FINAL NOTICE

1.
ACTION

1.1.
For the reasons given in this notice, the Authority hereby imposes on Cathay

International Holdings Limited (“Cathay”) a financial penalty of £411,000, pursuant

to section 91 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “Act”) because of

a number of breaches by Cathay of the Listing Principles and the Disclosure Rules

and Transparency Rules.

2.
SUMMARY OF REASONS

2.1.
Cathay is a holding company based in Hong Kong, and is premium listed on the

London Stock Exchange in the UK. Cathay operates through a number of

subsidiaries, and during 2015 between 70% and 80% of its revenue derived from

Lansen Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited (“Lansen”). Between 21 August 2015 and

29 December 2015 (“the 2015 Relevant Period”), Cathay had an average market

capitalisation of £69,602,132.

2.2.
On 29 December 2015, Cathay issued a trading update (“the December

Announcement”). The December Announcement informed the market that due to

operating expenses being significantly higher than anticipated, it expected a

material loss before tax for the year ending 31 December 2015, a performance

which would be markedly below market expectations. It also disclosed a significant

financial penalty imposed on a subsidiary of Lansen. On the day of the December

Announcement, Cathay’s share price dropped by 18.2%.

2.3.
The deterioration in Cathay’s financial performance over the course of 2015 was

the result of a number of issues across Cathay’s group. There were serious

procedures, systems and controls failings at Cathay which meant that Cathay did

not monitor the full impact of these issues on its expected financial performance

for the year ending 31 December 2015.

Listing Principle 1 breach

2.4.
Listing Principle 1 requires a listed company to take reasonable steps to establish

and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable it to comply

with its obligations. As a premium listed company, the obligations imposed on

Cathay included the Authority’s Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules (“DTRs”).

2.5.
Cathay breached Listing Principle 1, as during the 2015 Relevant Period:

(a)
Cathay did not have adequate procedures, systems and controls to comply

with its obligations under Chapter 2 of the DTRs in relation to how it would

forecast and monitor how it was performing against market expectations of

its financial performance. In particular, in August 2015 Cathay had been

advised by its appointed advisers in relation to its disclosure obligations and

Cathay gave an assurance that it would monitor its financial performance.

However, Cathay did not take reasonable steps in this regard;

(b)
until 6 December 2015, Cathay failed to produce any completed year-end

forecasts covering the whole of its business as to its expectations of its

financial performance for the financial year ending 31 December 2015; and

(c)
performance monitoring did not include any means of assessing whether the

performance of Cathay constituted inside information satisfying the test set

out in section 118C of the Act.

2.6.
Cathay’s senior management appreciated the risk that their actions or inaction

could result in a failure to take reasonable steps to establish and maintain adequate

procedures, systems and controls, and failed adequately to mitigate that risk.

Cathay thereby acted recklessly.

DTR 2.2.1R and Premium Listing Principle 6 breaches

2.7.
DTR 2.2.1R requires an issuer to notify the market as soon as possible of any inside

information which directly concerns it, unless DTR 2.5.1R applies. Premium Listing

Principle 6 requires a listed company to communicate information to holders and

potential holders of its listed equity shares in such a way as to avoid the creation

of a false market in those listed equity shares.

2.8.
As a result of the failings in its procedures, systems and controls, Cathay failed to

disclose to the market as soon as possible on or shortly after 6 December 2015 a

material change in its actual and expected financial performance for the year ending

31 December 2015 when, as a result of the deterioration of Cathay’s performance,

Cathay was aware of circumstances in which there was projected to be a 56%

deviation from market expectations of the loss after tax1. Cathay therefore

breached DTR 2.2.1R. Cathay’s senior management were aware, including from

advice given to Cathay by its appointed advisers, of the risk of a breach if Cathay

did not make an appropriate disclosure but failed to do so. Cathay thereby acted

recklessly.

2.9.
Further, Cathay recklessly breached Premium Listing Principle 6 when it failed,

between 6 December 2015 and 29 December 2015, to release relevant information

to the market, and so created a false market in its listed equity shares.

Listing Principle 2 breach

2.10. Listing Principle 2 requires a listed company to deal with the Authority in an open

and co-operative manner.

2.11. Between 29 February 2016 and 16 August 2016 (“the 2016 Relevant Period”),

Cathay corresponded with the Authority about the timing of the December

Announcement. The Authority’s requests for information clearly required

explanations of the events surrounding the December Announcement. In that

1 In this Notice references to profit or loss after tax, in relation to Cathay, mean profit or loss (as the case may

be) attributable to Cathay’s owners.

correspondence, Cathay provided information to the Authority about its forecasting

procedures and its forecasts in 2015 which was materially different to the actual

processes followed in 2015 and was not contemporaneous with the period leading

up to the December Announcement. While the Authority accepts Cathay’s

explanation that it did not intend to mislead the Authority, Cathay had decided to

provide this information to the Authority and was aware that the information being

provided was not an accurate record. Cathay did not in that correspondence either

state that, or provide an explanation of why, it was providing non-contemporaneous

information.

2.12. During the 2016 Relevant Period Cathay failed to be open and co-operative with

the Authority when it provided, without any explanation, materially different

information to the Authority about its forecasting procedures to the actual

procedures followed at the relevant times during 2015. Cathay therefore breached

Listing Principle 2.

The nature and effect of the breaches

2.13. The Authority considers the breaches by Cathay to be particularly serious. Cathay

was unable to comply with its obligations as a listed company, and its procedures,

systems and controls were so inadequate that it was unable to keep the market

properly informed of its financial performance. As a result, there was a risk that

investors would make decisions based on incomplete information.

2.14. Further, the Authority relies on listed companies to provide clear, accurate and

complete information to it in order effectively to monitor and regulate the integrity

of the financial markets in the UK. The provision of inaccurate information to the

Authority impacts its ability to do this.

2.15. The Authority hereby imposes a financial penalty on Cathay in the amount of

£411,000 pursuant to section 91 of the Act. This financial penalty consists of:

(a)
a penalty of £261,000 for breaches during the 2015 Relevant Period; and

(b)
a penalty of £150,000 for breaches during the 2016 Relevant Period.

2.16. The Authority does not make any criticism of any other person or entity in this

Notice.

3.
DEFINITIONS

3.1.
The definitions below are used in this Notice:

the “Act” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000;

the “Authority” means the Financial Conduct Authority;

the “Board” means the Cathay board of directors;

“Cathay” means Cathay International Holdings Limited;

“CFDA” means the China Food and Drug Administration;

the “December Announcement” means the trading update made to the market (by

way of Regulatory Information Service) by Cathay on 29 December 2015;

“DEPP” means the Authority’s Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual;

“DTR” or “DTRs” means the Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules, part of the

Handbook;

the “Handbook” means the Authority’s Handbook of rules and guidance;

“Lansen” means Lansen Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited;

“Listing Principles” means the Listing Principles set out in the Listing Rules, part of

the Handbook;

“N+1” means N+1 Singer, Cathay’s financial adviser and broker during the 2015

Relevant Period;

“RMB” means Ren Min Bi;

the “Tribunal” means the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber);

“USD” means United States Dollars;

the “2015 Relevant Period” means 21 August 2015 to 29 December 2015; and

the “2016 Relevant Period” means 29 February 2016 to 16 August 2016.

4.
FACTS AND MATTERS

4.1.
Cathay is a holding company based in Hong Kong, which is premium listed on the

London Stock Exchange. It specialises in investing and operating in the healthcare

sector in the People’s Republic of China, as well as in luxury hotels. It operates

through a number of subsidiaries, including Lansen (listed on the main board of the

Hong Kong Stock Exchange) which accounted during the 2015 Relevant Period for

70% to 80% of Cathay’s revenue. During the 2015 Relevant Period, Cathay had an

average market capitalisation of approximately £69,602,132.

4.2.
Cathay’s financial performance and interim and year-end accounts were

determined by the consolidation of the performance of its five subsidiaries, and the

costs to run its corporate office, as it did not carry out its own business activities.

Cathay was therefore reliant on the provision of information from its subsidiaries

to understand its actual and expected financial performance during the 2015

Relevant Period. During the 2015 Relevant Period, Cathay’s performance was

overseen by its Board, which consisted of four executive directors and three non-

executive directors.

4.3.
During the 2015 Relevant Period, Cathay was the majority shareholder of Lansen,

owning 50.56% of its shares. Cathay also had representatives on Lansen’s Board

of Directors. Lansen and its subsidiaries primarily engage in the manufacturing and

trading of pharmaceutical products in the People’s Republic of China. Its wholly-

owned subsidiaries include Ningbo Liwah, a pharmaceutical company based in the

People’s Republic of China.

4.4.
The Board met on four occasions each financial year, and in 2015 the Board met:

(a)
in March, primarily to review the year-end results for the previous financial

year, and to set the internal budget for Cathay’s operations for the year

ending 31 December 2015;

(b)
in June, primarily to coincide with Cathay’s Annual General Meeting. This

meeting also considered Cathay’s financial performance against the internal

budget;

(c)
in August, primarily to review Cathay’s six-month interim results up to 30

June 2015, to obtain an update on the operations of each subsidiary, to

prepare an outlook statement and to forecast Cathay’s expectations for the

year-end; and

(d)
in December, primarily to review Cathay’s ten-month results, and to obtain

an update on the operations of each subsidiary, and Cathay’s forecast

expectations for the year-end.

4.5.
There was no similar formal meeting structure for Cathay’s executive committee;

but the executive directors worked within the same office in close proximity to each

other, and so regularly met informally. However, in practice, decisions that were

not business as usual in nature would not be taken by the executive directors or

the executive committee, and would be escalated to the Board.

Cathay’s business in 2015

4.6.
In March 2015, Cathay’s Board set an internal budget for the year ending 31

December 2015 with a budgeted profit after tax totalling USD 3.4 million. In the

publication of its annual results for 2014 to the market on 27 March 2015, it also

released an outlook statement which discussed the various challenges and

prospects for Cathay in 2015, but ultimately stated that Cathay anticipated

operating cash flow to improve in all business segments. The outlook statement did

not, however. provide any quantified guidance to the market on Cathay’s year-end

expected profit or revenue.

4.7.
In May 2015, Cathay engaged N+1 as its new financial adviser and corporate

broker. As part of its role, N+1 would provide advice on Cathay’s financials, act as

a sponsor where required, and release analyst notes to the market. On 11 May

2015 analysts at N+1 released a note to the market setting out N+1’s expectations

for Cathay for the year ending 31 December 2015. N+1’s expectations were that

Cathay would make a loss after tax of USD 0.1 million for the year. This note was

prepared in conjunction with Cathay. It constituted the first occasion on which the

market was informed of any expectations for Cathay’s financial performance for the

year ending 31 December 2015, and as such constituted the best indicator of

market expectations.

4.8.
Over the course of 2015, Cathay’s business was impacted by a number of issues.

As a result, during 2015 Cathay saw its financial performance for the year ending

31 December 2015 being negatively impacted.

4.9.
At the relevant time Cathay was affected by the fact that Lansen, which specialises

in pharmaceutical products, had a number of significant issues occur, which

impacted on its trading and profitability. During 2015 the CFDA carried out a

nationwide inspection of the Gingko production industry. As a result of that

investigation, Ningbo Liwah incurred a number of expenses, including product recall

costs, inventory write off and, in December 2015, a substantial penalty imposed by

the CFDA.

4.10. During 2015 Cathay, through its subsidiaries, also had a number of initiatives which

would seek to improve its financial performance. One of those initiatives was the

diversification of Lansen’s product portfolio. In May 2015, Lansen added two new

products to its portfolio: Bio-Rad, a diagnostic kit for autoimmune diagnosis, and

Fillderm, a collagen injectable filler produced by Botai, a subsidiary of Lansen.

Lansen created a new budget for these products (i.e. comprising matters such as

launch costs and aims for future performance), which it sent to Cathay in May 2015

and which provided for expected revenue from the new products of USD 11,392,000

for the year ending 31 December 2015.

Cathay’s financial reporting process

4.11. Cathay did not have any written process for how it collated and considered results

from its subsidiaries. However, Cathay normally received monthly results from each

of its subsidiaries; generally between two and four weeks after the month-end.

Management of Cathay would also meet with its subsidiaries each month to

understand the key issues in the business, although these meetings were not

always formally documented or recorded.

4.12. Individuals within Cathay were directly involved in the preparation of the financial

results from all subsidiaries except Lansen. Lansen, as a separately listed company,

had its own process for compiling its monthly results. Once it had gone through

that process, it sent its results to Cathay (occasionally outside the two to four-week

window). Cathay, on occasion, made enquiries about the reasoning or assumptions

behind the numbers in the results, but would generally accept the numbers as

presented due to its awareness of the sign-off process for the numbers at Lansen.

On receipt of the results from its subsidiaries each month, Cathay’s finance

department consolidated the results, and (from April 2015 onwards) compared

Cathay’s performance to the budget set by the Board in March 2015. This

consolidation would, on occasion, be sent to the directors of Cathay.

4.13. Cathay also consolidated the monthly results in advance of the regular Board

meetings for the purposes of reviewing its financial performance. As with the

monthly consolidations, the figures prepared for the Board were compared to the

figures in Cathay’s internal budget, set by the Board in March 2015, as well as the

published results for the previous financial year. However, Cathay did not compare

its actual financial performance to market expectations for the year ending 31

December 2015.

Cathay’s forecasting process

4.14. Cathay had no documented procedures which set out how it forecast its expected

financial performance, including what factors it took into consideration when

determining whether it held inside information. However, twice a year, in advance

of the interim and end of year Board meetings in August and December, Cathay

also received year-end forecasts from its subsidiaries, which it would consolidate

alongside the results, in order to assess how it was performing against the budget

set by the Board in March. The interim forecast was based on six months’ results

and six months’ forecasts, and the year-end forecast was normally based on ten

months’ results and two months’ forecasts.

4.15. Individuals at Cathay were directly involved in the preparation of forecasts from its

subsidiaries except Lansen. As with its monthly results, Lansen followed its own

forecasting process and submitted the forecasts to Cathay following approval. As

with the monthly results, Cathay could make enquiries as to the reasoning or

assumptions behind the figures for Lansen, but generally accepted the forecasts as

submitted.

4.16. The forecasts compared the profit estimate against the budget, as well as a

comparison to the preceding financial year. During the 2015 Relevant Period,

Cathay did not compare the forecasts to the market expectations for the year

ending 31 December 2015.

The 2015 interim results

The August 2015 Board meeting

4.17. In advance of a Board meeting on 26 August 2015, Cathay received results from

all of its subsidiaries for the first six months of the year, up to 30 June 2015. The

consolidated results, alongside year-end forecasts for the subsidiaries (except year-

end forecasts for Lansen), were included in the Board pack which was sent to the

Cathay Board shortly in advance of the meeting. Cathay also submitted its interim

results, and associated draft commentary, to N+1 on 21 August 2015 for N+1’s

advice and comments on the drafting of the interim results announcement and

associated documents.

4.18. The interim results showed that Cathay had weaker financial performance than at

the same point in the preceding year, with six-month revenue totalling USD

62,156,000 and operating at a loss after tax of USD 4,266,000. This was

significantly below market expectations as set by analysts at N+1, who had

predicted a loss after tax of USD 0.1 million for the full financial year. Despite this,

Cathay did not consider revising its own expectations for the year-end, or whether

the deteriorating performance of Cathay constituted inside information. The interim

results were also not considered by Cathay against the market expectations set by

analysts at N+1.

4.19. While it received monthly results from Lansen up until June 2015 to be included in

Cathay’s interim results, Cathay was not provided with a forecast from Lansen

setting out its expectations for the year-end. Instead, Lansen provided an oral

update to the Board at the meeting on 26 August 2015, which did not include any

numbers or forecasts.

4.20. Cathay has stated to the Authority that it understood that Lansen did not provide

a forecast for the August 2015 Board meeting due to resourcing constraints at the

time as a result of the ongoing inspection of the Gingko production business by the

CFDA, and because it would have been difficult for Lansen to produce a meaningful

forecast at that time.

4.21. However, Cathay did not have any procedure in place to generate forecasts for its

own year-end expectations where it was not provided with information from a

subsidiary. Senior management at Cathay considered that it was inappropriate to

create its own forecast for Lansen, as it would not have been considered or

approved by the Lansen Board in accordance with Lansen’s own processes.

4.22. In the absence of forecasts from Lansen, Cathay’s Board only considered year-end

forecasts for the remaining subsidiaries. Consequently, Cathay was unable to

predict properly its year-end results at the August 2015 Board meeting, and so it

only assessed forecasts for approximately 20% to 30% of its business.

4.23. As noted above, the monthly results were not considered against market

expectations. Neither was the interim forecast. Both were only considered against

Cathay’s internal budget, and the 2014 performance. In fact, Cathay could not

compare the forecast effectively against market expectations as it had not taken

steps to assess what would be its total year-end position. Until discussions were

held with N+1, Cathay did not turn its mind to whether its performance might

constitute inside information.

Concerns raised by N+1

4.24. On 25 August 2015, N+1 raised concerns that, due to the interim results, it was

likely that Cathay would significantly miss the full year market expectations set out

in N+1’s note of 11 May 2015. This was because the interim results showed poor

performance in the first six months of the reporting period. Cathay was not aware

that it would miss expectations as this was the first occasion on which relevant

people at Cathay had considered the impact of Cathay’s interim results on the full

year performance of Cathay and whether Cathay held inside information.

4.25. On 27 August 2015, N+1 advised again that Cathay needed to include in its

announcement information about the fact it might miss market expectations for the

full year. N+1 proposed an amendment to a sentence to address this concern in

Cathay’s draft interim results which would have stated that ‘the Company

anticipates that operational performance for the full year will be significantly lower

than its previous expectation’.

4.26. The Board did not agree with N+1’s advice, and removed the entire sentence from

the draft of Cathay’s interim results announcement shortly before publication. The

Board considered that it was too soon to understand the financial impact of certain

events on the group’s business, and that the situation might change before year-

end. Cathay also considered that the announcement itself, while not providing

quantified guidance as to what it expected its position to be, provided the reader

with sufficient information as to the state of Cathay’s business (by way of the poor

performance in the first six months), and how this might impact year–end, and so

the announcement would not benefit from the additional clarification proposed by

N+1.

4.27. On 28 August 2015, N+1 repeated its advice and further advised that Cathay might

be in breach of the DTRs if it did not include a line in its interim results

announcement on whether it would meet market expectations, as N+1 considered

that Cathay held inside information about its expected financial performance for

the second half of the year. N+1 also alerted Cathay to the fact that N+1 would

need to downgrade market expectations for Cathay, through the issuance of a new

analyst note. Cathay considered that the revised analyst note, alongside the interim

results, was sufficient to inform the market of the impact of the interim results on

full year expectations.

4.28. Despite N+1 having expressly advised that a rule breach might occur, Cathay did

not consider this to be sufficient information to reconsider its decision, as the

sentence proposed by N+1 had already been rejected by the Board. As a result,

Cathay did not take any steps to reconsider its position in light of the further advice

from N+1 or to consider whether it did hold inside information, and the Board as a

whole was not informed that N+1 had advised of a potential rule breach. Cathay

released its interim results announcement shortly after these discussions with N+1,

and did not include any statement that it would not meet market expectations.

4.29. On 28 August 2015, as a result of Cathay’s poor performance in the first half of the

year, N+1 downgraded its expectations for Cathay’s performance in a published

analyst note. N+1’s revised expectations for Cathay were that it would make a loss

after tax of USD 6.3 million at year-end. This downgrade did not include

consideration of any revenue (or profits) from the new products referred to in

paragraph 4.10.

Period following the interim results

4.30. During conversations with N+1 at the time of finalising Cathay’s interim results,

Cathay’s senior management assured N+1 that Cathay would continue to monitor

its performance, so that it could identify whether a trading update was needed in

the future. However, between 28 August 2015 and the year-end December Board

meeting, Cathay did not monitor its performance against the market expectations

set out by N+1 in the analyst note. Instead, Cathay monitored its performance

against its internal budget, and continued to assess whether the facts in the

unquantified outlook statement in the interim results remained true.

4.31. Between Cathay’s interim results and the consolidation of its ten-month results for

the 10 December 2015 Board meeting, Cathay’s performance was so poor that it

failed to generate even half of the revenue it had budgeted for internally. Despite

Cathay continuing to perform well below its budget for the year, it did not consider

whether this deterioration in performance might amount to inside information, and

whether it should issue a trading update.

4.32. During the same period, N+1 attempted to obtain from Cathay year-end forecasts

on multiple occasions, but was not provided with them. Cathay failed to inform N+1

that the year-end forecasts did not, at this point, exist.

The December Announcement

Earlier advice received by Cathay

4.33. On 13 November 2015, N+1 made a further attempt to receive forecasts from

Cathay for its year-end performance. As a result of this contact from N+1, a call

was arranged for 27 November 2015. At this point, Cathay had actual financial

results for ten months plus two months’ forecasts for all of its subsidiaries except

Lansen (but did have nine months’ actual financial results from Lansen).

4.34. On 27 November 2015 individuals at Cathay, including those to be on the call,

received notification of a penalty intended to be imposed by the CFDA on Ningbo

Liwah of RMB 18,290,177.32, equivalent to approximately USD 2,860,000 at the

relevant time. Therefore, at the time of the call with N+1 on 27 November 2015,

Cathay was aware of a significant cost to Lansen which would need to be announced

to the market once the settlement process had been finalised with the CFDA.

4.35. During the call with N+1 on 27 November 2015, Cathay described in general how

each subsidiary, and therefore Cathay itself, was performing. Cathay stated that as

trends that had occurred during the first six months of the year had continued

during the second half of the year, it considered that its overall performance was

similar to the first half of the year. However, N+1 advised that Cathay was

performing below market expectations, and that a trading update should be made

as soon as possible. N+1 further stressed that while it had not seen Cathay’s

results, from the comments made by Cathay, it appeared that the gap in

performance compared to market expectations was impossible to close, and that if

Cathay were to wait to make a trading update, it would be in breach of its regulatory

obligations. At this point, Cathay informed N+1 that it could not make a decision

on whether to publish an update, and so would have to obtain Board approval (due

to the fact that, as noted in paragraph 4.5, decisions that were not business as

usual would in practice be approved by the Board).

4.36. On 28 November 2015, N+1 followed this call up with written advice reflecting the

advice provided on the call. On both occasions, N+1 requested information from

Cathay showing the financial performance of Cathay.

4.37. A second call with N+1 was arranged for 2 December 2015. At this point, Cathay

still did not have a forecast from Lansen for the year-end, but as with the 27

November 2015 call, had two months’ forecasts and ten months’ financial

performance for all of its subsidiaries except Lansen, and nine months’ results for

Lansen. In the call, Cathay provided further information about the performance of

Lansen, which it stated was underperforming. Cathay covered a number of factors

impacting Lansen’s performance, such as the CFDA penalty on Ningbo Liwah, and

stated that there was no argument that an update needed to be made. However,

Cathay’s view was that there was a choice about when that announcement could

be made. Specifically, Cathay wished to provide the trading update to coincide with

Lansen’s announcement of the penalty imposed on Ningbo Liwah, in order to avoid

multiple announcements to the market. N+1 advised on a number of occasions

during the call that Cathay was incorrect in its view, and that a trading update

needed to be made irrespective of the fact that a later announcement would need

to be made about Lansen. N+1 further stated that it appeared there was no

argument that a trading update was needed, and urged Cathay to take its advice.

Again, N+1 requested information showing the financial performance of Cathay.

4.38. On 2 December 2015, Cathay sought legal advice (which it has disclosed to the

Authority under a waiver of legal advice privilege) on whether it could delay an

announcement on Cathay’s performance to coincide with the announcement of the

penalty on Lansen. However, the legal advice, received by Cathay on 3 December

2015, agreed with N+1, and noted that it appeared an announcement would need

to be made. The legal advice specifically advised Cathay that it could not

choreograph its announcements and delay disclosure to coincide with the

announcement of Lansen’s penalty. The legal adviser attached the Authority’s

technical note on assessing and handling inside information which had been

published in December 2012. The technical note stated that it was not acceptable

for issuers to attempt to choreograph the assessment and possible disclosure of

various and offsetting information that might individually meet the tests for inside

information. The technical note also stated that issuers should have a consistent

procedure for determining what information is sufficiently significant for it to be

deemed inside information and for the release of that information to the market.

4.39. Following this, Cathay contacted N+1 on 4 December 2015, and confirmed that it

would begin drafting a trading update to put to the Board for approval on 10

December 2015. However, a trading update was not drafted and put to the Board.

The December forecast

4.40. Lansen provided its results and forecasts for the full financial year to Cathay on 4

December 2015. Lansen’s ten months’ results showed that it had realised a profit

after tax of USD 7,149,000, which was 44% below its own expectations. Between

4 and 6 December 2015, an individual at Cathay orally enquired as to the basis of

Lansen’s forecasts. These enquiries established that Lansen had incorporated the

costs of its new products, but did not forecast any revenue from the new products

as Lansen had adopted a conservative approach to its forecasts. Cathay did not ask

Lansen to make any revisions to its forecast.

4.41. Cathay consolidated these results and forecasts by 6 December 2015, and sent

them to the Board as part of its Board pack for the Board meeting taking place on

10 December 2015. The forecasts showed that Cathay was now projecting a year-

end loss after tax of USD 9,866,000. N+1’s market forecast for year-end (which

was not discussed or analysed in the Board papers) was a loss after tax of USD

6,300,000. Therefore, Cathay’s forecast figure represented an approximate 56%

deviation from N+1’s analyst note which set the market expectations. This

significant deterioration in Cathay’s performance should have formed part of its

consideration of the need for an announcement to the market and its timing.

4.42. Cathay knew prior to the Board meeting that the CFDA would not change the

amount of the penalty, and that the penalty might be paid by instalments, the first

of which, totalling RMB 3,658,177,32 (equivalent to approximately USD 566,688),

might be payable before year-end. The payment by instalments agreement was

subsequently confirmed by the CFDA in a notice to Ningbo Liwah dated 11

December 2015. The penalty was not included in the forecast figures provided to

the Board for the 10 December 2015 meeting, and Cathay was aware that its

financial performance would be further adversely impacted by the penalty.

4.43. On 10 December 2015, the Board convened and considered the results and

expected financial performance of Cathay, and heard oral updates from each of its

subsidiaries on factors that had impacted performance. The Board was not provided

with a draft trading update at this meeting, as set out at paragraph 4.39. The Board

pack included information on the forecast loss after tax of USD 9,866,000 by

Cathay, but did not include any document showing the financial penalty for Lansen.

The performance of Cathay was acknowledged in the minutes.

4.44. The performance of Cathay, including its full year financial projections was

discussed at the Board meeting. Cathay has stated, and the Authority accepts, that

an oral update was given about potential significant new product sales by Lansen

which might occur before year-end, in such volumes that Lansen would meet or

exceed its new product budget set in May 2015. This would mean that Lansen would

have to generate revenue of USD 11,305,000 for new products, despite having only

generated USD 87,000 in revenue between May (the first time Lansen could sell

the products) and October 2015. Had this level of revenue been generated in the

short period from October 2015 to year-end, Cathay’s performance might not have

missed the market expectations set by N+1’s analyst note in August 2015. Cathay

has stated to the Authority that it was agreed at the Board meeting that, should

these new sales not materialise by 18 December 2015, an announcement would

need to be made to the market.

4.45. Cathay has stated to the Authority that Lansen informed it that it was “confident”

that such new sales could occur, and that Cathay thought concluding such sales

before year end was “an achievable scenario”. On 10 December 2015, the Board

had the 6 December 2015 forecast incorporating what Cathay’s senior management

later described to the Authority as a “conservative scenario” for Lansen and that

Cathay was at the time of the Board meeting projecting a year-end loss after tax

of USD 9,866,000 excluding the CFDA penalty. Nevertheless, these deliberations

or conclusions were not minuted; nor was there contemporaneous documentary

evidence at Cathay or Lansen referring to or discussing such new potential sales or

the Board’s analysis of, or conclusions in relation to, them.

Preparation of the December announcement

4.46. On 11 December 2015, Cathay sent the completed forecasts and results to N+1,

with a draft trading update. This was the first time N+1 had seen Cathay’s financial

performance. Cathay also held a call with N+1 to discuss the content of any update.

Cathay stated during this call that the penalty to be imposed on Ningbo Liwah might

be announced by Lansen in the following week, and that it hoped Cathay’s trading

update could go out at the same time so that negative news did not hit the market

twice. Cathay also noted that it did not want its trading update to trigger an

announcement for Lansen. Cathay made no other statement about when it might

issue the December Announcement, and did not impose on N+1 any deadline for a

response on the draft trading update.

4.47. Between 11 and 17 December 2015, Cathay and N+1 attempted to speak on a

number of occasions to discuss the wording of the December Announcement. It

was only after a conversation had taken place, in which N+1 sought clarification on

Cathay’s results and forecasts, that N+1 was able to provide detailed comments to

Cathay on the drafting of the December Announcement, which it did on 17

December 2015.

4.48. However, also on 18 December 2015, it was confirmed to Cathay that Lansen would

shortly be announcing the CFDA penalty to the market. Cathay redrafted the

trading update so that it could incorporate the penalty. Cathay has stated to the

Authority that it had to liaise with Lansen on the wording of the announcement, to

ensure consistency of messaging. As a consequence of re-drafting the trading

update, and multiple sign-off procedures, it was not until 24 December 2015 that

Cathay approved the December Announcement by email.

4.49. The December Announcement was released to the market on 29 December 2015,

the first working day after approval had been granted. The announcement stated

that, due to operating expenses being significantly higher than anticipated, Cathay

expected to report a material loss before tax for the year ending 31 December

2015, a performance which would be markedly below market expectations. It also

disclosed the CFDA penalty. On the day of the December Announcement, Cathay’s

share price dropped by 18.2%.

Communications with the Authority

Statements in communications

4.50. Between 29 February 2016 and 16 August 2016, Cathay corresponded with the

Authority about the timing of the December Announcement. In a letter dated 4

February 2016, the Authority wrote to Cathay to request information about the

December Announcement. The Authority asked Cathay, amongst other things, to

provide ‘details of any re-forecasting undertaken by the Company as a matter of

course or in light of the additional spending identified above’ (the spending being

the increase in operating expenses referred to in the December Announcement).

4.51. In a letter dated 29 February 2016, Cathay responded to this request by stating

‘the Company prepares its year-end projections twice a year, one in late July (based

on 6 months actual and 6 months projection) prepared for a regular August board

meeting, and another in late November (based on 10 months actual and 2 months

projection) prepared for a regular December board meeting; and at such other

times as may be necessary (for example when the actual numbers are not

performing in line with the management’s expectation or with market

expectations).’ Cathay did not provide any supporting contemporaneous evidence,

nor did it provide the figures for the relevant 2015 forecasts.

4.52. In a letter dated 2 March 2016, the Authority asked Cathay to provide ‘projected

figures for the period sourced from projections as they were at the time along with

any updated projections, indicating when any such update was made’.

4.53. In response, in a letter dated 15 April 2016, Cathay stated ‘as noted in our reply

on 29 February 2016, Cathay prepares its year-end projections twice a year, one

in late July (based on 6 months actual and 6 months projection) prepared for a

regular August board meeting, and another in late November (based on 10 months

actual and 2 months projection) prepared for a regular December board meeting,

and at such other times as may be necessary. The projections in late July and late

November 2015 are shown below’. Cathay provided the following information

about its 2015 forecasts:

(a)
for the interim forecasts, it provided complete forecasts including figures

attributed to Lansen. Those figures suggested that Cathay had forecast a

profit before tax of USD 6,514,000; and

(b)
for the year-end forecasts, it provided complete forecasts, including figures

representing substantial profits from new product sales at Lansen. Those

figures suggested that Cathay had forecast a profit before tax of USD

55,000.

4.54. Throughout its correspondence with the Authority, when commentating on the

forecasts, Cathay used the phrases ‘in the projection exercise conducted in late July

2015’, ‘at the time of conducting this late November projection exercise’ and ‘in

July, Lansen provided the company with the new product projections’ to describe

the timing of the forecasts.

Cathay’s 2015 interim forecasts

4.55. Despite the forecast figures provided to the Authority taking into account forecasts

from Lansen, as noted in paragraph 4.19 Cathay did not receive any interim year-

end forecasts from Lansen, which at the time represented between 70% and 80%

of its business. The Board therefore only considered forecasts for the remaining

subsidiaries. The absence of any forecasts from Lansen is reflected in the Board

pack for 26 August 2015, where Lansen’s forecasts are blank. Therefore, had

Cathay responded to the Authority with contemporaneous information from its

actual projection exercise, it should have provided the forecast which was put to

the Board on 26 August 2015, including blank forecasts for Lansen.

4.56. The Board also did not have any contingency plan in place to forecast Lansen’s

financial performance in the event that Lansen was unable to provide a forecast.

Further, the first time in 2015 that year-end forecasts for Lansen were received by

Cathay was on 4 December 2015, and these did not include any, or any material,

forecast profits from new products.

4.57. Cathay’s letter of 15 April 2016 to the Authority described the interim new products

forecast which it included as having been based on six months’ results and six

months’ projections. In fact, the figures included by Cathay in the letter

attributable to Lansen’s new product forecasts were based on the budget for the

new products, which was set by Lansen in May 2015.

4.58. Further, the figures included by Cathay in its letters to the Authority attributable to

interim forecasts for Lansen’s existing business (that is, those reviewed by the

Board at its meeting of 26 August 2015) were sourced from scenario based analysis

figures created by Lansen in September 2015. The figures were not intended by

Lansen to be a forecast, and were not treated by Cathay as a forecast during the

2015 Relevant Period. These figures did not exist at the time of the Board meeting

in August 2015 and were therefore never set out in any paper provided to the Board

or otherwise brought to the Board’s attention for that meeting.

Cathay’s 2015 year-end forecasts

4.59. Despite the forecast figures provided to the Authority taking into account

substantial profit from new product sales at Lansen, as noted at paragraph 4.56

Lansen’s own forecasts sent to Cathay on 4 December 2015 did not actually include

any, or any material, profits from new product sales.

4.60. Therefore, the Board did not receive or consider a forecast which included any, or

any material, profits from new products, as these were not contained in the Board

pack for the 10 December 2015 Board meeting, which forecast a loss after tax of

USD 9,866,000. Therefore, had Cathay responded to the Authority with information

from the time of the Board meeting, it should have provided the forecast which was

actually put to the Board on 10 December 2015. The information provided to the

Authority in response to its request for information that Cathay forecast a profit

(before tax) of USD 55,000 was wrong and not contemporaneous with the Board

meeting which had the loss (after tax) figure of USD 9,866,000 actually forecast in

the contemporaneous documents before the Board.

4.61. Cathay’s letter of 15 April 2016 to the Authority described the year-end new

products forecast which it included as having been based on ten months’ results

and two months’ projections. In fact, the figures included by Cathay in the letter

attributable to Lansen’s new product forecasts were based on the budget for the

new products, which was set by Lansen in May 2015. Cathay did not inform the

Authority during the 2016 Relevant Period that this was the case.

General statements made by Cathay

4.62. As noted at paragraph 4.51 above, Cathay stated to the Authority that it prepared

additional year-end projections if Cathay was not performing in line with market or

management expectations. However, as Cathay did not monitor its performance

against market expectations in 2015, Cathay would have been unable to prepare

additional projections in the event of a perceived failure to meet those expectations.

In fact, in 2015, Cathay monitored its performance against its own internal budget;

however, this was not the same as the market expectations set out in analyst notes

by N+1 in May and August 2015. As set out in paragraphs 4.20 to 4.23 above,

there was no monitoring of interim projections by Cathay due to the absence of

information from Lansen.

5.
FAILINGS

5.1.
The facts and matters referred to above resulted in Cathay breaching the following

Listing Principles and DTRs of the Authority in force at the time of the breach:

Listing Principle 1, DTR 2.2.1R and Premium Listing Principle 6 and Listing Principle

2. These breaches are set out below and the provisions referred to are set out at

Annex A to this Notice.

The 2015 Relevant Period

Cathay’s obligations

5.2.
Listing Principle 1 requires a listed company to take reasonable steps to establish

and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable it to comply

with its obligations.

5.3.
Cathay’s obligations during the 2015 Relevant Period included compliance with the

DTRs. The guidance at DTR 2.2.8G provides that the directors of the issuer should

carefully and continuously monitor whether changes in circumstances of the issuer

are such that an announcement obligation has arisen. The Authority had also issued

a technical note in December 2012 (ref: UKLA / TN / 521.1) on assessing and

handling inside information. As noted at paragraph 4.38, this was the technical note

Cathay’s legal advisers provided to Cathay.

Cathay’s breaches

5.4.
During the 2015 Relevant Period, the shortcomings in Cathay’s procedures,

systems and controls meant that Cathay was unable to comply with its obligations

set out in paragraph 5.3, because it:

(a)
failed to put in place adequate processes and consistent procedures for

compliance with its obligations under the DTRs, in relation to how it would

forecast and monitor how it was performing against market expectations;

(b)
failed to have in place any procedures, systems or controls to calculate its

expected financial performance where it did not obtain year-end forecasts

from its main subsidiary, Lansen, so that it could not assess and carefully

and continuously monitor whether its year-end expectations for financial

performance matched, or deviated from, market expectations; and

(c)
due to (a) and (b) Cathay and its Board did not assess whether the financial

performance of Cathay and its comparison to market expectations amounted

to inside information under section 118C of the Act, and whether this gave

rise to an obligation to make an announcement.

5.5.
Cathay’s senior management failed adequately to mitigate the risk, which they

appreciated, that their actions or inaction could result in a failure to take reasonable

steps to establish and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls. Cathay

thereby acted recklessly.

5.6.
The Authority expects that a premium listed company would have in place

procedures, systems and controls which would help it identify and disclose inside

information, such that it could inform the market of any changes arising from that

inside information in a timely manner. As provided for by the Authority’s listing

regime and the technical note referred to in paragraph 5.3, in order to identify

information which may be inside information requiring disclosure to the market:

(a)
the Authority expects a premium listed company regularly to monitor

changes in its financial performance and its expectations of year-end

performance; and

(b)
the Authority expects a premium listed company to be aware of market

expectations regarding its financial performance and to check regularly

whether its own expectations of financial performance are in line with

market expectations.

5.7.
The only procedures that Cathay had in place during the 2015 Relevant Period were

inadequate and did not comply with Cathay’s obligations, because:

(a)
during the 2015 Relevant Period, Cathay was reliant on Lansen providing

accurate and complete financial information to it so that it could assess

Cathay’s overall financial performance given that Lansen amounted to 70%

to 80% of its business. However, Cathay failed to put in place a forecasting

process which would enable it properly to consider its financial performance

in the event that Lansen did not provide the relevant information;

(b)
when Lansen failed to provide a forecast to Cathay in August 2015, Cathay,

in the absence of any documented procedure for this issue, then did not take

adequate steps to gather the information required, in order to ensure that

it could comply with its own regulatory obligations by carefully and

continuously monitoring whether there had been changes in Cathay’s

circumstances. Instead, Cathay simply chose not to complete its forecasts;

(c)
the Authority does not agree with Cathay’s assertion that because Lansen

was separately listed and had its own forecasting procedures Cathay could

not have put in place a contingency plan to forecast Lansen’s financial

performance. The Authority considers that there were a number of options

available to Cathay; and

(d)
the absence of a forecast from Lansen meant that it was not until 6

December 2015 that Cathay had a completed year-end forecast for Cathay

for the year ending 31 December 2015.

5.8.
The Authority considers that this failed to meet the required standard for a premium

listed company to monitor its own financial performance and relevant market

expectations.

5.9.
Further, when Cathay did monitor its financial performance, either in its forecasts

or in its monthly results, it did not consider its financial performance against market

expectations. Instead, Cathay considered its financial performance against Cathay’s

budget, and Cathay’s outlook statement. This process was not sufficient, as neither

the budget, nor the outlook statement, were comparable to the market

expectations set by N+1. The outlook statement, while referring to issues which

might impact Cathay’s performance, did not quantify or set any guidance as to what

the year-end position might be. Therefore, during the 2015 Relevant Period, Cathay

should have taken into account the market expectations set by analysts at N+1.

5.10. N+1 provided advice to Cathay on its disclosure obligations on a number of

occasions during the 2015 Relevant Period, in particular Cathay’s need to identify

and disclose inside information. Cathay did not take adequate steps properly to

consider that advice in relation to the specific matters raised by N+1 and

consistently chose to act against the advice. Further, Cathay failed to engage with

the substance of the advice when considering what it should take into account in

future when reviewing its financial performance on an ongoing basis, including

whether it had inside information to disclose.

5.11. This meant that, in August 2015, senior management at Cathay did not consider

that advice pertaining to a potential rule breach was sufficiently serious to escalate

to the Board.

5.12. In fact, Cathay’s failures in its procedures, systems and controls were so serious

that in August 2015 it took Cathay’s advisers to identify to Cathay that it might

miss market expectations. While N+1’s own forecasts were not comparable to

Cathay’s own understanding of its financial performance, Cathay should, when it

discussed the advice with N+1, have attempted to form its own view as to whether

it would miss expectations, but it did not. Cathay then resisted attempts to

persuade it to clarify its financial performance to the market, and did not use the

advice either to assist Cathay in forecasting what its 2015 financial performance

would be, or to change its procedures to enable Cathay and the Board continuously

and carefully to monitor whether changes in Cathay’s circumstances were such that

inside information was held which had to be disclosed. The Authority considers that

Cathay relied on the fact that N+1 would downgrade market expectations on the

same day as the interim results announcement as a reason not to make its own

announcement on the issue.

5.13. It also meant that in December 2015, when N+1 again advised Cathay of a need

to disclose what N+1 considered to be inside information (which advice was

confirmed by Cathay’s legal advisers), Cathay did not have in place a consistent

procedure to ensure that by continuous monitoring it could identify inside

information that had to be disclosed to the market as soon as possible.

5.14. Therefore, Cathay acted recklessly and did not have adequate procedures, systems

and controls in the 2015 Relevant Period to enable it to give the market important

information as to a material change in its expected financial performance in a timely

manner.

DTR 2.2.1R and Premium Listing Principle 6

Cathay’s obligations

5.15. In the 2015 Relevant Period, DTR 2.2.1R stated:

“An issuer must notify a [Regulatory Information Service] as soon as possible

of any inside information which directly concerns the issuer unless DTR 2.5.1R

applies”.

5.16. DTR 2.5.1R stated:

“An issuer may, under its own responsibility, delay the public disclosure of

inside information, such as not to prejudice its legitimate interests provided

that:

(1) such omission would not be likely to mislead the public;

(2) any person receiving the information owes the issuer a duty of

confidentiality, regardless of whether such duty is based on law, regulations,

articles of association or contract; and

(3) the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of that information”.

“A listed company must communicate information to holders and potential

holders of its listed equity shares in such a way as to avoid the creation of a

false market in those listed equity shares”.

Cathay’s breaches

5.18. Over the course of the 2015 Relevant Period, Cathay’s monitoring of its financial

performance (through its monthly results) continued to identify that the

performance of Cathay was very poor.

5.19. The information collated on 6 December 2015 met the statutory test set out in

section 118C of the Act for inside information, set out in the Annex to this Notice.

Each of the relevant criteria is set out below:

(a)
the information must be precise. The material consolidated on 6 December

2015 included Cathay’s internal projection of a year-end loss after tax of

USD 9,866,000 compared to N+1’s forecast for year-end of a loss after tax

of USD 6,300,000 (around 56% below market expectations). This

demonstrated that Cathay’s financial performance would fall markedly below

market expectations. This information was specific enough to allow for the

conclusion that it would have an impact on Cathay’s share price;

(b)
the 6 December 2015 consolidated group forecast financial information

showed a material deviation from market expectations. The Authority

concludes that because Cathay held this forecast on 6 December 2015, this

was information which satisfied the test in section 118C of the Act for inside

information as it indicated circumstances that existed, or might reasonably

be expected to come into existence, of Cathay’s year-end financial

performance being materially lower than the market expectations which had

been set by N+1 analyst’s note on 28 August 2015. The forecast financial

information consolidated on 6 December 2015 also corroborated the position

set out by N+1 in its calls on 27 November 2015 and 2 December 2015, and

in its email of 28 November 2015. The Authority accepts Cathay’s assertion

that at the 10 December 2015 Board meeting a discussion occurred about

the prospects of new product sales. Although Cathay has stated (as noted

in paragraph 4.45) that Lansen informed it that Lansen was confident by the

10 December 2015 Board meeting new sales could occur, this would have

been so uncertain that Cathay could not appropriately have decided that it

displaced the circumstances that existed or might reasonably be expected

to come into existence such that Cathay held information subject to section

118C of the Act;

(c)
the information was not generally available. The 6 December 2015 material

was not generally available as only senior management received the

information and were in the position of being able to understand its

implications for the year-end;

(d)
the information related, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of the

qualifying investments. The information related directly to Cathay, which is

an issuer of shares listed in the UK; and

(e)
if generally available, a 56% deviation from market expectations (that being

a material loss after tax), would be likely to have had a significant effect on

Cathay’s share price, and a reasonable investor would be likely to use it as

part of the basis for their investment decisions. This is supported by the

18.2% drop in Cathay’s share price on the day of the December

Announcement.

5.20. The Authority considers that Cathay’s decision not to make a trading update on or

shortly after 6 December 2015 was influenced by the fact that it was aware that a

substantial penalty was due to be announced by Lansen, which would have required

Cathay to make a further announcement. Cathay was more concerned with

ensuring that its own announcement did not trigger one for Lansen, and the

prospect of multiple bad news announcements, than it was with complying with its

own obligations, as set out at paragraph 5.3.

5.21. The Authority also does not consider that there existed any of the grounds under

DTR 2.5.1R for Cathay to have delayed disclosure. Specifically, this is because the

Authority considers that DTR 2.5.1R could not be satisfied because the omission,

by Cathay not informing the market of Cathay’s deteriorating financial

performance, was likely to mislead the public.

5.22. The Authority therefore considers that the December Announcement was delayed

without proper justification in order to allow Cathay to announce the financial

penalty on Ningbo Liwah at the same time, despite Cathay having received advice

that it should not do this. Cathay should have made an announcement to the

market on, or shortly after, 6 December 2015.

5.23. As a result of Cathay’s failure to disclose inside information to the market, it created

a false market in its listed equity shares, as investors were not informed that Cathay

was performing markedly below market expectations. This false market was in

existence between 6 December 2015 and 29 December 2015.

5.24. Cathay breached DTR 2.2.1R and Premium Listing Principle 6 by failing to inform

the market of its deteriorating financial performance at an earlier date than 29

December 2015. Cathay had received and consolidated all of its year-end forecasts

by 6 December 2015, and that information was sufficiently clear and precise that it

should have at least issued a holding statement putting the market on notice of a

potential material change to its expected financial performance on or soon after 6

December 2015. Cathay’s senior management were aware, including from advice

given to Cathay by its appointed advisers, of the risk of a breach if Cathay did not

make an appropriate disclosure, but failed to do so. Cathay thereby acted

recklessly.

The 2016 Relevant Period

Cathay’s obligations

5.25. During the 2016 Relevant Period, Listing Principle 2 stated:

“A listed company must deal with the Authority in an open and co-operative

manner”.

It is a factual matter whether or not a company has been open and co-operative in

how it responds to requests for information from the Authority.

Cathay’s breaches

5.26. Cathay’s statements in the 2016 Relevant Period, and the financial information

provided to the Authority, implied that during 2015 Cathay had stronger

procedures, systems and controls in place for its forecasting and monitoring

procedures than were actually in place. Cathay gave the impression to the Authority

that forecasts were available to its Board when they were not. For example,

Cathay’s letter of 15 April 2016 to the Authority described the interim new products

forecast which it included as having been based on six months’ results and six

months’ projections. In fact, the figures included by Cathay in the letter

attributable to Lansen’s new product forecasts were based on the budget for the

new products, which was set by Lansen in May 2015. By way of further example,

the figures included by Cathay in its letters to the Authority attributable to interim

forecasts for Lansen’s existing business (that is, those reviewed by the Board at its

meeting of 26 August 2015) were sourced from scenario based analysis figures

created by Lansen in September 2015. The figures were not intended by Lansen to

be a forecast, and were not treated by Cathay as a forecast during the 2015

Relevant Period. These figures did not exist at the time of the Board meeting in

August 2015 and were therefore never set out in any paper provided to the Board

or otherwise brought to the Board’s attention for that meeting.

5.27. Further, the figures provided to the Authority by Cathay for its forecasts implied

that Cathay might not have had a material deviation from market expectations (or

might have had a smaller deviation than it actually did). These figures also implied

that Cathay might not have needed to issue a trading update to the market during

the 2015 Relevant Period. However, this implied position is not supported by any

contemporaneous evidence. Had the Authority accepted Cathay’s statements and

figures as provided in its communications, the Authority might have considered

Cathay’s financial performance at the relevant times to have been better than it

was and chosen to conduct no further investigations.

5.28. The Authority considers that its requests were clear as to what information should

be provided to it and that this concerned giving explanations of events surrounding

the December Announcement. Accordingly, the Authority considers that Cathay

understood the requests and knew that the information it provided did not respond

to the Authority’s requests. Cathay, however, did not provide any explanation that

different information to that requested was being provided and it appeared that

what was provided was responsive to the Authority’s requests.

5.29. The Authority is dependent on companies providing clear and accurate information

to it, in order to ensure that it can effectively monitor and regulate the integrity of

the financial markets in the UK. It is a company’s responsibility to deal with the

Authority in an open and co-operative manner including providing complete and

accurate information to the Authority.

5.30. The Authority has had regard to, and accepts, Cathay’s explanation that it did not

intend to mislead the Authority. However, Cathay provided different information to

that which was requested and did so without any explanation. Cathay therefore

acted unreasonably in the way that it dealt with the Authority’s information

requests.

5.31. The Authority therefore considers that Cathay did not deal with the Authority in an

open and co-operative manner, in breach of Listing Principle 2.

6.
SANCTION

Financial penalty

6.1.
The Authority’s policy for imposing a financial penalty is set out in Chapter 6 of

DEPP. In determining the appropriate financial penalty, the Authority has had

regard to Chapter 6 of DEPP.

6.2.
The Authority considers that the breaches within the 2015 Relevant Period and

2016 Relevant Period relate to two serious but separate issues, and so hereby

imposes separate penalties for each period.

6.3.
The total financial penalty which the Authority hereby imposes on Cathay is

£411,000. This penalty is calculated as set out below. The Authority considers that

taking this action helps to achieve its strategic objective of ensuring that the

relevant markets function well and the operational objectives of protecting and

enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system and ensuring an appropriate

degree of protection for consumers.

2015 Relevant Period penalty

Step 1 – Disgorgement

6.4.
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.1G, at Step 1, the Authority seeks to deprive a firm of the

financial benefit derived directly from the breach. Cathay did not derive any

financial benefit from the breaches and so there is no amount subject to

disgorgement.

Step 2 – Seriousness of the breach

6.5.
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.2G at Step 2, the Authority determines a figure that reflects

the seriousness of the breach. Where the amount of revenue generated by a firm

from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential

harm that its breach may cause, that figure will be based on a percentage of the

firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business area.

6.6.
However, in this case, the Authority considers that the revenue generated by

Cathay is not an appropriate indicator as it does not reflect the harm or risk of harm

resulting from Cathay’s breaches.

6.7.
The Authority considers the appropriate indicator is Cathay’s average daily market

capitalisation throughout the period of the breach as it reflects the harm or risk of

harm resulting from the breaches. The Authority considers that the period of the

breaches should be the 2015 Relevant Period. Cathay’s average daily market

capitalisation over this period was £69,602,132.

6.8.
The Authority considers that a scale of 0-0.5% of market capitalisation (applied

according to the seriousness of the breach) is appropriate in order that the penalty

properly reflects the seriousness of the breach. The range is divided into five fixed

levels that represent, on a sliding scale, the seriousness of the breach; the more

serious the breach, the higher the level:

Level 1 – 0%

Level 2 – 0.125%

Level 3 – 0.25%

Level 4 – 0.375%

Level 5 – 0.5%

Level of seriousness

6.9.
In assessing the seriousness level for the purpose of penalty, the Authority takes

into account various factors which reflect the impact and nature of the breach.

Impact of the breach

6.10. The impact of these failings was significant as they resulted in Cathay failing to

release inside information to the market and created a risk of harm to consumers

who were making investment decisions without the benefit of current and accurate

information.

6.11. There was an effect on the orderliness of, or confidence in, markets as a result of

the breaches. Cathay’s failures created a false market in its listed equity shares.

Investors would have placed reliance on the market expectations published by N+1

in its analyst note dated 28 August 2015, which were later shown to be unattainable

but the market was not informed.

Nature of the breach

6.12. The nature of the breaches by Cathay is particularly serious. This is because:

(a)
Cathay’s senior management were aware of the breaches and had been

repeatedly advised by Cathay’s advisers about its disclosure obligations; and

(b)
the breaches revealed serious and systemic weaknesses in Cathay’s

procedures and/or in the management systems or internal controls relating

to Cathay’s business.

6.13. DEPP 6.5A.2G(11) sets out the factors which are likely to be considered ‘level 4

factors’ or ‘level 5 factors’. Of these, the Authority considers the following factors

to be relevant to the breaches:

(a)
the breaches revealed serious and systemic weaknesses in Cathay’s

procedures and/or in the management systems or internal controls relating

to Cathay’s business; and

(b)
the breaches of Listing Principle 1, DTR 2.2.1R and Premium Listing Principle

6 were committed recklessly.

6.14. DEPP 6.5A.2G(12) sets out the factors which are likely to be considered ‘level 1

factors’, ‘level 2 factors’ or ‘level 3 factors’. Of these, the Authority considers the

following factor to be relevant:

(a)
no profits were made or losses avoided by Cathay as a result of the

breaches, either directly or indirectly.

6.15. The Authority therefore considers the seriousness of the breaches to be level 4.

Therefore the Step 2 figure is 0.375% of £69,602,132, which is £261,007.

Step 3 – mitigating and aggravating factors

6.16. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.3G, at Step 3 the Authority may increase or decrease the

amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2 to take into account factors

which aggravate or mitigate the breach.

6.17. The Authority considers that there are no aggravating or mitigating factors. The

Step 3 figure is therefore £261,007.

Step 4 – adjustment for deterrence

6.18. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.4G, if the Authority considers the figure arrived at after Step

3 is insufficient to deter the firm who committed the breach, or others, from

committing further or similar breaches, then the Authority may increase the

penalty.

6.19. The Authority considers that no adjustment for deterrence is applicable. The Step

4 figure is therefore £261,007.

Step 5 – settlement discount

6.20. No settlement discount is applicable. The Step 5 figure is therefore £261,000

(rounded down to the nearest £100).

2016 Relevant Period penalty

Step 1 – Disgorgement

6.21. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.1G, at Step 1, the Authority seeks to deprive a firm of the

financial benefit derived directly from the breach. Cathay did not derive any

financial benefit from the breaches and so there is no amount subject to

disgorgement.

Step 2 – Seriousness of the breach

6.22. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.2G at Step 2, the Authority determines a figure that reflects

the seriousness of the breach. Where the amount of revenue generated by a firm

from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential

harm that its breach may cause, that figure will be based on a percentage of the

firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business area.

6.23. The Authority considers the revenue generated by Cathay is not an appropriate

indicator of the harm or potential harm caused by its breaches of Listing Principle

2 and there is no alternative indicator of harm or potential harm. Pursuant to DEPP

6.5A.2G(13), the Authority has determined the appropriate Step 2 amount by

taking into account those factors which are relevant to an assessment of the

seriousness of the breaches.

6.24. DEPP 6.5A.2G(6) sets out the factors relating to the impact of a breach. Of these,

the Authority considers the following factors to be relevant to the breach:

(a)
The adverse effect on markets. The impact of the breach was such that,

based on the information that Cathay provided to the Authority which was

materially different to the actual processes followed in 2015, the Authority

had to take further investigatory steps to uncover the true position in

relation to Cathay’s forecasts, and only uncovered the true position when

Cathay was asked for contemporaneous evidence of its forecasts in 2015;

and

(b)
The provision of inaccurate information to the Authority undermines its

ability effectively to monitor and regulate the integrity of the financial

markets in the UK.

6.25. DEPP 6.5A.2G(7) sets out the factors relating to the nature of a breach. Of these,

the Authority considers the following factors to be relevant to the breach:

(a)
whether senior management were aware of the breach. Cathay’s senior

management were aware that the information provided to the Authority was

not a contemporaneous reflection of matters known to Cathay at the

relevant time;

(b)
the nature of the rule breached by Cathay. The listing regime relies on

companies being open and co-operative with the Authority, and so Listing

Principle 2 is fundamental to the effective functioning of the listing regime;

and

(c)
the frequency of the breach. Cathay provided inaccurate information to the

Authority on two occasions during the 2016 Relevant Period.

6.26. DEPP 6.5A.2G(11) sets out the factors which are likely to be considered ‘level 4

factors’ or ‘level 5 factors’. The Authority does not consider any of these factors to

be relevant; in particular, the Authority has not seen any evidence showing that

the breach was committed either deliberately or recklessly. While the Authority

considers that senior management of Cathay knew that the information provided

did not correspond to the Authority’s requests, they did not foresee the likely or

actual consequences of their actions; namely, that by providing no explanation, the

information may have appeared to the Authority to have been responsive to its

requests.

6.27. DEPP 6.5A.2G(12) sets out the factors which are likely to be considered ‘level 1

factors’, ‘level 2 factors’ or ‘level 3 factors’. Of these, the Authority considers the

following factors to be relevant to the breach:

(a)
no profits were made or losses avoided by Cathay as a result of the breach,

either directly or indirectly; and

(b)
there was no loss to consumers, investors or other market users.

6.28. The Authority considers the seriousness of the breaches to be level 3. In particular,

it notes that Cathay provided inaccurate information to the Authority without

intending to mislead. The Authority also notes that no consumers, investors or

market participants were impacted by Cathay’s breach, and it did not significantly

impact the investigation of the breaches of Listing Principle 1, DTR 2.2.1R and

6.29. Taking all of the factors into account including that while Cathay did not intend to

mislead the Authority, it deliberately provided information, without any

explanation, that did not respond to the Authority’s requests, the Authority

considers the Step 2 figure should be £150,000.

Step 3 – mitigating and aggravating factors

6.30. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.3G, at Step 3 the Authority may increase or decrease the

amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2 to take into account factors

which aggravate or mitigate the breach.

6.31. The Authority has taken into account Cathay’s co-operation in waiving privilege

over the legal advice it received on 3 December 3015, and that it later provided

corrected information about the 15 April 2016 letter, and an apology. However,

the Authority does not consider that those matters provide sufficient mitigation to

warrant a reduction in the financial penalty. The Authority considers that there are

no aggravating factors. The step 3 figure is therefore £150,000.

Step 4 – adjustment for deterrence

6.32. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.4G, if the Authority considers the figure arrived at after Step

3 is insufficient to deter the firm who committed the breach, or others, from

committing further or similar breaches, then the Authority may increase the

penalty.

6.33. The Authority considers that the Step 3 figure of £150,000 represents a sufficient

deterrent to Cathay and others, and so has not increased the penalty at Step 4.

6.34. The Step 4 figure is therefore £150,000.

Step 5 – settlement discount

6.35. No settlement discount is applicable. The Step 5 figure is therefore £150,000.

7.
REPRESENTATIONS

7.1.
Annex B contains a brief summary of the key representations made by Cathay and

how they have been dealt with. In making the decision which gave rise to the

obligation to give this Notice, the Authority has taken into account all of the

representations made by Cathay, whether or not set out in Annex B.

8.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

8.1.
This Notice is given to Cathay under and in accordance with section 390 of the Act.

The following statutory rights are important.

Decision maker

8.2. The decision which gave rise to the obligation to give this Notice was made by the

Regulatory Decisions Committee.

Manner and time for payment

8.3. The financial penalty must be paid in full by Cathay to the Authority no later than

12 July 2019.

If the financial penalty is not paid

8.4. If all or any of the financial penalty is outstanding on 13 July 2019, the Authority

may recover the outstanding amount as a debt owed by Cathay and due to the

Authority.

8.5. Sections 391(4), 391(6) and 391(7) of the Act apply to the publication of

information about the matter to which this notice relates. Under those provisions,

the Authority must publish such information about the matter to which this notice

relates as the Authority considers appropriate. The information may be published

in such manner as the Authority considers appropriate. However, the Authority

may not publish information if such publication would, in the opinion of the

Authority, be unfair to you or prejudicial to the interests of consumers or

detrimental to the stability of the UK financial system.

Authority contacts

8.6.
For more information concerning this matter generally, contact Stephen Robinson

(direct line: 020 7066 1338) or Kevin Oh (direct line: 020 7066 4312) of the

Enforcement and Market Oversight Division of the Authority.

Financial Conduct Authority, Enforcement and Market Oversight Division

ANNEX A

RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

The statutory and regulatory provisions set out below are the versions that were in force

in the periods between 21 August 2015 and 29 December 2015 (i.e. the 2015 Relevant

Period) and 29 February 2016 and 16 August 2016 (i.e. the 2016 Relevant Period).

1.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1.1.
The Authority’s general duties established in section 1B of the Act include the

strategic objective of ensuring that the relevant markets function well and the

operational objectives of protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial

system and securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers.

1.2.
Section 118C of the Act:

“(1) This section defines “inside information” for the purposes of this Part.

(2) In relation to qualifying investments, or related investments, which are not

commodity derivatives, inside information is information of a precise nature

which—

(a) is not generally available,

(b) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of the qualifying

investments or to one or more of the qualifying investments, and

(c) would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the price

of the qualifying investments or on the price of related investments.

(5) Information is precise if it—

(a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected to come

into existence or an event that has occurred or may reasonably be expected to

occur, and

(b) is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect

of those circumstances or that event on the price of qualifying investments or

related investments.

(6) Information would be likely to have a significant effect on price if and only if it

is information of a kind which a reasonable investor would be likely to use as

part of the basis of his investment decisions.

(8) Information which can be obtained by research or analysis conducted by, or on

behalf of, users of a market is to be regarded, for the purposes of this Part, as

being generally available to them.”

1.3.
Section 91 of the Act:

“(1) If the [Authority] considers that—

(a) an issuer of listed securities, or

(b) an applicant for listing,

has contravened any provision of listing rules, it may impose on him a penalty of

such amount as it considers appropriate.”

2.
RELEVANT REGULATORY PROVISIONS

2.1.
Unless otherwise stated, the regulatory provisions set out below were in force at

all material times.

2.2.
Listing Principle 1: “A listed company must take reasonable steps to establish

and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable it to comply

with its obligations”.

2.3.
Listing Principle 2: “A listed company must deal with the Authority in an open

and co-operative manner”.

2.4.
Premium Listing Principle 6: “A listed company must communicate information

to holders and potential holders of its listed equity shares in such a way as to avoid

the creation of a false market in those listed equity shares”.

Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules

2.5.
DTR 2.2.1R: “An issuer must notify a RIS as soon as possible of any inside

information which directly concerns the issuer unless DTR 2.5.1R applies”.

2.6.
DTR 2.5.1R: “An issuer may, under its own responsibility, delay the public

disclosure of inside information such as not to prejudice its legitimate interests

provided that:

(1)
such omission would not be likely to mislead the public;

(2)
any person receiving the information owes the issuer a duty of

confidentiality, regardless of whether such duty is based on law, regulations,

articles of association or contract; or

(3)
the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of that information”.

2.7.
DTR 2.2.8G: “The directors of the issuer should carefully and continuously monitor

whether changes in the circumstances of the issuer are such that an announcement

obligation has arisen under this chapter”.

ANNEX B

REPRESENTATIONS

1. Cathay’s representations (in italics), and the Authority’s conclusions in respect of

them, are set out below.

Cathay did not breach Listing Principle 1 by failing to compare forecasts against

market expectations

2. Cathay had a long-standing and well-established process for preparing full-year

projections twice annually. This was reasonable for a company of its size. Its

advisers were fully aware of this process and did not advise that Cathay needed to

prepare forecasts more frequently; the Authority does not allege that year-end

forecasts should have been prepared more frequently. Thus, the first opportunity

Cathay had to compare its performance against the August 20015 analyst’s note

was in November/December 2015, when it did so.

3. Each month between August and December Cathay received data from each of its

subsidiaries regarding actual monthly financial performance (without projections

for future months). It monitored these and compared them to its own budgets and

the unquantified statements in its interim results. Operating a system of

performing twice-annual forecasts, as it did, it could not have done more in the

circumstances.

4. Listing Principle 1 requires a listed company to take reasonable steps to establish

and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to comply with its

obligations. It is not prescriptive about what the procedures, systems and controls

should be, but (regardless of the circumstances and size of the company) they

must be sufficient to enable the listed company to comply with its obligations,

including the obligation under DTR 2.1.1R to notify a Regulatory Information

Service as soon as possible of inside information which concerns it. As noted in the

guidance in DTR 2.2.8G, the Authority considers that the directors of a listed

company should carefully and continuously monitor whether changes in its

circumstances are such that an announcement obligation has arisen. This required

Cathay, as a premium listed company, to monitor changes in its financial

performance and its expectations of year-end performance, to be aware of market

expectations regarding its financial performance and to check regularly whether its

own expectations of financial performance were in line with market expectations.

5. Even if its twice-yearly projection process was long-standing and well-established,

it was inadequate to enable Cathay to comply with its obligations under DTR 2.2.1R

because Cathay was unable to monitor whether its own expectations for its financial

performance were in line with market expectations. Comparing data received

monthly from subsidiaries against internal budgets and unquantified statements in

its interim results did not achieve this as neither was comparable to market

expectations as set by N+1’s analyst’s notes.

6. The obligation was on Cathay to comply with Listing Principle 1 and it would be no

excuse to show that it was never advised that its procedures were deficient.

However, it should in fact have been clear to Cathay from the advice it received

from N+1 about its disclosure obligations and the risk of breach of the DTRs in

August 2015, and then again in November and December of that year, that it

needed to amend its procedures, systems and controls to ensure compliance with

Listing Principle 1.

Cathay did not breach Listing Principle 1 by failing to produce a contingency plan

for circumstances in which Lansen did not produce a forecast

7. Lansen was unable to produce a quantified forecast in July 2015 because of specific

and unusual circumstances. Cathay nevertheless turned its mind to its projected

year-end performance and formed a view, based on qualitative information about

the key trends driving its overall business, including for Lansen. This was a

reasonable response to the circumstances and was adequate to enable Cathay to

produce interim results which complied with the DTRs.

8. It is incorrect to suggest that Cathay required a contingency procedure to deal with

the situation that arose, rather than being ready to deal with the circumstances

when they arose on an ad hoc basis. In forming the view that Lansen’s performance

in the second half of the year would be similar to its performance in the first half,

Cathay took a reasoned view, without overreaching by creating unsubstantiated

proxy data, which would risk misleading. This is not a matter of systems and

controls but a criticism of action taken (or not taken) in response to an event.

9. This failure is a matter of systems and controls. As noted above, Cathay was

obliged under Listing Principle 1 to take reasonable steps to establish and maintain

adequate procedures, systems and controls to comply with its obligations. As

Lansen represented 70% to 80% of its business at the time, Cathay was particularly

reliant on Lansen to provide accurate and timely information to it. Yet Cathay failed

to have in place any procedures, systems and controls to ascertain its expected

financial performance when it did not obtain year-end forecasts from Lansen. When

Lansen failed to provide a forecast to Cathay in August 2015, Cathay did not take

adequate steps to gather the information it required and so it did not have a

completed year-end forecast for its own performance for the year ending 31

December 2015 until 6 December of that year. There is no contemporaneous

evidence that Cathay had a procedure or system for producing a forecast, whether

based on qualitative information or otherwise, or of any objective evaluation by

Cathay of such information.

Any breach of Listing Principle 1 by Cathay was not committed recklessly

10. A finding of recklessness would require Cathay to have been specifically aware of a

risk that its systems and controls were inadequate, and nevertheless to have failed

to put proper systems and controls in place knowing, or turning a blind eye to, the

risk of harm or breach resulting.

11. Cathay was not aware of any risk that its systems and controls were inadequate.

It was never advised that they were inadequate, or potentially so, and nor was

there any suggestion from which this could have been inferred.

12. N+1’s advice in August concerned the specific and narrow issue of whether the

interim statement should contain the words set out at paragraph 4.25 of this Notice.

It did not concern, reveal or put Cathay on notice of anything to do with its systems

and controls. There is nothing else in the communications with N+1 in the 2015

Relevant Period that supports the contention that Cathay must have appreciated

that its systems and controls were inadequate.

13. The Authority accepts that a finding of recklessness requires Cathay to have been

aware of a risk that its procedures, systems and controls were inadequate, and

nevertheless to have failed to put in place adequate procedures, systems and

controls, knowing, or turning a blind eye to, the risk of a breach resulting. It is not

however, necessary to show that Cathay was advised of this risk.

14. The Authority considers that it must have been clear to Cathay’s senior

management, including from the advice it received from N+1 between 25 and 28

August 2015 (summarised at paragraphs 4.24 to 4.27 of this Notice) that Cathay

needed to commence monitoring of its financial performance to enable it to identify

any changes in that performance, and particularly whether its expectations of

performance were in line with market expectations as set by N+1. That advice was

not narrowly focused on the specific wording of the interim statement. Further, as

noted at paragraph 4.30 of this Notice, Cathay’s senior management assured N+1

that it would monitor its performance so that it could identify whether a trading

update was required in the future, demonstrating that they were aware of the need

to do so and that Cathay’s procedures, systems and controls up until then for doing

so were deficient. Cathay’s senior management appreciated the risk that their

actions or inaction could result in a failure to take reasonable steps to establish and

maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls. By then failing to carry out

the monitoring, or take other appropriate actions, they failed adequately to mitigate

that risk and Cathay thereby acted recklessly.

DTR 2.2.1 and Premium Listing Principle 6

Cathay did not have inside information, either at all or alternatively until 18

15. The difference in net profit line was not price-sensitive to Cathay’s shares. A

reasonable investor would not have used the difference between the projected net

profit figures in the projections consolidated by Cathay on 6 December 2015 and

the N+1 research note of August 2015 as a basis for making investment decisions

in relation to Cathay’s shares. The 56% deviation in projected net profits in this

case was material but, given that other significant items – revenue and gross profit

– were broadly unchanged from market expectations, that material deviation was

unlikely to have a significant effect on Cathay’s share price in all the circumstances.

16. No weight should be placed on the 18.2% drop in Cathay’s share price on the day

of the announcement (29 December 2015) because the trading update also

contained information about the CFDA penalty and it is not possible safely to

conclude that that did not explain all, or a significant part, of the price drop.

17. Further, the August 2015 research note did not value Cathay’s shares using

projected net profit; instead, it valued Cathay’s share on the asset values of its

holdings. The relevant question, therefore, is whether the information reflected in

Cathay’s projections would have affected the value of Cathay’s holding in Lansen,

as an asset of Cathay. Lansen made its own trading update in March 2016 in

relation to the downturn in its 2015 expected profits, covering the information

included by Cathay in its trading update on 29 December 2015, and stating that

group profit was expected to show a “relatively substantial decline”. Lansen’s share

price did not move materially on that announcement, strongly supporting the view

that the deviation in net profits was not price-sensitive in relation to Lansen’s listed

shares and thus not price-sensitive in relation to Cathay’s shares.

18. If the Authority does not accept the above analysis, in any event the difference in

the net profit line between the 6 December projections and the August research

was not price-sensitive until 18 December 2015 because, until then, Cathay had a

reasonable expectation of Lansen obtaining a large stocking order for Fillderm

before year-end. Cathay took account of the prospect of such a stocking order in

assessing whether it had an obligation to disclose information contained in its 6

December 2015 projections.

19. The strategy of pursuing stocking orders had commenced in October 2015 and had

not been included in the original budget. Cathay had a discussion with Lansen on

or around 7 December to understand why Lansen’s projection did not include

reference to a Fillderm stocking order, and was told that it was still the target to

achieve this by the end of the year, and there were ongoing discussions. Lansen

gave an oral update at the Cathay Board meeting on 10 December. Lansen has told

the Authority that there was a common understanding that Lansen was progressing

towards its target of selling 20,000 Fillderm units and that at the Board meeting on

10 December it informed Cathay that Lansen still aimed to conclude such an order

by 18 December 2015. A stocking order was in fact concluded in March 2016,

generating $8.5m in revenue which, if factored into the 6 December 2015 net loss

for Cathay, would have been considered in line with market expectations. This was

soon after the year end (taking into account major Hong Kong holidays in January

and February 2016), which is strong evidence in support of Cathay’s position that

it had a reasonable expectation of a Fillderm stocking order during 2015.

20. The Authority considers that Cathay had inside information from 6 December 2015.

This is because the 56% difference in Cathay’s projected net loss figures (a

projected loss after tax of over USD 9.8 million against market expectations of a

loss after tax of approximately USD 6.3 million) was information that would, if

generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of Cathay’s

shares, because it was information of a kind which a reasonable investor would be

likely to have used as part of the basis of an investment decision. This is so even

taking into account that other aspects of Cathay’s figures, such as revenue and

gross profit, were likely to be in line with market expectations. The information

thus satisfied the test in s118C (2)(c) of the Act.

21. It is not necessary to examine contemporaneous evidence relating to what

happened when the information was actually released to the market. Nevertheless,

the 18.2% drop in price that did occur at that point is supportive evidence that the

information was likely to have a significant effect on price. The Authority accepts

that it is not possible to demonstrate that the price drop was solely attributable to

the announcement of an expected material loss before tax, markedly below market

expectations, rather than the announcement of the CFDA financial penalty, but nor

is it possible to say that it was solely attributable to the penalty. It is a reasonable

inference that it was attributable in part to the announced marked increase in the

expected loss before tax. This inference is supported by an analysis of the sequence

of Bloomberg announcements on the morning of 29 December 2015: after releasing

Cathay’s trading announcement at 08:45, Bloomberg released two notes referring

only to Cathay’s full year losses, at 08:46 and 08:47 respectively, and a further

note referring to the CFDA penalty, at 08:48. The fall in share price began after

the trading update and continued until 08:49.

22. The Authority does not accept that the fact that the N+1 analyst’s valuation in

August 2015 was made by reference to asset values indicates either that a

reasonable investor would not have regard to profits after tax, or that the analyst

himself regarded profit after tax as unimportant. The N+1 note was released to the

market in the light of weak profits in the first half of the year which indicated that

market expectations for Cathay’s year-end performance would not be met. It

provided revised downgraded forecasts for Cathay’s year-end performance which

focused on projected profit after tax.

23. The fact that Lansen’s share price did not move significantly when it made its own

announcement in March 2016 is not an indication that the information about

Cathay’s projected net profits was not market-sensitive. This was an

announcement about a different company, made to a different market;

furthermore, Cathay’s announcement in December 2015, while not expressly

referring to a fall in profits at Lansen, would have given an indirect indication that

Lansen – which was 70 to 80% of Cathay’s business at the time – was in difficulty.

24. As set out in paragraphs 4.44 and 5.18 of this Notice, the Authority accepts

Cathay’s assertion that a discussion about the prospects of Fillderm stocking orders

occurred at the Board meeting on 10 December 2015. The Authority also accepts

that those orders were potentially of a size that could have rendered an update

unnecessary. However, the Authority considers that there is insufficient evidence

that from either 6 or 10 December 2015 it was considered by Cathay to be

sufficiently certain that Lansen would make sufficient sales by year-end that it

would have been appropriate for Cathay to conclude that it was unnecessary to

issue a profits warning. There is no contemporaneous record of this conclusion

having been reached, or even discussed; for example, in the lengthy telephone

discussion which took place with N+1 the day after the 10 December 2015 Board

meeting. Lansen’s later statement to the Authority, referred to at paragraph 19

above, suggests only an aim, rather than an expectation, that substantial orders

could occur before year-end. Nor is there any contemporaneous evidence that the

prospect of Fillderm stocking orders played any part in Cathay’s substantive

analysis of whether it was necessary to issue an update.

Any breach of DTR2.2.1R or Premium Listing Principle 6 by Cathay was not

committed recklessly

25. Cathay had a genuine and reasonable belief in the prospect of a Fillderm stocking

order until 18 December 2015. Even if its assessment of whether it had inside

information before that date was wrong, it had no subjective belief that it had inside

information and therefore no subjective appreciation that it would risk breaching

the STRs if it did not make a disclosure.

26. The advice of Cathay’s appointed advisers was general advice on Cathay’s

regulatory obligations, which did not take account of the prospect of further

Fillderm sales, and was given without having reviewed Cathay’s financial data, at a

time when it is not alleged Cathay held any inside information. Indeed, N+1’s

advice (in a telephone conversation on 2 December 2015) mentioned that if Cathay

had grounds to think that it could still make the full year’s expectations or, say,

10% below, and there were certain things on which it was awaiting confirmation,

there would be no requirement for an announcement. Cathay was indeed waiting

on such confirmation. If Cathay had behaved recklessly in relation to a potential

announcement, N+1 would inevitably have identified this and given strong advice,

but it did not.

27. During the period from 6 December 2015 to the release of the trading update,

Cathay took reasonable steps to consider its forecasts, draft a trading update in

case one was to be necessary and discuss the advice it received.

28. For the reasons set out above, the Authority does not accept that Cathay did have

a sufficiently certain belief that a Fillderm stocking order would be made such that

Cathay could have appropriately decided that a market update was unnecessary.

It considers that Cathay was well aware, including from the advice it had received

from its financial and legal advisers, that if there were a material deviation from

market expectations, it must make an announcement to the market. This was not

general advice given in a vacuum but was on the basis of advice sought by, and

discussions with, Cathay about its likely financial performance for the second half

of the year and its obligations arising from that performance. On 6 December 2015,

when Cathay received and consolidated its ten-month results and year-end

forecast, it was in possession of all the information it needed to conclude that it

held inside information and was under an obligation to disclose it. N+1 continued

to advise thereafter on the basis that Cathay would need to make an announcement

as soon as possible. Cathay acted recklessly in not making a disclosure to the

market on or as soon as possible after 6 December 2015, knowing of the risk that

it was in breach of the DTRs.

29. The Authority does not consider that Cathay was relying on the statement by N+1

referred to in paragraph 26 above in not making an announcement to the market.

This was a brief comment in the context of a very long call, and there is no evidence

of Cathay having taken particular note of it at the time, or discussed with its

advisers at any point after 10 December 2015 that it might not need to issue an

update because of its expectations in relation to Fillderm; as set out above, the

Authority considers that any consideration of possible Fillderm sales would have

been so uncertain that Cathay could not appropriately have decided that it displaced

the circumstances that existed or might reasonably be expected to come into

existence such that Cathay held information subject to section 118C of the Act.

30. The Authority considers that, during the period from 6 December 2015 until the

release of the trading update, Cathay did not work quickly towards disclosure of

the inside information. Rather, it acted with unnecessary and inappropriate delay.

In particular:

(a)
After receiving the consolidated forecast figure on 6 December 2015, it only

circulated these to the Cathay Board two days later, and the Board did not

meet for another two days thereafter; this was notwithstanding that it had

been in possession of the Technical Note since 3 December 2015; this stated

that the Authority would not be likely to regard the inability to convene a

Board meeting as a justifiable reason for delaying disclosure, and that it

understood that responsibility might be delegated to a small number of

directors.

(b)
A first draft of the trading update was not prepared until 11 December 2015,

the day after Cathay’s Board meeting, five days after receipt of the inside

information, and seven days after Cathay had informed N+1 that it would

draft a trading update.

(c)
The trading update was not circulated to, and signed off by, the Board until

24 December 2015. It was issued on 29 December 2015.

The timing of the trading update was not influenced by the timing of the CFDA penalty

announcement

31. Cathay did not delay disclosure in order to co-ordinate announcements with the

CFDA penalty and was not influenced by such considerations. If there was a delay

in disclosing inside information from 6 December 2015, it was due to other factors.

From 6 to 18 December 2015, Cathay had a genuine and reasonable belief that it

did not hold inside information, because of the expectation of Fillderm orders. From

18 December 2015 onwards, it was working as quickly as possible to prepare and

release an announcement, with the timing impacted by difficulties in obtaining sign-

off from all Board members and advisers over the Christmas period.

32. Although Cathay did strongly suggest it would prefer to issue a single

announcement to coincide with the announcement of the CFDA penalty, this was at

an early stage. Cathay undertook to obtain advice from its lawyers; that advice

stated that the disclosure of inside information could not be delayed to coincide

with an interim report or other announcement, and at no point after this did Cathay

suggest the two announcements could be deliberately coordinated. From that point

onwards, it sought to work to draft a trading update to be issued if required.

33. After 18 December 2015, Cathay was waiting for comments and sign-off on the

draft trading update. From 18 December 2015, as noted in an email from Cathay

sent on that date, Cathay did intend to co-ordinate the trading update with the

penalty announcement, as at that stage there was no reason not to. There were

only four working days between 18 and 24 December, and none between 24 and

29 December, on which date the announcement was made.

34. Cathay expressed itself in strong terms when, in the call with N+1 on 2 December

2015, it expressed the view that it could choose when to issue a trading update

and that it wished to co-ordinate it with Lansen’s announcement of the CFDA

penalty, and received clear advice from N+1 that it could not delay an

announcement for that purpose. Having thereafter received clear advice from its

lawyers that it could not choreograph or co-ordinate announcements, it is

unsurprising that it did not repeat its suggestion that the two announcements could

be co-ordinated.

35. However, the Authority does not accept that the delay in disclosing the inside

information from 6 December 2015 until 29 December 2015 was not influenced by

Cathay’s wish to co-ordinate its announcement with Lansen’s announcement of the

CFDA penalty. For the reasons set out above, the Authority considers that any

possible Fillderm stocking order would have been so uncertain at this time that

Cathay could not appropriately have decided that it displaced the circumstances

that existed or might reasonably be expected to come into existence such that

Cathay held information subject to section 118C of the Act. As explained at

paragraph 30 above, the Authority does not consider that Cathay worked as quickly

as possible towards the drafting and release of an announcement; rather, it delayed

unnecessarily and inappropriately during the period 6 to 29 December 2015.

36. The Authority does not agree that there was, by 18 December 2015, no reason why

the trading update and the penalty announcement should not have been co-

ordinated. Nothing had changed which justified delaying the trading update by

reference to the penalty announcement. In any event, the Authority’s conclusion is

that the trading update should have been made as soon as possible after 6

December 2015.

The letters of 29 February 2016 and 15 April 2016 presented a reasonable, full and

accurate picture of events as they occurred in 2015

37. The written projection material prepared for the Board in 2015 did not fully reflect

the Board’s considerations at the time. While the written projection material

prepared for the Board in August 2015 contained no data for Lansen, at the August

2015 Board meeting the Cathay Board believed that Lansen was likely to perform

similarly in the second half of the year to how it had performed in the first half, and

was specifically aware of Lansen’s budget for new product sales, which had been

delivered to Cathay in May 2015. In December 2015, the written projection

material prepared for the Board contained no data relating to potential new stocking

orders for Lansen. In fact, the Cathay Board received an oral update at that

meeting that Lansen still expected significant new product sales to occur before

year-end in such volumes that Lansen would have met or exceeded its product

budget set in May 2015. Thus, the data presented to the Authority in the letter of

15 April 2016 did reflect the financial information available to the Cathay Board in

the broader sense. It was not made clear by the Authority in its requests that all

that was required was written material; the information provided was in fact

“sourced from projections as they were at the time”, albeit those projections were

reported orally.

38. The two letters from Cathay to the Authority made no representation about the

strength or otherwise of Cathay’s systems and controls, which were outside the

scope of the correspondence at the time. The Authority told Cathay in 2016 that it

was investigating whether Cathay had complied with DTR 2.2.1R and with another

provision of the Listing Rules. In these circumstances, Cathay was rightly focused

on explaining the information it considered during 2015, not on its written record-

keeping or the processes followed by the Board.

39. The Authority’s finding that Cathay was in breach of Listing Principle 2 is not based

only on the figures provided by it in its letter of 15 April 2016 regarding projected

new product sales at Lansen. It is based on the statements made, and financial

information provided, in its letters of 29 February 2016 and 15 April 2016.

40. The Authority considers that its requests for information were clear and that the

responses provided by Cathay in the two letters were inaccurate and misleading.

In its letter of 4 February 2016, the Authority requested “details of any re-

forecasting undertaken by the Company as a matter of course or in light of the

additional spending identified above”. Cathay’s letter of 29 February 2016

incorrectly stated that it prepared twice-yearly projections and additional

projections when it was not performing in line with the management’s expectations

or with market expectations. In 2015 Cathay did not, in fact, monitor its

performance against market expectations, and did not monitor interim projections

due to the absence of information from Lansen. The letters thereby implied that

Cathay’s procedures, systems and controls were better than was in fact the case.

41. Further, the request by the Authority in its letter of 2 March 2016 was clear in

requesting figures sourced from projections “as they were at the time” along with

any updated projections, indicating when those were made. This was a clear

request to provide contemporaneous figures from actual projection exercises, and

it was clear from the Authority’s letter that it needed the information in order to

understand how Cathay was able to monitor its financial performance against

market expectations. The figures set out in Cathay’s letter of 15 April 2016 did

not reflect actual projection exercises as they were at the time, but the letter

suggested (in several places) that they did. Further, if Cathay considered it would

have been misleading to provide the Authority with only the written material (or

figures from written material) because it would not have accurately reflected

Cathay’s view of Lansen’s anticipated performance, it could and should have

explained this in its letter.

42. In fact, however, the Authority considers that the data in the letter of 15 April 2016

does not accurately represent the information considered by the Board at the time.

For example, certain figures that were said by Cathay to have been considered by

the Board in August 2015 were from September 2015 and thus did not exist, and

could not have been considered by the Board, when they were said to have been

so considered.

Financial penalty

2015 Relevant Period – only level 2 would be appropriate

43. The Authority considers that Cathay’s conduct should be treated as level 4 on its

scale of seriousness because it involves serious or systematic weaknesses in

Cathay’s procedures, and because the breach was committed recklessly. If it is

found that Cathay was in breach of the DTRs and/or Listing Principles, but that any

breach was not committed recklessly, a level 2 classification would be appropriate.

Any breach was inadvertent and caused not by failures in systems and controls,

but by judgement calls that can be criticised in hindsight but were reasonably

thought to be correct at the time.

44. As set out above, the Authority considers that Cathay’s breaches during the 2015

Relevant Period involved serious weaknesses in Cathay’s procedures, systems and

controls, and were committed recklessly. In those circumstances a finding of level

4 seriousness is appropriate.

2016 Relevant Period – only level 2 would be appropriate

45. The Authority accepts that Cathay did not intend to mislead it. Although, with the

benefit of hindsight, Cathay would not respond to the Authority in the same way

again, it considered that it was providing data that most accurately represented its

expectations for its performance as they were at the relevant times. It involved

advisers in the preparation of the letters, supporting the view that it was trying to

respond appropriately, although the advisers were not asked to comment on the

projection figures themselves.

46. Cathay had a genuine expectation of Fillderm stocking orders. The Authority

accepts that these were genuinely discussed and considered, (albeit it is in issue

whether they were sufficiently likely to be taken into account in the announcement

decision). The Authority should reduce the penalty accordingly, as this makes the

Board’s responses during 2016 less open to criticism because Cathay was seeking

in its responses to communicate the true position, namely the assessed impact of

the expected Fillderm sales on the projections.

47. Account should also be taken of Cathay‘s broader open and co-operative behaviour.

At an early stage during the 2016 Relevant Period, it voluntarily waived privilege

over the advice it had received from its lawyers, on which the recklessness case is

based. This could be said to have been contrary to its own interests and

demonstrates that, during the 2016 Relevant Period, it was seeking to be open and

co-operative with the Authority. Later, it volunteered a clarification to the Authority

at the earliest opportunity after its lawyers drew attention to the potential for its

letter of 15 April 2016 to mislead, and provided full corrected information and an

apology. These matters are mitigation. For these reasons, a Level 2 classification

would be appropriate if the Authority finds Cathay to have been in breach.

48. In concluding that the breach of Listing Principle 2 was level 3 in seriousness, the

Authority has taken into account that Cathay did not intend to mislead it.

49. The Authority’s conclusion that Cathay’s breaches (in the 2015 Relevant Period)

were committed recklessly is not primarily based on the legal advice received; the

Authority has nevertheless taken into account Cathay’s co-operation in waiving

privilege over that advice, and that, albeit a year later, it provided full corrected

information about the potential for the 15 April 2016 letter to mislead, and an

apology. However, in the light of the seriousness of the breach (taking into account

factors as to its nature and impact) the Authority does not consider these matters

sufficient to warrant a reduction in the penalty.

50. As set out above, the Authority does not accept that Cathay had a sufficiently

certain expectation of Fillderm stocking orders such as to render a trading update

unnecessary. The Authority does not consider that the fact that the prospects for

stocking orders were explained to the Board makes the breach of Listing Principle

2 any less serious because those prospects were not such as to render the

information provided to the Authority in the letter of 15 April 2016 less inaccurate.