FINAL NOTICE

1.
ACTION

1.1
For the reasons given in this Final Notice, the Authority hereby:

a) imposes on Mr Omar Hussein (“Mr Hussein”), pursuant to section 66 of the

Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (the “Act”), a financial penalty of

£116,000.00;

b) withdraws, pursuant to section 63 of the Act, Mr Hussein’s approval given by

the Authority under section 59 of the Act to perform the SMF3 (Executive

Director), SMF16 (Compliance Oversight), and SMF17 (Money Laundering

Reporting) functions at Consumer Wealth Limited (“CWL”); and

c) makes an order, pursuant to section 56 of the Act, prohibiting Mr Hussein from

performing any function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by any

authorised or exempt person, or exempt professional firm.

1.2
Mr Hussein agreed to resolve this matter and qualified for a 30% (stage 1) discount

in financial penalty under the Authority’s executive settlement procedures. Were it

not for this discount, the Authority would have imposed a financial penalty of

£165,797.38 on Mr Hussein.

2.
SUMMARY OF REASONS

2.1
On the basis of the facts and matters described below, the Authority considers that

between 20 March 2015 and 1 March 2017 (the “Relevant Period”), Mr Hussein

breached Statement of Principle 1 and Statement of Principle 7 of the Authority’s

Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons Chapter of the

Authority’s Handbook (“APER”) by failing to act with integrity and by failing to take

reasonable steps to ensure that CWL complied with the relevant standards and

requirements of the regulatory system.

2.2
During the Relevant Period, Mr Hussein was approved to perform the CF1

(Director), CF10 (Compliance Oversight), CF11 (Money Laundering Reporting) and

CF30 (Customer) controlled functions at CWL, a financial advisory firm specialising

in the provision of pension switching services of which he was the sole owner. Upon

the introduction of the Senior Managers and Certification Regime on 9 December

2019, Mr Hussein’s approvals became the SMF3 (Executive Director), SMF16

(Compliance Oversight), and SMF17 (Money Laundering Reporting) functions.

2.3
Pensions are a traditional and tax-efficient way of saving money for retirement.

The value of someone’s pension can have a significant impact on their quality of

life during retirement and, in some circumstances, may affect whether they can

afford to retire at all. Customers who engage authorised firms to provide them with

advice in relation to their pensions place significant trust in those providing the

advice. Where a financial adviser fails to act with integrity and to conduct the affairs

of their advice business in a manner that is compliant with the Authority’s

regulatory requirements, this exposes their customers to a significant risk of harm.

2.4
As CWL’s principal director during the Relevant Period, Mr Hussein was responsible

for establishing and maintaining CWL’s systems and controls and the oversight of

the business of CWL. As the most senior and principal financial adviser at CWL, Mr

Hussein was also responsible for ensuring the suitability of advice provided to the

customers of CWL in relation to recommendations made to switch their existing

pension into a new Self-Invested Personal Pension (“SIPP”).

Summary of misconduct

2.5
During the Relevant Period, Mr Hussein failed to act with integrity and failed to take

reasonable steps to ensure that the business of CWL, for which he was responsible,

complied with the relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system.

3


2.6
Mr Hussein advised, and permitted others at CWL to advise, customers to switch

their existing pensions into a new SIPP. These SIPPs invested a significant

proportion of customers’ retirement savings into Portfolio 6 (“P6”), a portfolio of

investments managed by Greyfriars Asset Management LLP (“Greyfriars”). CWL

recommended 620 of its customers switch from their existing personal pensions

into SIPPs which included a large investment in P6. The Authority considers that in

each customer file that it reviewed, this was unsuitable advice.

2.7
P6 was a high-risk investment principally due to the nature of its underlying

investments. These comprised corporate mini-bonds issued to finance speculative

projects such as overseas property developments, car parks, green energy projects

and holiday resorts. The individual mini-bonds in P6 offered returns of up to 11%

per annum which was an indicator of the underlying investment risk. The

investments in P6 were also unregulated and illiquid in nature. A number of the

underlying investments in P6 subsequently failed and P6 was closed to new

investment in 2016. To date, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme

(“FSCS”) has upheld 437 claims against CWL and paid out over £4.3m in

compensation to customers of CWL, including in respect of advice given on P6.

2.8
The Authority’s investigation found that during the Relevant Period, both personally

and through his direction of CWL, Mr Hussein:

a) Advised customers to switch their existing pensions into a SIPP when a pension

switch was often unnecessary and not in their best interests. Recommendations

to switch were based on inadequate and generic assessments of customers’

needs which were highly likely to result in a recommendation to switch;

b) Advised customers to invest large portions of their SIPP (up to 49%) into P6.

This investment, particularly in such large amounts, was completely unsuitable

for CWL’s customers given their risk profiles, objectives and individual

circumstances and went against the recommendations of P6’s own fund

manager;

c) Prepared
unclear
and
misleading
Suitability
Reports
for
customers

recommending they switch pensions. The Reports failed to communicate

important risk warnings in relation to P6, for example, that it was a high-risk

and potentially illiquid investment. In addition, the Suitability Reports provided

misleading information as to CWL’s charges. In all 24 customer files reviewed

by the Authority, CWL recommended pension switches as being “more cost

effective” when this was simply untrue when all charges were considered;

d) Made false and misleading statements and confirmations to P6’s fund manager,

Greyfriars, including that CWL’s customers were “experienced investors” when

there was no reasonable basis for doing so; and

e) Charged customers significant fees for an ongoing advice service. However,

there is no evidence CWL ever provided this service to customers, or ever made

any substantial arrangements to do so, during the Relevant Period. CWL also

failed to make clear this was an optional extra service separate to its pension

switch advice. During the Relevant Period only a single customer declined the

service.

2.9
Between May and June 2015, Mr Hussein advised, and permitted others at CWL to

advise, the firm’s initial 48 customers to invest a portion of their SIPPs into P6

without conducting due diligence to a reasonable level on the suitability of P6 and

its underlying investments for retail customers. In any event, it should have been

obvious to Mr Hussein from even the limited information that he had gathered that

P6 was unlikely to be suitable for CWL’s customers, except in very limited

circumstances and investment sizes.

2.10
Between the period June 2015 and July 2016, Mr Hussein conducted some due

diligence on P6. The high-risk nature of the investment and the risks it presented

to customers should have become even clearer to Mr Hussein from these due

diligence steps. However, Mr Hussein continued to advise, and permitted others at

CWL to advise, more than 500 customers to transfer large parts of their pensions

into P6. Mr Hussein’s explanation for this was that he believed P6 was “fully liquid”

and “not high-risk”, and that it was a regulated product. Mr Hussein’s assessments

were wholly unreasonable and directly contradicted by the information he had

gathered in his limited due diligence.

2.11
Mr Hussein was aware of the statements and risk warnings contained in the

promotional documentation relating to P6. These made clear the high-risk nature

of the underlying investments. Mr Hussein had never advised on pension switches

before setting up CWL and by his own admission was “not a stock picker” and “not

a fund manager”. Mr Hussein therefore knew he lacked the expertise or any proper

basis to ignore the statements and risk warnings in the promotional material.

Notwithstanding this, Mr Hussein rejected the statements and risk warnings of P6’s

own fund manager on the basis that he did not “agree” with them.

2.12
Mr Hussein also disregarded clear guidance from Greyfriars that P6 was appropriate

for only a small proportion of an investor’s funds. Notwithstanding this, Mr Hussein

created a Central Investment Proposition (“CIP”) which recommended a default

position that 49% of a typical CWL customer’s funds be invested into P6,

irrespective of their individual risk profile.

2.13
While the investment risks associated with P6 may have been acceptable for

experienced and sophisticated investors who had a higher capacity for loss, they

were unsuitable for CWL’s customers, who were typically low net worth,

inexperienced in financial products, of limited financial means and had little or no

capacity for loss. Further, although P6’s investment manager, Greyfriars, was

regulated by the Authority, this did not extend to the underlying mini-bond

investments held in P6.

2.14
Mr Hussein also described customers advised to invest in P6 as “experienced

investor[s] in property, bonds and mainstream investments” in Application Forms

provided to Greyfriars. This information was incorrect and contradicted by CWL’s

own fact gathering. In the most serious cases, CWL described some individuals who

had no job, no income except benefits and no assets except their pension as an

“experienced investor in property, bonds and mainstream investments”.

2.15
Mr Hussein classified CWL’s customers as “experienced investors” based on their

existing pension and the underlying investments held within it. This approach was

unreasonable. Mr Hussein ignored customers’ actual investment experience, which,

beyond being in an existing pension arrangement, was often effectively non-

existent. Further, the fact that CWL provided a pension switch service meant that

its customers would always already hold a pension which was invested in different

products. Mr Hussein’s assertion that such customers constituted “experienced

investors” rendered the term redundant as all pension switch customers would

satisfy the definition.

2.16
In addition, the Suitability Reports Mr Hussein prepared for CWL customers advising

them to switch pensions contained insufficient information and explanation of the

material risks and disadvantages inherent in P6. Mr Hussein also omitted specific

risks relating to P6 from the Suitability Reports, again because he did not “agree”

with them. Mr Hussein’s approach meant that the Suitability Reports were

misleading and that CWL’s customers were not provided with key advice and

information about the nature and suitability of the underlying investments in their

SIPP before deciding to invest a substantial portion of their pensions into a high-

risk investment portfolio.

Breaches and failings

2.17
During the Relevant Period, Mr Hussein failed to act with integrity and breached

Statement of Principle 1 (acting with integrity) of APER. In particular, Mr Hussein:

a) advised, and permitted CWL to advise, the firm’s initial 48 customers to invest

nearly half their pensions into P6 on the basis it was a suitable investment

before carrying out a reasonable level of due diligence on P6, and in

circumstances where even on the basis of the information available to him, it

should have been obvious to him that the advice was unsuitable; and

b) advised, and permitted CWL to advise, more than 500 further customers to

invest, in most cases, nearly half their pensions into P6 when even the limited

due diligence Mr Hussein did conduct made it apparent that P6 was a

fundamentally unsuitable investment for CWL’s customers, except in very

limited circumstances and amounts.

2.18
Mr Hussein provided this advice to customers in circumstances where he:

a) disregarded clear statements and risk warnings regarding P6 contained in the

Greyfriars documentation on the basis that he “disagreed” with them, when he

knew that he did not have the expertise to conclude that such risks could

reasonably be disregarded; and

b) disregarded Greyfriars’ recommendation that only a “small proportion” of an

investor’s portfolio should be allocated to P6 and instead proceeded with a

Central Investment Proposition which advised CWL customers to invest 49% of

their SIPPs into P6.

2.19
Mr Hussein deliberately and unjustifiably closed his mind to the risks he was taking

with his customers’ retirement savings and failed to communicate those risks to his

customers. In doing so, he acted recklessly and therefore without integrity.

2.20
In addition, Mr Hussein acted without integrity as he:

a) misrepresented to Greyfriars that customers investing in P6 were “experienced

investors in property, bonds and mainstream investments”, without having any

reasonable basis for doing so;

b) misrepresented CWL customers’ total investable funds and / or financial position

to Greyfriars, being aware that Greyfriars would not normally accept

investments of more than 25% of a customer’s investable funds into P6; and

7


c) charged customers for an on-going advice service which there is no evidence

CWL ever provided, or ever put any substantial arrangements in place to effect,

during the Relevant Period.

2.21
Mr Hussein also breached Statement of Principle 7 of APER during the Relevant

Period by failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of CWL for

which he was responsible in his accountable functions complied with relevant

regulatory requirements and by being knowingly concerned in such breaches. In

particular, Mr Hussein failed to:

a) ensure that CWL had due regard to whether switching a customer’s existing

pension into a SIPP was in that customers’ best interests;

b) ensure that CWL took reasonable care to assess customers’ knowledge and

experience in relation to investments in financial products and whether a

pension switch was appropriate for them;

c) ensure that CWL adequately assessed the suitability of the underlying

investments within the proposed SIPP for each customer’s specific risk profile

and individual needs;

d) prevent CWL advising initial customers and transferring their funds into P6 prior

to carrying out a reasonable level of due diligence on P6;

e) prevent CWL employees advising customers to invest in P6 when even basic

due diligence had made clear that P6, particularly in the proportions

recommended, was an unsuitable investment for CWL’s target market;

f) ensure that the Suitability Report CWL prepared for each customer advising

them to switch pensions contained sufficient information and a clear and fair

explanation of the material risks and specific disadvantages associated with

investing a large portion of their SIPP in P6;

g) prevent CWL giving customers unclear and misleading charge comparisons

between customers’ existing pension plans and the proposed SIPP they were

being recommended; and

h) ensure that CWL’s on-going advice service was clearly communicated as being

an optional and voluntary service that was separate from the initial switching

advice and for which the customer’s explicit, informed consent ought to have

been obtained.

2.22
The Authority considers Mr Hussein’s failings to be particularly serious and to

demonstrate a reckless lack of integrity for the following reasons:

a) Mr Hussein was aware of the Authority’s pension alerts published in 2013 and

2014 (the “Alerts”) which made clear that an assessment of the suitability of

underlying investments must form part of the advice given to customers

switching their SIPPs. SIPPs intended to hold non-mainstream propositions

were unlikely to be suitable options for the vast majority of retail customers. Mr

Hussein concluded that the Alerts were not applicable to P6. That conclusion

was wrong and Mr Hussein had no reasonable basis for coming to that view. As

a qualified financial adviser, it should have been obvious to Mr Hussein that the

Alerts were directly applicable to P6 and that P6 was unsuitable for retail

customers, except in very limited circumstances.

b) Mr Hussein’s customers included individuals who were vulnerable due to their

age, their inability to replace capital, medical conditions and / or other personal

circumstances.

c) Mr Hussein’s actions resulted in a significant risk of financial detriment to the

customers of CWL. CWL advised 620 of its customers to switch from their

existing personal pensions into SIPPs which included a large investment in P6.

The Authority estimates the combined value of and risk of detriment to funds

invested in P6 by CWL’s customers to be in the region of £13.5m.

d) The breaches identified demonstrate serious failings by Mr Hussein across

multiple of his controlled functions. In particular, Mr Hussein’s oversight of the

business of CWL (as CF1), his responsibility for CWL’s compliance with

regulatory requirements (as CF10) and his responsibility for the suitability of

advice given to the customers of CWL (as CF30).

2.23
Mr Hussein continues to maintain that his advice in relation to P6 was suitable, that

P6 was not a high-risk or illiquid investment and that it was appropriate to describe

customers advised to invest in P6 as “experienced investors”. His reckless lack of

integrity and continued lack of insight into his misconduct mean that Mr Hussein

poses a serious on-going risk to consumers.

Action

2.24
For the above reasons, the Authority considers that Mr Hussein is not a fit and

proper person to perform any function in relation to any regulated activity carried

on by any authorised, exempt person or exempt professional firm.

2.25
The Authority withdraws Mr Hussein’s approval to perform the SMF3 (Executive

Director), SMF16 (Compliance Oversight) and SMF17 (Money Laundering

Reporting) functions at CWL pursuant to section 63 of the Act and makes an order

prohibiting Mr Hussein from performing any functions in relation to any regulated

activities carried on by an authorised or exempt person or exempt professional firm

pursuant to section 56 of the Act. This order is effective from the date of this Notice.

2.26
The Authority also imposes a financial penalty of £116,000.00 on Mr Hussein

pursuant to section 66 of the Act.

2.27
This action supports the Authority’s operational objectives of securing an

appropriate degree of protection for consumers and protecting and enhancing the

integrity of the UK financial system.

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1.
The definitions below are used in this Notice:

the “Act” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000;

“APER” means the Authority’s Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for

Approved Persons;

“Approved Person” means an individual who the Authority approves to perform one

or more activities called 'controlled functions' for an authorised firm;

“the Authority” means the body corporate previously known as the Financial

Services Authority and renamed on 1 April 2013 as the Financial Conduct Authority;

“CF1 Director” or “CF1” is an individual who performs the controlled function of

director at an authorised firm;

“CF10 Compliance Oversight” or “CF10” is an individual who performs the controlled

function of compliance oversight at an authorised firm;

“CF11 Money Laundering Reporting” or “CF11” is an individual who performs the

controlled function of money laundering reporting at an authorised firm;

“CF30 Customer Function” or “CF30” is an individual who performs the controlled

function of dealing with customers at an authorised firm;

“CIP” means Central Investment Proposition at CWL;

“COBS” means the Conduct of Business Sourcebook;

“CPD” means Continued Professional Development;

“CWL” means Consumer Wealth Limited;

“DEPP” means the Authority’s Decision Procedures and Penalties Manual;

“DFM” means Discretionary Fund Manager;

“EG” means the Authority’s Enforcement Guide;

“FIT” means the Authority’s Fit and Proper test for Employees and Senior Personnel

section of the Handbook;

“FOS” means the Financial Ombudsman Service;

The “Handbook” means the Authority’s Handbook of Rules and Guidance, as

applicable during the Relevant Period;

“Greyfriars” or “GAM” means Greyfriars Asset Management LLP;

“Mr Hussein” means Mr Omar Hussein;

“IAR” means Introducer Appointed Representative;

“ISA” means and Instant Savings Account;

“mini-bond” means an illiquid debt securities offering marketed to retail investors.

These instruments are typically offered by small or start-up companies which

provide a fixed rate of interest over a set period, at the end of which an investor’s

initial investment is repaid.

“P6” means the Greyfriars Asset Management DFM Portfolio 6;

“Part 4A permission” means, as defined in section 55A of the Act (Application for

permission), a permission given by the Authority under Part 4A of the Act

(Permission to carry on regulated activities), or having effect as if so given.

“Relevant Period” means the period from 20 March 2015 to 1 March 2017;

“RDR” means the Authority’s Retail Distribution Review;

“SIPP” means Self-Invested Personal Pension;

“Statement of Principle” means of the Statements of Principle for Approved Persons

set out in Chapter 2 of APER;

“the Pension Alerts” mean the FCA Alerts issued in January 2013 and April 2014;

“the CWL P6 Agreement” means the ‘adviser as client’ agreement between CWL

and Greyfriars dated 26 May 2015;

“the Tribunal” means the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber);

“the 2015 Fund Selection Strategy” means the strategy implemented by CWL in

2015;

“the Firm” means CWL;

“the FCA Visits” means the visit by the Authority to CWL on 13 and 14 July 2016;

and

“the Skilled Person’s Report” means the Skilled Person Report into CWL issued on

10 March 2017 pursuant to section 166 of the Act.

4.
FACTS AND MATTERS

Background

The Authority’s Pension Alerts in January 2013 and April 2014

4.1
In January 2013, the Authority published an alert in relation to advising on pension

transfers or switches with a view to investing pension money into unregulated

products through a SIPP. The Authority stated that financial advisers

recommending investments into investment vehicles in other products, such as a

SIPP, were expected to consider the suitability of the entire proposition, i.e. the

wrapper and the underlying product. The suitability of the underlying product had

to be assessed in the context of the customer’s individual circumstances and any

wider investment strategy, where appropriate.

4.2
In April 2014, the Authority issued a further alert in which it reminded regulated

firms that “if the underlying investment is not suitable for the customer, then the

overall advice is not suitable”. The Authority warned “switches to SIPPs intended

to hold non-mainstream propositions are unlikely to be suitable options for the vast

majority of retail customers”, referred to the findings of its supervisory work, and

noted that examples of underlying investments seen included overseas property

developments, store pods and forestry.

4.3
The Authority also published notices in respect of enforcement action taken against

the partners of a pension advice firm who failed to comply with the rules in this

area. In March 2015, the Authority published further notices in relation to directors

of another firm which failed to comply with regulatory requirements in this area.

The directors concerned were prohibited from senior positions in financial services

following the Authority’s finding that (amongst other matters) they had failed to

ensure customers received suitable pension switching advice and failed to oversee

properly the firm’s compliance function, which had been outsourced to external

consultants.

4.4
CWL was incorporated on 4 December 2014. Mr Hussein was throughout the

Relevant Period the sole shareholder and principal director of CWL.

4.5
On 20 March 2015, the Authority authorised CWL to advise on investments (except

on Pension Transfers and Pension Opt Outs) in respect of Retail (Investment) and

Retail (Non-Investment Insurance) customers. During the Relevant Period, CWL

provided financial advice to pension customers considering switching their pension

funds into a SIPP.

4.6
A SIPP is a trust-based wrapper for an individual’s pension investment. It gives tax

relief on an individual’s contributions and tax-free growth and offers much wider

investment powers than are generally available for personal pensions and group

personal pensions. These allow an individual to invest in a wide range of assets. In

addition, a SIPP offers greater control over where and when funds are invested or

moved than is permitted by traditional pension arrangements run by investment

management and life assurance companies or Defined Benefit Pension Schemes.

4.7
CWL obtained its new business leads through Introducer Appointed Representatives

(“IARs”) offering pension reviews. CWL’s business model entailed agents making

cold-calls to target customers, from a database of customers, who had not opted

out of being contacted via this method through the Telephone Preference Service.

The Authority found that customer complaints stated some recipients of the phone

calls had been told that the review was “government backed” and that the review

could “improve the performance” of their pension.

4.8
If customers agreed to a pension review, CWL or the IAR would send a courier to

the home of the customer for them to obtain a signed letter of authority permitting

CWL to contact their current pension provider to request details of their current

pension.

4.9
Between the period March 2015 and December 2016, CWL employed 4 financial

advisers. In addition to the financial advisers, CWL had 6 Paraplanners, 2

Reviewers, 10 Customer Service Officers, 14 Administrators and 1 Compliance

Officer reporting into an external compliance firm.

4.10
On 13 and 14 July 2016, the Authority visited CWL and raised concerns about the

suitability of advice to customers, the adequacy of due diligence on investment

recommendations and Mr Hussein’s understanding of CWL’s activities and

associated regulatory obligations.

4.11
On 16 August 2016, the Authority formally communicated its concerns to CWL and

requested it cease all regulated activity pending a Skilled Person report pursuant

to section 166 of the Act with a view to carrying out an assessment of CWL’s

systems and controls and regulatory compliance. On 17 October 2016, the

Authority’s Supervisory division issued a Requirement Notice to CWL pursuant to

section 166 of the Act. The Skilled Person produced a final report on 10 March

2017. The Skilled Person performed a detailed review of 25 CWL customer files. In

no instances did the Skilled Person find that both the advice to switch pensions and

the specific investment strategy proposed were “suitable” for the customer.

4.12
The Authority subsequently reviewed 24 of the 25 customer files assessed by the

Skilled Person and found that in all cases the customer had been exposed to a level

of risk that they were not willing and able to take. Further, all customer files

reviewed by the Authority showed that the customer had been recommended a

product that, when all charges were included, was in fact more expensive than their

existing one. This was even though each customer’s Suitability Report

recommended the pension switch as being “more cost effective”.

4.13
On 19 April 2018, CWL voluntarily applied to the Authority to cancel its Part 4A

permission to carry on regulated activities.

4.14
On 12 December 2018 and 15 March 2019, the Financial Ombudsman Service

published findings in favour of two customers who had complained about the advice

provided to them by CWL to switch their pensions into P6.

4.15
CWL was placed into Members Voluntary Liquidation on 18 December 2018 and

Creditors Voluntary Liquidation on 2 July 2019. Companies House documentation

published on 23 May 2019 showed that CWL had consumer complaint liabilities of

£699,643.

4.16
On 5 November 2019, the FSCS announced that it had declared CWL ‘in default’.

As at the date of this Notice, the FSCS has upheld 437 claims against CWL and paid

out over £4.3m in compensation to customers of CWL. A further 171 claims are still

being assessed by FSCS. Given that CWL’s central investment proposition advised

customers to invest 49% of their SIPP into P6 and 49% into a global investment

fund (of which no concerns have been identified), the Authority considers these

claims primarily relate to CWL’s advice to customers to switch out of their existing

pensions into a SIPP and / or to invest in P6 specifically.

4.17
When calculating compensation, the FSCS assessed that all of the corporate mini-

bonds included within P6 meet its definition of an ‘illiquid fund’. The FSCS defines

‘illiquid funds’ as those investments which are not tradable and/or for which no

surrender value is available, meaning the customer’s holdings cannot be realised

or redeemed.

4.18
In the period between September 2011 and April 2014, Mr Hussein worked at

various high street banks as a financial advisor. Mr Hussein’s role as a financial

adviser principally involved advising customers in relation to stocks, shares and

ISAs.

4.19
Whilst working in financial services in the period September 2011 and April 2014,

Mr Hussein concurrently obtained professional qualifications relevant to his financial

adviser role. These qualifications included a Certificate for Financial Advisers, in

August 2012 and a Level 4 Diploma for Financial Advisers, in July 2013. The

Authority considers the Level 4 Diploma for Financial Advisers to be the minimum

level qualification needed for an individual to become a financial adviser.

4.20
In December 2016 Mr Hussein obtained a Level 6 Award in Pension Transfers. This

qualification was obtained by Hussein after the Authority’s visits to the Firm on 13

and 14 July 2016 and after CWL had recommended 620 pension switches which

included an allocation into P6.

4.21
Although pension switching was the core specialism of CWL, Mr Hussein had no

practical experience of advising on pension switches specifically or pensions

generally, prior to founding CWL in December 2014. The first opportunity for Mr

Hussein to acquire practical knowledge and experience of switching pensions and

related advice was in the performance of his CF30 (Customer) advice role at CWL

during the Relevant Period.

Mr Hussein’s roles and responsibilities at CWL

4.22
On 20 March 2015 Mr Hussein was authorised by the Authority to hold the CF1

(Director), CF10 (Compliance), CF11 (Money Laundering Reporting) and CF30

(Customer) controlled functions at CWL. Mr Hussein held these controlled functions

throughout the Relevant Period until 8 December 2019, when the Senior Managers

and Certification Regime came into force. From 9 December 2019, Mr Hussein was

automatically transferred to the SMF3 (Executive Director), SMF16 (Compliance

Oversight) and SMF17 (Money Laundering Reporting) functions.

4.23
Mr Hussein was ultimately responsible for the business of CWL throughout the

Relevant Period. He set the business strategy at CWL. For example, Mr Hussein

made the decision for CWL to offer a restricted advice service.

4.24
In performing his CF1 (Director) function, Mr Hussein had oversight of and day to

day responsibility for the business of CWL. Although the CWL business structure

changed over time to employ additional staff, all staff at CWL including senior

management and financial advisers reported directly into Mr Hussein throughout

the Relevant Period. During the Relevant Period, Mr Hussein was also one of CWL’s

financial advisers, advising customers in the performance of his CF30 (Customer)

role. In performing his CF30 (Customer) role, Mr Hussein advised on a total of 12

of the 24 customer files reviewed by the Authority.

4.25
Mr Hussein also held the CF10 (Compliance) controlled function although regulatory

support was provided by an external compliance firm throughout the Relevant

Period. Mr Hussein told the Authority that in performing his CF10 (Compliance) role

he reviewed the suitability of advice provided by CWL’s other financial advisers and

he also reviewed the work undertaken by CWL’s external compliance firm. None of

the 24 customer files reviewed by the Authority contained any evidence of such

discussions and nor were there any records of meetings between Mr Hussein and

the advisors to demonstrate whether such discussions had taken place during the

Relevant Period.

CWL’s relationship with Greyfriars and P6

4.26
During the period April 2004 to April 2018 the Greyfriars Discretionary Fund

Management (“DFM”) service operated a range of risk rated portfolios aimed at

financial advisers, who were invited to select the portfolio suitable for their

customers’ objectives and risk profile. The Fund Managers at Greyfriars had

discretionary powers to purchase and sell specific assets within each portfolio at

any time to suit the objectives and strategy of that portfolio. The Greyfriars DFM

service offered five risk-graded traditional model portfolios and allocation to each

asset class was determined according to customers’ risk grading of: (i) Cautious;

(ii) Balanced; (iii) Adventurous; and (iv) Aggressive.

4.27
In April 2014, Greyfriars introduced a sixth investment portfolio P6, which was

promoted exclusively to financial advisors. Documentation relating to P6 stated that

the “non-correlated” P6 was added to the range of services offered by Greyfriars

to financial advisers as an opportunity to invest in a fully-managed non-correlated

investment, using varied asset classes with the potential for investors to gain high

returns. Investments were said to be selected on their own merit to perform

independently of major markets utilising instruments such as corporate bonds.

4.28
The Greyfriars documentation also stated that most traditional investment assets

are “correlated”, i.e. their value is influenced by macroeconomic, industry, sector

or commodity trends. When the economic cycle turns to a recessionary phase, most

correlated investments suffer. Greyfriars stated that most sophisticated or

experienced investors would counter this risk by holding a proportion of their

investment portfolio in “non-correlated” assets.

4.29
The nature of P6 was described in the following terms:

“Non-Correlated Products: The nature of Portfolio Six is that it holds a

mix of non-correlated products, i.e. low capital funds (either regulated

by an EEA regulator, or unregulated), fixed interest corporate bonds

issued by specific trading entities or the subsidiaries set up for the

purpose, and Funds which hold combinations of the previous two

examples”.

4.30
Further, “non-correlated” assets were described as including a “range of potential

investments including real estate and corporate bonds”.

4.31
It was Mr Hussein’s account that he first became acquainted with Greyfriars prior

to making the application for CWL to be authorised by the Authority, in January

2015. It was also Mr Hussein’s account that in the early stage, he explored and

considered the business offerings of Greyfriars. Mr Hussein told the Authority that

he was specifically drawn to P6 because of his experience with individuals who had

difficulties accessing discretionary fund management services and because the

assets were “non-correlated”.

4.32
CWL entered into an agreement with Greyfriars on 26 May 2015 to provide DFM

services to CWL which specifically related to Greyfriars’ P6 product (“the CWL P6

Agreement”).

4.33
Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, Greyfriars was responsible for making

discretionary fund management decisions relating to the selection of products in

P6 and would deal exclusively with CWL and not the underlying customer. CWL was

responsible for selecting and assessing the suitability of the Greyfriars model

portfolio (P6) when advising a customer to switch pensions.

4.34
Where a financial adviser has a professional relationship with a discretionary fund

management service, the financial adviser is responsible for the suitability of advice

it provides to its customer. Although Mr Hussein was not responsible for selecting

the investments in P6, he was responsible for assessing the suitability of P6 for his

customers.

4.35
The CWL P6 Agreement described CWL as “a start-up company”, but it nevertheless

anticipated introducing “1200 DFM cases to Greyfriars in the following 12 months”.

The composition and liquidity of P6

4.36
P6 was made up exclusively of mini-bonds including overseas investments in real

estate, car parks, renewable energy and holiday resorts. The bonds were not listed

on a regulated market and generally promised high returns, frequently between

7% and 11% per annum.

4.37
Greyfriars described the liquidity of P6 in the following terms:

“The intermediary understands Portfolio Six […] isn’t as liquid as more

conventional investments […]. ‘[Company A]’s Warehousing System

will endeavour, where required, to facilitate trades on a matched

bargain basis at each point of dealing, although there may be occasions

when this is not possible. Should this occur it is likely any investor may

be locked into a security for an indefinite period”.

4.38
Where redemptions could not be paid to customers through Greyfriars’ normal

issuer redemption route, a separate “Warehousing” facility, which did not belong

to Greyfriars, was stated to be available to facilitate redemptions by customers. In

such instances, the redemption funds would have come directly from the separate

facility.

4.39
Following the Authority’s intervention, in 2016 Greyfriars stopped accepting any

new money into P6 on a permanent basis.

CWL’s initial advice recommending P6 in May 2015 and due diligence in June 2015

4.40
Mr Hussein told the Authority that he had carried out due diligence on P6. Mr

Hussein started recommending P6 to customers in May 2015, before he had carried

out important due diligence steps on the product and was largely reliant on due

diligence conducted by other parties. This was despite the fact that CWL’s own

2015 Fund Selection Strategy (see paragraph 4.44) stated that non-correlated

assets were to be “selected carefully, based on an extensive programme of due

diligence”.

4.41
CWL first recommended a customer to switch from their existing pension into P6

(and a separate global investment fund) on 29 May 2015 three days after signing

the CWL P6 Agreement with Greyfriars. In the period between 29 May 2015 and 26

June 2015 CWL advised a total of 48 customers to switch their pensions into SIPPs

which included an allocation into P6.

4.42
However, the first recorded instance of P6 being discussed in the context of due

diligence was at the CWL investment committee meeting on 28 June 2015. Mr

Hussein was present at this Investment Committee meeting at which it was agreed

that further information regarding the “capital”, “security” and “liquidity” of P6

would be sought from Greyfriars. The Investment Committee noted that it had

considered the due diligence undertaken by Greyfriars on P6 which included a

report prepared by a third-party.

CWL establishes its Fund Selection Strategy in July 2015

4.43
During the Relevant Period, CWL provided advice to typically low net worth

customers, who, it stated, would otherwise struggle to obtain advice in the post

Retail Distribution Review environment. The Firm’s target market was explicitly

stated to be customers with modest pensions and whose investment experience

was limited.

4.44
In July 2015, after it had begun advising customers to invest in P6, CWL published

its “Fund Selection Strategy” document. The 2015 Fund Selection Strategy

established the Firm’s approach to selecting products, fund managers and

investment funds. The 2015 Fund Selection Strategy was approved by the CWL

investment committee. The Fund Selection Strategy described CWL’s target market

in the following terms:

“This strategy document has been prepared against the backdrop of

the company’s target market: the mass market … Consumer Wealth’s

clients generally have limited experience of dealing with investment

based financial products. They are not familiar with complex

investment products, they generally have either a cautious or balanced

attitude to risk and usually a limited capacity for loss. Finally, they have

typically undertaken investment transactions on a relatively infrequent

basis. These factors have therefore been taken into account in

formulating this strategy document, with particular reference to the

fund selection aspects”.

4.45
The Fund Selection Strategy also stated:

“In developing its philosophy and methodologies on fund selection, the

Investment Committee has been mindful of the company’s obligations

to take into account the client’s knowledge and experience in the

relevant investment field. This requirement is amplified by COBS

9.2.3R, which states: The information regarding a client’s knowledge

and experience in the investment field includes, to the extent

appropriate to the nature of the client, the nature and extent of the

service to be provided and the type of product or transaction

envisaged, including their complexity and the risks involved,

1)
The types of service, transaction and designated investment

with which the client is familiar;

2)
The nature, volume, frequency of the client’s transactions in

designated investments and the period over which they have

been carried out;

3)
The level of education, profession or relevant former

profession of the client”.

4.46
CWL identified “non-correlated assets” as a type of investment potentially suitable

for customers. CWL explained that this investment vehicle was selected to protect

part of a customer’s SIPP investment portfolio from macro-economic shocks, based

on selecting strategies where the drivers of returns are either not correlated, or

ideally negatively correlated, to price movement in more traditional asset classes.

CWL asserted that this offered investors the opportunity to optimise the

performance of their portfolios, whilst providing a hedge against the cyclical nature

of traditional equity and bond markets. However, as noted at paragraphs 4.27 to

4.28 above, the Greyfriars documentation referred to the use of “non-correlated”

assets by “sophisticated or experienced investors”.

4.47
By the time the CWL Fund Selection Strategy was formally established and

implemented in July 2015, identifying its customer base and the requisite

regulatory requirements applicable to customers and its investment offering, CWL

had already commenced advising customers to transfer their funds into P6 in May

2015. It was Mr Hussein’s account that the Fund Selection Strategy was developed

earlier, but it was not formally approved until July 2015.

4.48
Moreover, although CWL’s Fund Selection Strategy contained an explanation for

selecting non-correlated assets as an investment vehicle, it failed to consider to

what extent and in what amounts it was appropriate to include non-correlated

assets in its customers’ portfolios, despite identifying that CWL’s target market had

limited experience and familiarity with complex investment products. (see

paragraph 4.44 above).

CWL review of P6 in September 2015

4.49
On 29 September 2015, the CWL Investment Committee held a further meeting at

which Mr Hussein was present and where due diligence on P6 was discussed. The

Investment Committee considered the due diligence conducted by Greyfriars

including a legal opinion received from a third-party. The Investment Committee

agreed with the third-party conclusion that the bonds within P6 were “non-readily

realisable securities”.

4.50
This was a clear indication to Mr Hussein that there was a risk the underlying

investments in P6 could be difficult to price and sell. In certain scenarios, there

could be no or only a limited secondary market for P6. The lack of a secondary

market meant that customers could be unable to sell or trade their investments to

access their funds if required, for example, where there had been a change in their

personal circumstances such as reaching retirement age.

CWL review of P6 in March and June 2016

4.51
On 24 March 2016, the CWL Investment Committee recorded a further review of

the Greyfriars due diligence process. The Committee noted that redemptions in P6

were still being completed within 30 days of application and therefore it considered

the bonds were standard assets for the purpose of SIPP operators’ capital adequacy

requirements. The definition of standard assets for these purposes required that an

asset be capable of being readily realised within 30 days, whenever required. Given

the legal advice that the bonds in P6 were not readily realisable securities and

Greyfriars’ warnings as to P6’s liquidity, that conclusion was incorrect and

inconsistent with other information Mr Hussein was aware of. P6 could not be

readily realised within 30 days whenever required. Moreover, the definition of a

standard asset was relevant to SIPP operators in calculating their capital

requirements. It did not enable an IFA to automatically conclude an investment

was appropriate or suitable for their customers.

4.52
On 28 June 2016, the CWL Investment Committee recorded a meeting between

CWL’s external compliance consultant and Greyfriars which had taken place on 23

June 2016. Greyfriars had provided CWL’s external compliance consultant with a

2-year update on P6. The CWL Investment Committee noted that P6 had achieved

its main aim of delivering consistent returns and insulating investors from cycles in

the equity markets.

Statements and risk warnings in P6 documentation

4.53
The Greyfriars documentation contained numerous clear statements and risk

warnings in relation to P6. Examples of statements and risks warnings included:

a) “The portfolio will consist of investments that are not regulated and this affects

client’s rights to complain to the Ombudsman and under the FSCS”;

b) “The investments are illiquid in nature and in extreme market conditions clients

may be unable to exit at any price”;

c) “The values of the investments and the income therefrom can fall as well as

rise. Valuations will not always be tested in free market conditions”;

d) “Cons: Non-transferable, high risk, lack of transparency, imbalanced downside

and upside exposure, lack of investor protection and not covered by FSCS”;

e) “Portfolio Six will have one dealing date per month…and as such isn’t as liquid

as more conventional investments” … “Company A’s warehousing system will

endeavour, where required, to facilitate trades on a matched bargain basis at

each point of dealing, although there may be occasions when this is not

possible. Should this occur, it is likely any investor may be locked into a security

for an indefinite period…”;

f) “Portfolio Six is designed as a long-term investment however investors can exit

at any time for no additional fee (subject to marketability of the underlying

investments)”; and

g) “Portfolio Six’ is promoted exclusively to Financial Advisers for clients […] who

are looking to gain access to the diversification benefits alternative investments

bring, in proportion to an overall portfolio of assets. In particular, for those

investors who are looking to gain a relatively stable, strong level of income for

a considerable period of time, but who appreciate, in full, the risks with such

investments…”.

4.54
Mr Hussein reviewed the P6 documentation and was therefore on notice of these

risks. In addition, the Authority found that the terms of the CWL P6 Agreement

signed by Mr Hussein on 26 May 2015 confirmed his understanding that “Portfolio

Six isn’t as liquid as more conventional investments” and that customers could be

“locked into a security for an indefinite period”.

4.55
Further, CWL completed an application form for each customer whom it

recommended invest in P6 which it sent to Greyfriars (the “Application Forms”).

The Application Forms contained the disclaimer that “Given the nature of the

underlying investments, the liquidity of the portfolio may be restricted, but we will

endeavour to facilitate trades via the single dealing point each month, where

necessary”. This statement provided further indication as to significant liquidity

risks of P6. In all the cases reviewed by the Authority where Mr Hussein was the

CF30 adviser, the declaration to each Application Form was signed by Mr Hussein.

BBC Panorama broadcast in July 2016

4.56
On 11 July 2016, a BBC Panorama programme aired. The programme focused on

selling practices and direct investment into overseas property being developed by

Company B. P6 included a series of Company A’s bonds with an approximate value

of £13.5m.

4.57
CWL’s Investment Committee convened a meeting to discuss the programme which

Mr Hussein attended. The CWL Investment Committee identified the reputational

risk associated with continuing to recommend customers to invest in a portfolio

that included an allocation to corporate bonds backed by Company B’s assets. The

CWL Investment Committee noted a further meeting with Greyfriars at which it was

reported that “Greyfriars’ experience to date of dealing with [Company B] has been

the security provided has been of an acceptable standard and Company B has made

all payments in accordance with the bond schedule”.

The Authority’s visits in July 2016

4.58
Following the Authority’s visits to the Firm on 13 and 14 July 2016 (see paragraph

4.10 above), a further CWL Investment Committee meeting was convened on 18

July 2016. This meeting discussed the Authority’s visit and specifically the concerns

raised regarding advice relating to P6. The CWL Investment Committee noted that

it remained of the view that P6 could perform a legitimate role in an investment

portfolio for a broad range of retail customers. The Committee stated that this was

based on the extensive due diligence performed on the fund and assurances from

Greyfriars that it offered an acceptable level of liquidity. Notwithstanding those

factors, CWL took the view that with immediate effect, no further recommendations

should be made to customers to invest into P6.

Mr Hussein’s advice

Advice to switch pensions

4.59
In all of the customer files reviewed by the Authority and the Skilled Person, the

rationale used by CWL to justify recommending customers switch pensions was

either unsuitable or unclear. Reasons provided by CWL to customers in their

Suitability Reports to justify recommendations to switch included statements and

objectives which were often inaccurate or equally true of a customer’s existing

pension scheme. For example:

a) The Suitability Reports did not compare fees under the recommended SIPP on

a like-for-like basis with those under customer’s existing pension scheme(s)

(see paragraphs 4.86 to 4.89 below). This meant that in all 24 customer files

reviewed by the Authority, the pension switch did not actually meet a

customers’ stated objective to achieve a reduction in fees and charges. Indeed,

when all relevant charges were taken into account, in every case reviewed, the

customer was exposed to higher charges as a result of the switching, rather

than lower.

b) Suitability Reports prepared by Mr Hussein also included generic objectives for

switching such as “the ability to pass on benefits to your family” and “the

capability to track the performance of your pension fund”. In many cases, such

objectives could be achieved by customers with their existing pension provider

without needing to incur significant pension switching fees. However, Suitability

Reports informed customers that their stated objectives could not be met by

their current provider.

c) Another stated objective for switching included in Suitability Reports was

“access to ongoing pension and investment advice”. However, there was no

need for a customer to switch pensions to access such advice.

4.60
The Skilled Person also identified that CWL did not have a central formal pension

switch policy governing its pension switch activity. Instead, CWL had a limited

number of short stand-alone documents. CWL’s pension switch policy on when it

would or would not recommend a pension switch was not sufficiently detailed or

clear; there was no articulation of CWL’s rationale for recommending a switch, for

example, a reduction in existing fees and charges for the customer could be a

reason to recommend a switch. Additionally, CWL did not have a formal procedure

document setting out how pension switch activity should be undertaken. This was

particularly important given CWL’s business relied on IARs and cold calling potential

customers to offer “pension reviews”.

4.61
The absence of a clear rationale for switching pensions and clear charge

comparisons meant that in all 24 customer files reviewed by the Authority, there

was no justification for Mr Hussein/CWL recommending that customers switch from

their existing pension provider into a SIPP. This was particularly concerning given

that CWL only received advice fees when a customer agreed to switch pensions.

Assessment of customers’ experience and attitude to risk

4.62
CWL’s assessment of a customers’ knowledge and experience in relation to financial

products, their investment objectives and attitude to risk was contained in its fact

find documents and its Suitability Reports. CWL customers were asked for details

of their assets and liabilities, income and expenditure and existing pension.

4.63
None of the 24 customer files reviewed by the Authority contained any evidence

that CWL took steps to assess the suitability of the underlying investments within

the SIPP (including P6) for that customer’s individual needs and risk profile. Nor

did they demonstrate that CWL took any reasonable steps to assess customers’

knowledge and experience in relation to financial products. This information was

required for CWL to advise on whether or not P6 (including the underlying

investments) would be suitable for the customer.

4.64
Further, Mr Hussein’s decision to disregard risk warnings relating to P6 (see

paragraphs 4.69 to 4.70 below) also meant that CWL failed to discuss key risks

associated with P6 in assessing its suitability for customers. By way of example,

Greyfriars’ Appropriateness Flow Chart, which was to be used when assessing CWL

customers suitability for P6, specifically requested a financial adviser seek

confirmation that a customer understood that the underlying investments were not

FCA regulated, nor FSCS protected. However, Mr Hussein’s position – for which he

had no rational basis - was that these risks did not need to be communicated to

customers as he disagreed with them.

4.65
In any event, customers were often advised to invest the same amount of their

SIPP into P6 irrespective of information gathered during their customer fact find.

This reflected CWL’s CIP which recommended a 49% allocation into P6, largely

irrespective of a customer’s appetite for risk or personal circumstances. By way of

example, the Authority’s review of customer files identified customers categorised

between low and relatively high attitudes to risk who were all advised to invest

49% of their SIPPs into P6. Similarly, the same 49% investment into P6 was

recommended to customers who had completely different levels of income and

savings. There was no reasonable basis for considering the exact same allocation

to P6 was suitable for all such customers.

Advice on a SIPP and underlying investments

4.66
When a financial adviser is advising on an investment wrapper product, such as a

SIPP, that financial adviser must consider the suitability of the overall proposition

(i.e. the suitability of both the SIPP wrapper and the underlying investments) to be

able to advise their customers properly. Where the customer is selling existing

investments (including transferring or switching their existing pension) to invest in

financial instruments via a SIPP, the financial adviser must assess the suitability of

that underlying investment for the customer prior to recommending a SIPP. The

regulatory provisions relevant to these requirements are referred to in Annex A.

4.67
The Alerts published by the Authority in January 2013 and April 2014 set out its

expectations of financial advisers advising on overseas property investments. The

Authority’s alerts made clear that financial advisers must give careful consideration

to the particular features of the investment in question, and that the suitability of

the underlying investment must form part of the advice to the customer. If the

underlying investment was not suitable for the customer, then the overall pension

switch advice was not suitable.

4.68
It was Mr Hussein’s account that he was aware of the Alerts but discounted them

because he did not consider them to be applicable to the underlying investments

in P6. He had no reasonable basis for doing so. It was clear that P6 included

investments in overseas property and it was incumbent upon CWL and its financial

advisers to consider whether such an investment was suitable. By wrongly

discounting the alerts, Mr Hussein missed a critical step in assessing the suitability

of the underlying investments as part of his overall recommendation that customers

switch to a SIPP.

Mr Hussein’s advice in relation to P6

4.69
Mr Hussein told the Authority that he had reviewed certain documentation relating

to Greyfriars’ P6, and he had knowledge of the statements and the risks warnings

contained in the Greyfriars P6 documentation.

4.70
However, Mr Hussein explained that he disregarded these statements and risk

warnings because he did not “agree” with them. This was despite the fact that prior

to founding CWL, Mr Hussein had no pensions advisory experience. Further, Mr

Hussein admitted at interview that his ability to assess investments was limited as

he was “not a stock picker” and “not a fund manager”. Mr Hussein was therefore

aware of the limitations of his knowledge but nonetheless chose to ignore the

warnings of P6’s own fund manager.

4.71
Instead, Mr Hussein took the view that P6:

a) was not high-risk and he disagreed with Greyfriars giving P6 this risk rating;

b) was a regulated product and a standard asset for capital adequacy purposes;

and

c) was fully liquid because, irrespective of the underlying investments, in his

experience customers had been able to redeem their investment when required.

4.72
Each of these positions was directly contradicted by statements and / or information

in the Greyfriars P6 documentation (see paragraph 4.53 – 4.55 above). Moreover,

Mr Hussein had agreed to the terms of the CWL P6 Agreement which confirmed,

amongst other things, his understanding that P6 was not as liquid as more

conventional investments.

4.73
The CWL Investment Committee meetings which took place during the period June

2015 to September 2015 also discussed “liquidity” and “security of capital” issues

and noted that the P6 “bonds are non-readily realisable securities” which were

further indications as to the risk profile and suitability of P6. Mr Hussein therefore

had ample information available to him to be aware of the high-risk nature of P6

and that it was unlikely to be suitable for CWL’s customers.

4.74
Given the statements and risk warnings contained in the P6 documentation and the

terms of the CWL P6 Agreement, it was or ought to have been clear to Mr Hussein

that each of the conclusions he had reached in his assessment of P6 and his

resulting decisions to disregard Greyfriars’ risk warnings were incorrect and

unreasonable. Given CWL’s customers consisted of typically low net worth investors

with limited investment experience and financial sophistication, P6 was entirely

unsuitable to be included in the Firm’s CIP, let alone to form up to 49% of many of

CWL customers’ SIPPs.

4.75
The Authority considers that CWL’s allocation of 49% of customers’ SIPPs into P6

meant that the overall exposure of their pension to risk was significantly higher

than was suitable for them. It was Mr Hussein’s view that when P6 was combined

with a separate global investment fund, CWL had sufficiently balanced investment

risk for its customers. Mr Hussein described this as a “blended” approach and took

the view that applying this approach meant he could discount the specific warnings

that only a small proportion of a customer’s assets should be invested in P6. He

had no reasonable basis for that belief. Combining P6 (and including 49% of a

customers’ funds into P6) with a separate fund did not make the overall SIPP

suitable for CWL’s customers as it still meant that nearly half of their pensions were

invested in underlying investments which were high-risk and unsuitable for them.

4.76
In September 2016, Mr Hussein formally responded to the Authority’s Feedback

letter of August 2016 following the Authority’s Visits. In this response, Mr Hussein

reiterated that he did not agree that P6 was high-risk or illiquid or that it was

unsuitable for retail investors.

4.77
Mr Hussein’s view that P6 was a liquid investment was based on the fact that CWL

customers had, to date, been able to redeem their investment when a request had

been made. This demonstrated a fundamental failure by Mr Hussein to understand

the liquidity risks he had been informed of. The liquidity of any investment is not

measured only by its ability to meet a small number of redemptions in favourable

market conditions but also larger volumes in stressed market conditions. In such

circumstances (and as Greyfriars had warned Mr Hussein) it could become

impossible for customers to exit their investment in P6.

4.78
Prior to the 18 July 2016 Investment Committee meeting (following which

recommendations to customers to invest in P6 ceased), CWL recommended 620 of

its customers to switch from existing personal pensions, into SIPPs which had an

allocation to P6 (frequently up to 49%). This exposure to an unsuitable, high-risk

and illiquid investment resulted in a risk of detriment to CWL customers estimated

to be in the region of £13.5m. Those customers were largely low net worth and

financially unsophisticated and likely to be particularly adversely affected by losses

of this magnitude.

4.79
CWL prepared a Suitability Report for each customer to whom it recommended a

pension switch. Mr Hussein routinely signed off the Suitability Reports personally.

4.80
As noted above, P6 was a high-risk investment due to the nature of the underlying

investments (including unregulated overseas property developments). This was

reflected in the warnings and guidance provided by P6’s own DFM, Greyfriars. Such

investments may have been appropriate for experienced investors who had a

higher capacity for loss. However, these were expressly not the types of customers

which CWL targeted. The mini-bonds which were included in P6 offered returns of

up to 11% per annum which was an indicator of their relatively high underlying

investment risk. The investments in P6 were also unregulated and illiquid in nature.

4.81
It was Mr Hussein’s view that P6 was a “medium risk investment” and therefore

suitable for CWL’s CIP and its Advice Matrix. This was despite the fact that

statements and risk warnings contained in the Greyfriars documentation relating

to P6 clearly pointed to it being a higher risk rather than a medium risk investment.

4.82
The CWL Suitability Reports purported to set out the “inherent risks associated with

this product”. However, Mr Hussein acknowledged that the Suitability Reports failed

to specify which risks related to which product.

4.83
The disadvantages in relation to the SIPPs CWL recommended were set out in the

“Risks and potential disadvantages associated with the contract” section of the

Suitability Reports. This set out a list of factors for CWL customers to consider

before agreeing to switch pensions. However, the risks and potential disadvantages

associated with the recommended SIPP were generic. Each suitability report only

contained high-level, identical risk warnings such as “Past performance is no

guarantee” … “The price of units and the income from them can fall as well as rise”

… and “investment values may go down as well as up …”.

4.84
CWL’s Suitability Reports did not explain any of the specific risks associated with

P6. The Authority considers that given the high-risk nature of P6, the Suitability

Reports should have, at a minimum, communicated and explained the risk warnings

contained in the Greyfriars P6 documentation. However, by Mr Hussein’s own

admission, he deliberately chose not to communicate these specific risk warnings

to customers in the Suitability Reports because he did not “agree” with them. As a

result:

a) The Suitability Reports contained no information to indicate to customers that

P6 included investments in speculative overseas developments nor any other

indication that P6 was a high-risk investment (or, even on Mr Hussein’s own

assessment, a medium-risk investment).

b) The only information relating to the liquidity of the proposed investments was

included in the “Product Inherent Risks” section of the Suitability Reports. This

was simply the words “liquidity risk”. This was included in a list of ten complex

financial risks with no further explanation.

c) The Suitability Reports made no reference to Greyfriars’ warning that only a

small portion of customer’s funds (and in any event not more than 25%) should

be invested in P6. Nor was any specific explanation provided as to why such a

large allocation to P6 was viewed as being suitable.

d) The Suitability Reports contained no information to make clear that P6

contained underlying investments which were unregulated and not covered by

the FSCS.

4.85
CWL’s customers were retail investors with limited knowledge and experience of

financial services products. It was therefore necessary for those customers to be

provided with clear information and explanations about the disadvantages in

relation to the SIPP recommended by CWL and the material risks associated with

P6 so that they could provide their informed consent to the proposed pension

switch.

Comparison of pension charges

4.86
Mr Hussein was responsible for considering the fees charged by CWL when advising

on whether a pension switch was suitable and in the best interests of CWL’s

customers. Mr Hussein was also responsible for ensuring that the charges

comparison presented to customers in the Suitability Reports were fair, clear and

not misleading.

4.87
At the point of the initial pension switch advice provided by CWL to customers, CWL

charged a one-off fee of 5% of the amount it invested into the new SIPP pension,

up to a maximum of £1,500. The Authority considers that a key justification for

recommending a switch is if the charges under the SIPP are materially lower than

under the customer’s existing scheme, allowing for the one-off adviser charge of

5%. In all 24 customer files reviewed by the Authority, when all the CWL charges

were taken into account, the costs to the customer were higher than if they had

not switched.

4.88
By way of example, in each of the Suitability Reports reviewed by the Authority,

the “Charges and Costs Comparison” did not include the initial advice charge that

would be applied to customers switching to the proposed SIPP. The comparisons

also failed to include the cost of CWL’s ongoing advice service (charged annually at

1% of a customer’s total SIPP). Whilst these fees were mentioned elsewhere in the

Suitability Reports, they were not included in the comparison table, despite it

purporting to be an “analysis of all comparative costs and charges”.

4.89
The Suitability Reports were therefore misleading and unfair. They did not clearly

compare the charges under the ceding scheme with those under the recommended

SIPP and made it difficult for a customer to carry out a side by side comparison of

the charges, particularly as CWL’s customer base was typically inexperienced in

financial products and investments. CWL’s customers were provided with

misleading information and would therefore not have been in a position to make

an informed decision about CWL’s recommendation to switch their pensions.

4.90
As noted at paragraph 4.55 above, CWL submitted Application Forms to Greyfriars

on behalf of each customer whom it recommended to invest in P6. These

Application Forms contained responses to questions regarding the appropriateness

of P6. The information CWL supplied in these responses was misleading and

inaccurate.

4.91
Mr Hussein personally signed many of the Application Forms reviewed by the

Authority. In each Application Form, identical responses were recorded in answer

to certain questions. In response to a question regarding their investment

experience, every CWL customer was stated to be an “experienced investor in

property, bonds and mainstream investments”. In the section which asked why

investing in unregulated underlying investments would be suitable for the

customer, Mr Hussein replied in each case “Client requires diversification of his

overall investment portfolio and is attracted to un-correlated nature of the fixed

returns this service offers”.

4.92
It was Mr Hussein’s account that he considered customers to be experienced

investors on the basis of their existing pension and the underlying investments held

within it. The Authority’s investigation identified that the customers whom CWL

advised included, amongst others, unemployed individuals and an individual

receiving Disability Living Allowance, living in rented accommodation, with no liquid

assets. The customer file for this individual noted “has nothing, lives off his benefits

due to having a major disability”. Another customer was an individual, who was

employed as a housekeeper, with no liquid assets and living in rented

accommodation and receiving housing benefit contributions towards rent. Both

individuals were amongst the customers Mr Hussein determined to be “experienced

investors in property, bonds and mainstream investments”.

4.93
None of the individuals whose files the Authority reviewed had provided any

information to CWL to confirm or support Mr Hussein’s assessment that they had

knowledge and experience in relation to financial products. It was therefore

unreasonable to treat such customers as experienced investors and provide

investment advice on that basis. In addition, the Authority considers the fact that

certain customers owned or had a mortgaged property and an existing pension did

not mean they had knowledge and experience of financial products generally nor

that P6 was a suitable investment for them.

4.94
Mr Hussein also took an unreasonable and misleading approach to calculating

customers’ investable assets.

4.95
One of the questions on the Application Form asked CWL what proportion of a

customer’s total assets their investment in P6 represented. Mr Hussein was aware

that Greyfriars would not normally accept an investment into P6 where it

represented more than 25% of a customer’s investable assets. The Greyfriars P6

documentation stated that P6 was appropriate only for a “small proportion” of an

investor’s funds. CWL therefore, when calculating a customer’s investable assets

for the purposes of the Application Form, ignored customers’ liabilities and included

the entire value of their homes (including the mortgage element) and emergency

savings. This approach had the effect of making many of CWL customers’

investments in P6 appear to be only a few percent of their total investable assets

when, in fact, it was a far larger proportion.

4.96
In other cases, for customers who did not own a home and had little or no savings

(and therefore the above approach could not be applied) Mr Hussein provided a

‘side letter’ to Greyfriars explaining why, notwithstanding these circumstances, he

still viewed an investment in P6 of more than 25% of their total assets to be

suitable.

4.97
Again, Mr Hussein’s explanation of these customers’ financial circumstances to

Greyfriars was misleading. In one example, relating to a customer he was advising

invest 49% of their SIPP into P6, Mr Hussein wrote to Greyfriars confirming “client

is holding sufficient alternative liquid assets to enable them to cope with any

unforeseen financial contingencies without having to access their investment into

P6” and that the allocation to P6 was appropriate given their “ability to take risk”.

In fact, CWL’s customer fact find had identified that the customer in question was

unemployed, that their only income was Jobseeker’s Allowance and that their

pension was their only financial asset.

On-going service and annual reviews

4.98
CWL offered an ongoing service with a guaranteed annual review at an annual cost

of 1% of the value of a customer’s total investment. The service purported to

provide customers with monitoring of funds for their continuing suitability; review

of the circumstances and the client’s attitude to risk; and an opportunity to keep

financial arrangements up to date and reports on the performance of a customer’s

investments. The 1% annual review fee was not capped, so in the cases of

customers with larger investments it could represent a larger fee than that charged

for the initial switching advice.

4.99
CWL’s Suitability Reports failed to make the voluntary nature of the ongoing advice

service clear and did not explicitly request a customer's acceptance of the service.

Indeed, when describing adviser charges, the Suitability Reports described it as an

“annual servicing fee”. The Skilled Person’s Report identified that, during the

Relevant Period, only a single customer declined the ongoing service when

switching pensions. The Authority considers that this exceptionally high uptake

indicated that customers were insufficiently aware of the optional nature of the

service.

4.100 None of the 24 customer files reviewed by the Authority contained any

documentation to suggest that that annual reviews or related monitoring and

review work had actually taken place in respect of these customers. Nonetheless,

the 1% annual review fee had still been charged from these customers’ SIPPs.

4.101 Moreover, prior to May 2017, no policy existed explaining how CWL’s annual

reviews were to be conducted. Notwithstanding this, Mr Hussein proactively

encouraged advisors at CWL to promote the ongoing review service.

4.102 At interview, Mr Hussein acknowledged that annual reviews had not taken place in

respect of customers because there was not a system in place and CWL was reliant

on customers ‘taking up’ the service. In these circumstances, CWL continued to

charge the 1% annual fee despite being unable to contact customers to provide the

service.

4.103 It was Mr Hussein’s account that towards the end of the Relevant Period, he

introduced a policy whereby customers who did not use the ongoing service for two

years were no longer charged the 1% fee after that period. However, even with

this change, CWL still was charging customers for two years of a service which they

were not receiving.

4.104 The Authority considers that not only did CWL fail to make customers aware of the

voluntary nature of the ongoing service, the acceptance of which was not explicitly

requested, but the purported service in fact was not and could not be delivered

because there was no annual review system in place at CWL.

5.
FAILINGS

5.1.
The regulatory provisions relevant to this Notice are referred to in Annex A.

5.2.
By reason of the facts and matters above, during the Relevant Period, Mr Hussein

failed to act with integrity and breached Statement of Principle 1 (acting with

integrity) of APER. In particular Mr Hussein:

a) advised, and permitted CWL to advise, the firm’s initial 48 customers to invest

nearly half their pensions into P6 on the basis it was a suitable investment for

them before carrying out a reasonable level of due diligence on P6 and in

circumstances where, even on the limited information available, it was clear

that the investment was not suitable;

b) advised, and permitted CWL to advise, a total of 620 customers to invest up to

49% of their pensions into P6 when even the limited due diligence Mr Hussein

did conduct made it apparent that P6 was a fundamentally unsuitable

investment for CWL’s customers, except in very limited circumstances and

amounts.

5.3.
Mr Hussein provided this advice to customers in circumstances where he:

a) recklessly disregarded clear statements and risk warnings regarding P6

contained in the Greyfriars documentation on the basis that he “disagreed” with

them. Mr Hussein knew that he did not have the expertise to conclude that such

risks could reasonably be disregarded; and

b) recklessly disregarded Greyfriars’ recommendation that only a “small

proportion” of an investor’s portfolio should be allocated to P6 and instead

proceeded with a Central Investment Proposition which advised CWL customers

to invest 49% of their SIPPs into P6 irrespective of their attitude to risk or

personal circumstances.

5.4.
In doing so, Mr Hussein deliberately and unjustifiably closed his mind to the risks

he was taking in providing unsuitable advice in relation to his customers’ retirement

savings. He also deliberately did not communicate material risks to his customers

in their Suitability Reports with the result that he misled them as to the risks

involved in their pension switches. In doing so, he acted recklessly and therefore

without integrity.

5.5.
In addition:

a) Mr Hussein misrepresented to Greyfriars that customers investing in P6 were

“experienced investors in property, bonds and mainstream investments”. He

had no reasonable basis for making these statements and they were

contradicted by information gathered during CWL’s own customer fact finding

work;

b) Mr Hussein misrepresented CWL customers’ total investable funds and / or

financial position to Greyfriars, being aware that Greyfriars would not normally

accept investments of more than 25% of a customer’s assets into P6. In the

most serious cases, Mr Hussein represented that multiple customers who had

no job and no or minimal assets were “experienced investors” and had sufficient

alternative liquid assets to invest in P6 when he knew this to be untrue; and

c) Mr Hussein charged customers for an on-going advice service without putting

in place any material arrangements to provide it.

5.6.
Mr Hussein therefore made statements to and regarding CWL customers that he

knew or ought to have known were misleading, unfair and inaccurate. Mr Hussein’s

conduct resulted in CWL customers investing significant portions of their retirement

savings into unsuitable investments and exposed them to an unacceptable risk of

detriment.

5.7.
Mr Hussein also breached Statement of Principle 7 during the Relevant Period

because he failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that CWL complied with the

relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system.

5.8.
By reason of the facts and matters referred to above, during the Relevant Period

Mr Hussein breached Statement of Principle 7 by failing to take reasonable steps

a) ensure that CWL had due regard to whether switching a customer’s existing

pension into a SIPP was in that customers’ best interests, including appropriate

policies and procedures for when to recommend a pension switch;

b) ensure that CWL took reasonable care to assess customers’ knowledge and

experience in relation to investments in financial products and the overall SIPP

proposition appropriate for them;

c) ensure that CWL adequately assessed the suitability of the underlying

investments within the proposed SIPP, in particular P6, for each customer’s

specific risk profile and individual needs, being individuals who were entitled to

rely upon CWL’s judgment;

d) prevent CWL employees advising initial customers and transferring their funds

into P6 prior to carrying out a reasonable level of due diligence;

e) prevent CWL employees advising customers to invest in P6 when even basic

due diligence had made clear that P6, particularly in the proportions

recommended, was an unsuitable investment for CWL’s target market;

f) ensure that customers’ Suitability Reports contained a clear and fair explanation

of the material risks and specific disadvantages associated with investing a large

portion of their SIPP in P6;

g) ensure that customers’ Suitability Reports provided charge comparisons

between their existing pension plans and the proposed SIPP they were being

recommended which were clear and not misleading;

h) ensure that CWL’s on-going advice service was clearly communicated as being

an optional and voluntary service that was separate from the initial switching

advice and for which customer’s explicit, informed consent ought to have been

obtained. Further, that appropriate systems were in place to ensure this service

was actually provided;

i) gather sufficient information from customers in order to properly assess their

knowledge, experience and risk appetite in relation to investments in financial

products so as to be able to provide suitable advice; and

j) ensure that CWL’s Suitability Reports contained any information or explanation

of the specific risks and disadvantages associated with P6.

5.9.
As a result of these failings, Mr Hussein caused CWL to breach Principles 3, 6, 7

and 9 of the Authority’s Handbook.

6.
SANCTION

Financial penalty

6.1.
As a result of Mr Hussein’s breaches of Statement of Principles 1 and 7, the

Authority has decided to, and hereby does impose, a penalty pursuant to section

66 of the Act. The Authority’s policy on the imposition of a financial penalty is set

out in Chapter 6 of DEPP. In determining the financial penalty, the Authority has

had regard to that guidance.

6.2.
In determining the financial penalty to be attributed to Mr Hussein’s breaches, the

Authority has had particular regard to the following matters as applicable:

a) the need for credible deterrence;

b) the nature, seriousness and impact of the breach;

c) the aggravating factors relating to the breach; and

d) the settlement discount for agreeing to resolve this matter.

6.3.
The penalty calculation in relation to Mr Hussein is set out in Annex B to this Notice.

Having regard to all the circumstances, the Authority considers that £116,000.00

is the appropriate financial penalty to impose on Mr Hussein.

Prohibition Order and withdrawal of approval

6.4.
The Authority has the power to make prohibition orders in respect of individuals

under section 56 of the Act and the power to withdraw approval from an approved

person under section 63 of the Act. The Authority’s approach to exercising these

powers is set out at Chapter 9 of the Enforcement Guide.

6.5.
In considering whether to withdraw the approval given to Mr Hussein under section

59 of the Act and to impose a prohibition order, the Authority has had regard to all

relevant circumstances of the case. In particular, the Authority has considered Mr

Hussein’s fitness and propriety and the severity of the risk which Mr Hussein poses

to consumers and to confidence in the financial system.

6.6.
Given the nature and seriousness of the failings outlined above, the Authority

considers that Mr Hussein acted recklessly and without integrity in respect of advice

provided to CWL’s customers and in respect of the truth and completeness of

numerous statements made to and regarding those customers. Further, the

Authority considers that Mr Hussein’s conduct demonstrated that he failed to take

reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which he was

responsible in his accountable function complied with the relevant requirements

and standards of the regulatory system.

6.7.
Further, Mr Hussein’s conduct resulted in a risk of detriment to funds invested in

P6 by CWL’s customers of approximately £13.5m. To date, the FSCS has upheld

437 claims against CWL and paid out over £4.3m in compensation to customers of

CWL, including in respect of advice given on P6. Mr Hussein maintains, despite the

findings of the Skilled Person’s Report and the specific warnings provided in P6

documentation, that P6 was not a high-risk investment, was sufficiently liquid and

that it was appropriate to create a CIP which allocated 49% of CWL customers’

SIPPs into P6. Mr Hussein further maintains that it was appropriate to treat all CWL

customers as “experienced investors”.

6.8.
The Authority considers that, given Mr Hussein’s ongoing failure to show insight

into the serious failings in his conduct of the business of CWL and the

appropriateness and suitability of the advice he provided through CWL, he

continues to pose a serious risk to consumers and to confidence in the financial

system more widely.

6.9.
The Authority therefore withdraws Mr Hussein’s approval given by the Authority

under section 59 of the Act to perform the SMF3 (Executive Director), SMF16

(Compliance Oversight), and SMF17 (Money Laundering Reporting) functions at

CWL and makes an order prohibiting Mr Hussein from performing any function in

relation to any regulated activity carried out by an authorised person, exempt

person or exempt professional firm.

7.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

7.1.
This Notice is given to Mr Hussein, Consumer Wealth Limited (in liquidation) and

Greyfriars Asset Management LLP (in liquidation) under section 390(1) of the Act.

7.2.
The following statutory rights are important.

Decision maker

7.3.
The decision which gave rise to the obligation to give this Notice was made by the

Settlement Decision Makers.

Manner and time for payment

7.4.
The financial penalty of £116,000 must be paid in full to the Authority by Mr Hussein

within 18 months of the issuance of this Final Notice in accordance with the

payment schedule agreed by the Authority. The date stipulated for the purpose of

the agreed payment schedule is the date of this Final Notice.

If the financial penalty is not paid

7.5.
If all or any of the financial penalty is outstanding within 18 months from the date

of the issuance of this Final Notice, or is not paid when due, the Authority may

recover the outstanding amount as a debt owed by Mr Hussein and due to the

Authority.

7.6
The third parties have not referred the matter to the Tribunal within 28 days of the

date on which the Decision Notice was issued to them.

7.7
Sections 391(4), 391(6) and 391(7) of the Act apply to the publication of

information about the matter to which this Notice relates. Under those provisions,

the Authority must publish such information about the matter to which this Notice

relates as the Authority considers appropriate. The information may be published

in such manner as the Authority considers appropriate. However, the Authority may

not publish information if such publication would, in the opinion of the Authority,

be unfair to you or prejudicial to the interests of consumers or detrimental to the

stability of the UK financial system.

7.8
The Authority intends to publish such information about the matter to which this

Notice relates as it considers appropriate.

Authority contacts

7.9
For more information concerning this matter generally, contact Laurenz Maurer

(direct line: 020 7066 8096 / email: laurenz.maurer@fca.org.uk) or Shamsher

Singh (direct line: 020 7066 5284 / email: shamsher.singh@fca.org.uk) at the

Authority.

Lauren Rafter

Financial Conduct Authority, Enforcement and Market Oversight Division

ANNEX A

RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1.
The Authority’s statutory objectives, set out in section 1B(3) of the Act, include the

consumer protection objective and integrity objectives.

2.
Section 56 of the Act provides that the Authority may make an order prohibiting an

individual from performing a specified function, and function falling within a

specified description or any function, if it appears to the Authority that that

individual is not a fit and proper person to perform functions in relation to a

regulated activity carried on by an authorised person, exempt person or a person

to whom, as a result of Part 20, the general prohibition does not apply in relation

to that activity. Such an order may relate to a specified regulated activity, any

regulated activity falling within a specified description, or all regulated activities.

3.
Section 66 of the Act provides that the Authority may take action against a person

if it appears to the Authority that the person is guilty of misconduct and the

Authority is satisfied that it is appropriate in all the circumstances to take action

against him/her. Misconduct includes failure, while an approved person, to comply

with a Statement of Principle issued under section 64 of the Act. The action that

may be taken by the Authority pursuant to section 66 of the Act includes the

imposition of a penalty on the approved person of such amount as it considers

appropriate.

RELEVANT REGULATORY PROVISIONS

4.
In exercising its power to make a prohibition order, the Authority must have regard

to guidance published in the Handbook and in Regulatory Guides, such as EG. The

relevant main considerations in relation to the action specified above are set out

below.

The Enforcement Guide

5.
The Authority’s policy in relation to exercising its power to issue a prohibition order

is set out in the Enforcement Guide (“EG”).

6.
EG 9.1 explains the purpose of prohibition orders in relation to the Authority’s

statutory objectives.

7.
EG 9.2 sets out the Authority’s general policy on making prohibition orders. In

particular:

a) EG 9.2.1 states that the Authority will consider all relevant circumstances,

including whether enforcement action has been taken against the individual by

other enforcement agencies, in deciding whether to make a prohibition order;

b) EG 9.2.2 states that the Authority has the power to make a range of prohibition

orders depending on the circumstances of each case; and

c) EG 9.2.3 states that the scope of a prohibition order will depend on, among

other things, the reasons why the individual is not fit and proper and the

severity of risk he poses to consumers or the market generally.

Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons (APER)

8.
The Authority’s Statements of Principle have been issued under section 64 of the

Act.

9.
APER sets out the fundamental obligations of approved persons and sets out

descriptions of conduct, which, in the opinion of the Authority, does not comply

with the Relevant Statements of Principle. It also sets out, in certain cases, factors

to be taken into account in determining whether an approved person’s conduct

complies with a Statement of Principle.

10.
APER 2.1A.3P, which applies from 1 April 2013, sets out Statement of Principle 1

which states that an approved person must act with integrity in carrying out his

accountable functions.

11.
APER 3.13G provides that, when establishing compliance with, or a breach of, a

Statement of principle, account will be taken of the context in which a course of

conduct was undertaken, including the precise circumstances of the individual case,

the characteristics of the particular controlled function and the behaviour expected

in that function.

12.
APER 3.1.4G provides that an approved person will only be in breach of a Statement

of Principle if they are personally culpable, that is, where their conduct was

deliberate or where their standard of conduct was below that which would be

reasonable in all the circumstances.

13.
APER 4.1.4G sets out examples of behaviour which the Authority considers does

not comply with Statement of Principle 1 (acting with integrity).

14.
Statement of Principle 7 states:

“An approved person performing significant influence function must

take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which

he is responsible in his controlled function complies with the relevant

requirements and standards of the regulatory system”.

The Fit and Proper Test for Approved Persons

15.
The part of the Authority’s Handbook titled “The Fit and Proper Test for Approved

Persons” (FIT) sets out the criteria that the Authority will consider when assessing

the fitness and propriety of a candidate for a controlled function. FIT is also relevant

in assessing the continuing fitness and propriety of an approved person.

16.
FIT 1.3.1G states that the Authority will have regard to a number of factors when

assessing the fitness and propriety of a person. The most important considerations

will be the person’s honesty, integrity, and reputation, competence and capability

and financial soundness.

The Enforcement Guide

17.
The EG sets out the Authority’s approach to exercising its main enforcement powers

under the Act.

The Authority’s policy for exercising its power to make a prohibition order

18.
The Authority’s policy in relation to prohibition orders is set out in Chapter 9 of

the EG.

19.
EG 9.1 states that the Authority may exercise this power where it considers that,

to achieve any of its regulatory objectives, it is appropriate either to prevent an

individual from performing any functions in relation to regulated activities or to

restrict the functions which he may perform.

20.
EG 9.17 states where the Authority is considering making a prohibition order

against an individual other than an individual referred to in EG 9.8 to 9.14, the

Authority will consider the severity of the risk posed by the individual, and may

prohibit the individual where it considers this is appropriate to achieve one or more

of its statutory objectives.

21.
EG 9.18 states when considering whether to exercise its power to make a

prohibition order against an individual, the Authority will consider all the relevant

circumstances of the case. These may include, but are not limited to, where

appropriate, the factors set out in EG 9.9.

22.
The relevant factors set out in EG 9.9 are:

a) The matters set out in section 61(2) of the Act;

b) Whether the individual is fit and proper to perform functions in relation to

regulated activities. The criteria for assessing the fitness and propriety of

approved persons are set out in FIT (Honest, integrity and reputation); FIT 2.2

(Competence and capability) and FIT 2.3 (Financial soundness);

c) The relevance and materiality of any matters indicating unfitness; and

d) The severity of the risk which the individual poses to consumers and to

confidence in the financial system.

Principles of Business

23.
The Principles are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of firms

under the regulatory system and are set out in the Authority’s Handbook. They

derive their authority from the Authority’s rule making powers set out in the Act.

24.
Principle 9 states: “A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its

advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its

judgment.”

25.
Conduct of Business 2.10 The following rules in COBS are relevant regarding

suitability of advice given to customers: COBS 2.1.1R (1) A firm must act honestly,

fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its client (the

client's best interests rule)

COBS 9.2.1R

(1)
A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that a personal

recommendation, or a decision to trade, is suitable for its client.

(2)
When making the personal recommendation or managing his investments,

the firm must obtain the necessary information regarding the client's:

(a)
knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the

specific type of designated investment or service;

(b)
financial situation; and

(c)
investment objectives;

so as to enable the firm to make the recommendation, or take the decision,

which is suitable for him.

COBS 9.2.2R

(1)
A firm must obtain from the client such information as is necessary for the

firm to understand the essential facts about him and have a reasonable

basis for believing, giving due consideration to the nature and extent of the

service provided, that the specific transaction to be recommended, or

entered into in the course of managing:

(a)
meets his investment objectives;

(b)
is such that he is able financially to bear any related investment risks

consistent with his investment objectives; and

(c)
is such that he has the necessary experience and knowledge in order

to understand the risks involved in the transaction or in the

management of his portfolio.

(2)
The information regarding the investment objectives of a client must

include, where relevant, information on the length of time for which he

wishes to hold the investment, his preferences regarding risk taking, his risk

profile, and the purposes of the investment.

(3)
The information regarding the financial situation of a client must include,

where relevant, information on the source and extent of his regular income,

his assets, including liquid assets, investments and real property, and his

regular financial commitments.

COBS 9.2.3R

The information regarding a client's knowledge and experience in the investment

field includes, to the extent appropriate to the nature of the client, the nature and

extent of the service to be provided and the type of product or transaction

envisaged, including their complexity and the risks involved, information on:

(1)
the types of service, transaction and designated investment with which the

client is familiar;

(2)
the nature, volume, frequency of the client's transactions in designated

investments and the period over which they have been carried out;

(3)
the level of education, profession or relevant former profession of the client.

ANNEX B

PENALTY ANALYSIS

1.
The Authority’s policy for imposing a financial penalty is set out in Chapter 6 of

DEPP. In respect of conduct occurring on or after 6 March 2010, the Authority

applies a five-step framework to determine the appropriate level of financial

penalty. DEPP 6.5B sets out the details of the five-step framework that applies in

respect of financial penalties imposed on individuals in non-market abuse cases.

Steps 1: disgorgement

2.
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.1G, at Step 1 the Authority seeks to deprive an individual

of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach where it is practicable to

quantify this.

3.
The Authority identified no financial benefit that Mr Hussein derived directly from

the breach in connection with regulated activities.

4.
Step 1 is therefore £0.

Steps 2: the seriousness of the breach

5.
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.2G, at Step 2 the Authority determines a figure that reflects

the seriousness of the breach. That figure is based on a percentage of the

individual’s relevant income. The individual’s relevant income is the gross amount

of all benefits received by the individual from the employment in connection with

which the breach occurred, and for the period of the breach.

6.
The period of Mr Hussein’s breach was from 20 March 2015 to 1 March 2017

inclusive. The Authority considers Mr Hussein’s relevant income for this period to

be £89,042.63. The Authority has assessed that on the facts of this case, the

monies that Mr Hussein received should be included in the monies that the

Authority considers to be ‘relevant income’ for the purposes of assessing any

financial penalty to be imposed on him (those monies being a benefit received by

him from the employment in connection with which the breaches occurred).

7.
In deciding on the percentage of the relevant income that forms the basis of the

step 2 figure, the Authority considers the seriousness of the breach and chooses a

percentage between 0% and 40%. This range is divided into five fixed levels which

represent, on a sliding scale, the seriousness of the breach; the more serious the

breach, the higher the level. For penalties imposed on individuals in non-market

abuse cases there are the following five levels:

a) Level 1 – 0%

b) Level 2 – 10%

c) Level 3 – 20%

d) Level 4 – 30%

e) Level 5 – 40%

8.
In assessing the seriousness level, the Authority takes into account various factors

which reflect the impact and nature of the breach, and whether it was committed

deliberately or recklessly. The Authority considers the following factors to be

relevant.

Impact of the breach

9.
The Authority considers that there are several factors present in this case relating

to the impact of Mr Hussein’s breaches which affect the seriousness of his

misconduct as set out in DEPP 6.5B.2(7)). Specifically:

a) Mr Hussein’s failings meant that CWL customers invested a total of £13.5m via

their SIPPs into an investment portfolio which was unsuitable for them and

created a risk of detriment to them. The underlying investments which

comprised P6 were high-risk investments that were unregulated and therefore

not covered by the FSCS. CWL customers investing in unregulated investments

were therefore at risk of losing all of their investments. There was therefore a

significant risk of loss associated with Mr Hussein’s failings.

b) The Authority’s review of the customer files revealed that Mr Hussein’s

customers included individuals whose physical and personal circumstances

meant that they were vulnerable particularly as they had minimal or no capacity

for loss, were typically low net worth and inexperienced in financial products.

Indeed, it was CWL’s stated business model to target such types of consumers.

c) Since 2015, the FOS have received approximately 40 complaints against CWL.

Of these, three complaints have so far been upheld by the FOS in final decisions.

In these decisions, the Ombudsman noted the trouble, upset and concern that

Mr Hussein’s and CWL’s advice had caused inexperienced retail investors.

Nature of the breach

10.
In addition, a number of factors relating to the nature of the breach are relevant in

the Authority’s overall assessment of the seriousness of the breach (see DEPP

6.5B.2(9)). In particular:

a) Mr Hussein’s failings meant that the identified breaches continued for a period

of almost two years and would likely have continued but for the Authority’s

intervention.

b) Mr Hussein caused and in some instances encouraged other individuals at the

Firm to commit the identified breaches.

c) As the CF1 (Director) and CF10 (Compliance) of CWL, Mr Hussein was the most

senior person at the Firm. Mr Hussein also held significant responsibility for the

financial advice the business provided in relation to the identified breaches

concerning the P6 investment.

d) Mr Hussein failed to act with integrity in respect of a number of the breaches.

e) Mr Hussein abused a position of trust. Mr Hussein’s customers were

inexperienced investors who entrusted him with their retirement savings (in

some cases their only asset). Mr Hussein’s misconduct saw him recklessly

disregard risks and provide unsuitable advice to these customers. He also made

and caused to be made misleading statements to and regarding his customers.

Whether the breaches were deliberate and / or reckless

11.
The Authority found Mr Hussein’s conduct to include both deliberate and reckless

misconduct. Specifically, Mr Hussein:

a) recklessly disregarded clear statements and risk warnings regarding P6

contained in the Greyfriars documentation on the basis that he “disagreed” with

them, when he knew that he did not have the expertise to conclude that such

risks could reasonably be disregarded;

b) recklessly disregarded Greyfriars’ recommendation that only a “small

proportion” of an investor’s portfolio should be allocated to P6 and instead

proceeded with a Central Investment Proposition which advised CWL customers

to invest 49% of their SIPPs into P6;

c) misrepresented to Greyfriars that customers investing in P6 were “experienced

investors in property, bonds and mainstream investments”, without having any

reasonable basis for doing so;

d) misrepresented CWL customers’ total investable funds and / or financial position

to Greyfriars, being aware that Greyfriars would not normally accept

investments of more than 25% of a customer’s investable funds into P6; and

e) charged customers for an on-going advice service which there is no evidence

CWL ever provided.

12.
Taking all of these factors into account, the Authority considers the seriousness of

the breach to be Level 5 and so the Step 2 figure is 40% of £89,042.63.

13.
Step 2 is therefore £35,617.05.

Step 3: mitigating and aggravating factors

14.
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.3G, at Step 3 the Authority may increase or decrease the

amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any

amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which

aggravate or mitigate the breach.

15.
The Authority does not consider there to be any factors that mitigate the breaches.

Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.3 G (2), several factors aggravate the breach as follows:

a) The Authority had previously published alerts to the financial adviser market in

2013 and 2014. These clearly related to the advice Mr Hussein was providing

and were intended to prevent precisely the type of consumer detriment which

occurred in this case. Mr Hussein’s conduct took place after the publication of

the two FCA alerts. Mr Hussein told the Authority that he was aware of the

concerns expressed by the FCA in those publications, but nonetheless chose to

disregard them, wrongly taking the view they did not apply to his activities.

Given that the Authority had publicly called for an improvement in standards in

relation to the behaviour constituting the breach or similar behaviour, it was

incumbent on Mr Hussein to not discount the various risks and warning

statements he was aware of from the Greyfriars P6 documentation when he had

no reasonable basis for doing so.

b) The Authority has previously published numerous Final Notices relating to

misconduct and unsuitable advice in the financial adviser sector and in pensions

advice specifically. See for example Andrew Rees, Timothy Hughes and Lloyd

16.
As a result, the Authority considers that an uplift of 35% to the penalty at Step 3

to be appropriate.

17.
The Step 3 figure is therefore £47,370.68.

Step 4: adjustment for deterrence

18.
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.4G, if the Authority considers the figure arrived at after Step

3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the breach, or others, from

committing further or similar breaches, then the Authority may increase the

penalty.

19.
The Authority considers that the figure reached at Step 3 is unlikely to send a

credible message of deterrence to either Mr Hussein or to others. The Authority has

therefore decided to apply an uplift to the financial penalty to achieve credible

deterrence. The Authority’s considers this to be appropriate given that:

a) the absolute value of the penalty is too small in relation to the seriousness,

nature and impact of the breach to meet the Authority’s objective of credible

deterrence;

b) the Authority’s previous action in respect of similar breaches has failed to

improve industry standards; and

c) the Authority considers it is likely that similar breaches will be committed by

the individual or other individuals in the future absent an appropriate increase

in the penalty.

20.
Taking all of the above factors into account, the Authority considers it appropriate

to increase the figure at Step 4 by a multiple of 3.5.

21.
The Step 4 figure is therefore £165,797.38.

Step 5: settlement discount

22.
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.5G, if the Authority and the individual on whom a penalty

is to be imposed agree the amount of the financial penalty and other terms, DEPP

6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have

been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the Authority and the

individual reached agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the

disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step 1.

23.
Mr Hussein agreed to settle at Stage 1 and so a 30% discount applies to the Step

4 figure.

24.
The Step 5 figure is therefore £116,000.00 (penalty rounded down to the nearest

hundred).

25.
Having applied the five-step framework set out in DEPP and rounding down to the

nearest hundred, the Authority has decided that the appropriate financial penalty

to be imposed on Mr Hussein is £116,000.00 for breaching Statement of Principle

1 and Statement of Principle 7 during the Relevant Period.

26.
The financial penalty is to be paid in accordance with the payment schedule agreed

between Mr Hussein and the Authority.