FINAL NOTICE

TAKE NOTICE: the FSA of 25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, London E14
5HS has taken the following action.

1.
ACTION

1.1.
For the reasons given in this notice, the FSA hereby:

(1)
imposes a financial penalty of £60,000 on Mr O’Donnell pursuant to section

66 of the Act in respect of Mr O’Donnell’s contravention of Statements of

Principle 2 and 7;

(2)
withdraws Mr O’Donnell’s approval to perform controlled functions in

relation to P3 pursuant to section 63 of the Act; and

(3)
makes an order, pursuant to section 56 of the Act, prohibiting Mr O’Donnell

from performing any function in relation to any regulated activity carried on

by any authorised person, exempt person or exempt professional firm because

he is not a fit and proper person in that he lacks the necessary competence and

capability to continue as an approved person.

1.2.
On 25 February 2012, Mr O’Donnell exercised his right to make a reference to the

Tribunal about the matters contained in the Decision Notice. On 16 March 2012, Mr

O’Donnell withdrew that reference and the Tribunal consented to the withdrawal on

11 April 2012. Accordingly, this order takes effect from 24 April 2012.

2.
REASONS FOR THE ACTION

2.1.
For the reasons set out in more detail below, the FSA has concluded that Mr

O’Donnell’s conduct, while acting in his capacity as the sole director and adviser at

P3 amounted to breaches of Statements of Principle 2 and 7 and fell below the

minimum standards of fitness and propriety required of an approved person under the

Act.

2.2.
Mr O’Donnell breached Statement of Principle 2 because he failed to exercise due

skill, care and diligence in carrying out his customer controlled function (CF30) as an

adviser. Specifically, Mr O’Donnell promoted and recommended complex

unregulated investments and UCIS to customers without:

(a)
an understanding of the restrictions on the promotion of UCIS and/or

an understanding of the nature, complexity and risks of the products he

recommended;

(b)
adequate regard to whether the product recommended met the

customer’s objectives, including whether the customer was financially

able to bear any investment risks. For example, Customer H was

retired on ill-health grounds and dependent on state benefits. However,

she was advised to invest over 90% of her available pension funds into

UCIS and unregulated schemes;

(c)
adequate regard to whether the customer had the relevant knowledge

and experience to understand the risks involved in the specific type of

investments. For example, Customer R was employed as a fork-lift

truck driver and his wife as an administrator and the couple’s sole

investment comprised a protection plan for their repayment mortgage.

They were advised to invest the entirety of their known pension funds

into unregulated schemes and UCIS; and

(d)
taking reasonable steps to ensure he obtained the necessary information

about customers to whom he made a personal recommendation. For

example, Customer A earned £29,000 per annum, had two life policies

and invested over £25,000 in UCIS. All documentation on the

customer file related to her husband. There is no record of Customer

A’s attitude to risk, her investment objectives or financial

circumstances.

2.3.
The impact of Mr O’Donnell’s failure to take adequate steps to ensure that the

personal recommendations he made were suitable for his customers was serious and

gave rise to a significant risk that unsuitable recommendations were made and

products missold.

2.4.
Mr O’Donnell breached Statement of Principle 7 because he failed to take reasonable

steps to ensure that P3 complied with the relevant requirements and standards of the

regulatory system. Specifically, whilst acting as the sole director of P3, Mr

O’Donnell failed to ensure that:

(1)
P3 complied with the statutory and regulatory restrictions on the promotion of

UCIS;

(2)
P3 complied with the FSA’s rules and requirements when he advised on the

transfer of personal pensions; and

(3)
adequate customer file and business records were maintained at P3, including

customer files relating to P3’s mortgage intermediary business; and

(4)
recommendations made by P3’s compliance consultant for improvements to

P3’s systems and procedures, including regular checking of customer files,

were implemented in a timely manner.

2.5.
Mr O’Donnell’s failures were aggravated by his conduct in:

(1)
permitting £185,306 of UCIS and unregulated scheme business to be

completed four days before he submitted a variation of permission application

in which he agreed that P3 would cease conducting UCIS business. This

increased significantly the total sums of customers’ money placed at risk in

circumstances in which Mr O’Donnell was aware of the FSA’s concerns

regarding the suitability of his personal recommendations; and

(2)
completing investment applications on behalf of two P3 customers after he had

submitted a variation of permission application in which he agreed that P3

would cease conducting UCIS business.

3.
DEFINITIONS

3.1.
The definitions below are used in this Decision Notice.

(1)
the “Act” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.

(2)
“COBS” means the FSA’s Conduct of Business Handbook.

(3)
“Company P” is a pension provider (SIPP) with which Mr O’Donnell

habitually placed customers in order for them to have access to the UCIS and

unregulated schemes which he advised and promoted.

(4)
“DEPP” means the Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual.

(5)
“EG” means the Enforcement Guide.

(6)
the “FPA” means a Financial Planning Analysis form used by P3 the purpose

of which was to record information about the customer.

(7)
the “FSA” means the Financial Services Authority.

(8)
“FSCS” means Financial Services Compensation Scheme.

(9)
“I#3” means an unregulated closed ended investment company (closed in June

2009) into which Mr O’Donnell advised customers to invest. Customers

received preference shares in I#3 proportionate to the sum invested.

(10)
“I#4” means an unregulated closed ended investment company (closed in

December 2009) into which Mr O’Donnell advised customers to invest.

Customers received preference shares in I#4 proportionate to the sum invested.

(11)
“KYC” means Know Your Customer.

(12)
“Mr O’Donnell” means Mr Patrick Francis O’Donnell.

(13)
“P3” means P3 Wealth Management Limited.

(14)
the “PCIS Order” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000

(Promotion of collective investment schemes) (Exemptions) Order 2001.

(15)
the “Section 238 Restriction” means the provision of section 238(1) of the Act

which states that an authorised person must not communicate an invitation or

inducement to participate in a collective investment scheme (which includes a

UCIS) except in prescribed circumstances.

(16)
the “Statements of Principle” mean the FSA’s Statements of Principle and

Code of Practice for Approved Persons.

(17)
“UCIS” means an unregulated collective investment scheme.

(18)
“The Tribunal” means the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber).

4.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS, REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

AND GUIDANCE

4.1.
The statutory provisions, regulatory requirements and guidance relevant to this Notice

are set out in Annex A.

5.
FACTS AND MATTERS RELIED ON

5.1.
P3 was a small IFA firm based in West Lothian, Scotland and was approved by the

FSA with effect from 3 August 2004.

5.2.
Mr O’Donnell was the sole director and only approved person performing significant

influence functions at P3. Until December 2008, P3’s principal business was advising

on mortgage contracts. It then switched its focus to investments during 2009.

5.3.
During the period from 27 November 2008 to 4 December 2009, Mr O’Donnell was

the only investment adviser at P3. He visited approximately 150 investment

customers to discuss investing in UCIS and other unregulated schemes; 57 of these

customers invested in one or more UCIS and/or unregulated schemes.

5.4.
In addition to customer visits, Mr O’Donnell promoted UCIS by handing out a flyer at

marketing and networking events and had that flyer on display at P3’s office, where it

could be picked up by customers. The flyer was also published on P3’s website.

5.5.
The first completed UCIS transaction took place on 15 December 2008 and the last on

30 November 2009. Of the 57 customers who invested in UCIS promoted by Mr

O’Donnell, 14 customers also invested in schemes, I#3 and I#4, which were

unregulated investment schemes but which Mr O’Donnell believed were UCIS at the

time he promoted them and/or made personal recommendations in respect of them.

5.6.
In September 2009, P3 was selected by the FSA to take part in its “Treating

Customers Fairly” assessment programme. On 27 October 2009 the FSA visited P3

7


and prior to the visit the FSA randomly selected 19 customer files for review. The

FSA then reviewed 8 cases during their visit on 27 October 2009. The FSA noted the

absence of key information on the customer files which would otherwise have

demonstrated how UCIS had been promoted in light of the Section 238 Restriction

(and the statutory and regulatory exemptions to the Section 238 Restriction). The

FSA also had concerns regarding the suitability of the advice.

5.7.
On 13 November 2009, the FSA asked P3 to apply to vary its permission to cease

conducting UCIS business as a result of serious concerns around its promotion and

advice on UCIS and other unregulated schemes. P3 agreed to make a voluntary

application to vary its permission and cease conducting UCIS business. Also on 13

November 2009, the FSA wrote to Mr O’Donnell confirming the above and

requesting a response from Mr O’Donnell by 20 November 2009.

5.8.
On 25 November 2009, the FSA confirmed it had not received a response to its letter

of 13 November 2009 regarding the voluntary variation of permission form. On 27

November 2009, the FSA again wrote to request the submission of the voluntary

variation of permission form and in another letter of the same date again set out its

concerns in relation to the promotion of UCIS and the suitability of the personal

recommendations made by Mr O’Donnell.

5.9.
P3 did not submit the requisite variation of permission form until 4 December 2009

Significantly, four days prior, on 30 November 2009, Mr O’Donnell permitted

£185,306 of UCIS and unregulated scheme business to be completed.

The promotion of UCIS

5.10. From evidence gathered by the FSA during its supervisory visit, Mr O’Donnell was,

at that time, largely unaware of the Section 238 Restriction on the promotion of UCIS

to retail customers and did not understand the exemptions to this restriction. In

particular, COBS 4.12.1R states that a firm may communicate an invitation or

inducement to participate in an unregulated collective investment scheme without

breaching the Section 238 Restriction if the promotion falls within particular

exemptions explained therein.

5.11. On 25 May 2010 (some seven months after the supervisory visit), during a compelled

interview, Mr O’Donnell was able to identify that there were rules relating to the

marketing of UCIS which related to high net worth individuals or sophisticated

investors and that there were COBS rules which applied. However, when it came to

the application of exemptions Mr O’Donnell initially admitted that he didn’t consider

the application of those exemptions and only after consulting his legal representative,

was Mr O’Donnell able to state that he applied the exemptions in COBS 4.12.1R.

5.12. Mr O’Donnell stated that he applied the Category 2 exemption under COBS 4.12.1R.

A Category 2 exemption applies to a person for whom a firm has taken reasonable

steps to ensure that investment in the collective investment scheme is suitable; and

who is an 'established' or 'newly accepted' customer of the firm or of a person in the

same group as the firm.

5.13. There is no evidence that Mr O’Donnell understood that the Category 2 exemption

under COBS 4.12.1R comprises two elements. Firstly Mr O’Donnell was required to

assess whether the particular UCIS product was suitable before he promoted it to the

customer. Mr O’Donnell assessed the suitability of a particular UCIS during his

discussion with the customer and the conversation around the product informed his

view of whether or not it was something the customer was interested in or not. The

extent to which suitability was adequately assessed is dealt with in paragraphs 5.21 to

5.45 below.

5.14. Secondly, the customer must be either an ‘established’ or a ‘newly accepted’

customer of the firm. This requires P3 to have entered into a written agreement with

the customer which related to the provision of designated investment business. This

written agreement must have been obtained without breaching the rules regarding the

promotion of UCIS. However, Mr O’Donnell had not retained a copy of any

customer agreements because he contended it was not a regulatory requirement. This

is corroborated by the nine customer files (for 15 customers) reviewed by the FSA -

none of the files contained a customer agreement.

5.15. In three of the nine customer files reviewed by the FSA, there was a ‘sophisticated

investor certificate’ on file which had been signed by Mr O’Donnell and the relevant

customer. These certificates were required to be provided by Company P.

5.16. Under the PCIS Order, an unregulated collective scheme may be promoted to certain

types of individual provided conditions/exemptions set out in the PCIS Order are met.

One of the exemptions applies to ‘sophisticated investors’. A certified sophisticated

investor is a person who has a certificate signed by an authorised person confirming

he is sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the risks associate with an unregulated

scheme and who has also signed a statement in the terms set out in the PCIS Order.

The statement the customer signs must be accompanied by an indication of the

requirements for the customer to qualify as a ‘sophisticated investor’ and a risk

warning. Importantly, the appropriately worded certificate must be signed by both the

customer and the authorised person doing the ‘certifying’ before the promotion is

made.

5.17. The wording of the certificates signed by Mr O’Donnell and the three customers

referred to above did not follow that required by the PCIS Order. They were also not

accompanied by the information required by the PCIS Order. Further, in all three

cases the certificates were dated after the relevant promotions had been made. In one

of the three, the customer who had signed the certificate, Customer C, had not

actually invested in UCIS. Customer C’s partner, customer DA, had invested in

UCIS but had not signed a certificate.

5.18. Such information about the 15 customers as is contained in the nine customer files,

shows that none of these customers could reasonably be considered, on a natural

meaning of the word, ‘sophisticated’ investors. With one exception all the customers

were basic-rate tax payers and only five had investments other than pension and life

policies.

5.19. In the case of Customer H, Mr O’Donnell relied on the Category 1 exemption in

COBS 4.12.1R in order to promote subsequent UCIS investments to her. A Category

1 exemption applies to a person who is already a participant in an unregulated

collective investment scheme; or a person who has been, in the last 30 months, a

participant in an unregulated collective investment scheme. However, the initial

UCIS was not compliantly promoted and the new UCIS was not sufficiently similar to

the initial UCIS in order for this exemption to be successfully applied.

5.20. Accordingly, during the period from 27 November 2008 to 4 December 2009, P3

promoted UCIS in breach of the Section 238 Restriction. This was due to Mr

O’Donnell’s lack of understanding of the restrictions on the promotion of UCIS (or

the reasons for such restrictions) and despite Company P’s requirement for

‘sophisticated investor certificates’ which should reasonably have alerted him to the

fact that these were products only suitable for such individuals.

Suitability of advice

5.21. The FSA reviewed nine customer files dealing with personal recommendations by Mr

O’Donnell to 15 customers. These recommendations related to five different UCIS

and two unregulated schemes. The majority of these investments were funded by

transfers from existing pension schemes that Mr O’Donnell’s customers had in place.

5.22. Mr O’Donnell breached Statement of Principle 2 because he failed to take reasonable

steps to ensure that his personal recommendations to customers were suitable. The

FSA has concluded that Mr O’Donnell failed to have regard to his customers’:

(1)
financial situation;

(2)
investment objectives;

(3)
attitude to risk; or

(4)
knowledge and experience

such that Mr O’Donnell’s customers were unable to understand the risks involved in

the relevant transactions.

The customers’ financial situation

5.23. Of the 15 customers, only one was, at the point of sale, a higher-rate tax payer. Only

three of the 15 customers earned more than £25,000 per annum. Customer H had

retired due to ill-health and was dependent on state benefits and her husband.

Customer R earned £25,000 as a forklift truck driver and his wife received £7,200, per

annum.

5.24. Customer F (and possibly her husband) might have been capable of falling within the

exemption for ‘high net worth’ individuals in the PCIS Order due to their existing

assets and the number of properties they owned. However, this exemption could not

have been used by Mr O’Donnell to promote UCIS compliantly to this couple as the

UCIS he promoted did not fall within the (relatively narrow) class of UCIS to which

this exemption is applicable. In any event, the financial information recorded on the

customer file was insufficient for the customers’ net asset position (jointly or

individually) to be determined.

5.25. Six of the nine customer files reviewed contained an incomplete record of the

customers’ financial situation. For example:

(1)
the FPA for Customer S stated that he had recently been made redundant and

contained no details of income by him or his wife. A suitability letter drafted

by Mr O’Donnell the following year states that he was employed with an

annual income of £35,000. It is possible that Customer S had become

employed in the interim but this is not reflected on the customer file;

(2)
both Customer S and his wife separately invested in UCIS. There are no

documents on the wife’s customer file to record her income, objectives,

experience, attitude to risk or why this investment was suitable for her;

(3)
Customer F was advised to invest in UCIS C and a report was produced for her

in January 2009. The investment was made a month later. However, the FPA

for Customer F was not completed until April 2009, some 2 months after the

investment was made. There may have been earlier discussions or an earlier

FPA but these were not contained on the customer file.

The customers’ investment objectives

5.26. Mr O’Donnell used standardised investment objectives in making personal

recommendations for UCIS and unregulated schemes. Those customers who invested

in the same schemes often had different personal and financial circumstances.

However, in each case, with very little variation, the customers’ suitability letters and

pension performance reviews contained the same investment objectives. Customer F

was an administrator earning £8,000 per annum. Her husband was a higher-rate tax

payer and together they owned 44 buy-to-let properties, in addition to their principal

residence. They also had existing investments of £100,000. Customer F’s stated

objectives in relation to the I#3 scheme were almost identical to those of Customer T.

Customer T earned £10,400 per annum and had one dependent son. She was 39 years

old, her only existing investment was a personal pension into which she paid £125 per

month. Customer T was also advised by Mr O’Donnell to invest in I#3.

5.27. Customer A was also advised to invest in I#3. He was provided with an investment

report for the scheme recording his objectives. According to the investment report,

Customer A’s objectives included investing in an asset class with low or no

correlation to the stock market. Of the seven reports for I#3 reviewed by the FSA, six

had exactly the same objectives as Customer A.

5.28. In respect of UCIS SM, Mr O’Donnell made a personal recommendation to Customer

W to invest in this scheme. However, he did so prior to completing his own due

diligence on this scheme.

5.29. Of the nine files reviewed, none held evidence of comparisons between the UCIS and

unregulated schemes recommended and a regulated alternative. There was no

evidence (on the files reviewed) of research into alternatives. Mr O’Donnell stated

research material was held centrally, however, this material does not evidence

independent analysis of the schemes recommended or comparisons with regulated

products.

5.30. In respect of the UCIS C, Mr O’Donnell made personal recommendations to

customers about the scheme prior to being in receipt of its first quarterly performance

report and based solely on the information contained in the Information

Memorandum. The Information Memorandum described the scheme as a medium

term investment. However, Mr O’Donnell described it as a ‘holding bay’, indicating

he viewed it as a short term investment.

The customers’ attitude to risk

5.31. In seven of the customers files reviewed, there were discrepancies in the descriptions

of the customers’ attitude to risk. Frequently, the customers’ recorded attitudes to

risk varied across different documents, sometimes it appeared to develop towards a

high position from an initial low/moderate position and often the recorded attitude to

risk bore little correlation to the risk profile of the investment product recommended.

5.32. In the case of Customer F, her attitude to risk was variously described in different

documents as low, medium, medium/high and high. Specifically, the suitability letter

for entering a SIPP with Company P stated that Customer F wished to reduce her

exposure to equities as she was of the view that her money would be safer in cash in

the short term. Customer F invested in 84% of her known funds across three

unregulated funds including one UCIS. One of these was an investment in I#3, a type

of preference share investment. In the investment report for Scheme C, Mr O’Donnell

described Customer F’s attitude to risk as “high”.

5.33. Customer A stated he could tolerate a 5-10% loss before moving his investments. Mr

O’Donnell described Customer A as a ‘moderate aggressive’ investor, requiring a

broad selection of mainly UK based equities where capital return may be limited to

compensation limits. Customer A was advised to place 100% of the funds available

to Mr O’Donnell and 37.4% of his known pension funds in I#3. As I#3 was a type of

preference share investment, it was suitable only for those who could assume the risk

of losing their entire investment. It was not covered by FSCS.

5.34. The I#3 report presented to Customer A stated that I#3 was not covered by FSCS and

carried a risk of a total capital loss but not until pages 11 and 13 of 16 and these

significant factors were not mentioned in the ‘General Risk Warnings’ section on

page 2. The FSA has concluded that there is a significant risk that the product

recommended does not match Customer A’s attitude to risk or the descriptions set out

by Mr O’Donnell in the customer documentation provided.

5.35. The UCIS and unregulated funds recommended by Mr O’Donnell products were only

suitable for customers with an aggressive attitude to risk or a high risk tolerance.

With the exception of UCIS C, all the products Mr O’Donnell recommended carried

the risk of a total loss of capital. Mr O’Donnell explained the products to customers

in meetings in order to ensure they understood the products. However, there was a

significant risk that Mr O’Donnell advised customers to purchase products that did

not match their real attitude to risk.

The customers’ knowledge and experience

5.36. None of the files reviewed by the FSA contained evidence to support a conclusion

that the relevant customers had knowledge and experience of the types of investments

that Mr O’Donnell recommended to them. Of the nine files (for 15 customers)

reviewed by the FSA, only five customers had any investments additional to a life

policy or pension with a standard provider (such as might be expected with a home

owner).

5.37. Mr O’Donnell accepted that his customers were not experienced or sophisticated

investors. However he stated that he discussed the funds with his customers in order

that they might understand the funds and to educate them.

5.38. Customer S was previously employed with a large company and had recently been

made redundant. He had a life policy and an occupational pension which he

transferred into a SIPP with Company P in order to access the unregulated funds. He

was advised to place 77% of his known pension funds into UCIS C, UCIS A and the

unregulated fund, I#3. The investment report stated that Customer S was not a

sophisticated investor but was satisfied he understood the risks of these investments.

5.39. Customer H was a cautious investor, seeking to reduce her exposure to equities, with

the objective of providing her husband with benefits in the event of her death. She had

no life assurance or savings. Her husband earned £24,500 as a baggage handler and

he also had no savings or life assurance. She had an occupational pension. Customer

H invested 94% of her known assets in unregulated schemes.

5.40. Customer F had 44 buy-to-let properties held jointly with her husband. She earned

just under £10,000 as an administrator and also had ISAs and other investments which

may have included regulated collective investment schemes.

5.41. Mr O’Donnell placed too much reliance on his discussions with the customer and to

proxy indicators, such as the customer being a company director or owning buy-to-let

properties, in determining whether the customer should be able to understand and

tolerate the investment risk presented by these schemes.

5.42. There was a high risk that Mr O’Donnell’s discussions with customers were

insufficient as it appears he himself did not adequately understand the risks of the

schemes on which he advised in order for such explanations to be reasonably

sufficient. In particular he:

(1)
described UCIS C as low risk with a guaranteed return. However, all the funds

were invested in one type of asset, the capital guarantee was dependent on the

solvency of a firm on which Mr O’Donnell does not appear to have conducted

any due diligence and it was not covered by the Financial Services

Compensation Scheme;

(2)
appeared to be unaware that the due diligence on UCIS A and UCIS AH

carried out by an introducer was performed on the parent company and not on

the schemes themselves;

(3)
understood that all the schemes recommended related to property, something

he and his customers understood and it was safer than FTSE-linked

investments. However, UCIS G, in which six of his customers invested,

invested in futures in listed companies and the offer document specifically

stated that UCIS G would not invest in land.

(4)
appeared not to have understood the charging structure of I#3 and I#4 as he

stated that the investors got the first 30% increase in the net asset value of the

fund before any charge. In fact, a fixed closing fee, administration fees and

annual investment adviser fees would be incurred and paid regardless of the

funds’ performance. Mr O’Donnell also described I#3 and I#4 as a two year

deal. He did not understand that it was open to the ordinary shareholders to

extend the termination date beyond two years (which has already occurred).

Personal pensions

5.43. Seven out of the nine customer files reviewed reveal that the relevant customers had

invested in UCIS and unregulated funds using pension funds. Where Mr O’Donnell

advised on the transfer to a different personal pension provider in order to be able to

invest in these specific funds, the advice to transfer should have been suitable for the

relevant customers and the customer files should have evidenced this.

5.44. Of the files reviewed, three customers had small pension funds which were worth less

than £33,000. The largest pension pot was worth £139,586. These customers were

advised to accept a significantly higher investment risk in exchange for the possibility

of greatly increasing their pension provision in circumstances in which the suitability

reports did not adequately explain why the particular pension provider was suitable

for the customers.

5.45. In the majority of cases it appears the pension provider was recommended for their

access to the specific UCIS and unregulated funds that Mr O’Donnell advised on. For

example:

(1)
Customer R was initially advised against entering into a SIPP, however a

month later Mr O’Donnell advised him to enter into a SIPP with Company P

to gain access to I#3;

(2)
Customer W held an occupational pension and was advised by an independent

pensions adviser to retain it. Customer W stated that Mr O’Donnell advised

him the pensions adviser was naturally cautious and he subsequently chose to

pursue the transfer to gain access to the specific UCIS and unregulated funds

recommended by Mr O’Donnell. The suitability letter did not adequately deal

with the reasons why these investments were suitable for Customer W; and

(3)
Customer T consolidated her three personal pensions on Mr O’Donnell’s

advice. Mr O’Donnell initially advised Customer T that a SIPP would not be

appropriate as she would not utilise the wide range of funds. Two months

later he advised her to transfer into a SIPP with Company P to permit her to

invest in I#3.

Record keeping

5.46. The overall level of record keeping on the customer files was inadequate. The record

keeping requirements set out in COBS vary across the different products on which Mr

O’Donnell was advising. However, given the complexity and high-risk nature of the

underlying products and the inexperience and financial background of the customers

he advised, the FSA considers that Mr O’Donnell should have applied the most

stringent levels of record keeping to the customer files in order to be able to

demonstrate that the advice he gave his customers was suitable.

5.47. In particular, in the nine customer files reviewed:

(a)
there were no terms of business such as to establish whether those

customers to whom UCIS was recommended were “established”

customers for the purposes of the COBS 4.12R Category 2 exemption;

(b)
the FPA documentation for most customers was incomplete and, in

some of the cases reviewed, did not separate out husband and wife

despite the variance in financial position between husband and wife

and the differing investments made;

(c)
such risk analysis documentation as was contained on the files, set out

varying attitudes to risk across a number of different documents in

relation to a number of different products making it difficult to

establish the customer’s true attitude to risk for the specific product

recommended (i.e. it is unclear whether the attitude to risk related to

the transfer of the personal pension or the specific unregulated scheme

recommended as the underlying investment);

(d)
files often did not contain Key Facts Illustrations, suitability letters or

comparison material for every part of the transaction. For example,

where a customer had transferred their personal pension, such

suitability letters as were contained on the file related only to the

underlying pension investment and not to the transfer of the pension

itself;

(e)
the files did not contain a complete and coherent record of the

transactions the customer had entered into.

5.48. P3 was repeatedly advised to improve the record keeping on its customer files by its

compliance consultant and persistently failed to act on these recommendations. This

included persistent failures detailed in compliance reports (in relation to both

mortgage and investment customer files) regarding out of date or missing fact finds,

missing suitability letters and inadequate records of a customer’s financial

circumstances such as to enable an assessment of affordability to be made.

5.49. In terms of general record keeping, the pensions information provided to the FSA was

incomplete as was the new business register. P3 also could not provide the FSA with

a complete set of the compliance consultant’s reports and appendices or the terms and

conditions agreements entered into with the customers.

5.50. The failings by Mr O’Donnell regarding the promotion of UCIS, the record keeping

failures and the risk that P3 may have made unsuitable sales were made in the context

of repeated failures by Mr O’Donnell to act on the advice of P3’s compliance

consultant.

5.51. The compliance consultant had made a number of findings and recommendations as

part of their ongoing reviews, such recommendations and findings were often

reiterated in subsequent reports as a result of the failure of P3 to follow up on these

recommendations. In particular, the compliance consultant repeatedly identified the

failure of P3 to record within the files evidence to demonstrate why the advice given

was suitable.

5.52. Mr O’Donnell appears to have attached little import to the findings by P3’s

compliance consultant. He informed the FSA that where the compliance consultant

had raised issues he would endeavour to get things done but it depended what was

going on and how much time he had available to work on compliance issues.

5.53. As already noted above, P3 could not provide the FSA with a complete set of the

compliance consultant’s reports and appendices or the terms and conditions

agreements entered into with the customers.

6.
REPRESENTATIONS, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Representations

6.1.
Below is a summary of the key representations made by Mr O’Donnell in this matter

and how they have been dealt with. In making the decision which gave rise to the

obligation to give this Final Notice, the FSA took into account all of Mr O’Donnell’s

representations, whether or not explicitly set out below.

6.2.
Mr O’Donnell did not seek to contest the alleged breaches in so far as they related to

his promotion and recommendation of complex unregulated investments and UCIS.

6.3.
Mr O’Donnell accepted that:

(1)
“he was by and large, unaware of the statutory requirements and regulatory

imperatives” relating to the promotion and recommendation of complex

unregulated investments and UCIS; and

(2)
his conduct was in breach of the Section 238 Restriction; and

(3)
he could not rely on any of the exemptions in the PCIS Order.

6.4.
Mr O’Donnell maintained that he honestly and sincerely believed he was doing the

best for his customers when he promoted and recommended complex unregulated

investments and UCIS to them.

6.5.
Notwithstanding the above, Mr O’Donnell submitted that he should not be prohibited

from working as a mortgage intermediary because:

(1)
he is (and always has been) a competent mortgage intermediary; and

(2)
his overall level of record keeping on the customer files is (and always was)

adequate although he accepts that his record keeping is “by no means perfect”.

6.6.
Mr O’Donnell also submitted that the financial penalty of £60,000 is disproportionate

in all the circumstances (and especially if he is prohibited from working as a

mortgage intermediary).

6.7.
Mr O’Donnell stated that even if he is able to continue working as a mortgage

intermediary, the impact of the financial penalty of £60,000 on him will be

“catastrophic” as the income he is capable of deriving from a mortgage intermediation

business is at best marginal in the current market conditions. Mr O’Donnell asserted

that the detailed statement of means form he provided to the FSA demonstrates that

the imposition of a financial penalty of £60,000 would cause him severe and undue

financial hardship.

6.8.
Finally, during his oral representations meeting, Mr O’Donnell admitted that he

completed investment applications on behalf of two P3 customers after he had

submitted a variation of permission application in which he agreed that P3 would

cease conducting UCIS business. Mr O’Donnell was unable to provide any reasons

for his actions in this regard.

6.9.
The FSA noted that Mr O’Donnell did not seek to contest the alleged breaches in so

far as they related to his promotion and recommendation of complex unregulated

investments and UCIS.

6.10. The FSA found that Mr O’Donnell failed to take adequate steps to ensure that the

personal recommendations he made were suitable for his customers. In particular, Mr

O’Donnell promoted and recommended complex unregulated investments and UCIS

to customers without:

(a)
an understanding of the restrictions on the promotion of UCIS and/or

the nature, complexity and risks of the products he recommended;

(b)
adequate regard to whether the product recommended met the

customer’s objectives, including whether the customer was financially

able to bear any investment risks;

(c)
adequate regard to whether the customer had the relevant knowledge

and experience to understand the risks involved in the specific type of

investments; and

(d)
taking reasonable steps to ensure he obtained the necessary information

about customers to whom he made a personal recommendation.

6.11. The FSA accepted that Mr O’Donnell may have honestly and sincerely believed he

was doing the best for his customers when he promoted and recommended complex

unregulated investments and UCIS to them.

6.12. However, Mr O’Donnell did not appear to understand that:

(1)
as a result of his advice, just under two thirds of those customers reviewed by

the FSA invested over 75% of their known available funds into UCIS and

other unregulated schemes. None of these schemes are covered by FSCS and

all of them carry a risk of potential loss of capital; and

(2)
the impact of his actions was serious and gave rise to a significant risk that

unsuitable recommendations were made and products missold to customers,

some of whom were vulnerable individuals.

6.13. Accordingly, the FSA found that Mr O’Donnell breached Statement of Principle 2

because he failed to exercise due skill, care and diligence in carrying out his customer

controlled function (CF30) as an adviser.

6.14. The FSA also found that Mr O’Donnell breached Statement of Principle 7 as he failed

to take reasonable steps to ensure that P3 complied with the relevant requirements and

standards of the regulatory system. Specifically, whilst acting as the sole director of

P3, Mr O’Donnell failed to ensure that:

(1)
P3 complied with the statutory and regulatory restrictions on the promotion of

UCIS;

(2)
P3 complied with the FSA’s rules and requirements when he advised on the

transfer of personal pensions;

(3)
adequate customer file and business records were maintained at P3 including

customer files relating to P3’s mortgage intermediary business; and

(4)
recommendations made by P3’s compliance consultant for improvements to

P3’s systems and procedures, including regular checking of customer files,

were implemented in a timely manner.

6.15. The FSA considers that Mr O’Donnell’s failures were aggravated by his conduct in:

(1)
permitting £185,306 of UCIS and unregulated scheme business to be

completed four days before he submitted a variation of permission application

in which he agreed that P3 would cease conducting UCIS business. This

increased significantly the total sums of customers’ money placed at risk in

circumstances in which Mr O’Donnell was aware of the FSA’s concerns

regarding the suitability of his personal recommendations; and

(2)
completing investment applications on behalf of two P3 customers after he had

submitted a variation of permission application in which he agreed that P3

would cease conducting UCIS business.

6.16. The FSA has concluded (for the reasons set out above) that Mr O’Donnell has

demonstrated a serious lack of competence and capability and the FSA considers that

he does not meet the minimum standards of fitness and propriety required to remain

an approved person under the Act.

6.17. In light of its findings, the FSA considers that the imposition of a financial penalty of

£60,000 and full prohibition against Mr O’Donnell is both justified and proportionate

in all the circumstances and supports the FSA’s regulatory objectives of maintaining

market confidence and the protection of consumers. In making this decision, the FSA

has taken into account (in paragraphs 7.1 to 7.23 below) all of Mr O’Donnell’s

representations regarding the appropriateness of the sanction.

7.
SANCTION

Imposition of financial penalty

7.1.
The FSA's policy on the imposition of financial penalties relevant to the misconduct

as detailed in this Notice is set out in Chapter 6 of the version of DEPP in force prior

to 6 March 2010, which formed part of the FSA Handbook. All references to DEPP

in this section are references to that version of DEPP.

7.2.
The principal purpose of imposing a financial penalty is to promote high standards of

regulatory conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from

committing further breaches, helping to deter other persons from committing similar

breaches and providing an incentive for compliant behaviour.

7.3.
In determining whether a financial penalty is appropriate the FSA is required to

consider all the relevant circumstances of a case.

7.4.
DEPP 6.5.2G sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be of relevance in

determining the level of a financial penalty. The FSA considers that the following

factors are particularly relevant in this case.

Deterrence (DEPP 6.5.2(1))

7.5.
In determining the level of the financial penalty, the FSA has had regard to the need

to ensure those who are approved persons exercising significant influence functions

act in accordance with regulatory requirements and standards. The FSA considers

that a penalty should be imposed to demonstrate to Mr O’Donnell and others the

seriousness of failing to meet these requirements

The nature, seriousness and impact of the breach in question (DEPP 6.5.2(2))

7.6.
As a result of Mr O’Donnell’s breaches, P3 exposed retail customers to a serious risk

that the personal recommendations made were unsuitable having regard to their

financial circumstances, attitude to risk, investment objectives, and knowledge and

experience. Consequently, these customers have invested significant proportions of

their available assets in complex schemes which place them at risk of losing their

entire investment which, for almost all of the customers reviewed, would be a loss

they could not bear financially.

7.7.
The FSA has also taken into account the fact that Mr O’Donnell:

(1)
permitted the sums invested by P3’s customers in UCIS and unregulated

schemes to increase when on 30 November 2009 he permitted £185,306 of

unregulated transactions to be completed; and

(2)
completed investment applications on behalf of two P3 customers after he had

submitted a variation of permission application in which he agreed that P3

would cease conducting UCIS business.

The FSA considers these actions aggravate the seriousness and impact of the

breaches.

The extent to which the breach was deliberate or reckless (DEPP 6.5.2(3))

7.8.
The FSA has concluded that Mr O’Donnell did not wilfully or intentionally place

customers at risk. It has therefore concluded that the contraventions were not

deliberate but arose primarily from his own lack of understanding about these

schemes. However, the FSA considers that the nature of his actions (and inaction) as

set out in this Notice amounts to serious misconduct. In particular, the FSA considers

Mr O’Donnell’s actions in completing investment applications on behalf of two P3

customers after he had submitted a variation of permission application in which he

agreed that P3 would cease conducting UCIS business to be particularly serious.

7.9.
The FSA notes that Mr O’Donnell actively sought compliance advice from a third

party. However, he then failed to take account or implement the recommendations

made.

Whether the person on whom the penalty is to be imposed is an individual (DEPP

7.10. When determining the appropriate level of financial penalty, the FSA will take into

account that individuals will not always have the same resources as a body corporate,

that enforcement action may have a greater impact on an individual, and further, that

it may be possible to achieve effective deterrence by imposing a smaller penalty on an

individual than a body corporate. The FSA will also consider whether the status,

position and/or responsibilities of the individual are such as to make a breach

committed by the individual more serious and whether the penalty should therefore be

set at a higher level.

7.11. The FSA recognises that the financial penalty imposed on Mr O’Donnell is likely to

have a significant impact on him as an individual but considers it to be proportionate

in relation to the seriousness of his misconduct and as the only approved person

performing a significant influence function at P3.

The size, financial resources and other circumstances of the person on whom the

penalty is to be imposed (DEPP 6.5.2(5))

7.12. The FSA considers that a financial penalty of the level proposed is appropriate,

having taken account of all relevant factors, including the statement of means Mr

O’Donnell has submitted and the resources available to him.

7.13. The FSA notes that Mr O’Donnell failed to provide any evidence that the imposition

of a financial penalty of the level proposed will cause him serious financial hardship.

The amount of benefit gained or loss avoided (DEPP 6.5.2.G(6))

7.14. P3 received an upfront commission and an ongoing annual fee based on a percentage

of customers’ funds that it transferred into new pensions arrangements. In addition,

P3 has also received commission payments from some of the schemes it has

recommended.

Conduct following the breach (DEPP 6.5.2G(8))

7.15. The FSA has taken into account Mr O’Donnell’s conduct since the breach (including

Mr O’Donnell’s co-operation with the FSA’s investigation).

7.16. Mr O’Donnell continued to assist customers to reinvest in the UCIS he originally

recommended to them, introducing these customers to other firms for advice on UCIS

investments and permitting P3 to assist them to make online reinvestments of interest.

As a result, some customers remain invested in UCIS C. This is inconsistent with his

statement made in written representations that no customers remained invested in

UCIS C. He also continued to advise customers to enter into off shore, complex

structured products. This indicates that Mr O’Donnell has not adequately taken steps

to mitigate the exposure of customers for whom there is a significant risk that these

schemes may be unsuitable given the concerns raised in this Decision Notice.

7.17. Mr O’Donnell admitted (during his oral representations meeting) that he completed

investment applications on behalf of two P3 customers after he had submitted a

variation of permission application in which he agreed that P3 would cease

conducting UCIS business. Mr O’Donnell was unable to provide any reasons for his

actions in this regard.

Disciplinary record and compliance history (DEPP 6.5.2G(9))

7.18. The FSA has taken into account the fact that Mr O’Donnell has not been the subject

of previous disciplinary action by the FSA.

Other action taken by the FSA (DEPP 6.5.2G(10))

7.19. The FSA has taken action against other approved persons for similar conduct.

7.20. Taking into account the above factors, the FSA hereby imposes a financial penalty of

£60,000 on Mr O’Donnell.

Withdrawal of approval and prohibition

7.21. The FSA’s policy on the imposition of prohibition orders is set out in Chapter 9 of

EG. The relevant provisions of EG are set out in Annex A of this notice.

7.22. The FSA has considered and rejected Mr O’Donnell’s submissions that his failings do

not extend to basic file maintenance tasks such as those required to be conducted in

his mortgage intermediary business. Given the nature and seriousness of Mr

O’Donnell’s failures outlined in this Notice (above), the FSA has concluded that he is

not fit and proper to perform any functions in relation to any regulated activity carried

on by any authorised person, exempt person or exempt professional firm. Mr

O’Donnell’s individual approval to perform controlled functions are hereby

withdrawn and he is prohibited from performing any functions in relation to any

regulated activity carried on by any authorised person, exempt person or exempt

professional firm.

7.23. In particular, Mr O’Donnell has demonstrated:

(1)
a fundamental lack of understanding of the restrictions and risks associated

with promoting UCIS to retail customers and has demonstrated that he is

unable to take adequate steps to ensure customers receive suitable personal

recommendations. In the interests of consumer protection, the FSA deems it

appropriate to impose the prohibition order; and

(2)
that he poses a serious risk to customers generally (in light of his admission

that he completed investment applications on behalf of two P3 customers after

he had submitted a variation of permission application in which he agreed that

P3 would cease conducting UCIS business).

8.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Decision maker

8.1.
The decision which gave rise to the obligation to give this Notice was made by the

Regulatory Decisions Committee.

8.2.
This Final Notice is given to Mr O’Donnell in accordance with section 390 of the Act.

Manner of and time for Payment

8.3.
The financial penalty must be paid in full by Mr O’Donnell to the FSA by no later

than 8 May 2012, 14 days from the date of the Final Notice.

If the financial penalty is not paid

8.4.
If all or any of the financial penalty is outstanding on 8 May 2012, the FSA may

recover the outstanding amount as a debt owed by Mr O’Donnell and due to the FSA.

8.5.
Sections 391(4), 391(6) and 391(7) of the Act apply to the publication of information

about the matter to which this notice relates. Under those provisions, the FSA must

publish such information about the matter to which this notice relates as the FSA

considers appropriate. The information may be published in such manner as the FSA

considers appropriate. However, the FSA may not publish information if such

publication would, in the opinion of the FSA, be unfair to you or prejudicial to the

interests of consumers.

8.6.
The FSA intends to publish such information about the matter to which this Final

Notice relates as it considers appropriate.

FSA contacts

8.7.
For more information concerning this matter generally, contact Rachel West (direct

line: 020 7066 0142 /fax: 020 7066 0143) of the Enforcement and Financial Crime

Division of the FSA.

………………………………………………
Tom Spender
FSA Enforcement and Financial Crime Division

ANNEX A

RELEVANT STAUTORY PROVISIONS, REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND

FSA GUIDANCE

1.
Statutory provisions

1.1.
The FSA’s statutory objectives, set out in Section 2(2) of the Act, include the

protection of consumers.

1.2.
The FSA has the power, by virtue of section 66 of the Act, to impose a financial

penalty of such amount as it considers appropriate where it appears to the FSA that an

individual is guilty of misconduct and it is satisfied that it is appropriate in all the

circumstances to take action against the individual.

1.3.
An individual is guilty of misconduct if, while an approved person, they fail to

comply with a statement of principle issued under section 64 or have been knowingly

concerned in a contravention by the relevant authorised person of a requirement

imposed on that authorised person by or under the Act.

1.4.
Pursuant to section 63 of the Act, the FSA has the power to withdraw the approval

given to an individual under section 59 of the Act if it considers that they are not a fit

and proper person to perform them.

1.5.
The FSA has the power, pursuant to Section 56 of the Act, to make a prohibition order

against an individual to prevent that individual from performing a specified function

or any function falling within a specified description; or any function, if it appears to

the FSA that the individual is not a fit and proper person to perform functions in

relation to a regulated activity carried on by an authorised person. Such an order may

relate to a specific regulated activity, a regulated activity falling within a specified

description or all regulated activities.

2.
APER Statements of Principle for Approved Persons

2.1.
APER is issued pursuant to section 64 of the Act. It sets out Statements of Principle

with which approved persons are required to comply when performing a controlled

function for which approval has been sought and granted. They are general

statements of the fundamental obligations of approved persons under the regulatory

system. APER also contains descriptions of conduct which, in the opinion of the

FSA, constitutes a failure to comply with a particular Statement of Principle and

describes factors which the FSA will take into account in determining whether an

approved person’s conduct complies with it.

2.2.
APER 3.1.3G states, as guidance, that, when establishing compliance with, or breach

of, a Statement of Principle, account will be taken of the context in which a course of

conduct was undertaken, the precise circumstances of the individual case, the

characteristics of the particular controlled function and the behaviour expected in that

function.

2.3.
APER 3.1.4G states, as guidance, that an approved person will only be in breach of a

Statement of Principle if they are personally culpable, that is in a situation where their

conduct was deliberate or where their standard of conduct was below that which

would be reasonable in all the circumstances.

2.4.
In this case, the FSA considers the most relevant Statements of Principle to be

Statement of Principle 2 and Statement of Principle 7.

2.5.
Statement of Principle 2 requires that an approved person must act with due skill, care

and diligence in carrying out his controlled function.

2.6.
Statement of Principle 7 requires that an approved person performing a significant

influence function must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm

for which he is responsible in his controlled function complies with the relevant

requirements and standards of the regulatory system.

2.7.
APER 4.2.2E to 4.2.13E provide examples of the types of behaviour that, in the

opinion of the FSA, do not comply with Statement of Principle 2. These include:

(1)
failing to inform a customer of material information in circumstance where the

approved person ought to have been aware of such information and of the fact

that he should provide it, including failing to explain the risks of an investment

to a customer (APER 4.2.3E and 4.2.4E);

(2)
recommending an investment to a customer where the approved person does

not have reasonable grounds to believe that it is suitable for that customer

(APER 4.2.5E); and

(3)
recommending transactions without a reasonable understanding of the risk

exposure of the transaction to a customer including where that

recommendation is made without a reasonable understanding of the liability

(either potential or actual) of the transaction (APER 4.2.6E and 4.2.7E)).

2.8.
APER 4.7.2E to 4.7.10E provide examples of the types of behaviour that, in the

opinion of the FSA, do not comply with Statement of Principle 7. These include:

(1)
failing to take reasonable steps to implement (either personally or through a

compliance department or other departments) adequate and appropriate

systems of control to comply with the relevant standards of the regulatory

system in respect of the relevant firm’s regulated activities (APER 4.7.3E);

(2)
failing to take reasonable steps to monitor (either personally or through a

compliance department or other departments) compliance with the relevant

requirements and standards of the regulatory system in respect of the relevant

firm’s regulated activities (APER 4.7.4E); and

(3)
failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that procedures and systems of

control are reviewed and, if appropriate, improved, following the identification

of significant breaches (whether suspected or actual) of the relevant

requirements and standards of the regulatory system relating to its regulated

activities, including but not limited to:

(a)
unreasonably failing to implement recommendations for improvements

in systems and procedures; or

(b)
unreasonably failing to implement recommendations for improvements

to systems and procedures in a timely manner.

3.
FSA’s policy on exercising its power to impose a financial penalty

3.1.
The FSA's statement of policy with respect to the imposition and amount of penalties

under the Act, as required by sections 69(1), 93(1), 124(1) and 210(1) of the Act, and

guidance on those matters is provided in Chapter 6 of the FSA’s Decision Procedure

and Penalties Manual (“DEPP”), entitled “Penalties”, which is part of the FSA’s

Handbook. In summary, chapter 6 of DEPP states that the FSA will consider the full

circumstances of each case when determining whether or not to take action for a

financial penalty, and sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be relevant for

this purpose.

3.2.
The principal purpose of imposing a financial penalty is to promote high standards of

regulatory conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from

committing further breaches, helping to deter other persons from committing similar

breaches and demonstrating generally the benefits of compliant behaviour.

3.3.
The FSA will consider the full circumstances of each case when determining whether

or not to take action for a financial penalty. DEPP6.2.1G sets out guidance on a non-

exhaustive list of factors that may be of relevance in determining whether to take

action for a financial penalty, which include the following.

(1)
DEPP 6.2.1G(1): The nature, seriousness and impact of the suspected breach.

(2)
DEPP 6.2.1G(2): The conduct of the person after the breach.

(3)
DEPP 6.2.1G(3): The previous disciplinary record and compliance history of

the person.

(4)
DEPP 6.2.1G(4): FSA guidance and other published materials.

(5)
DEPP 6.2.1G(5): Action taken by the FSA in previous similar cases.

4.
Determining the level of the financial penalty

4.1.
The FSA will consider all the relevant circumstances of a case when it determines the

level of financial penalty. DEPP 6.5.2G sets out guidance on a non exhaustive list of

factors that may be of relevance when determining the amount of a financial penalty.

4.2.
Factors that may be relevant to determining the appropriate level of financial penalty

(1)
whether the breach revealed serious or systematic weaknesses in the person's

procedures or of the management systems or internal controls relating to all or

part of a person's business (DEPP 6.5.2G(2)(b)); and

(2)
the general compliance history of the person, including whether the FSA has

previously brought to the person's attention, issues similar or related to the

conduct that constitutes the breach in respect of which the penalty is imposed

(DEPP 6.5.2(9)(d)).

5.
Fit and Proper Test for Approved Persons

5.1.
The part of the FSA Handbook entitled “FIT” sets out the Fit and Proper Test for

Approved Persons. The purpose of FIT is to outline the main criteria for assessing the

fitness and propriety of a candidate for a controlled function. FIT is also relevant in

assessing the continuing fitness and propriety of an approved person.

5.2.
FIT 1.3.1G provides that the FSA will have regard to a number of factors when

assessing a person’s fitness and propriety. One of the considerations will be the

person’s competence and capability.

5.3.
As set out in FIT 2.2, in determining a person’s competence and capability, the FSA

will have regard to matters including but not limited to:

(1)
whether the person satisfies the relevant FSA training and competence

requirements in relation to the controlled function the person performs or is

intended to perform; and

(2)
whether the person has demonstrated by experience and training that the

person is able, or will be able if approved, to perform the controlled function.

6.
FSA’s policy for exercising its power to make a prohibition order and withdraw
a person’s approval

6.1.
The FSA’s approach to exercising its powers to make prohibition orders and

withdraw approvals is set out at Chapter 9 of the Enforcement Guide (“EG”).

6.2.
EG 9.1 states that the FSA’s power to make prohibition orders under section 56 of the

Act helps it work towards achieving its regulatory objectives. The FSA may exercise

this power where it considers that, to achieve any of those objectives, it is appropriate

either to prevent an individual from performing any functions in relation to regulated

activities or to restrict the functions which he may perform.

6.3.
EG 9.4 sets out the general scope of the FSA’s powers in this respect, which include

the power to make a range of prohibition orders depending on the circumstances of

each case and the range of regulated activities to which the individual’s lack of fitness

and propriety is relevant. EG 9.5 provides that the scope of a prohibition order will

vary according to the range of functions which the individual concerned performs in

relation to regulated activities, the reasons why he is not fit and proper and the

severity of risk posed by him to consumers or the market generally.

6.4.
In circumstances where the FSA has concerns about the fitness and propriety of an

approved person, EG 9.8 to 9.14 provides guidance. In particular, EG 9.8 states that

the FSA may consider whether it should prohibit that person from performing

functions in relation to regulated activities, withdraw that person’s approval or both.

In deciding whether to withdraw approval and/or make a prohibition order, the FSA

will consider whether its regulatory objectives can be achieved adequately by

imposing disciplinary sanctions.

6.5.
EG 9.9 states that the FSA will consider all the relevant circumstances when deciding

whether to make a prohibition order against an approved person and/or to withdraw

that person’s approval. Such circumstances may include, but are not limited to, the

following factors:

(1)
whether the individual is fit and proper to perform functions in relation to

regulated activities, including in relation to the criteria for assessing the fitness

and propriety of an approved person in terms of competence and capability as

set out in FIT 2.2;

(2)
the relevance and materiality of any matters indicating unfitness;

(3)
the length of time since the occurrence of any matters indicating unfitness;

(4)
the particular controlled function the approved person is (or was) performing,

the nature and activities of the firm concerned and the markets in which he

operates;

(5)
the severity of the risk which the individual poses to consumers and to

confidence in the financial system; and

(6)
the previous disciplinary record and general compliance history of the

individual.

6.6.
EG 9.12 provides a number of examples of types of behaviour which have previously

resulted in the FSA deciding to issue a prohibition order or withdraw the approval of

an approved person. The examples include serious lack of competence.

7.
Promotion of collective investment schemes

7.1.
Section 238(1) of the Act provides that an authorised person must not communicate

an invitation or inducement to participate in a collective investment scheme (“CIS”),

and therefore also an UCIS. Section 21 of the Act imposes an equivalent restriction

in relation to unauthorised persons.

7.2.
Section 238 goes on expressly to carve out circumstances where this prohibition will

not apply. These include:

(1)
Where the CIS in question is an authorised unit trust/open ended investment

company.

(2)
The circumstances set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000

(Promotion of collective investment schemes)(Exemptions) Order 2001 (“the

PCIS Order”).

(3)
The exemptions listed in table 4.12.1R(4) of the Conduct of Business

Sourcebook (COBS).

7.3.
The PCIS Order provides for authorised firms to promote UCIS to individuals if they

fall within a particular category of exemption set out in the order.

7.4.
These exemptions pertain to individuals classed as certified high net worth

individuals, certified sophisticated investors or self-certified sophisticated investors

(articles 21, 23 and 23A of the PCIS Order).

8.
The PCIS Order exemptions - Certified high net worth individuals

8.1.
Article 21(2) defines a certified high net worth individual as being an individual who

has signed a statement complying with Part I of the Schedule to the PCIS Order in the

past 12 months. Essentially this requires that at least one of the following sets of

circumstances apply:

(1)
The person had, during the previous financial year, an annual income of

£100,000 or more; and/or

(2)
The person held, throughout the previous financial year, assets to the value of

£250,000 or more, not including that person’s primary residence/mortgage, life

insurance or death in service benefits.

8.2.
The statement also requires that the person signs a statement to indicate he accepts

that he can lose his property and other assets from making investment decisions based

on financial promotions and is aware it is open to him to seek specialist advice.

8.3.
If the person making the communication believes on reasonable grounds that he is

making it to a certified high net worth individual, then the section 238 restriction will

not apply as long as the communication:

(1)
is a non-real time communication or a solicited real time communication;

(2)
relates only to units in a UCIS which invests wholly or predominantly in the

shares in or debentures of one or more unlisted companies;

(3)
does not invite or induce the recipient to enter into an agreement under the

terms of which he can incur a liability or obligation to pay or contribute more

than he commits by way of investment;

(4)
a specified warning in the following terms is given both orally (in respect of a

real-time communication) and in writing in the manner prescribed in Article

“Reliance on this promotion for the purpose of buying the units to which the

promotion relates may expose an individual to a significant risk of losing all

of the property or other assets invested.”; and

(5)
is accompanied by an indication that the promotion is exempt from section 238

on the grounds that it is communicated to a certified high net worth individual,

together with details of the requirements for certified high net worth investors

and a reminder that the individual should consult a specialist if in any doubt

about participating in a UCIS.

8.4.
There are similar provisions for high net worth companies and associations at Article

22.

9.
The PCIS Order exemptions - Sophisticated investors

9.1.
There are two sorts of sophisticated investors referred to in the PCIS Order – certified

and self-certified.

Certified sophisticated investors

9.2.
A certified sophisticated investor is defined in Article 23(1) as someone:

(1)
Who has a current certificate (signed and dated in the past three years) in

writing or other legible form signed by an authorised person to the effect that

he is sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the risks associated with

participating in a UCIS; and

(2)
Who has signed, within the previous 12 months, a statement in the following

terms:

“I make this statement so I can receive promotions which are exempt from the

restriction on promotion of unregulated schemes in the Financial Services and

Markets Act 2000. The exemption relates to certified sophisticated investors and I

declare that I qualify as such. I accept that the schemes to which the promotions will

relate are not authorised or recognised for the purposes of that Act. I am aware that

it is open to me to seek advice from an authorised person who specialises in advising

on this kind of investment.”

9.3.
The communication must be accompanied by an indication that section 238 does not

apply, of the requirements to be a certified sophisticated investor, a prescribed risk

warning and a reminder to seek independent advice.

9.4.
Provided all this is met, and the communication is not to participate in a UCIS carried

on by the person who certified the investor as sophisticated, then the section 238

restriction will not apply.

Self-certified sophisticated investors

9.5.
Article 23A defines a self-certified sophisticated investor as an individual who has

signed a statement complying with Part II of the Schedule to the PCIS Order in the

past 12 months. Essentially this requires that at least one of the following sets of

circumstances applies to the investor:

(1)
he is a member of a network or syndicate of “business angels” and has been so

for at least the last six months;

(2)
he has made more than one investment in an unlisted company in the past two

years;

(3)
he is working, or has worked in the past two years, in a professional capacity

in the private equity sector, or in the provision of finance for small and

medium enterprises;

(4)
he is currently, or has been in the two years before signing the statement, a

director of a company with an annual turnover of at least £1 million.

9.6.
As with high net worth individuals, the statement also requires the investor to sign a

statement that he accepts he can lose his property and assets from making investment

decisions based on financial promotions and that he is aware that it is open to him to

seek specialist advice.

9.7.
If the person making the communication believes on reasonable grounds that he is

making it to a self-certified sophisticated investor, then the section 238 restriction will

not apply as long as the communication:

(1)
relates only to units in a UCIS which invests wholly or predominantly in the

shares in or debentures of one or more unlisted companies;

(2)
does not invite or induce the recipient to enter into an agreement under the

terms of which he can incur a liability or obligation to pay or contribute more

than he commits by way of investment;

(3)
a specified warning in the following terms is given both orally (in respect of

real time communications) and in writing in the manner prescribed in Article

“Reliance on this promotion for the purpose of buying the units to which the

promotion relates may expose an individual to a significant risk of losing all of

the property or other assets invested.”; and

(4)
is accompanied by an indication that the promotion is exempt from section 238

on the ground that it is made to a self-certified sophisticated investor, together

with details of the requirements for self-certified sophisticated investors and a

reminder that the individual should consult a specialist if in any doubt about

participating in a UCIS.

10.
The COBS exemptions

10.1. A firm may communicate an invitation or inducement to participate in a UCIS

without breaching the section 238 restriction if the promotion falls within an

exemption listed in the table at 4.12.1R(4) of the Conduct of Business Sourcebook

(COBS).

10.2. The inducement or invitation must be made only to recipients whom the firm has

taken reasonable steps to establish are persons in that category or be directed at

recipients in such a way as to reduce, as far as possible, the risk of participation in the

CIS by persons not in that category. There is no provision for these steps to be taken

retrospectively.

10.3. Category 1 covers people who are already participants in a UCIS or have been so in

the last 30 months. An authorised person can promote to these persons the UCIS in

which they are already participants (and any successor scheme) or one whose

underlying property and risk profile are both “substantially similar” to those of the

UCIS in which they participate.

10.4. Category 2 deals with those persons for whom the firm has taken reasonable steps to

ensure that investment in the UCIS is suitable and who is a client of the firm or a

company in its group.

10.5. Category 7 provides that if a client is categorised as a professional client or eligible

counterparty then an authorised person can promote to that client any UCIS in

relation to which the client is so categorised.

10.6. Category 8 allows financial promotion of UCIS to a person:

(1)
In relation to whom the firm has undertaken an adequate assessment of his

expertise, experience and knowledge and that assessment gives reasonable

assurance, in light of the nature of the transactions or services envisaged, that

the person is capable of making his own investment decisions and

understanding the risks involved;

(2)
To whom the firm has given a clear written warning that this will enable the

firm to promote UCIS to the client; and

(3)
Who has stated in writing, in a document separate from the contract, that he is

aware of the fact the firm can promote certain UCIS to him.

11.
Suitability of advice

11.1. The fact that a customer is eligible to receive a communication promoting an

unregulated scheme under one or more exemptions does not mean that the

unregulated scheme will be automatically suitable to that customer.

11.2. Principle 9 of the FSA’s Principles for Businesses states a firm must take reasonable

care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any

customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment.

11.3. COBS 9.1.1 states that COBS 9 applies to a firm which makes a personal

recommendation to a designated investment. The definition of a designated

investment includes in investments which are rights or interests in collective

investment schemes.

11.4. In considering the suitability of a particular scheme for a specific client, a firm is

required by COBS 9 to obtain the necessary information to understand the essential

facts about the client (COBS 9.2.2R).

11.5. COBS 9.2.6R provides that if a firm does not obtain the necessary information to

assess suitability, it must not make a personal recommendation to the client.