FINAL NOTICE

To:
Andrew Jon Osborne

TAKE NOTICE: The Financial Services Authority of 25 The North Colonnade, Canary
Wharf, London E14 5HS (the “FSA”) gives final notice that it has taken the following
action:

1.
THE ACTION

1.1. The FSA served on Andrew Jon Osborne (‘Mr Osborne’) a Decision Notice on 12
January 2012 which notified him that it had decided to impose on him for the reasons
set out below, and pursuant to section 123(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000 (“the Act”), a financial penalty of £350,000 for engaging in market abuse in
breach of section 118(3) of the Act.

1.2. Mr Osborne has not referred the matter to the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery
Chamber).

1.3. Accordingly, for the reasons set out below, the FSA hereby imposes a financial penalty
of £350,000 for engaging in market abuse.

2.
REASONS FOR THE ACTION

2.1. This notice is issued to Mr Osborne as a result of his behaviour between 9 and 11 June
2009.

2.2. In June 2009, Mr Osborne was a Managing Director in the Corporate Broking group of
Merrill Lynch International (“MLI”). (MLI is now part of Bank of America Merrill
Lynch.) In May and June 2009, Mr Osborne led the corporate broking team at MLI in
acting for Punch Taverns Plc (“Punch”) as joint book runner and co-sponsor in relation
to a transaction to issue new equity (“the Transaction”).

2.3. Mr Osborne’s role in the Transaction included responsibility for wall crossing certain
shareholders in Punch based in America (“the US Shareholders”). Specific wall
crossing procedures for the US Shareholders were put in place by MLI requiring the US
Shareholders to agree to the terms of a written non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”).
(The terms “wall crossing” and “non disclosure agreement” or “NDA” are explained at
paragraphs 3.4-3.10 below.) These procedures were known to and understood by Mr
Osborne.

2.4. Greenlight Capital Inc (“Greenlight”) was one of the US Shareholders and owned
13.3% of Punch’s shares (Greenlight had investments in Punch in the form of both
shares and contracts for difference, but for convenience, this Final Notice refers to
Greenlight as a “shareholder” and to Greenlight’s “shares”.) Greenlight refused Mr
Osborne’s invitation to be wall crossed in relation to Punch, but Mr Osborne proceeded
to arrange a conference call on a non-wall crossed basis between Greenlight and Punch
management to take place on Tuesday 9 June 2009 (“the Punch Call”).1

2.5. During the Punch Call, Mr Osborne disclosed information concerning the Transaction
to Greenlight. The inside information disclosed by Mr Osborne to Greenlight was that
Punch was at an advanced stage of the process towards the issuance of a significant
amount of new equity, probably within a timescale of around a week, with the principal
purpose of repaying Punch’s convertible bond and creating headroom with respect to
certain covenants in Punch’s securitisation vehicles. In providing information about the
Transaction to Greenlight during the Punch Call, Mr Osborne engaged in market abuse
by improperly disclosing inside information.

2.6. As a result of the Punch Call, Greenlight proceeded to sell shares in Punch. Between 9
June and 12 June 2009, it sold 11.65 million Punch shares. The Transaction was
announced to the market on 15 June 2009 and the price of Punch’s shares fell by 29.9%.
Greenlight’s sale of Punch shares prior to the announcement had resulted in loss
avoidance of approximately £5.8 million.

2.7. The FSA considers this to be a serious case of market abuse by Mr Osborne for the
following reasons:

(i)
Mr Osborne was an experienced corporate broker in a position of considerable
responsibility. He had significant wall crossing experience. He understood the
market abuse provisions in the Act and understood the nature of the type of
information that could be inside information;

1 Transcript of the Punch Call on 9 June 2009 (See Annex 2).

2

(ii)
Mr Osborne knew and understood MLI’s internal policies regarding wall
crossings and the protection of inside information. He knew and understood the
specific wall crossing procedures in place regarding the Transaction for the US
Shareholders, in particular, that details about the Transaction should not be
disclosed without agreement to the terms of a written NDA;

(iii) bearing in mind the fact that Greenlight had refused to be wall crossed and that, as
a result, significant legal and regulatory risk arose from a conversation proceeding
between Punch management and Greenlight, Mr Osborne should have taken great
care regarding the information he disclosed, and taken adequate steps to ensure
that he complied with regulatory requirements. He did not do so. Further, despite
the evident risk arising from the Punch Call, he did not refer the contents of the
call to senior management, internal compliance or legal personnel at MLI, as a
matter of potential concern;

(iv) Mr Osborne was trusted in his role as the gatekeeper of inside information. By
disclosing inside information to Greenlight he compromised the integrity of the
market, thereby damaging market confidence.

(v)
shortly after the Punch Call, Mr Osborne was put on notice that Greenlight was
selling its shares in Punch. He took no steps to raise any concerns regarding the
contents of the Punch Call and the subsequent sale of shares by Greenlight with
anybody, including MLI’s senior management, legal or compliance personnel. It
should have been obvious to Mr Osborne that Greenlight may have been selling
due to the information received during the Punch Call, and at the very least he
should have reconsidered the situation in light of the selling, yet he took no steps
to address the risk of market abuse.

2.8. Despite being a serious case of market abuse, the improper disclosure by Mr Osborne
was not deliberate or reckless. In disclosing inside information, Mr Osborne did not
intend or expect Greenlight to deal on the basis of that information. Indeed,
Greenlight’s sale of Punch shares was potentially contrary to the interests of Punch and
potentially detrimental to the Transaction. Mr Osborne did not stand to gain any
personal or professional benefit through Greenlight’s sale of Punch shares.

3.
FACTS AND MATTERS

3.1. Mr Osborne has over 18 years of experience acting as a corporate broker for public
limited companies and has held FSA approval since 2001 (in June 2009, he held FSA
approval as the CF30 Customer Function). In June 2009, he was one of the four
Managing Directors in the Corporate Broking group at MLI and also sat on the MLI
UK executive committee which was responsible for running MLI’s investment banking
business in the UK. He was therefore in a senior position with considerable
responsibility.

3.2. Mr Osborne undertook regular training regarding market abuse in his role at MLI. He
understood the meaning of inside information and he understood that it is an offence to

3

improperly disclose inside information. He was familiar with MLI policies that applied
when wall crossing third parties on a transaction and he had considerable experience
performing wall crossings.

3.3. MLI was the long-term broker to Punch and Mr Osborne led this corporate broking
account. He also led the corporate broking team at MLI in relation to the Transaction.

Wall crossing

3.4. Wall crossing is a process whereby a company can legitimately provide inside
information to a third party. A company may wall cross a variety of third parties
ranging from large institutional shareholders to small shareholders or completely
unrelated parties.

3.5. There are a number of reasons for wall crossing third parties. A common reason is to
give the third party inside information about a proposed transaction by a company that
is publicly listed (for example, a merger or acquisition, or fundraising transactions,
including equity issuances).

3.6. In the context of a proposed transaction, the purpose of the wall crossing is to share
inside information with the third party in order to be able to discuss the third party’s
views on the transaction. These views would usually include an indication of the third
party’s interest in and/or support for the transaction.

3.7. Once a third party agrees to be wall crossed, it can be provided with inside information
and it is then restricted from trading. The party is only able to trade in the company’s
shares again once the information it has been given is made public. In the context of a
transaction, the information will be made public either when the transaction is
announced to the market, or in cases where a transaction does not proceed, when an
announcement is made to the market stating that a transaction was contemplated, but
did not proceed. This announcement may be referred to as a cleansing statement.

3.8. Wall crossing is a well-established practice in large public companies and investment
banks. It may be carried out verbally or recorded in writing. An example of a verbal
process of wall crossing would be where the third party is contacted by telephone. The
third party is asked if they are prepared to be wall crossed, usually for a specified period
of time. If they agree, they are then told the relevant information. An example of a
wall crossing procedure recorded in writing is where written terms are agreed. These
terms set out the basis on which the third party agrees to receive the inside information.
Such agreements may be referred to as non-disclosure agreements or NDAs.

3.9. With regard to the Transaction, it was decided that it would be desirable to wall cross
Punch shareholders and potential investors in the new equity prior to the Transaction
being announced to the public. In particular, the US Shareholders held a significant
stake in Punch and were to be wall crossed for the purpose of gauging their support for
the Transaction and understanding their level of interest in purchasing new equity in
Punch.

3.10. MLI designed a bespoke procedure for wall crossing the US Shareholders in
consultation with its internal lawyers and also external legal advisors. Mr Osborne was

responsible for effecting the wall crossing of the US Shareholders pursuant to this
procedure. This involved the US Shareholders agreeing to the terms of a written NDA,
following which details of the Transaction could be provided to them.

Events leading to the Punch Call on 9 June 2009

3.11. Punch had considered issuing equity in late 2008, but had been advised that an equity
issuance would not be possible due to poor market conditions. In early 2009, market
conditions improved such that equity transactions once more became a realistic
possibility.

3.12. Punch issued interim results for the first quarter of 2009 on 29 April 2009 and it then
conducted a post results road show at the beginning of May. During the road show,
several shareholders and potential investors suggested to Punch that it should consider
an equity raise.

3.13. Following the road show, on 6 May 2009, the Board of Punch gave approval for
management to consider an equity issuance. The principal purpose of the proposed
issuance was to repay Punch’s convertible bond in the sum of approximately £220
million, and also to create headroom with respect to certain covenants in Punch’s
securitisation vehicles. (Punch had three wholly owned securitisations vehicles.
Punch’s assets (i.e., the pubs) were owned by these securitisation vehicles. Income
from the securitisations (i.e., profits made by the pubs) would flow to Punch. Certain
‘tests’ or ‘covenants’ governed the flow of money from the securitisations to Punch. If
the appropriate ratio was not maintained in respect of each test, there would be
restrictions on the money that could flow to Punch. Cash raised through an equity
issuance could therefore be used to ensure the relevant ratios were maintained and that
there was no default such as to restrict money flowing from the securitisations to
Punch.)

3.14. Preparations for the Transaction were progressed in May 2009. In early June, the Board
of Punch approved certain documentation required for the Transaction and agreed that
Punch management could speak to third parties about the proposed Transaction on a
wall crossed basis.

3.15. It was decided that the US Shareholders would be wall crossed first. This was because
it was considered desirable to understand their response to the proposed equity issuance
before wall crossing others. The wall crossing procedure for the US Shareholders is
outlined at paragraph 3.10 above.

3.16. Mr Osborne was tasked with making the initial approach to wall cross the US
Shareholders as he was Punch’s lead corporate broker at the time and had met these
shareholders before. MLI internal records show that members of the deal team raised
concerns that if Punch approached the US Shareholders, there was a risk that they
would be put on notice of the Transaction before having agreed to be wall crossed.

3.17. MLI’s legal department told Mr Osborne the procedure in place for communicating
with the US Shareholders, which was to obtain their agreement to be wall crossed by
telephone, then obtain their agreement to the terms of an NDA by email and only then
to give them details of the Transaction. Mr Osborne understood that he was not to give

5

the US Shareholders specific information to suggest Punch was considering an
imminent, significant equity issuance on these initial calls, prior to the NDA being
agreed.

3.18. By the time that Mr Osborne started to make calls to ask the US Shareholders if they
would agree to be wall crossed (on 8 June), the anticipated launch date for the
Transaction was set for Friday 12 June (although in the event this was delayed by one
trading day to Monday 15 June).

3.19. On Monday 8 June 2009, Mr Osborne had a telephone conversation with an analyst at
Greenlight. He said that the call was a post road show follow up call and he raised the
subject of a possible equity issuance by Punch and asked the analyst if Greenlight
would agree to be wall crossed. The wall crossing request was referred to David
Einhorn, President and sole portfolio manager of Greenlight. Mr Einhorn would not
agree to Greenlight being wall crossed and this decision was relayed back to Mr
Osborne by the analyst. Mr Osborne attempted to persuade Greenlight to be wall
crossed, but this was not agreed and instead a call was set up for the following day
between Greenlight and Punch management on an ‘open’ basis.

3.20. In a telephone call on the morning of 9 June, Punch management sought legal advice
from their external lawyers on the Transaction regarding the call with Greenlight.
Whilst they advised that the call could proceed, the only detail of the advice given, that
Mr Osborne could recall, was that they should not give any definitive sense that a
transaction was going ahead, and should not disclose the timing, structure or pricing of
any potential transaction. Mr Osborne was party to this call between Punch
management and its lawyers, but he did not take any other steps himself to deal with
legal or regulatory risk in advance of the Punch Call. In particular, he did not consult
with MLI’s lawyers or compliance teams involved in the Transaction.

The Punch Call

3.21. Mr Osborne and Punch management participated in the Punch Call with Greenlight.
The Punch Call lasted for approximately 45 minutes and involved a considerable
amount of discussion between Punch management and Greenlight. Mr Osborne made
several key disclosures to Greenlight during the Punch Call.

3.22. Mr Osborne’s disclosures to Greenlight during the Punch Call have been assessed in the
context of the Punch Call as a whole. The context includes the information provided to
Greenlight both shortly before the Punch Call and during the Punch Call, in particular:

(i)
MLI wanted to wall cross Greenlight in relation to Punch; and

(ii)
Punch was considering a new equity issuance.

3.23. The inside information disclosed by Mr Osborne to Greenlight on the Punch Call was
that Punch was at an advanced stage of the process towards the issuance of a significant
amount of new equity, probably within a timescale of around a week, with the principal
purpose of repaying Punch’s convertible bond and creating headroom with respect to
certain covenants in Punch’s securitisation vehicles. The particular points of
information disclosed by Mr Osborne on the Punch Call are detailed below.

6

3.24. First, Mr Osborne told Greenlight that the amount of any possible issuance would need
to be about £350 million in order to repay the convertible and create 10% headroom in
the securitisations2:

Einhorn: So would you – as you pencil that out, what do those amounts turn out
to be?

Osborne: Something like 350 sterling

Einhorn: 350 million sterling?

Osborne: If you were – if you were roughly to sort of work on the basis that you
kinda took out the – the converts and that’s something that gives you,
say 10 percent headroom in within both of the covenants, filed
covenants.

3.25. Accordingly, Mr Osborne disclosed that the principal purpose of the issuance would be
to repay the convertible bond and create headroom in the securitisations, and that the
sum of issuance being considered was of a very significant size; Punch was not
considering a small equity issuance in the sum of, for instance, around £50 million.
Whilst he did not state that the figure was definitive, the information he disclosed
indicated that the issuance would be of considerable size compared to Punch’s market
capitalisation. (Punch’s market capitalisation at the time of the Punch Call was
approximately £400 million.)

3.26. Second, Mr Osborne disclosed to Greenlight that an NDA would be likely to last for
less than a week. He offered to give Mr Einhorn a “timeframe” in respect of the NDA,
and when questioned by Mr Einhorn on what that would be Mr Osborne stated “Well,
within less than a, kind of a week.”3

3.27. Whilst an NDA does not confirm that a transaction is definitely going to take place
within a certain time scale, it does disclose anticipated timing and, in these
circumstances, it disclosed that the Transaction was at an advanced stage.

3.28. Third, Mr Osborne disclosed to Greenlight that Punch was consulting with all of its
major shareholders, and that there was broad support for an equity issuance, thus also
indicating that the Transaction was at an advanced stage and likely to proceed4:

2 Transcript of the Punch Call, page 16.
3 Transcript of the Punch Call, page 30.


4 Transcript of the Punch Call, pages 31 & 32.

7

Really it’s fair to say like, consulting with all of the – the major shareholders in
terms of taking, you know, taking into account their views…

…a number of people have sort of signed NDAs because we had a bit more open
conv- conversations…

…I think it’s fair to say that, you know, broadly, mostly all the shareholders are
supportive…

3.29. Mr Osborne’s reference to other NDAs further indicated that the Transaction was likely
to take place within a short period of time.

3.30. In isolation, none of the above points would (in the context of the Punch Call) amount
to inside information. However, taken together these points did constitute inside
information particularly because they disclosed the purpose and anticipated size and
timing of the Transaction.

3.31. Despite assertions made during the call by Punch management that they were
considering their options and that no formal decisions had been made, this did not
detract from the essential information disclosed during the call, namely that they were at
an advanced stage of the process towards the issuance of a significant amount of new
equity, probably within the timescale of around a week, with the principal purpose of
repaying Punch’s convertible bond and creating headroom with respect to certain
covenants in Punch’s securitisation vehicles.

Notice of sale of shares by Greenlight after the Punch Call, prior to the
announcement of the Transaction

3.32. On 11 June, Mr Osborne was specifically informed by Punch management that
Greenlight had sold a significant number of shares in Punch on the preceding days.

3.33. Mr Osborne took no action to address the risk that Greenlight was selling on the basis
of the Punch Call and, consequentially, he failed to address the possibility that market
abuse was taking place.

3.34. On Monday 15 June an RNS was released by Punch announcing the Transaction.
Punch informed the market of its intention to raise approximately £375 million by
means of a firm placing and open offer of new ordinary shares. It also announced its
intention to make a tender offer to holders of the convertible bond to purchase any or all
of the bonds at a purchase price of not less than 95% (as a percentage of nominal
principal amount outstanding).

3.35. Following the announcement of the Transaction, the price of Punch’s shares fell by
29.9%. Greenlight’s trading had avoided losses of approximately £5.8 million.

4.
FAILINGS

4.1. Relevant statutory provisions and regulatory guidance are set out in Annex 1.


4.2. Mr Osborne’s behaviour fell within section 118(1)(a) of the Act, in that he disclosed
information about Punch shares:

(i)
shares in Punch are qualifying investments; and

(ii)
shares in Punch are traded on a prescribed market, the London Stock Exchange.

4.3. Mr Osborne’s behaviour amounted to market abuse by way of improper disclosure in
breach of section 118(3) of the Act:

(i)
Mr Osborne was an insider;

(ii)
Mr Osborne disclosed inside information; and

(iii) the disclosure was not in the proper course of his employment, profession or
duties.

4.4. Mr Osborne was an insider because he had inside information as a result of having
access to information through the exercise of his employment as a Managing Director
in corporate broking at MLI.

4.5. The information disclosed by Mr Osborne met the statutory requirements of inside
information, namely:

(i)
the information related to Punch and to Punch shares;

(ii)
the information was precise because:

(a)
it indicated an event (i.e., the issue of new shares) that may reasonably
have been expected to occur (see paragraphs 4.7-4.10 below); and

(b)
it was specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the
possible effect of the share issuance on the price of Punch shares (see
paragraphs 4.11-4.14 below);

(iii)
the information was not generally available (see paragraphs 4.15-4.16 below);
and

(iv)
the information was likely to have a significant effect on the price of Punch
shares as it was information which a reasonable investor would be likely to use
as part of the basis of his investment decisions (see paragraph 4.17 below).

4.6. Mr Osborne did not make the disclosures within the proper course of his employment,
profession or duties.

The information indicated an event may reasonably have been expected to occur

4.7. The information disclosed by Mr Osborne was sufficiently precise to indicate that a
share issuance may reasonably be expected to occur. It was not necessary for Mr

Osborne to disclose that the Transaction was definitely going to proceed and, indeed,
the Transaction was not a certainty at the time of the disclosures.

4.8. Mr Osborne told Greenlight the likely amount of the issuance and the purpose of the
issuance, that an NDA would last for less than a week, that Punch was consulting with
all of the major shareholders and that other shareholders had signed an NDA and
shareholders were broadly supportive of Punch issuing equity. These points together
indicated that an equity issuance may reasonably be expected to occur.

4.9. The information provided, that an NDA would last less than a week, is particularly
relevant in that it gave a clear indication as to the expected timing of the Transaction.
When a firm wall crosses investors, a transaction is usually close to launch. Firms do
not wall cross investors for more than a short period of time prior to the intended launch
date of a transaction and it is usually one of the latter stages in the transaction process.
Thus, at the time of wall crossing third parties, there is no absolute certainty that a
transaction will go ahead, however, it is the case that a transaction is likely to be at an
advanced stage of preparation. Mr Osborne’s disclosure that the NDA would last for
less than a week, together with the other pieces of information he disclosed, provided a
clear indication that the Transaction was at an advanced stage, probably within a
timescale of around a week.

4.10. The information disclosed by Mr Osborne was sufficient to indicate that an equity
issuance might reasonably be expected to occur, especially when viewed in the context
of the Punch Call generally.

The information was specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the
possible effect of the Transaction on the price of Punch shares

4.11. With regard to the price sensitivity of the information, the information given by Mr
Osborne about the size and purpose of the issuance was sufficient to allow a conclusion
to be drawn as to its possible effect on the price of Punch shares.

4.12. The conclusion could be drawn that when the Transaction was announced it would have
an effect on the price, and that if there were such an effect it would be to reduce the
price.

4.13. Whilst in some situations equity issuances may cause the share price to go up, the most
likely effect of this size of equity issuance by Punch, at this time and for the given
reasons was to cause the share price to fall. The particular factors to note are:

(i)
the market was not expecting the issuance so it was not factored into the share
price; in particular, the interim results released by Punch 6 weeks previously
had indicated that Punch was financially on track and that it was focussing on a
strategy of “self help”;

(ii)
the anticipated size of the issue was a large amount of equity in relation to
Punch’s market capitalisation;

(iii)
the money was to be used to pay off debt and create headroom in relation to
the securitisations in order to avoid a breach of covenants, but would still leave
Punch with substantial debt;

(iv)
the money was not being used to make an acquisition or some other such
purpose that might boost the share price; and

(v)
Punch’s share price had significantly recovered from its low of 32p in March
2009 and Punch was not in a position where the only possible reaction to the
issuance was for the share price to increase.

4.14. In these circumstances, it was predictable that the share price would fall. The
information disclosed by Mr Osborne was therefore specific enough to enable a
conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of the issuance on the price of Punch
shares.

The information was not generally available


4.15. Whilst there was some speculation in the market that Punch may have to raise capital
by way of new equity in or around 2009, there was no certainty as to whether Punch
would announce this type of transaction. Press releases and public statements from
Punch indicated that it was pursuing a strategy of “self help” by disposing of assets and
buying back debt at a discount in the market.

4.16. There was no generally available information regarding the timing, size and support for
the Transaction and these factors could not have been deduced by market participants
from public information. Therefore, it was not generally available information that
Punch was at an advanced stage of the process towards the issuance of a significant
amount of new equity, probably within a timescale of around a week, with the principal
purpose of repaying Punch’s convertible bond and creating headroom with respect to
certain covenants in Punch’s securitisation vehicles.

The information was likely to have a significant effect on price as it was
information which a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis
of his investment decisions

4.17. It follows from the analysis at paragraphs 4.11–4.14 above that a reasonable investor
would be likely to use the information disclosed by Mr Osborne as part of the basis of
his investment decisions.

5.
SANCTION

5.1. DEPP 6.1.2 sets out that the principal purpose of imposing a financial penalty is to
promote high standards of regulatory and market conduct by deterring persons who
have committed breaches from committing further breaches, helping to deter other
persons from committing similar breaches and demonstrating generally the benefits of
compliant behaviour.

5.2. In enforcing the market abuse regime, the FSA’s priority is to protect prescribed
markets from any damage to their fairness and efficiency. Effective and appropriate use
of the power to impose penalties for market abuse will help to maintain confidence in
the UK financial system by demonstrating that high standards of market conduct are
enforced in the UK financial markets. The public enforcement of these standards also
furthers public awareness of the FSA’s statutory objective of the protection of
consumers, as well as deterring potential future market abuse.

5.3. DEPP 6.2.2 sets out a number of factors to be taken into account when the FSA decides
whether to take action in respect of market abuse. They are not exhaustive, but include
the nature and seriousness of the behaviour, the degree of sophistication of the users of
the market in question, the size and liquidity of the market and the susceptibility of the
market to market abuse. Other factors include action taken by the FSA in similar cases,
the impact that any financial penalty or public statement may have on financial markets
or on the interests of consumers and the disciplinary record and general compliance
history of the person concerned.

5.4. DEPP 6.4 sets out a number of factors to be taken into account when the FSA decides
whether to impose a financial penalty or issue a public censure. They are not exhaustive
but include deterrent effect, whether a person has made a profit or loss by his
misconduct, the seriousness of the behaviour and the FSA’s approach in similar
previous cases.

5.5. DEPP 6.5 (as it applied during the relevant period) sets out some of the factors that may
be taken into account when the FSA determines the level of a financial penalty that is
appropriate and proportionate to the misconduct. They are not exhaustive, but include
deterrence, the nature, seriousness and impact of the misconduct, the extent to which
the breach was deliberate or reckless, whether the person on whom the penalty is to be
imposed is an individual, his status, position and responsibilities, financial resources
and other circumstances, the amount of any benefit gained or loss avoided, the
difficulty of detecting the breach, the disciplinary record and compliance history of the
person and the action that the FSA has taken in relation to similar misconduct by other
persons.

5.6. The FSA has taken all of the circumstances of this case into account and considered the
guidance in DEPP 6 in deciding that it is appropriate in this case to take action in
respect of behaviour amounting to market abuse, that the imposition of a financial
penalty is appropriate and that the level of financial penalty is appropriate and
proportionate.

5.7. The FSA has had particular regard to the following circumstances in relation to Mr
Osborne’s behaviour:

(i)
Mr Osborne was an experienced corporate broker in a position of considerable
responsibility. He had significant wall crossing experience. He understood the
market abuse provisions in the Act and understood the nature of the type of
information that could be inside information;

(ii)
Mr Osborne knew and understood MLI’s internal policies regarding wall
crossings and the protection of inside information. He knew and understood the

specific wall crossing procedures in place regarding the Transaction for the US
Shareholders, in particular, that details about the Transaction should not be
disclosed without agreement to the terms of a written NDA;

(iii) bearing in mind the fact that Greenlight had refused to be wall crossed and that, as
a result, significant legal and regulatory risk arose from a conversation proceeding
between Punch management and Greenlight, Mr Osborne should have taken great
care regarding the information he disclosed, and taken adequate steps to ensure
that he complied with regulatory requirements. He did not do so. Further, despite
the evident risk arising from the Punch Call, he did not refer the contents of the
call to senior management, internal compliance or legal personnel at MLI, as a
matter of potential concern;

(iv) Mr Osborne was trusted in his role as the gatekeeper of inside information. By
disclosing inside information to Greenlight he compromised the integrity of the
market, thereby damaging market confidence;

(v)
shortly after the Punch Call, Mr Osborne was put on notice that Greenlight was
selling its shares in Punch. He took no steps to raise the contents of the Punch
Call and the subsequent sale of shares by Greenlight with MLI’s senior
management, legal or compliance personnel. It should have been obvious to Mr
Osborne that Greenlight may have been selling due to the information received
during the Punch Call, and at the very least he should have reconsidered the
situation in light of the selling, yet he took no steps to address the risk of market
abuse;

(vi) the improper disclosure by Mr Osborne was not deliberate or reckless;

(vii) in disclosing inside information, Mr Osborne did not intend or expect Greenlight
to deal on the basis of that information. Indeed, Greenlight’s sale of Punch shares
was contrary to the interests of Punch and potentially detrimental to the
Transaction; and

(viii) Mr Osborne did not stand to gain any personal financial benefit through
Greenlight’s sale of Punch shares.

5.8. It is also noted that Mr Osborne voluntarily attended an FSA interview under caution.
Further, he has not previously been the subject of an adverse finding by the FSA.

5.9. In the circumstances, the FSA has decided to impose a financial penalty on Mr Osborne
of £350,000.

6.
REPRESENTATIONS AND FINDINGS

6.1. Below is a brief summary of the key written and oral representations made by Mr
Osborne in this matter and how they have been dealt with. In making the decision
which gave rise to the obligation to give this notice, the FSA has taken into account all
of Mr Osborne’s representations, whether or not explicitly set out below.

Greenlight’s knowledge prior to the Punch Call

6.2. Mr Osborne made representations that:

(i)
prior to the Punch Call, Greenlight knew that an equity issuance was an option
that Punch was considering, in which other shareholders had shown an interest.
Greenlight also knew that an NDA was being offered to some investors.
Taking into account the information already known to Greenlight prior to the
Punch call, along with the information provided to Greenlight on the call by
Punch’s management, on the Punch Call Mr Osborne did not add significantly
to the sum total of information already known to Greenlight;

(ii)
some of the information which Mr Osborne is criticised for revealing is the
same information revealed by Punch management earlier on the call. It is
unfair to criticise Mr Osborne for revealing information already revealed by
Punch management. Mr Osborne could only ‘disclose’ information by
revealing previously unknown information; and

(iii)
overall, although Mr Osborne may have reinforced the impression that an
equity issuance was imminent, his statements on the Punch Call did not go so
far as to constitute inside information.

6.3. The FSA has found that:

(i)
although Greenlight were made aware of some information regarding a
possible equity issuance by Punch prior to the Punch Call, and on the call itself
by management, Mr Osborne’s statements, taken together and in the context of
the call, disclosed to Greenlight for the first time the inside information that
Punch was at an advanced stage of the process towards the issuance of a
significant amount of new equity, probably within a timescale of around a
week, with the principal purpose of repaying Punch’s convertible bond and
creating headroom with respect to certain covenants in Punch’s securitisation
vehicles;

(ii)
information can be disclosed to an individual to whom that information has
already been revealed. Even if the information is the same, the mere fact that
another person has stated it may lend credence to its veracity. Further, it may
carry more weight depending on by whom it is disclosed. In any event, in this
case, notwithstanding the information of which Greenlight was already aware,
Mr Osborne disclosed to them the inside information for the first time; and

(iii)
as set out above, Mr Osborne’s disclosures constituted inside information.

Reasonable expectation

6.4. Mr Osborne made representations that:

(i)
He did not have a reasonable expectation of an equity issuance at the time of
the Punch Call and, as a matter of fact, he does not believe that there was a
reasonable expectation of an equity issuance at the time which he could have
disclosed. As at the time of the Punch Call there was significant uncertainty as

to whether an equity issuance would proceed, and what form it would take if it
did. A lot depended on shareholder feedback – negative feedback from the
largest shareholders could potentially have prevented any issuance. Bearing in
mind the only definitively known views at the time were largely negative, in
Mr Osborne’s view it was more likely than not that no issuance would take
place; and

(ii)
although it may have been possible for Greenlight to have formed a reasonable
expectation of an equity issuance on the basis of the information conveyed to
Greenlight on the Punch Call (by both Mr Osborne and Punch management), it
is not fair to blame Mr Osborne alone for this. The £350m stated by Mr
Osborne was just one possible scenario, and stating that there would be a one-
week timetable for an NDA was a perfectly proper attempt to persuade
Greenlight to be wall crossed – it is common to give a timeframe for an NDA.
Further, it was stated repeatedly on the call that the discussion was high-level
and conceptual. Mr Osborne did not believe that a reasonable expectation had
been conveyed to Mr Einhorn.

6.5. The FSA has found that:

(i)
although the equity issuance was not certain to occur, at the time of the Punch
Call, taking into account among other factors the advanced stage of preparation
of the transaction, it was reasonably expected to occur. Bearing in mind his
knowledge of this, the FSA finds that Mr Osborne had a reasonable
expectation that it would occur; and

(ii)
Greenlight formed a reasonable expectation of an equity issuance specifically
on the basis of Mr Osborne’s comments on the call, notwithstanding Punch
management’s comments that the discussion was high-level and conceptual.
Mr Osborne’s comments taken together, and in the context of the Punch Call
and the background to it, indicated that an equity issuance was reasonably
expected to occur.

Specific information

6.6. Mr Osborne made representations that the information he disclosed was not ‘specific’
within the meaning of section 118C of FSMA. It did not include details regarding the
structure, terms or pricing of any equity issuance. It was therefore not possible to draw
the conclusion that the effect the equity issuance would be to cause a fall in the price of
Punch shares. This was a possible outcome, but a price rise was also possible. Further a
reasonable investor would not use the information as part of the basis for an investment
decision, as they would require more information to do so.

6.7. The FSA has found that, taking into account Punch’s circumstances and the information
about it which was already generally available, the information disclosed, which
included the anticipated size, purpose and timing of an equity issuance, contained
sufficient detail to enable the conclusion to be drawn that the effect on the share price
would be a decrease. The information was therefore ‘specific’.

Section 123 of the Act

6.8. Mr Osborne made representations that:

(i)
he approached the Punch Call with considerable caution. He had the benefit
before the call of internal legal advice as well as advice from MLI’s and
Punch’s respective external legal advisers – the latter immediately prior to the
Punch Call. Overall the advice was to say that no decisions had been made -
the participants could discuss a possible equity issuance, but not details
(structure, terms and pricing) or indicate that it was definitely going ahead. Mr
Osborne followed this advice. Mr Osborne cannot waive MLI’s or Punch’s
privilege in relation to the advice. Without it the FSA cannot conclude that he
acted contrary to it – there is no evidence that he acted inconsistently with the
advice received. It should be assumed that, on the basis of the advice, Mr
Osborne’s approach to the Punch Call was proper, and that he had the best
intent;

(ii)
MLI senior management were aware of the Punch Call before and after it took
place, and there were a number of experienced professionals on the call, none
of whom raised any concerns about the information disclosed, even when
Greenlight’s sale of Punch shares became known; and

(iii)
therefore, having obtained legal advice on the initial approach to shareholders
and on the specific scope of the Punch Call, and having acted consistently with
that advice, in the knowledge of MLI senior management and in the proper
course of his employment, Mr Osborne took all reasonable precautions and
exercised all due diligence to avoid, and believed on reasonable grounds that
his behaviour did not amount to, market abuse.

6.9. The FSA has found that:

(i)
Mr Osborne’s comments on the Punch Call demonstrate that he was not
sufficiently cautious in his approach. The FSA makes no findings about the
legal advice received, in respect of which privilege has been claimed by the
respective parties and to which the FSA has therefore not been able to give any
weight. To the extent that the advice was that Mr Osborne should not disclose
that an equity issuance was proceeding, or give details about it, in the FSA’s
view he did not follow the advice. Further, he did not consult with any
compliance or legal advisers following the call;

(ii)
as an approved person holding a senior position within MLI Mr Osborne had a
duty not to disclose inside information on the call, and to consider for himself
whether Greenlight’s trading was cause for concern. He failed in both of these
duties;

(iii)
therefore the defences set out in section 123 of the Act are not available to Mr
Osborne in this case.

6.10. Mr Osborne made representations that the penalty to be imposed on him is
disproportionate in the circumstances, and inconsistent with those imposed in other
FSA cases. This is particularly so given that his behaviour was not deliberate or
reckless, and that he did not stand to gain any personal benefit from it. His behaviour
did not even demonstrate a lack of care; at worst it was an error of judgement – an
honest mistake made under pressure in the course of a difficult phone call at a tough
time in the market, and which no one else noticed either, as no single comment
constituted inside information. At worst his behaviour falls at the least serious end of
the spectrum, and it would not be fair to apply a ‘means test’ based on income.

6.11. The FSA has found that the penalty imposed on Mr Osborne must be sufficient to act as
a deterrent to other individuals of equivalent seniority, performing controlled functions
at firms which are recognised as significant market participants, whose actions are
fundamental to market integrity. In circumstances such as those of this case, an error of
judgement can have an extremely serious impact on the markets. Mr Osborne’s actions,
though inadvertent, constituted the improper disclosure of inside information to a major
shareholder, widely followed in the market, of a large publicly listed company, which
had significant market-wide ramifications. The FSA therefore considers that a
significant penalty is warranted.

7. DECISION MAKER

7.1.
The decision which gave rise to the obligation to give this Final Notice was made by
the Regulatory Decisions Committee.

8. IMPORTANT

8.1.
This Final Notice is given to Mr Osborne in accordance with section 390 of the Act.

Manner and time for payment

8.2.
The financial penalty must be paid in full by Mr Osborne to the FSA by no later than
29 February 2012, being 14 days after the date of this Final Notice.

If the financial penalty is not paid

8.3.
If all or any of the financial penalty is outstanding on 1 March 2012 the FSA may
recover the outstanding amount as a debt owed by Mr Osborne and due to the FSA.

8.4.
Section 391(4), (6) and (7) of FSMA apply to the publication of information about the
matter to which this Final Notices relates. Under those provisions, the FSA must
publish such information about the matter to which the Final Notice relates as the FSA
considers appropriate. The information may be published in such manner as the FSA
considers appropriate. However, the FSA may not publish information if such

publication would, in the opinion of the FSA, be unfair to you or prejudicial to the
interests of the consumers.

8.5.
The FSA intends to publish such information about the matter to which this Final
Notice relates as it considers appropriate.

8.6.
For more information concerning this matter generally, you should contact either
Helena Varney (direct line: 020 7066 1294) or Sadaf Hussain (direct line: 020 7066
5768) at the FSA.

Matthew Nunan
Acting Head of Department
FSA Enforcement and Financial Crime Division


ANNEX 1

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND REGULATORY GUIDANCE

Statutory provisions

1.
Market Abuse is defined at Section 118(1) of the Act as follows:

For the purposes of this Act, market abuse is behaviour (whether by one person
alone or by two or more persons jointly or in concert) which:-
(a) occurs in relation to - (i) qualifying investments admitted to trading on a
prescribed market …and
(b) falls within any one or more of the types of behaviour set out in subsections
(2) to (8).

2.
Section 118(3) sets out the behaviour that will amount to improper disclosure:

…where an insider discloses inside information to another person otherwise than
in the proper course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties.

3.
Section 118B of the Act provides as follows:

… an insider is any person who has inside information:…
(c) as a result of having access to the information through the exercise of his
employment, profession or duties.


4.
Section 118C(2) sets out the requirements for information to be inside information:


Inside information is information of a precise nature which:
(a) is not generally available;
(b) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of the qualifying
investments or to one of more of the qualifying investments;
(c) would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the price
of the qualifying investments.


5.
Section 118C(5) states that information will be precise if it:

(a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected to come into
existence or an event that has occurred or may reasonably be expected to occur,
and
(b) is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect
of those circumstances or that event on the price of qualifying investments or
related investments.

6.
Section 118C(8) of the Act states that:

Information which can be obtained by way of research or analysis conducted by,
or on behalf of, users of a market is to be regarded, for the purposes of this Part,
as being generally available to them.

7.
Section 118C(6) of the Act sets out when the information will have a significant effect
on price:

Information would be likely to have a significant effect on price if and only if it is
information of a kind which a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part
of the basis of his investment decisions.

8.
Section 123(1) of the Act states:

If the Authority is satisfied that a person (“A”)—

(a) is or has engaged in market abuse, or
(b) by taking or refraining from taking any action has required or encouraged
another person or persons to engage in behaviour which, if engaged in by A,
would amount to market abuse,

it may impose on him a penalty of such amount as it considers appropriate.

9.
Section 123(2) of the Act states that the Authority may not impose a penalty for
market abuse in certain circumstances:

But the Authority may not impose a penalty on a person if … there are reasonable
grounds for it to be satisfied that –
(a) he believed, on reasonable grounds, that his behaviour did not fall within
paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1), or
(b) he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid
behaving in a way which fell within paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection.

The Code of Market Conduct

10.
The FSA has issued the Code of Market Conduct (“MAR”) pursuant to section 119 of
the Act. In deciding to take the action set out in this notice, the FSA has had regard to
MAR and other guidance published in the FSA Handbook.

11.
MAR 1.2.3 G states that it is not a requirement of the Act that the person who engaged
in the behaviour amounting to market abuse intended to commit market abuse.

12.
MAR 1.2.9 G states that in order for an individual to be an insider under subsection
118B(c) of the Act, it is not necessary for the person concerned to know that the
information in question is inside information

13.
MAR 1.2.12 E sets out factors that are to be taken into account in determining
whether or not information is generally available, each of which indicate that the
information is generally available (and therefore that it is not inside information):

•
Whether the information has been disclosed to a prescribed market through a
regulatory information service or otherwise in accordance with the rules of the
market.

•
Whether the information is contained in records which are open to inspection
by the public.

•
Whether the information is otherwise generally available, including through
the Internet, or some other publication (including if it is only available on
payment of a fee), or is derived from information which has been made public.

•
Whether the information can be obtained by observation by members of the
public without infringing rights or obligations of privacy, property or
confidentiality; and

•
The extent to which the information can be obtained by analysing or
developing other information which is generally available.

13.
MAR 1.2.13 E states that in relation to the factors it sets out, information is “generally
available” even if only available outside the UK. Further, information is “generally
available” even if the observation or analysis is only achievable by a person with
above average financial resources, expertise or competence (other than in relation to
information contained in records open to inspection by the public).

14.
MAR 1.4.5 E and 1.4.6 G set out factors that indicate a disclosure has been made in
the proper course of employment, profession or duties:

•
whether the disclosure is permitted by the rules of a
, of the
prescribed market

FSA or the
; or
Takeover Code


•
whether the disclosure is accompanied by the imposition of confidentiality
requirements upon the
to whom the disclosure is made and is:
person


(a) reasonable and is to enable a
to perform the proper functions of his
person

employment, profession or duties; or

(b) reasonable and is (for example, to a professional adviser) for the purposes
of facilitating or seeking or giving advice about a transaction or
;
takeover bid

or

(c) reasonable and is for the purpose of facilitating any commercial, financial
or
transaction (including prospective underwriters or placees of
investment

securities); or

(d) reasonable and is for the purpose of obtaining a commitment or expression
of support in relation to an
which is subject to the
; or
offer
Takeover Code


(e) in fulfilment of a legal obligation, including to
representatives or
employee

trade unions acting on their behalf ; or

•
whether:

(a) the information disclosed is
;
trading information

(b) the disclosure is made by a person ("A") only to the extent necessary, and
solely in order, to offer to dispose of the
to, or acquire the
investment

investment from, the
receiving the information; and
person

(c) it is reasonable for A to make the disclosure to enable him to perform the
proper functions of his employment, profession or duties.

Decision Procedures and Penalties Manual

15.
Section 123(1) of the Act authorises the FSA to impose financial penalties in cases of
market abuse. Section 124 of the Act requires the FSA to issue a statement of its
policy with respect to the imposition of penalties for market abuse and the amount of
such penalties. The FSA’s policy in this regard is contained in Chapter 6 of the
Decision Procedures and Penalties Manual (“DEPP”).

16.
In deciding whether to exercise its power under section 123 in the case of any
particular behaviour, the FSA must have regard to this statement of policy. Therefore,
in determining the penalty to be imposed on Mr Osborne, the FSA has had regard to
DEPP 6 as it applied in June 2009.

ANNEX 2

TRANSCRIPT OF THE PUNCH CALL

Transcript of telephone call on 9 June 2009 between Punch management, Andrew Osborne
(MLI), David Einhorn and Analyst (Greenlight Capital Inc)1

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
All right. How do you dial a…?

DAVID EINHORN:
Oh no, no. I said I wouldn’t [overspeaking] do it.

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
We might have to call Ten Holter to have him conference

in. He’s really smart dialling.

OPERATOR:
Thank you for calling Merrill Lynch conferencing. Please

enter your passcode followed by the “#” sign.

OPERATOR:
After the tone, please record your name.

DAVID EINHORN:
Greenlight…Greenlight…

OPERATOR:
Has joined the conference.

PUNCH CEO:
Hi.

1 Unkown to Mr Einhorn and Greenlight Capital Inc, the call also included two bankers as silent participants.

DAVID EINHORN:
Hello, good morning.

PUNCH CEO:
[Reference to Greenlight Analyst].

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
Yes, good morning.

PUNCH CEO:
Good morning! Well, afternoon our time, morning your

time. How are you?

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
Good. David’s here with me.

PUNCH CEO:
Good.

DAVID EINHORN:
Hello. I’m sorry I didn’t get to see you.

PUNCH CEO:
Hi David.

DAVID EINHORN:
Hi, I’m sorry I didn’t get to see you when you were in New

York.

PUNCH CEO:
No, no, we -- well, we’ve -- we’ve only had the chance to

speak once, although we have seen [reference to Greenlight

Analyst] a few times since then.

DAVID EINHORN:
Oh, you’re -- you’re -- you’re getting more than -- than I

could help with anyway. So, this is good.

PUNCH CEO:
Okay. That’s fair enough. Well, one day we’ll get you

around on a pub crawl around some English pubs.

DAVID EINHORN:
Oh, that sounds fun.

PUNCH CEO:
It is. You’re right. This -- we thought we could just take

the opportunity to have a chat with you following I think

the conversation you had with our broker at Merrill Lynch

just about, you know, sort of where we are in terms of our

position in the market, etc. You’ll have noticed today that

we now have sold 11 pubs to Greene King as well so, you

know, we’re making good progress on our strategy. But we

think that, you know, it’s worth at least discussing in

principle the -- you know, where that takes us, and what

other options we might have.

DAVID EINHORN:
Okay.

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
[whispering - inaudible].

PUNCH CEO:
So, you know, what we -- what we said at the time of the

prelims, and we reiterated it for the interim, is that we still

expect to upstream cash from the Punch A and Punch B

securitisations in this fiscal year together with the money

that we’re generating from selling assets from the parent

company down into the group. You know, there is a fair

chance that we will be able to achieve the repayment of the

convertible that’s due in December 2010. However, we’ve

always said that there are very large moving parts in this

and there is a, you know -- there is a potential so that that

isn’t achieved. And although the potential and the size of

the -- of any shortfall is small, we have to keep that in -- we

have to keep monitoring that situation. And moreover, as

we -- you know, as we do this process, obviously we’ve got

to keep one eye on the securitisations as well, because it’s

all very well up streaming cash to the parent company to

meet the convertible, but it would be frankly pointless if we

paid the convertible off only to breach either technically or

otherwise the covenants in Punch A or - or Punch B. So

it’s – it’s finite. The – there some specific advantages that

we’ve taken -- some -- some specific things that we’ve

taken advantage of in the last year which we can’t

guarantee going forward, and -- and so we really sort of --

sort of, you know, think about what other things we can

consider. I’m gonna give you some examples. So we’ve

been very proactive on the buy back of debt. We bought

back over 400 million pounds worth of debt. In fact, that’s

up almost 100 million since the last time we -- we were --

we spoke, and we continue to buy pubs and, you know,

excluding the announcement today -- the announcement

that we’ve made thus far, we’ve increased the number of

pubs bought from 170 to over 300.

DAVID EINHORN:
Sold.

PUNCH CEO:
Sold, sorry, sorry. It’s already sold, yeah. So, I mean, I

think that’s where we are. Having said that with all of the -

- the moving parts, you know, we are -- we are seriously

thinking about, you know, how we could actually better it.

There’s one other thing which is probably important is

whilst we’ve been buying back debt at a - at a substantial

discount and we continue to believe that’s readily available

in the marketplace, we’ve been able to take advantage of

tax structuring to ensure that that discount is tax free. That

tax structuring will have to change in October to maintain

that. And whilst we’re confident that we can maintain that,

we’re not 100 percent sure, and that would obviously make

any -- any -- any buy back to debt in the short -- in due

course, more expensive.

So, that’s where we stand, and then we think in the

circumstances therefore that, you know, it’s -- it’s only

right that we consider what other things we could do. And,

you know, given the market -- given the reaction of the

market to the interim results, there are a number of

alternatives that we -- we -- we think we can consider, and

we just wanted to gauge your opinion.

DAVID EINHORN:
Great. I’m not sure whether you’re asking what opinion

you’re asking about though. Is it that -- that you’re asking

about issuing equity or you’re asking about something else?

PUNCH CEO:
Well, we’re just talking about in general terms, about where

we are at the moment in terms of what we’ve achieved so

far.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah.

PUNCH CEO:
And, you know, where you are in terms of your position as

-- as shareholders.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right.

ANDREW OSBORNE:
I think it’s fair to say, David, that following the road show,

there’s been a degree of [inaudible] in bound queries from

both shareholders and non-holders [overspeaking] who

believe that it would be appropriate for the company to

consider issuing equity at this moment in time, which is the

conversation I had with [reference to Greenlight Analyst]

yesterday --.

DAVID EINHORN:
All right.

ANDREW OSBORNE:
-- and so, you know, we wanted to -- to follow up on that.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right. You know, it seems to me that -- that much of the

potential attractiveness of coming and selling equity at this

point stems from probably the fact that a few months ago

the equity was at 40 pence, and now it’s at a £1.60 or

something like this. And so, it’s up from the bottom. On

the other hand, if you look back a couple of years ago, it’s -

- the equity is really down a lot. It trades at a very low

multiple of the book value and, you know, the comp – the

company -- the equity continues to trade as if it’s really an

option on the debt side of the capital structure. That’s --

that’s the way that we look at it. And we think it’s a very

cheap option because of the types of things that you’ve

been -- already been able to execute on, and I think that

you’re going to be likely to be able to execute on, uh, going

forward. I think that in -- if the equity was -- was

overpriced and you had an opportunity to reduce the

financial risk of the company, I think it would make some

sense to considering equity at that point. But I think, if you

just looked in a slightly different world and thought “Jeez”,

if the stock had come from where it was and it had never

gone to 40 pence but instead was sitting at 1.60, then 1.60

represented a new low, down from whatever previous

higher price it had used to have been at, I don’t even think

you would be considering selling equity at this point. And

-- and so, I think the mere fact that the stock went to some

lower price is not reason to -- to dilute the -- to dilute the

equity in a substantial way, you know, at this time. The --

the next point would relate to, I guess, the amount, and I

guess that would look -- you could look at that two ways. I

suppose if it was a very small amount of equity being

raised it would not be all that dilutive, and so there

wouldn’t be a reason to have a very big concern about it.

But, on the other hand, if there was a small amount of

equity that was being raised, it wouldn’t really solve any of

the company’s intermediate or longer term risks. And if

there’s a large amount of equity to be raised, well, then it’s

massively dilutive, then it -- it will dramatically -- I -- from

my perspective, worsen the risk/reward from -- from

owning the stock. So, I -- I would -- I would suggest

continuing executing what you’re doing right now, which

seems to be doing very well. I agree with you, it seems like

there’s going to be a lot of debt in different parts of the

capital structure that seems like it’s going to be available at

attractive prices, and I -- and I wouldn’t allow myself to get

browbeaten by convertible bondholders or, excuse me,

Merrill Lynch investment bankers or whatever else, you

know, that -- that is more transaction oriented. I think we

create a tremendous amount of value by selling, you know,

by selling pubs at reasonable multiples of EBITDA and

then repurchasing debt at big discounts, and we’re hoping

as equity participants not to make 10 or 15 percent of a

year, you know, as market equity, but we’re looking for a

significant revaluation of this company on the basis that at

some point the world looks at it and says, “Yes, you are --

you -- you -- you have -- you are clearly solvent, and you

clearly deserve some kind of a multiple,” and -- and the

thing that would cut that off would be issuing so many

equity shares that, you know, that – that -- that the upside

disappears.

PUNCH CEO:
Yeah, David. That’s very -- very helpful. Just in terms of

-- firstly I completely agree with you in terms of the -- the

option, the – the effective implied value attributed to the --

to the equity, the option versus the debt side of the capital

structure. And therein lies the conundrum in a -- in a sense

that -- that of course that -- that option value at 40p was

pure option value. Now, there is at least some expectation

that we might survive despite people’s better expectations

back in, say, January February.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right, right.

7

PUNCH CEO:
In terms of – in terms of [overspeaking].

DAVID EINHORN:
I -- I would -- sorry. I would say as a -- I would say as a

rule of thumb, if the market capitalisation of the equity is

less than half of the face value of the debt, the -- the stock

remains sort of in an option area.

PUNCH CEO:
Well, the only - the only challenge to that is -- for the

entirety of our value – of our time as a public company, that

has been the case.

DAVID EINHORN:
Mm hmm. I don’t know if that’s really true. Is that really

true?

PUNCH CEO:
Yeah, yeah, I mean even -- even when our share price was,

you know, just over 2, 2.5 billion, you know, the mark --

the market cap value of the debt was over 4.5 billion.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah, and that’s about -- then you’re right. Then -- then

you had just crossed through the -- the cusp which is of

course why -- the stock was at risk to go down, you know,

much more than [overspeaking] as it changed.

PUNCH CEO:
Well -- well -- well, I don’t necessarily disagree with that

either –

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah.

PUNCH CEO:
-- because at that time, I was one of the few shareholders,

and in fact I was challenged by somebody who said that I

thought that there was, you know, considerable -- there was

too much hype in the -- in the share prices at the time, but

in -- in terms of just a couple of the other points you made

–

DAVID EINHORN:
We weren’t --

DAVID EINHORN:
-- we weren’t involved at that point, so I really don’t –

honestly, I don’t really know.

PUNCH CEO:
I -- I totally appreciate that and I, you know, I appreciate

your -- your -- your involvement as a shareholder. In terms

of the -- in terms of the -- the point about the share prices…

the 40p versus the 1.60 or something, I think I -- I slightly

disagree there because -- I mean, to be honest, the -- the --

the -- the key point is whether – when’s the right time to

de-risk the balance sheet, and to be honest, that’s not a

function of the share price. The -- the option value is -- is

fine. The prin -- principle of -- of -- of valuing it on an

option basis is perfectly fine, and I -- to be honest, you

know, we have always managed the capital structure on a --

on a minimal amount of equity relative to -- to the debt.

We’ve always looked to the debt side of the equation as the

more important part of the capital structure from use of

cash. On the other hand, I mean, what I don’t want to do is

be in a position where we take it too fine, and that -- that

you trip over a -- a hurdle that creates a series of problems,

which means that the option value of the equity really is

that, and the op -- the equity disappears. Well, whilst in --

in share price terms, the magnitude of the problem might be

significant in terms of the overall value terms relative to the

debt the magnitude of the -- of -- of the difference is very

small. And -- and if you can -- if you can see your way

through to a path which allows the re-rating of the stock to

compensate for that and also to take into account the fact

that you can use the cash to buy back debt at a substantial

discount -- to continue to buy back debt at a substantial

discount, any use of cash is very creative from a

shareholder point of a view immediately.

DAVID EINHORN:
Well, this comes – I mean, this [overspeaking].

PUNCH CEO:
I know, just -- just -- just one other point on the convertible.

We have not spoken to any convertible holders other than

our efforts to buy back the convertible in the market. So,

this is not a -- this conversation is not motivated by a

conversation with convertible holders, and nor for that

matter actually is it driven by investment banks. Having

been a poacher turned gamekeeper, I’m as sceptical as you

are, I’m unsure about their -- their motives.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah. What I would ask you then is -- then the question

comes down to, because maybe we’re just looking at it

from a different perspective, it comes down to a question:

well what do you think the stock is worth?

PUNCH CEO:
Well, I’ll be honest with you. The stock is worth either

very little or -- or a lot more than it is now depending on --

DAVID EINHORN:
Okay.

PUNCH CEO:
-- on the expectation of -- you know, of the next couple of

years.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yes.

PUNCH CEO:
And -- and I don’t mean -- I don’t mean it from my

personal perspective of what it’s actually worth, but I’m

talking about what the market reaction to that will be.

DAVID EINHORN:
No, no, no. No, no, then you’re making a mistake. Then

you’re letting the market dictate to you [overspeaking].

PUNCH CEO:
I’m sorry, [inaudible].

DAVID EINHORN:
Then you -- you don’t let the market dict -- my advice to

you is, don’t let the market dictate to you. You figure out

what you think it’s worth, and then use the market as a

opportunity to create value, which is something that I think

you’ve been doing instinctively, if not explicitly, on -- on

the debt side of the balance sheet, and -- and actually with

some of the asset sales. You’re letting the market tell you

what the opportunity is and taking advantage of it. So, why

-- why throw that aside for the purpose of -- of figuring out

what to do about the equity.

PUNCH CEO:
Oh, sure. But then -- then -- then -- then that’s the same in

terms of looking at the opportunity in terms of the equity.

If there is -- if there -- because --

DAVID EINHORN:
Of course.

PUNCH CEO:
-- to your point -- to your point, there is, yeah looking at --

looking forward in terms of our position and now I’m

talking in general terms rather than specifics --

DAVID EINHORN:
Right.

PUNCH CEO:
-- you know, there is a risk profile to the strategy that we’re

taking. That risk profile must have an effect on the -- on

the value that you would ascribe to the -- to the underlying

equity, yeah?

DAVID EINHORN:
Right, um. Yes, of course.

PUNCH CEO:
Yeah. So -- so, therefore, what I don’t want to do is

perhaps to have a conversation with you at some stage and

say, “Look, this left field event”, which is in -- in and of

itself relatively minor --

DAVID EINHORN:
Mm hmm.

PUNCH CEO:
-- has caused a sort of domino effect on all of the activities

we’re doing.

DAVID EINHORN:
Mm hmm.

PUNCH CEO:
Or that we’ve done very well, for example, on -- we’re

meeting the conv -- the convertible, but in doing so, we’ve

had to push the securitisations to the limits, and there has

been a technical breach on the securitisations, and that in

turn takes – takes the equation there. So, I’m -- you know,

I’m naturally -- we have -- we have -- despite everything,

we have acted, I -- I mean, whether it’s instinctively or --

implicitly or explicitly, we’ve been -- we’ve been very

clear in terms of our strategy of realising cash to and – and

buying back debts at a discount, as we did back in -- in the

autumn of last year. On the other hand, as I said in the

beginning, the number of moving parts in that does put

yourself in a position where there is a – there is a high risk

profile to that, and there has to be a value to the question to

-- to removing that risk or at least alleviating that risk.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah.

PUNCH CEO:
And that’s -- that’s all I’m trying to -- I’m trying to

evaluate, and --

DAVID EINHORN:
Sure.

PUNCH CEO:
-- and also there’s another key point which is the timing of

that, because 11th hour, 59th minute is brilliant in terms of --

in terms of theory, but in reality the -- the process that you

have to go through to have a discussion about equity or --

or quasi-equity-type transaction is much longer than that,

the legal process you have to go to, document, etc., seek

approvals. And therefore, you don’t have the privilege of

being able to sort of leave it until the last minute and then

pull the trigger.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah. Well, let me ask you this. You still -- you sort of

ducked the question about what you think the value of the -

- of the stock is with -- with -- without a -- without a deal.

PUNCH CEO:
Um… Well...

DAVID EINHORN:
It’s -- it’s important to have a view to make a -- to make a

reasoned decision.

PUNCH CEO:
I -- I think -- I think the -- the valuation is -- is fair at the

moment. On the other hand, I don’t think necessarily that

the market fully understands the extent of, the pluses and

minuses to get us to the position we are faced in 2010.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah.

PUNCH CEO:
And so, therefore -- therefore, if I was putting a risk factor

on that I would discount it.

DAVID EINHORN:
Mm hmm.

PUNCH CEO:
But at the same time, I just -- you know, I’m not -- I’m not

setting a market price for the -- for the equity. I’m just

running the business. I’m actually, frankly, not looking at

the equity price; I’m looking at it from the point of view of

maximising the value for shareholders, long-term.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right. Well, I think its fine to run the business not looking

at the equity price, except when you’re considering doing a

transaction relating to the equity. Then -- then -- then it’s --

then you can’t run the business without considering the

equity price. When you’re doing it -- when you’re

transacting in the equity you have to think about the equity

price.

PUNCH CEO:
Well, yes -- yes and no. Because the way I look at our

business and I’m -- I’m -- I’m being simplistic, I know that

it’s far more detailed than this, but it is that we have a fixed

asset value of port – of the portfolio at a number, and at the

last valuation, the number was 6.5 billion pounds. Now --

now, the enterprise value of the business today -- sorry, the

-- the -- the value of the debt on a gross basis is around 4.5

billion pounds, so that would imply -- so there is a --

roughly a 2 billion-pound asset value that is attributable to

the equity.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right, now, what’s the value of -- of the debt at market?

PUNCH CEO:
Right, the market value of the debt is around 3.5 billion

pounds so that’s a 3 billion implied value to the equity.

DAVID EINHORN:
Okay. Then -- and -- then we --

PUNCH CEO:
So that [overspeaking] -- so that compares to a, you know,

a position today of just over 400 million pounds market

cap. It seems like a very large delta which is worth --

worth preserving and that’s my -- so my view on that basis

is it’s, you know, the valuation is grossly undervalued. On

the other hand --

DAVID EINHORN:
Mm hmm.

PUNCH CEO:
-- if I trip over some further issue and the house of cards,

you know, you know, takes effect and we lose all of that --

DAVID EINHORN:
Mm hmm.

PUNCH CEO:
-- we won’t have time to turn around and say, “Let’s fill in

the gap today”, because it will have gone, it won’t be

attributable to us in a direct form. It will be very difficult

to extract.

DAVID EINHORN:
Mm hmm. So -- so how much equity do you think you

need to raise to protect the situation?

PUNCH CEO:
Well, I -- I think -- I -- I think the market sort of dictates

this. I don’t think it’s a matter for the market to dictate

that. We -- our view is simple, that is, that, you know, we

have to make sure that we can preserve a sensible

headroom to the covenant from a securitisation and -- and

take out the convertible as the -- the maximum and

minimum requirement of any discussion. But there’s

absolutely -- if you go back over the history, and I know --

I -- and I -- and I perfectly respect that you’ve not been

involved from the beginning, but when we originally

floated the company, we did an initial public offering of

116 million pounds. We have only done since that time --,

that’s 161 million pounds. We have only done, since that

time, 175 million pounds [inaudible]. So, to be absolutely

clear, I don’t -- I don’t look at the business from an equity

perspective and if -- you know, and it’s not my intention to

over-equitise this business whatsoever. The transactions

that we’ve done, for example, we’ve shown, pretty

substantially dispassion in what we’ve sold to ensure that

we maximise value on the debt and, so this -- so it’s merely

about making sure that -- and we can turn around to the

shareholders and say, “Actually, anything that we do is

sufficient to give ourselves a – headroom for a considerable

period of time into the future and also addresses the

convertible”. That’s the maximum and that would be the

minimum that would be worth considering.

DAVID EINHORN:
Mm hmm. So, would you -- as you pencil that out, what do

those amounts turn out to be?

ANDREW OSBORNE:
Something like 350 sterling.

DAVID EINHORN:
350 million sterling?

ANDREW OSBORNE:
If you were -- if you were to roughly sort of work on the

basis that you kinda took out the -- the converts, and that’s

something that gives you, say, 10 percent headroom in

within both of the covenants, filed covenants.

DAVID EINHORN:
Wow, wow. That would be shockingly horrifying from my

perspective. Can you sell half the company just at a buck

and a half -- a Euro -- a pound and half? Oh, no.

ANDREW OSBORNE:
So those proceeds are applied to buying back debt at say 60

in the pound and remember any --

DAVID EINHORN:
Who cares --

DAVID EINHORN:
-- who cares, who cares, after a year of going through this,

now we’re going to dilute ourselves like this. Oh, no.

ANDREW OSBORNE:
Why do you get diluted?

DAVID EINHORN:
Because you doubled the share capital almost.

DAVID EINHORN:
And this is --

ANDREW OSBORNE:
You know, and on a pre-emptive basis.

DAVID EINHORN:
We’ve done -- we’ve done all of this. We get to double our

investments and have basically still highly levered thing,

subject to all the same operating risk, just so that you guys

don’t have to follow through and, you know, deal with the

converters. We’ve been discussing with you for the last

year and a half, where, at worst, it was gonna get very close

to some small amount.

PUNCH CEO:
Dave -- Dave -- David, but we’re sorry, we’re -- we are

acting on the basis of the current plans so you -- today, we

announced the transaction to sell 11 sites to Greene King.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right.

PUNCH CEO:
We’re not done, you know, that is -- that is the priority and

we’re carrying on business as usual. On the other hand, I

would be -- I would be at fault if I did not, sort of at least

identify the -- the risk profile of the issue.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right, I don’t -- I -- I don’t think --

PUNCH CEO:
I’m – I’m not –

DAVID EINHORN:
-- if there is -- if there is risks that we don’t understand, we

should talk about them some more, but, I mean, we’ve --

we have spent a fair amount of time kinda going through

this; and we understand it’s -- it’s a -- and it’s not that

we’re callous towards the risk that the company might --

you know, faces. We’ve survived watching the stock go all

the way to 40 pence, for crying out loud. But, man, this

sort of like validates the worst fears, and it seemed to me

like you’re --

DAVID EINHORN:
-- it seems like -- it seems like you guys were really on a

course towards figuring out how to manage the

securitisations,
manage
the
liquidity,
manage
the

covenants, sell assets, you know appropriately, take

advantage of discounts where available in the market, and,

you know, this doesn’t -- I don’t see that this gains us

anything. I mean, you’re gonna be able to pay out unless

you -- if there is some reason why you’re not gonna have

any money to upstream to pay the convert that you need to

pre-fund and fully fund that now because the thing is that if

you do this offering the -- the price of the converts, the

majority is going to go straight to par. So you’re not gonna

get to buy it back at any discount at all, maybe 95 or some

thing like this.

PUNCH CEO:
Sure, well just [overspeaking].

DAVID EINHORN:
You know, in -- in -- in fact -- in fact -- in fact you lose the

opportunity also within the securitisations to buy a lot of

the debt back at a discount because the market - the debt

market will better revalue to reflect the higher solvency of

the company and the equity market will say, “Jeez, that’s

all well and nice, but there’s twice as many shares

outstanding”.

DAVID EINHORN:
I wanna -- I would rather -- I mean, if I were a bondholder,

I would love this.

PUNCH CEO:
Okay. To me -- to me this -- just a couple of fill-in points,

in turn. Firstly, that we very much preserve -- process --

progress this business as usual. This is -- is not a, you

know, this is not a, uh, we can’t – we’re not going to carry

on unless we do this -- this -- that, you know, unless we

contemplate some alternative. We are operating on that

basis and we have disproved the market for a very long

time, specifically on that basis by -- by moving ahead or

being ahead of the curve on the disposals, and on our

ability to buy back debt.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right, but we haven’t yet [overspeaking].

PUNCH CEO:
You know, it’s very –

DAVID EINHORN:
But -- but as equity holders -- we -- as equity holders we

have not -- we, in our minds -- in Greenlight’s minds we

think that that’s true, and in your mind I think you think

that it’s true, but we just haven’t seen it in the stock price.

PUNCH CEO:
Well, let me just come back -- just come back to that, okay,

because there is this more compared -- more to that. We

have -- we have cash that we could -- to spend on the

convertible right now. We have cash to spend on the

convertible. The convertible is trading at the levels that

you were just talking about so therefore, that isn’t readily

avail -- the convertible isn’t readily available to discount

already. And that’s just a function of the fact that it is

small, relatively illiquid, tightly held and also has a

relatively short period of maturity. So, therefore,

DAVID EINHORN:
Well, and -- and also -- and also because the market is

judging it to be likely to be repaid.

PUNCH CEO:
Correct.

DAVID EINHORN:
Correct.

PUNCH CEO:
Correct. See -- so, therefore, if we - if we are – if we’re at

fault for anything, we’ve done too good a job on affecting

the market expectations. On the other hand, on the

securitised debt, there is 4.5 billion pounds on the

securitised debt, there are 21 tranches, and despite the fact

that at the interim we gave a clear indication of the

magnitude as to which we’ve been able to buy debt in the

market, as I said earlier, we have continued to be able to

buy debt in the market and we will continue to do so, and

we do not believe that whilst I -- that the market will close -

- that the market arbitrage pursuant to that will close down

and -- in -- to the same extent. So, to the point – from the

point – at the moment what we are doing is we are – we are

risking – increasing the risk on the securitisation at the cost

of the securitisation for the sake of paying off the

convertible at -- at or close to par. That’s what we’re doing

at the moment because that’s the short-term requirement.

Now, that is inefficient. If you can redirect your resources

that you’re doing to buying back securitised debt at a -- at a

continued discount, then that is more efficient use of

shareholders funds. It comes to the same thing. By 2010,

we have to have generated 208 -- 212 million pounds or

220 million pounds including accrual to meet the secure --

to meet the convertible. But, at the same time, what I don’t

want to do is to do that and then to be at a position where

we trip to default on any of the securitisations.

DAVID EINHORN:
Well…

PUNCH CEO:
The -- there is of course -- there is of course another factor

which is, as we get to the year-end this year, when -- when

we get to within 12 to 15 months of the -- of the repayment

date on the convertible, then we have to have debates with

the accountants about going concern, emphasis of matter

type of conversation. And then of course, if the market

perceives this to be a risk then we go back to the sort of

[inaudible] -- you know, analysis on share price that we had

back in January.

DAVID EINHORN:
I -- I didn’t understand what he said.

PUNCH CFO:
When we get to the August [overspeaking].

DAVID EINHORN:
I’m sorry, I didn’t -- I didn’t understand what you just said.

PUNCH CFO:
Yeah, at the year-end, clearly our accounts are audited --.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah.

PUNCH CFO:
-- and the auditors are required to look at least 12 months

forward to ensure that there are no events in that time

horizon that would give any kind of questions or -- or

concerns around a -- a going concern type of deliberation.

And -- and clearly at the year-end, when we look forward

12-15 months, there are a couple of events on the horizon

that – that the auditors will have to get their minds around.

First of all, the convertible, and I -- I think we talked about

that one at length. The second one is the -- the

securitisations themselves following upstream are very

tight on their covenant default test. By –[reference to

Punch CEO’s] point is taking the cash out to deal with

convertible, does take the securitisations very tight for their

default test, and actually one of them, Punch B, starts to

amortise which makes achieving the DSCR default test that

much more difficult. So, the two events on the horizons of

the auditors will have to deliberate on and -- and -- and take

into consideration that have real risk attached is the extent

of the company to repay -- to repay the convertible in full

and -- and -- and, you know, based on the kind of

conversations we’ve had before, you could see a potential

shortfall of up to 50 million for -- for that. The second

thing they’ll have to have a look at is -- is the tightness of

the covenants within the securitisations, particularly within

Punch B as it starts to amortise and -- and whether again

there is comfort there that no default will happen in that

time horizon. So, actually, the bulk of the -- yeah, the bulk

of the cash that we’ve been talking about is all about

creating headroom within the securitisations on an ongoing

basis, uh, to -- to a default, a potential default. Now, if the

auditors can’t get themselves comfortable with all of those

things then they are required under UK accounting

practices to comment specifically on that and then – and

that itself will adversely affect market sentiment, that’s the

point that is being made.

DAVID EINHORN:
Look, you know, if you think that the company is gonna

default on the debt and go -- become worthless, of course

you should sell equity. Not only that, we should sell our

equity and -- because then the equity just isn’t gonna do so

well. Even if you raise equity, you know, it – it unwinds so

many of the things that we’ve been believing for the last

year and a half, we will need to reassess. And that’s

unfortunate because I’ve been feeling very good about this

investment.

PUNCH CEO:
Yeah, I mean, I am -- to make it quite clear, you know, and

we’re -- you know, I’m the largest private shareholder in

the business and I’m very, very clear in terms of my

responsibility --

DAVID EINHORN:
No, I’m pretty sure -- I’m pretty sure I’m the largest private

shareholder.

PUNCH CEO:
Well, I wouldn’t -- got it, sorry. I have got something like

Greenlight as any financial institution rather than -- rather

than an individual, but, I mean, given that your name is

ascribed to -- to the holding collectively, I will accept that.

The -- so -- it -- it, you know, I -- I’m trying to balance out

the various -- the various components of the -- of the risk,

that’s all I’m trying to do. Happy to have a more detailed

conversation with you about some of those -- those issues,

but it -- it is not possible to do that without having to --

having to require -- having to have you sign an NDA.

That’s just a legal requirement and – and we’re happy to do

that at short notice. And, you know, we’ll take it from

there. As to the -- as for the business, I think -- actually

we’re still, you know, we’re still trading in line with

expectations and we, you know, we’re working very hard,

as I said, on the -- on with the activities that we could -- we

outlined when we saw [reference to Greenlight Analyst] in

New York a couple -- a month and a half ago.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah. That’s good.

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
If you’ve done so well through the first half and since then

at buying back debt, why are, in particular, the Punch B

securitizations still going to amortise over the next year

when you -- those tranches could be easily prepaid? Have

you been buying back other debt?

PUNCH CEO:
Yes, I mean, the answer is -- specifically on Punch B,

[reference to Greenlight Analyst], the -- the -- it’s the

Punch B amortising debt, the A7, been trading at virtually -

- virtually at par. So -- so actually there’ll be -- the -- the --

the advantage of buying back that tranche of debt is

marginal compared to other tranches of debt that are

available in the marketplace.

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
Isn’t the advantage of buying back that tranche of debt the

ability to avoid a potential cash trap or default?

PUNCH CEO:
Of course -- of course and that’s why when we measure

DAVID EINHORN:
[overspeaking].

PUNCH CEO:
--when we measure any of the debt that we -- we -- we do

look at, we look at it in terms of its DSCR impact, not just

its absolute value. So, of course that’s the fact and as you

said, you know, we do not believe that there’s any reason

why we would not up -- upstream Punch B this year, but

we’ve got to look forward beyond that. We’ve got to look

at the impact of that. We looked at -- look at the trading

performance of that portfolio and the -- the quantum of debt

that we would have to repay to ensure that we don’t trigger

a default in due course and then, you know, those are

factors that we have to keep in mind. You know that’s as a

general point.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah. Well look, we’re -- obviously we’re not in favour of

you defaulting on the debt.

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
Is the problem that you’ve sold so many pubs that your

cash generating ability is notably lower than historical?

PUNCH CEO:
No, no, but it is a function of course. When we’re looking

at disposal of pubs, we obviously got to take into account

the reduction in EBITDA versus the reduction in debt and

the interest and all the – sorry, the DSCR cost of that.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right.

PUNCH CEO:
And of course -- of course what we’ve been doing has been

highly accretive, and that’s why we’ll continue to do that

because
we’ve
been
buying
back
debt
that
is

disproportionately more expensive than the loss of the

EBITDA from those sites, and that is very much part of the

core strategy and we will continue to do that come what

may.

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
We appreciate that. I think that the difference in we do not

want you to default is that we do not think that the math

follows, that it is accretive to sell low priced equities to buy

back debt at a discount. We just don’t think that math

works unless the equity is of course high priced, which we

disagree with.

PUNCH CEO:
Yeah, but I -- I mean, I think on pure maths -- on the pure

maths of that trade, you’re right. There -- there is -- you

know, there is a point at which that’s not worthwhile. It is

a question of what we do with that, and what would be the

consequences if we didn’t do that. Those are the -- those

are the factors we have to take into account. And also for

that matter, the quantum, because I mean, if we were

suggesting a quantum that was completely out of line, then,

you know, which would over-equitise the company, then I

of course would understand that that was completely

unnecessary.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right.

PUNCH CEO:
The point I tried to make earlier was that’s never been the

way we’ve approached the business.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right, and that’s the -- that’s the issue. The issue is -- is

that the equity is trading still as an option, at least in my

opinion, and whether it’s a £1.60 option or a 40-pence

option, or even a 2 or 2.5 pound option, it’s really an option

on a very highly levered capital structure. And so, you

know, it seems to me that raising the kind of equity you’re

talking about, it doesn’t put the company into a situation

where everybody will agree that it’s de-risked. People will

still look at it and say it’s a very highly levered capital

structure. And so it’ll still have the basic economic risk of

the -- you know, the UK consumer, and so on and so

forth, that is there. It’ll still have the risk of a -- you

know, of a highly geared capital structure. And I think

what you’ll wind up with is some re-rating of the debt but

not really much of a re-rating of the equity, and really all

we’ll have done is sort of validated, you know, the

criticisms of the company that -- you know, that we’ve

been hearing for a long period of time. Now, obviously, if

a company looks at the math on the maturity of the convert

and says, “Jeez, we’re gonna be , you know, 20 million

pound short or 30 million pound short”, it makes all the

sense in the world to not run that right up to the wire in

year-end 2010, but to decide that one needs to prepay the

entire -- pre-fund three -- 300 – 400 million pounds of -- of

stock to give, you know -- you know, headroom at such a --

at such a dilutive time – Um…Mmm…I’m not really sure

that you’re gonna to get the re-rating from whatever risk

that you’re [overspeaking].

PUNCH CEO:
I think [overspeaking] sort of implies that there would be

the ability to do a two-stage process, and of course, markets

don’t necessarily like that, but -- but be that as it may, I

mean, I think, the problem we have we keep -- we’re going

around in circles. I mean, you know, these -- these are

talking in principles, and you know I -- I – I totally respect

your view, you know, our -- our approach to the business

has been exactly that basis. But, at the same time, you

know, we’ve done significant analysis, and we come -- you

know, we -- we have to consider those -- that, that analysis

is to determine, you know, where that takes us strategically.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah, I agree with you. You’ve done [overspeaking].

PUNCH CEO:
Hear about it more detail, and that detail goes beyond

where we can go, so --

DAVID EINHORN:
Of course. So, if you’re -- if you’re now -- look I mean the

thing is that we’re not gonna make this decision, you’re

gonna make this decision. You guys are the managers, you

guys are in charge of the company; we’re shareholders, and

we prefer to be passive shareholders and not run the

company. If we wanted to run the company, we should be

doing something different. We want to run our company,

not your company. If you’ve done the analysis, and come

to the conclusion that on it’s own, the company is not going

to make it, it makes all of the sense in the world to raise

equity at whatever the price is, so that you can know that

the company, you know, is – is going to make it. Now,

what that brings to my mind though is, you know,

obviously we haven’t done your analysis, we haven’t done

-- signed an NDA; I don’t know that we’re going to sign an

NDA, because we prefer to just remain investors, but from

my perspective, and I’ll be just straight up with you, is that

gives a lot of signalling value. And the signalling value

that comes from figuring out the company has figured out

that it’s not going to make it on it’s own is that we’ve just

grossly misassessed the -- you know what’s going on here.

And -- and that, that will cause us to have to just reconsider

what we’re doing, which is not the end of the world to you.

You will continue on even if we don’t continue on with

you. Its’ -- it’s -- it -- it really is some -- it really is okay,

it’s not what we’re looking for, and I’m not trying to

browbeat you into doing something that’s going to

bankrupt the company because there’s a lot of reasons the

company shouldn’t want to go bankrupt. But that -- that --

that is how I --

PUNCH CEO:
6,000 employees worth, yeah.

DAVID EINHORN:
No, no, no, I’m -- no, I’m -- I’m totally serious.

PUNCH CEO:
Yeah, yeah -- no, I -- I -- listen -- I appreciate that David.

And -- don’t get me wrong. As a major shareholder, we

have to give you the opportunity to have the conversation

and we’re just simply trying to sort of give you that

opportunity. I totally appreciate that we’ve had a very good

dialogue with [reference to Greenlight Analyst] throughout

the time as shareholders and yourself and so, you know,

I’m just – we can take that conversation as far as we can on

this basis or we can take you further if you want to on – on

a different basis. You know, clearly, if we decide to do

something and it comes in a, a, -- and it’s in the public

domain, then we can have further conversations at that

time.

DAVID EINHORN:
Sure that’s -- you know, but that’s -- you know that that’s

fine. You know, if there’s something that you think, you

know, can be explained to us, you know, without crossing

any lines, we would -- uh, we would love to come to a full

understanding, and see the -- you know, see the sensibility

of what you’re saying. If -- if that can’t be done, then

unfortunately we’re probably left to, you know, to just

draw our own – our own conclusions.

DAVID EINHORN:
And I - I don’t mean that -- I don’t mean that in a negative

way, it’s just that it’s just what we have to do.

PUNCH CEO:
What I would ask you -- I will ask you to do that in fact --

if that’s the case, then don’t draw conclusions right now on

the basis of this conversation because it’s it is a slightly sort

of -- sort of a -- in-concept conversation rather than one that

we’re, you know, than -- than anything else.

DAVID EINHORN:
Okay, fair enough.

ANDREW OSBORNE:
You know, I was gonna say, David, I mean look -- and

clearly, you know, we’ve -- we’ve -- there’s a whole lot of

analysis sort of behind this and there’s a sort of

presentation, if you wanted to, but I mean, we would need

to kind of talk your counsel about an NDA if, you know, if

you wanted to go down that route which [overspeaking].

DAVID EINHORN:
Well, I look at -- I don’t -- I don’t mind -- I don’t mind the

concept of an NDA in the sense that we’re not going to,

you know, pass on information to others that could, you

know, be competitively harmful to you and so on and so

forth. I -- I am uncomfortable with an NDA that is going

to, you know, restrict our ability to, you know, to transact.

PUNCH CEO:
We’re -- we’re well aware of that, and to the extent

anything, we ever did anything like that, we would have to

be -- give you the -- a clear understanding of the timescales,

which that -- that covers and the, you know, to the fact that

the company will cleanse any -- any conversation to allow

you to trade in due course.

DAVID EINHORN:
Yeah, that’s -- that’s right.

PUNCH CEO:
Well, we’re absolutely aware of that and -- and if that’s,

you know, and if you want us to consider that on that basis,

I’m happy to do so.

ANDREW OSBORNE:
We can give you a timeframe.

DAVID EINHORN:
So, what would -- what -- what would that be?

ANDREW OSBORNE:
Well, within less than a, kind of a week.

DAVID EINHORN:
Within a week? Yeah, we can [overspeaking] we could

probably do something with --

PUNCH CEO:
We -- we have a [inaudible].

DAVID EINHORN:
Well, I mean, let me ask you this. Is the decision basically

taken? I mean, have you basically decided and it’s just a

question of discussing it with people and, you know,

having these kinds of conversations and the analysis is

done and the decision has, you know, effectively been

made; or has the decision not really been taken and you’re

just kind of thinking things through and haven’t really

determined what you want to do?

PUNCH CEO:
No – I mean huge analysis has been done.

DAVID EINHORN:
Right.

PUNCH CEO:
But no -- no formal decision has been making – been made

and we’re -- we’re consulting with various people of the

consequences of that -- of that analysis. There -- there are -

- there are other external factors that we have to take into

account, as you said, about, you know, 11th hour type

decisions and -- and things like that which -- which mean

that, at some point this conversation, you know, we -- we

were going to have to contemplate this. You know, in the

list of things that we would have to we would be -- we

would be remiss, if we did not consider this in the list of

things we have to consider as -- as running the company.

DAVID EINHORN:
Okay, fine.

ANDREW OSBORNE:
Really, it’s fair to say like, consulting with all of the -- the

major shareholders in terms of taking, you know, taking

into account, their views.

DAVID EINHORN:
Okay. Is there a -- I mean -- do -- what do the other

shareholders you talked to say?

ANDREW OSBORNE:
I think, I mean, a num -- a number of people have sort of

signed NDAs because we had a bit more open conv --

conversations. I think it’s fair to say that, you know,

broadly, most of the other shareholders are supportive.

DAVID EINHORN:
Supportive of what?

PUNCH CEO:
Well, I – stuff that’s in the NDA –

DAVID EINHORN:
Oh, I see. All right, look, if it’s a question of – let us – let

us think this through. Let us -- let us -- let us think this

through whether it makes sense to sign an NDA or not. I’m

-- I’m not sure that it does.

PUNCH CEO:
Look -- well, it’s a -- I do -- I really appreciate the time; I

really appreciate the frankness of the conversation and –

hopefully we can have further conversation in due course.

DAVID EINHORN:
Very good. Thank you guys for -- for spending the

afternoon with us.

PUNCH CEO:
Thanks very much.

DAVID EINHORN:
Bye now.

GREENLIGHT ANALYST:
Thank you.

PUNCH CFO:
Bye.

END OF CALL