretion. In respect of the capital

guarantee, insurance was not in place for all of the funds, and where insurance is in

place, it only provided limited protection to customers. In the Authority’s view,

HJL’s lawyer’s legal opinion does not support Mr Page’s assertion that the Loan

Notes were not high risk or illiquid, as it is premised on the fact that appropriate

insurance was in place for all the funds and that the products would be

recommended where the authorised financial adviser had taken appropriate steps

to satisfy themselves that the Loan Notes were suitable for their customers.

32.
Even on the basis of the limited information available to him, Mr Page should have

appreciated that the Underlying Investments were high risk investments that were

likely to be suitable for FPL’s customers only in very limited circumstances. Mr

Page has provided no evidence to support his assertion that he tested the market

in advance of recommending the Underlying Investments and that, until this year,

they offered the best return for investors. As is explained in paragraph 4.19 of this

Notice the Authority considers that Mr Page failed to carry out appropriate due

diligence on the Loan Notes or the Bond before recommending them to his

customers.

33.
The fact that Mr Page had such belief in the Underlying Investments that he

invested his own pension in them does not rebut the Authority’s concern that he

failed to carry out sufficient due diligence on the products to advise whether they

were suitable for FPL’s customers.

The capital guarantee and insurance

35.
Mr Page denies that he is responsible for the reputable SIPP Provider’s failure to

procure adequate insurance as promised. Mr Page specifically queried the presence

of insurance and was shown two policies. It is not appropriate for the Authority to

criticise Mr Page when it itself has not been able to obtain copies of the insurance

policies.

36.
The insurance company based in Saint Kitts and Nevis is registered on the St. Nevis

Financial Services Regulation Board which has a well-developed banking system

with international links to Europe, Australasia and the USA and is based on the

British model and common law. It is therefore unclear why it is alleged that it is

subject to less stringent regulatory requirements.

37.
Whilst the Loan Notes themselves were not covered by the FSCS, Mr Page’s advice

was, so customers were not put at a disadvantage. In fact, many claims have been

made to the FSCS following the letter sent to investors by the SIPP Provider.

38.
Mr Page’s identification that there was a potential problem with one of the

insurance policies occurred about a year after he first decided that FPL should

adopt the Pension Review and Advice Process and recommend the Loan Notes to

FPL’s customers, and he failed to identify that an insurance policy for another fund

was also not in place.

39.
Mr Page’s attribution of the problems identified with the insurance cover to the

SIPP Provider does not address his own failure to identify the gaps in the insurance

cover. This resulted from his inadequate due diligence on the Loan Notes. The two

policies referred to by Mr Page are both dated 1 January 2016, after he stopped

advising customers through the Pension Review and Advice Process. The fact that

the Authority itself has not been able to obtain full details of the insurance policies

does not justify his conduct. As the advising financial adviser, it was Mr Page’s

responsibility to ensure he understood sufficiently the nature of the products he

was recommending to enable him to advise whether they were suitable. Where

there were gaps in the information available, or in his understanding about the

products, Mr Page should have ensured these were disclosed to customers as an

additional risk factor. However, he instead recommended the Loan Notes to

customers on the basis that they were protected by insurance when he did not

know if this was the case.

40.
The Authority’s concern with the fact that the insurance policy was registered in St

Nevis is that this exposed customers to a greater level of risk because of the fewer

regulatory requirements that are imposed on captive insurances in St. Nevis than

in the UK. Customers should have been informed about these additional risks, and

Mr Page’s failure to inform customers of the full risks associated with the Loan

Notes deprived customers of the opportunity to make an informed decision about

whether they wanted to proceed with the recommended investment in those

circumstances.

41.
The fact that the Loan Notes are not covered by FSCS protection means that, in the

event of insolvency, customers will be unsecured creditors and so at risk of not

being able to obtain compensation if the Loan Notes failed. This risk should have

been disclosed. This fact should have been apparent to Mr Page not only from the

information he had available about the products but also because it was referred to

specifically in the information memorandum. Customers should have received this

information in order to be able to take an informed view as to whether they wished

to proceed to invest in a product that was not itself covered by the FSCS. Mr

Page’s failure to take this factor into account, and to take steps to disclose it to

customers, meant that customers were not able to make informed decisions about

investing in the Loan Notes and were exposed to the risk of the products failing

without appropriate compensation being available to them.

Mr Page’s due diligence on the Underlying Investments

42.
It is inaccurate to suggest that Mr Page did not carry out meaningful due diligence.

The scope of his due diligence is demonstrated by the fact he submitted 400 pages

of due diligence to the Authority. It is not clear to him in what respect his due

diligence is alleged to have been deficient, and what further information he should

have obtained. He has never done more due diligence on a product before feeling

able to recommend it.

43.
Mr Page maintains that there was no better product, at the relevant time, that

would preserve capital and was guaranteed to return 8% per annum. He was

entitled to confine his market analysis to suitable products for the particular class of

investor. The Authority has not put it to him that he overlooked better products

and, even if he had done so, that would be a misjudgement rather than evidence of

a lack of integrity.

44.
It should not be for him to prove that he tested the market. It is an IFA’s duty to

ensure he is up to date with the market, not to keep a diary of how he did this.

The burden of proof to demonstrate that Mr Page did not test the market should be

on the Authority.

45.
The fact that HJL’s lawyer signed off on the process and the Underlying

Investments gave Mr Page considerable confidence in them. Mr Page made

numerous enquiries on an ongoing basis and was so confident in what he saw that

he transferred his own pension into a SIPP investing in the Underlying Investments.

He also delegated additional ongoing due diligence to Mr Ward.

46.
Mr Page is unclear as to the risk that the Authority alleges that customers were

exposed to as a result of the alleged failings in due diligence. The only factor that

Mr Page did not, and could not, foresee was a letter sent by the SIPP Provider this

year, at the behest of the Authority, that informed investors, wrongly, that the

Bond was a non-standard investment. The consequences of this letter have been

damaging to the fund.

47.
Mr Page took comfort from the status of the SIPP Provider, which is highly rated,

regulated by the Authority, with significant pension industry presence. Also, as part

of his ongoing due diligence, he spent an entire day with a director and staff at the

SIPP Provider, and took comfort from the fact that the director is highly regarded

by the industry and the Authority.

48.
Paragraph 4.19 of this Notice explains why the Authority considers that Mr Page’s

due diligence on the Underlying Investments was inadequate. In particular, Mr

Page failed to carry out research on the products from independent sources. Mr

Page should have realised that, by limiting his due diligence in this way, he ran the

risk of not obtaining a complete understanding of the Underlying Investments.

49.
Mr Page’s belief that the Underlying Investments were the best available products

does not address the Authority’s concern that Mr Page failed to carry out

appropriate due diligence on the Loan Notes and the Bond before recommending

them to customers, and that the Underlying Investments were high risk and

illiquid, and unlikely to be suitable for FPL’s customers except in very limited

circumstances. Mr Page’s focus on the promise that these products offered fixed

returns and a capital guarantee indicate his bias towards the perceived benefits of

the scheme without giving sufficient consideration to their risks.

50.
Mr Page’s submissions regarding testing the market do not address the Authority’s

case against him. The Authority’s case is not that he overlooked other more

suitable products, but that he failed to understand the products that he was

actively recommending to his customers because of his failure to carry out

appropriate due diligence on them. Without understanding what he was

recommending, he could not know whether the product was suitable for the

customer or whether there were other more suitable products available for that

customer. Given his inadequate due diligence, Mr Page was not in a position to

provide suitable and compliant advice to FPL’s customers.

51.
HJL’s lawyer’s legal opinions do not advise on the nature of the Underlying

Investments, other than to consider the extent to which they may be standard

assets and, briefly, the risk profile of the Loan Notes if comprehensive insurance is

in place. They therefore do not address any of the Authority’s criticisms of Mr

Page. In addition, the information that Mr Ward provided to Mr Page was

insufficient to enable Mr Page to understand the nature and risks of the Underlying

Investments. Mr Page was required to understand these as the only approved

director at FPL.

52.
The Authority does not agree that the Underlying Investments’ financial difficulties

arose as a result of the Authority’s actions. Mr Page’s adoption of the Pension

Review and Advice Process having carried out inadequate due diligence on the

Underlying Investments exposed FPL’s customers to the risk of investing in

products that carried a greater risk than they or Mr Page understood.

53.
Whether or not Mr Page took comfort from the status of the SIPP Provider, this did

not diminish his own responsibility to satisfy himself that the products he and FPL

were recommending to customers were suitable and that the process through

which advice was being given was compliant with the Authority’s rules.

FPL’s compliance consultant

54.
Mr Page denies that he failed to heed warnings given by FPL’s compliance

consultant. The compliance consultant checked files which had gone through the

Software and also outsourced a compliance check. Whilst the compliance

consultant passed the files it checked, the outsourced compliance check failed. Mr

Page asked Mr Ward to investigate these different outcomes and he concluded that

the customer journey was similar in each case, and that the file checkers simply

had different views of the customer journey. The compliance consultant therefore

investigated further and concluded that the process was compliant, following a full

and frank discussion with Mr Page.

55.
Although the compliance consultant concluded the process was compliant, they also

suggested that it could be made more robust by obtaining more soft facts from

customers. He therefore took the compliance consultant’s recommendations to

FPL’s Investment Committee, which agreed that they should develop the process

further, with this feedback in mind. This took place only a short time prior to the

Authority’s visit in early June 2015, so there was little time to effect changes. Mr

Page therefore took reasonable steps to address the compliance consultant’s

feedback.

56.
FPL’s compliance consultant provided positive feedback about the quality of Mr

Page’s advice. It is unclear how Mr Page’s advice fell short of the Authority’s

expectations as the Authority has not been precise about the alleged deficiencies in

the documentation. In respect of the allegation that there was inadequate notice to

the customer of risk associated with the investments, an industry standard warning

was contained within the Suitability Report.

57.
The Authority disagrees with Mr Page’s explanation for the different outcomes of

the compliance consultant’s file checks. The compliance consultant raised serious

concerns about all files checked, and the file that was passed received the lowest

possible pass score. Mr Page stated in an email to Mr Ward that this was

unbelievable, having expected the file to have been failed. Mr Page did not satisfy

the compliance consultant that the process was compliant. Instead, FPL and the

compliance consultant agreed to disagree, and the consultant no longer reviewed

files referred through the Pension Review and Advice Process.

58.
There is no evidence that, following the concerns raised by the compliance

consultant, FPL took steps to enable it to obtain more soft facts about its customers

in the course of the Pension Review and Advice Process, or to provide additional

oversight, or of any other changes having been made to the process. In the

Authority’s view, Mr Page’s response to the compliance consultant’s criticisms was

therefore not appropriate or sufficient.

59.
The Authority considers that the detailed criticisms made by the compliance

consultant and its file checker of the files they reviewed, and the Authority’s own

analysis of the failings within the 20 sample customer files that it reviewed, should

have provided Mr Page with a clear understanding of the concerns arising from the

advice given to customers through the Pension Review and Advice Process.

60.
Mr Page was permitted to advise on Pension Transfers until August 2015. He

denies overreaching his authority in respect of Pension Transfers prior to or after

that date, and is not aware of acting outside FPL’s permission.

61.
The products concerned were part of a contracted money purchase scheme, not a

defined benefit scheme, and so were not Pension Transfers. This was confirmed by

two compliance consultants.

62.
A firm, or any of its advisers, can only carry out, or advise on, Pension Transfers, if

the firm has specific permission to do so. FPL has never had permission to conduct

Pension Transfers, and in fact Pension Transfers were specifically excluded from

FPL’s permission. Therefore, Mr Page was not permitted to advise on Pension

Transfers whilst at FPL, and so FPL breached its permission when Mr Page provided

advice on Pension Transfers.

63.
The defining features of a Pension Transfer are whether the customer was

transferring deferred benefits from an occupational pension scheme into a personal

pension scheme. All of the transfers identified by the Authority had these features,

and were therefore Pension Transfers. The two compliance consultants’ advice was

received after the dates on which the Pension Transfers occurred, so Mr Page could

not have relied upon such advice at the time. In any event, neither of the

compliance consultants addressed the fundamental point that FPL needed to have,

but did not have, the relevant permission to carry out or advise on Pension

Transfers.

Cash to Bond switches

64.
Mr Page called approximately 140 customers, who had an element of cash in their

SIPP, to recommend them to switch to the Bond. The customers’ profile, attitude

to risk and recommendations were all reviewed beforehand and he had no cause to

doubt the suitability of the Bond as an investment. He also made five unsuccessful

attempts to contact the 30 other customers who had an element of cash in their

SIPP.

65.
The Authority considers that many more customers (675 in total) were switched to

the Bond than Mr Page states. Mr Page failed to consider all relevant

circumstances when assessing the suitability of the switch, and appears to have

focused on the potential benefits without considering the implicit risks. For

example, he does not appear to have given consideration to the fact that he was

recommending customers to move cash (a low risk, highly liquid asset) into an

investment that carried substantial risk, was illiquid, had yet to be listed on any

exchange and was a medium to long term investment. Further, the documentary

evidence does not support Mr Page’s contention that he reviewed each customer’s

profile, stated attitude to risk and recommendations made to them before calling

them. Instead, the evidence suggests he sought indiscriminately, and rather

urgently, to switch customers from cash to the Bond.

66.
The Authority considers that Mr Page’s use of an opt-out letter in respect of those

customers he could not contact in person was inappropriate, notwithstanding that

he allegedly sought to call them five times. It was open to Mr Page to ask those

customers to contact him or simply to leave them invested in cash. However, he

instead chose to move them, without their informed consent, from a low risk asset

into the high risk, illiquid Bond.

Misleading the Authority – Mr Page’s application for authorisation

67.
In respect of the Authority’s contention that Mr Page should have known the extent

to which he would be outsourcing certain functions of the advice process, the

contemporaneous evidence shows that HJL was not named as working with FPL and

Mr Page until September 2015.

68.
In respect of the Authority’s allegation that the application was misleading as it

stated advice would be independent and the product solution would be

independently chosen, it was never the case that Mr Page intended to recommend a

72

restricted product to those customers referred to FPL. 70% of the customers

referred were not suitable for the Underlying Investments and were dealt with

otherwise.

69.
The Software was not identified in the application as it was still in its infancy. Mr

Page used FPL’s compliance consultant’s online reporting system at that time,

which he used to report his business to the compliance consultant.

70.
Mr Page did not intend for his application to mislead the Authority. He was leaving

a network of professionals and had no idea about the likely income he would earn

or number of customers that would be generated. His aspirations for growth are not

the same as his realistic business projections.

71.
The Authority is unaware what contemporaneous evidence Mr Page is referring to.

However, it considers that the contemporaneous evidence shows that Mr Page

knew that FPL would be outsourcing functions to HJL when he signed FPL’s

application for direct authorisation on 25 March 2014. By this date, Mr Page had

met with HJL, signed an IAR agreement on behalf of FPL with HJL and signed a

licence to allow FPL to use the Software in the Pension Review and Advice Process.

He also informed a third party on 21 March 2014 that he would arrange for HJL’s

addresses to be added to FPL’s website, and subsequently gave the instruction for

this to happen on 24 March 2014.

72.
As explained in paragraph 18 above, few customers were advised against switching

their pensions to SIPPs investing in the Underlying Investments. Instead, most of

the customers who did not switch were either not eligible to invest, were no longer

interested or could not be contacted.

73.
FPL’s compliance consultant’s online reporting system was used by Mr Page to

report business transactions to FPL’s compliance consultant, and had very different

functions to the Software, which was specialised, bespoke software that allowed

FPL to use the Pension Review and Advice Process. In any event, Mr Page signed

the licence for the Software on 21 March 2014, and had also been given a

demonstration of how the Software worked prior to signing FPL’s application for

direct authorisation on 25 March 2014.

74.
The Authority does not accept Mr Page’s submission that he had no idea of the

likely income that he would earn or the number of customers that were likely to be

referred to FPL, as Mr Ward had clearly informed him of both in his email of 8

March 2014.

Misleading the Authority – 20 August 2014 new business register

75.
Mr Page regrets if there was any confusion, but considers that the request in

August 2014 was for business issued, and so would not have captured mere advice

which had not led to a switch. There was no intention by Mr Page to mislead.

76.
The Authority does not accept Mr Page’s explanation as the email from the

Authority clearly requested details of all business the Firm had arranged via a SIPP

arrangement. Further, Mr Page did not correct the inaccurate impression provided

by the 20 August 2014 new business register when he emailed the Authority on 5

September 2014, even though he would have known by this date that more

customers had switched to a SIPP following FPL’s advice.

Misleading the Authority – 1 September 2014 Telephone Call

77.
The communications are from Mr Ward to Mr Page and so do not demonstrate there

was any intention by Mr Page to mislead the Authority. Further, Mr Page disagrees

that the emails demonstrate an expression of intention to misdirect, or withhold

information from, the Authority. The emails clearly show that Mr Page and Mr Ward

did not know that cold calling may be occurring and that they took it incredibly

seriously, would investigate and, if cold calling was discovered, the introducer

would be dropped immediately.

78.
The lead generation company in question has confirmed that cold calling was not

taking place. Mr Page checked all firms generating leads and found no cold calling

to be taking place.

79.
The Authority considers it is clear from the emails from Mr Ward, for example from

his use of capital letters, that he and Mr Page appreciated the seriousness of the

issue, and considers that because of this they chose to hide the fact that one lead

generator was apparently cold calling from the Authority. Given that Mr Page did

not inform the Authority during the call that one lead generator apparently cold

called, the Authority concludes that Mr Page chose to follow Mr Ward’s advice and

mislead the Authority.

80.
As mentioned in paragraph 26 above, the lead generator alleged to have cold called

stated that it did not do so in an undated letter that appears to have been created

specifically for the purposes of Mr Page’s representations. Accordingly, it does not

provide independent, objective evidence that the lead generator did not engage in

cold calling.

Misleading the Authority – 5 September 2014 email

81.
Mr Page denies that the 5 September 2014 email was misleading. He did not

mention the use of cold calling as he did not believe that cold calling was

responsible for any of the lead generation or indeed that it was being undertaken

by the firms that HJL used.

82.
The Authority has cherry picked aspects of the 5 September 2014 email. The email

actually shows that Mr Page was transparent regarding his relationship with HJL.

83.
As explained above, the Authority considers that Mr Page was made aware during

the 1 September 2014 phone call that one lead generator used by HJL was

apparently cold calling. As Mr Page did not mention this during the 1 September

2014 call, he should have corrected the misleading impression given to the

Authority in the 5 September 2014 email.

84.
The Authority explains in paragraph 4.82 of this Notice why it considers the 5

September 2014 email to have been misleading, and does not agree that it has

cherry picked aspects of the email. In that email, Mr Page referred to HJL only as

an introducer to FPL. By also stating that he did not use the services of

unauthorised firms in the same email, Mr Page gave the impression that HJL’s

relationship with FPL was limited to that of introducer, even though Mr Page knew

that was not the case.

Misleading the SIPP Provider

85.
Mr Page regrets and apologises for his actions in respect of the SIPP Provider. Mr

Page needed some capital himself as he was subject to a high degree of financial

pressure. He wanted to prove that the funds would be willingly released to any

customer requesting a withdrawal and thus to allay the Authority’s fears that the

fund managers could refuse. His comment was flippant and he did not intend for it

to be taken seriously.

86.
It is unclear from Mr Page’s explanation how he expected to prove that the funds

would be willingly released to any customer, given that he provided false

information to the SIPP Provider to try to obtain their release. Mr Page’s

explanation does not excuse his conduct or mitigate the fact that he was willing to

mislead a third party apparently for his personal financial gain. The Authority also

does not consider his comment to have been made flippantly. Instead, the

Authority considers it was made deliberately in order to increase the pressure on

the SIPP Provider to effect the disinvestment as soon as possible.

Breach of the Asset Retention Requirement

87.
Mr Page did not deal with any assets. Person B issued a statutory declaration

against Mr Page seeking to recoup the £25,000, but this action was defeated by Mr

Page at a contested hearing of Mr Page’s application to set aside the statutory

demand. The issuing of the statutory demand followed a dialogue in which Person

B was notified that the ‘agreement’ was unenforceable and did not constitute a

dealing.

88.
Mr Page has not provided any documents to evidence the legal action or its

outcome. In any event, the Authority considers that the evidence demonstrates

that Mr Page intended to be bound by the loan agreement when he entered into it

with Person B, and so the extent to which it is valid is not relevant in these

proceedings. The Authority also notes that Mr Page had plenty of opportunity to

raise the status of the loan agreement with the Authority, but instead he chose not

to disclose its existence to the Authority.

Agreement with Mr Ward

89.
Mr Page considers it was reasonable for him, at a time when he had been notified of

investigations that may lead to FPL being compromised, to consider how best to

meet the needs of FPL’s customers in the event of FPL’s insolvency. The Authority

has not stated the contemporaneous evidence that it is relying on to conclude that

Mr Page was untruthful in stating that the purpose of the agreement was for

succession planning.

90.
For the reasons given in paragraph 4.92 of this Notice, the Authority considers that

Mr Page and Mr Ward entered into the agreement in order to preserve their

financial interests, rather than because they were acting in customers’ best

interests. The Authority set out the evidence supporting its view in its

Investigation Report, which was provided to Mr Page.

76

Dishonesty and lack of integrity

91.
Mr Page acted transparently and cooperatively in his dealings with the Authority,

and was willing to consult with compliance experts. This should be given due

weight by the Authority.

92.
Mr Page acted with due care and skill in the exercise of his duties. He insisted upon

an advisory, rather than an execution-only model; called customers to speak

personally with them and to understand if the advice and the recommended

products were suitable for them; and exercised a high degree of supervision and

inspection of customer files. He tested the market and found no more suitable

product for this class of customer, and believes that the customers were better off

as a result of the switch. He himself had confidence to switch his own pension to a

SIPP investing in the Underlying Investments. He would not have done so had he

not believed it was robust enough to guarantee his capital and a fixed return. A

lapse in judgement does not constitute a lack of integrity.

93.
Mr Page has pursued a successful career as an independent financial adviser and

has never before been the subject of any regulatory investigation. This experience

shows he is competent to conduct his duties and he maintains he is a fit and proper

person.

94.
The Authority has had regard to Mr Page’s representations in determining that, for

the reasons set out in section 5 of this Notice, Mr Page acted dishonestly and

recklessly between 9 April 2014 and 1 February 2016. The Authority considers

that, on account of his dishonest and reckless actions, Mr Page lacks integrity and

is not a fit and proper person, notwithstanding that he had not previously been the

subject of any regulatory investigation. The Authority considers that this was not a

mere lapse in judgment and that instead Mr Page acted dishonestly and recklessly

for a long period of time motivated by financial gain. In the circumstances, the

Authority considers it is appropriate and proportionate to withdraw Mr Page’s

approval to perform controlled functions, impose a prohibition order and impose a

significant financial penalty on him.

Proportionality of the proposed action

95.
Mr Page has not seen any evidence that customers have suffered loss as a result of

his advice, and it is not clear to him why the Authority believes customers received

deficient advice.

96.
The proposed action is disproportionate. If, as Mr Page submits, the advice was

deficient in style rather than substance, a simple suspension would be adequate.

97.
By acting recklessly in respect of FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension Review and

Advice Process, Mr Page exposed FPL’s customers to the risk of suffering potentially

significant loss to their pensions. This was a fundamental concern for the

Authority, irrespective of whether customers actually suffered loss. However,

customers have in fact suffered substantial losses as a result of their investments.

As at 17 May 2018, the FSCS had paid over £1.7 million in compensation to FPL

customers as a result of loss suffered upon transferring or switching their pension

to the Underlying Investments.

98.
The Notice makes it clear (for example from the Authority’s review of the 20

sample customer files) that the advice given by FPL was deficient for substantive

reasons, not just for reasons of style. The unsuitable advice was caused by Mr

Page’s reckless conduct in allowing FPL to adopt and use the Pension Review and

Advice Process. In the circumstances, and as explained in section 6 of this Notice,

the Authority considers that it is appropriate to withdraw Mr Page’s approval to

perform controlled functions, impose a full prohibition order and impose a

substantial financial penalty. The Authority considers that a suspension would not

reflect the seriousness of the conduct involved.

Representations received from HJL, Mr Stephen, Mr King and Person A (the

“third parties”)

99.
The third parties’ representations (in italics), and the Authority’s conclusions in

respect of them, are set out below:

The development of the Software and the pension switching advice model

100. HJL did not develop the Software or the pension switching advice model. They were

instead designed by two individuals at another company independent of HJL

(“Company A”).

101. The Authority accepts that HJL did not create the Software, and that it was instead

created by two individuals at Company A. However, the Software was developed at

the request of HJL. HJL initially sought an efficient way to provide customers with

a pension comparison, to see whether the customer’s existing pension charges

were reasonable. A system was developed by Company A in around 2011/2012 in

line with this request. This system was an early version of the Software.

102. In 2013, HJL asked Company A whether an advice model could be “bolted on”. HJL

staff assisted Company A to understand the products that would be recommended

through the Software so that Company A could develop the triggers for the advice.

HJL also led the creation of the templates of the documents which were used in the

Pension Review and Advice Process and which enabled a complete, fully advised

pension switch. The Authority therefore considers that HJL initiated and influenced

the development of both the Software and the pension switching advice model.

HJL did not process leads obtained through unlawful cold calling

103. HJL was at no time involved in cold calling activities itself. All clients introduced to

the Firm were obtained by lead generation businesses through a generic financial

promotion process, which did not involve the lead generator in identifying any

specific investment or a specific provider of investment services. To the extent the

activities of the lead generators involved unsolicited real-time financial promotions,

those promotions were exempt from the financial promotion restriction in section

21(1) of the Act by virtue of Article 17 of the Financial Service and Markets Act

2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005.

104. The Authority has not found that HJL cold called customers. Instead, the Authority

has found that Mr Page failed to take any steps to establish that the lead

generators used by HJL generated their customer introductions in an appropriate

manner and did not use cold calling. As such, he did not know whether leads were

generated by cold calling. In fact, the Authority was contacted by three customers

complaining that they had been cold called by one of the lead generation

companies used by HJL.

Mr Stephen properly managed any conflict of interest

105. Mr Stephen took careful steps to manage any potential conflicts of interest,

including taking legal advice on issues surrounding potential conflicts. From his and

HJL’s position, relevant potential conflicts were properly managed.

106. This Notice relates to the conduct of Mr Page and the steps he took to manage,

disclose and mitigate the potential conflicts of interest posed by Mr Stephen’s

common directorships. The Authority has made no finding as to whether Mr

Stephen adequately managed any actual or potential conflicts that he had.

However, it is necessary to describe Mr Stephen’s common directorships in the

Notice in order to explain Mr Page’s misconduct.

Reference to Mr King’s common directorship

107. Mr King was a director of HJL during the Relevant Period and was also a director of

the entities that issued the Bond. However, the corporate governance of those

entities was structured in such a way that he was able to recuse himself from

directors’ decisions in case of conflict. The nature of the investments of the

company issuing the Bond was such that there were few, if any, circumstances in

which Mr King needed to recuse himself.

108. For the reasons set out above in relation to Mr Stephen, it is necessary to describe

Mr King’s common directorships in the Notice in order to explain Mr Page’s

misconduct and the Authority has made no finding as to whether Mr King

adequately managed any actual or potential conflicts that he had.

HJL was not inherently unsuitable for the purposes for which it was retained by FPL

109. HJL’s qualification to operate the Software was its having staffing and

organisational capacity to do so. Moreover, the Authority has failed to explain on

what basis it implicitly contends that HJL was unsuitable.

110. When outsourcing functions to a third party, authorised firms which are common

platform firms (such as FPL) must comply with Principle 3 of the FCA’s Principles for

Business and applicable rules in SYSC, and should also have regard to applicable

guidance in SYSC. The relevant rules and guidance are set out in paragraph 4.39 of

this Notice. In light of these rules and guidance, Mr Page should have taken

reasonable steps, such as conducting adequate due diligence, to ensure that HJL

was suitable to perform the functions that were outsourced to it.

111. Mr Page did not take reasonable steps, or conduct adequate due diligence, even

though it was intended that HJL would correspond with customers on behalf of the

Firm, and would perform functions that were both necessary and important for the

giving of advice (such as the conduct of fact-finds). The Authority considers that

such due diligence should go beyond merely ensuring that HJL had the staffing and

organisational capacity to carry out the Outsourced Functions or its lead generation

activities. In addition, as part of Mr Page’s due diligence he could have considered,

for example, the suitability of HJL’s management and the quality of its staff.

Reference to Person A’s criminal record and bankruptcy

112. Person A was at all material times a consultant to HJL, and he played a limited role

as regards the Pension Review and Advice Process. There is no need to refer to

Person A’s criminal record and bankruptcy since these matters were not relevant to

any risk assessment that the Firm needed, on the facts of this case, to have carried

out. It is also denied, to the extent that it is alleged, that it would not have been

appropriate for the Firm to enter into a business relationship with HJL because of

these matters.

113. In the Authority’s view, the evidence supports its conclusion that Person A played a

significant part in the Pension Review and Advice Process and had an influential

role at HJL. For example, his job title in HJL’s organisation chart was “Senior

Investment Manager”, he was one of three representatives from HJL at meetings

with the SIPP Provider (along with Mr Stephen and Mr King), he brought the

business proposition from HJL to FPL and he gave instructions to FPL regarding the

cash to Liquid Assets Bond switch. The Authority considers that it is appropriate to

refer to Person A’s background, which demonstrates a serious failure to act with

integrity. When considering whether to outsource important functions to a third

party, especially where the third party will be responsible for most of the customer

contact, the extent to which customers could be exposed to persons who have

demonstrated a lack of integrity should be a fundamental consideration. Mr Page’s

failure to consider this illustrates his failure to give proper consideration to whether

HJL and CAL were suitable to perform services on behalf of the Firm.

Other entities were involved with the use of the Software during the Relevant Period but

have not been addressed in the Warning Notice to the same extent as HJL

114. HJL discharged its limited processing functions for the period July to October 2014.

At other times in the Relevant Period these functions were discharged by CAL,

however, HJL is named frequently throughout the Notice.

115. Each of the relevant entities that were involved in the Pension Review and Advice

Process are mentioned to the extent necessary to describe the facts and matters

relied on in reaching the decision to take the action set out in paragraph 1.1 of the

Notice. The fact that HJL is mentioned more often than CAL is a reflection of its

greater role in the Pension Review and Advice Process, in particular, its role in the

development of the model on which the process is based, its lead generation

activities, its role in relation to the products recommended through the process,

and its financial interest in those products.

Anonymisation of HJL, Mr Stephen and Mr King

116. There is no reason why HJL, Mr Stephen and Mr King should not be anonymised.

The Notice would achieve what it is intended to achieve even if HJL, Mr Stephen

and Mr King are not identified by name. Further, HJL’s commercial interests will be

significantly harmed if it is named in the Notice.

117. HJL had a central role in the Pension Review and Advice Process. In particular, it

initiated and influenced the development of the pension switching advice model,

brought the model to the attention of the Firm, performed the Outsourced

Functions and had a material financial interest in the Loan Notes. In these

circumstances, the Authority considers it appropriate to mention HJL by name so

that its findings, and the factual background (including the key parties involved),

can be easily ascertained by the recipient of the Notice, as well as by any other

reader of the Notice. Further, the Authority considers it possible that HJL could be

identified from the description of the matters contained in the Notice even if

anonymised as the Authority’s Financial Services Register names HJL as an IAR of

FPL between 11 September 2014 and 2 July 2015, and the Authority considers it is

necessary to include detail in the Notice about HJL, including that it was an IAR and

the time period that it was registered as an IAR, in order to explain the relationship

between HJL and FPL. As such, the Authority considers it unlikely that HJL will be

materially prejudiced as a result of being referred to by its name in the Notice.

118. The Authority has decided to name Mr Stephen and Mr King for similar reasons. As

Companies House records show they were the only two directors of HJL during the

period that FPL was using the Pension Review and Advice Process, the Authority

considers they could be identified even if anonymised. Further, as directors, they

were responsible for the day-to-day operation of HJL during the Relevant Period.