1

FINAL NOTICE

To:

Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc

1.
ACTION

1.1.
For the reasons given in this notice, the Authority hereby imposes on

Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc a financial penalty of £539,800.

1.2.
Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc agreed to settle at an early stage of the

Authority’s investigation. Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc therefore qualified

for a 30% (stage 1) discount under the Authority’s executive settlement

procedures. Were it not for this discount, the Authority would have

imposed a financial penalty of £771,190 on Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc.

2.
SUMMARY OF REASONS

2.1.
Between 1 July 2005 and 8 October 2012 (“the relevant period”) RB (as

defined below):

2

(1)
Breached Listing Rule 9.2.8 (“LR9.2.8R”) by failing to require

persons discharging managerial responsibilities (“PDMRs”) to take

all reasonable steps to secure their compliance with the Model

Code;

(2)
Breached Listing Principle 11 by failing to take reasonable steps to

enable its directors to understand their responsibilities and

obligations to comply with the Model Code resulting in a breach of

the Model Code;

(3)
Breached Listing Principle 22 by failing to take reasonable steps to

establish and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls

to enable it to comply with its obligations;

(4)
Breached Disclosure Rule and Transparency Rule (“DTR”) 3.1.4R(2)

by failing to notify the market of share dealings by two PDMRs as

soon as possible, and in any event by no later than the end of the

business day following receipt of the information;

(5)
Breached DTR3.1.5R by failing to include all the required

information in the notification to the market regarding the share

dealings by the two PDMRs.

2.2.
These failings occurred because, in the relevant period:

(1)
RB’s systems and controls were not adequate in that they did not

enable it to monitor effectively all share dealing by its PDMRs or to

identify potential or actual breaches of its share dealing policy and

the Model Code, with the result that it failed to detect breaches in a

timely manner;

(2)
RB failed to review its share dealing policy to identify or mitigate

certain risks which subsequently crystallised in the form of share

1 See Annex A

2 See Annex A.


3

dealing by two PDMRs (“PDMR A” and “PDMR B”) in breach of the

Model Code;

(3)
RB placed an over-reliance on the knowledge and experience of its

PDMRs to comply with the Model Code and to enable it, in turn, to

comply with its regulatory obligations under the Listing Rules and

Listing Principles;

(4)
RB used an informal process for clearance to deal under the Model

Code without keeping adequate records of any such clearance

given, in breach of the Model Code;

(5)
RB provided a copy of the Model Code and an explanatory

document to its PDMRs in July 2005 but failed to follow this up with

regular or structured training or reminders (save in advance of close

periods when it reminded PDMRs of the prohibition on trading at

such times and as part of RB’s annual certification process);

(6)
When RB became aware of the share dealing by the two PDMRs

referred to above, it did not make the necessary notifications to the

market within the required timeframe; and

(7)
The notifications to the market did not include all of the required

information: RB omitted the precise dates of the transactions, the

place of the transactions, the price of the transactions and the dates

when it was notified of the transactions.

2.3.
The purpose of the Model Code is to ensure that PDMRs do not abuse, and

do not place themselves under suspicion of abusing, inside information

that they may be thought to have, especially in periods leading up to an

announcement of the company’s results.

2.4.
Late notification of dealing by PDMRs in the shares of their issuers

undermines the Authority’s strategic objective of ensuring that the

relevant markets function well and its operational objective of protecting

and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system.

2.5.
It is imperative that all listed companies have appropriate and adequate

systems and controls in place to ensure that their PDMRs comply with

their responsibilities under the Model Code and to ensure that the

companies comply with their responsibilities to make timely disclosures to

the market.

2.6.
The Authority therefore imposes a financial penalty on Reckitt Benckiser

Group Plc in the amount of £539,800 (after Stage 1 discount) pursuant to

sections 91(1) and 91(1ZA) of the Act.

2.7.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Authority does not allege that any of the

share dealing by the PDMRs referred to above took place on the basis of

inside information.

3.
DEFINITIONS

3.1.
The definitions below are used in this Final Notice.

“the Act” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000

“the Authority” means the body corporate previously known as the
Financial Services Authority and renamed on 1 April 2013 as the Financial
Conduct Authority

“Close period” means a period of time during which PDMRs are prohibited
from dealing in RB’s shares and is defined in the Model Code

“DEPP” is the Decision Procedures and Penalties Manual, which forms part
of the Authority’s Handbook

“DTR” means the Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules, which form
part of the Authority’s Handbook

“LR” means the Listing Rules, which form part of the Authority’s Handbook

“LSE” means the London Stock Exchange

“the Model Code” means Listing Rule 9 Annex 1 The Model Code (R)

“the new penalty regime” means the financial penalty regime which was in
place from 6 March 2010, as set out in DEPP

“the old penalty regime” means the financial penalty regime which was in
place before 6 March 2010, as set out in DEPP

“PDMR” means a person discharging managerial responsibilities as defined
in section 96B(1) of the Act and the Glossary to the FCA Handbook

5

“RB” means Reckitt Benckiser Plc (company number 00527217) for the
period 1 July 2005 to 22 October 2007, and thereafter Reckitt Benckiser
Group Plc (company number 06270876)

“Top 40 executives” means the 40 most senior executives of RB

“the Tribunal” means the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber)

4.
FACTS AND MATTERS

4.1.
Throughout the relevant period:

(1)
Shares in RB were admitted to listing on the Official List of the UKLA

and admitted to trading on the Main Market of the LSE;

(2)
RB held Premium Listing status and was therefore subject to

Chapter 7 of the Listing Rules (Listing Principles) and Chapter 9 of

the Listing Rules (Continuing Obligations); and

(3)
All members of RB’s Executive Committee were designated as

PDMRs (PDMR B was a member throughout the relevant period and

PDMR A became a member in July 2006).

RB’s share dealing policy


4.2.
RB, from its inception in 1999, adopted the Model Code as its internal

share dealing policy and from that time it required its Top 40 executives

to seek clearance from the CEO before dealing in RB shares. In addition,

RB’s Insider Information Policy states that the Model Code applies to RB’s

Top 40 executives, which includes PDMRs.

4.3.
New rules in effect from 1 July 2005 introduced the concept of PDMRs in

listed companies, and imposed requirements on both PDMRs and

companies to take certain steps to ensure the market was notified of

share dealing by the PDMRs. At that time RB designated all members of

its Executive Committee (nine individuals, including two directors) as

6

4.4.
RB’s share dealing policy during the relevant period:

(1)
Required PDMRs to seek clearance from the CEO in advance of

dealing in RB shares, in accordance with the Model Code;

(2)
Required PDMRs to complete a prescribed form (referred to by RB

as an “Intention to Deal” form) to request clearance, to be

submitted to the company secretary and then on to the CEO for

consideration as to whether to grant clearance;

(3)
Stipulated that dealing by PDMRs must take place within two

business days of clearance being granted or the clearance would

have to be re-validated through the company secretary’s office, in

accordance with the Model Code;

(4)
Required PDMRs to notify RB that the dealing had taken place within

four business days of the date of dealing, in accordance with the

DTR; and

(5)
Prohibited PDMRs from dealing during close periods, in accordance

with the Model Code.

4.5.
The company secretary provided the PDMRs with a copy of the Model

Code and an explanatory document by email on 21 July 2005. RB made

the Model Code generally available to its staff via its intranet. It was also

available via the website of RB’s external share plan administrator.

4.6.
Among other things, the email reminded PDMRs of RB’s policies on inside

information and insiders lists, and notified them that as a result of the

new rules any share dealing in the future would be notified to the market.

Despite a request to acknowledge in writing that they had read the

documents and would comply with the new requirements, two PDMRs

failed to submit an acknowledgement and RB did not follow this up with

them.

4.7.
The company secretary also provided the Top 40 executives with a copy of

the Model Code and the explanatory document on 21 July 2005. PDMR A

was a Top 40 executive at that time. He was designated as a PDMR on 1

7

July 2006 when he became an Executive Vice President and joined RB’s

Executive Committee.

4.8.
In addition, RB required every employee (including PDMRs) on an annual

basis to certify electronically that he/she had reviewed, and would adhere

to, RB’s Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct referred to insider trading

and included a prohibition on employees trading on the basis of inside

information pertaining to RB. Each executive who had to seek pre-

clearance to deal in RB’s shares (which included PDMRs) also had to

provide an additional hard-copy certification.

4.9.
From 1 July 2005 RB did not provide training on the Model Code or the

DTR to its PDMRs to ensure they fully understood the requirements of

each and their responsibilities under each. Although RB sent emails to its

PDMRs during the relevant period in advance of each close period to

remind them of the prohibition on share dealing during such periods, it did

not otherwise proactively remind PDMRs of their responsibilities under the

Model Code or DTR. Instead it relied on (i) the annual certification process

referred to above, and (ii) the knowledge and experience of its PDMRs,

predominantly on the basis that from 1999 its senior executives (including

those later designated as PDMRs) had been required to seek clearance in

advance of share dealing. In RB’s view its PDMRs were already familiar

with the requirements of the new regime introduced in July 2005.

4.10. The vast majority of share dealing by PDMRs related to RB’s share plan

and was processed through the share plan administrator. The company

secretary provided the share plan administrator with a continually updated

list of PDMRs and Top 40 executives who required clearance to deal in

accordance with RB’s share dealing policy. The administrator would

process transactions only on behalf of individuals for whom it had received

written confirmation of clearance to deal. Rather than the PDMRs

themselves notifying RB when share dealing had taken place, the share

plan administrator automatically notified RB and on the basis of this

information the company secretary maintained a running total of each

PDMR’s share portfolio and made any required announcements to the

market.

RB and share dealing in the relevant period

4.11. As part of a scheme of arrangement in the High Court, Reckitt Benckiser

Plc was incorporated into a new publicly listed and traded entity called

Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc. This scheme of arrangement took effect on

23 October 2007. After that date, Reckitt Benckiser Plc ceased to be a

listed trading entity and Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc became the new

publicly traded listed entity. Reckitt Benckiser Plc still exists, but it is a

private company wholly owned by Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc, and is not

listed on any exchange. Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc has agreed to be

liable for any penalty which Reckitt Benckiser Plc might otherwise be liable

for in connection with the findings in this Final Notice.

4.12. PDMR B was a PDMR of Reckitt Benckiser Plc for the first portion of the

relevant period to 22 October 2007 and PDMR A was a PDMR of the same

company from July 2006 until 22 October 2007. Both individuals were

PDMRs of the new entity, Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc, for the remainder

of the relevant period. Their share dealings were in the shares of Reckitt

Benckiser Group Plc.

4.13. On 9 March 2010 the third party custodian of PDMR A’s shares in RB

informed him that a credit facility was available to him and it used shares

held in his brokerage account as security for the facility, although PDMR A

was unaware of this. He was also unaware that using his shares in this

way constituted dealing under the Model Code and that he therefore

should have sought clearance in advance and that he needed to notify RB

afterwards so that RB could make the required notification to the market.

4.14. Although he was unaware that the Model Code applied in the

circumstances, PDMR A issued a written instruction to the custodian to

copy certain documents regarding the use of the shares against the loan

facility to RB. The custodian was unable to comply with the instruction but

did not notify PDMR A of this. He therefore believed that RB had been

informed of his use of the shares as security.

4.15. On three occasions between October 2011 and September 2012, PDMR A

received further shares (in two instances by way of dividends received as

shares) into his brokerage account. The custodian allocated these shares

as further security for the loan. This was a standard term of the loan

agreement although PDMR A was not aware of these transactions, each of

which constituted dealing under the Model Code, with one instance of such

dealing occurring during a close period.

4.16. RB was unaware of the share dealing until September 2012 when PDMR A,

at the suggestion of his custodian, sought advice as to whether the use of

shares as security fell within the Model Code definition of dealing.

4.17. On learning of PDMR A’s share dealing, RB immediately notified the UKLA

and kept it updated (through its broker) but did not notify the market

within the time frame stipulated by the DTR. Rather RB conducted a

reconciliation exercise on the shareholdings of all its PDMRs in an attempt

to identify any other dealings of which it had been unaware, and which

should have been notified to the market.

4.18. As part of its reconciliation exercise RB raised a query with regard to

PDMR B’s shareholding and he confirmed in response, on 4 October 2012,

that he had sold RB shares on 3 and 4 December 2008. RB had been

unaware of this share dealing and therefore had made no announcement

to the market at the relevant time.

4.19. The shares PDMR B sold had been held in the name of a private

foundation in an off-shore account. Although RB’s records do not assist in

this regard, PDMR B believes he sought clearance orally in advance of the

dealing (and that a written request may also have been submitted by him)

and that clearance was granted orally or by email to him. RB has no

record of clearance being sought or granted and, therefore, it is not

possible to verify whether a request was made and, if so, whether such

clearance was given.

4.20. As the vast majority of PDMR B’s share dealing was processed by RB’s

share plan administrator, it appears that he grew accustomed to relying

on it to inform RB of his transactions. The share dealing on 3 and 4

December 2008 was not, however, processed by the share plan

administrator and it therefore fell to PDMR B to notify RB of the

transactions. As RB has no record of clearance being obtained or

notification given, the Authority has been unable to establish whether

PDMR B in fact sought and obtained such clearance and notified RB of his

share dealing on this occasion. The Authority notes that it is possible that

PDMR B on this occasion failed to seek clearance and to notify RB of the

share dealing.

4.21. RB notified the market on 8 October 2012 of PDMR A and PDMR B’s share

dealing. The notification did not contain certain required information: the

precise dates, place and price of the various transactions, and the dates

on which RB became aware of them.

Actions on discovering the breaches of the Model Code

4.22. RB took a number of remedial actions on discovering the breaches of the

(1)
It reminded all of its PDMRs in writing and in person of their

obligations, including that they must inform the company secretary

that they wished to deal in shares before doing so;

(2)
It required all of the PDMRs to provide confirmation that none of

their shareholdings in RB shares was subject to any encumbrances;

(3)
In addition to the annual certification requirement, it added a term

to their contracts of employment making compliance with their

obligations as PDMRs part of their terms and conditions of

employment;

(4)
It arranged for “VIP” markers to be put against all shareholdings of

its PDMRs and Top 40 Executives so that any movements in these

shareholdings are notified to the company secretary immediately for

further investigation (in the event that they are unexpected) and, in

addition, arranged for the company secretary to receive a weekly

report of all these VIP shareholdings;

(5)
It required those PDMRs who hold shares other than in their own

names to provide contact details for the relevant nominee or

custodian and arranged for the company secretary to receive

notifications of any changes in the shareholdings in addition to a

copy of the month end statement provided to the PDMR;

(6)
It required the PDMRs to provide evidence on an annual basis of all

their RB shareholdings so that a reconciliation exercise may be

carried out to identify any anomalies;

(7)
It required each of the PDMRs to confirm, after each dividend

payment they receive, whether they had applied their dividends in

the purchase of additional shares, so that the appropriate

notifications could be made to the market.

5.
FAILINGS

5.1.
The regulatory provisions relevant to this Final Notice are referred to in

5.2.
Under LR9.2.8R a listed company must require every PDMR, including

directors, to comply with the Model Code and must require them to take

all proper and reasonable steps to secure their compliance.

5.3.
The purpose of the Model Code is to ensure that PDMRs do not abuse, and

do not place themselves under suspicion of abusing inside information

that they may be thought to have, especially in periods leading up to an

announcement of the company’s results.

5.4.
In the Authority’s view, it is therefore reasonable to expect a listed

company to take proactive steps to comply with LR9.2.8R and to have in

place procedures, systems and controls that serve to facilitate and

encourage the compliance of its PDMRs with the Model Code which enable

the company to identify and deal promptly with instances of non-

compliance.

5.5.
The Authority accepts that RB provided sufficient information and

guidance to its PDMRs to enable them to understand their obligations

regarding inside information and RB’s policies on insiders and maintaining

lists of insiders. The Authority further accepts that RB issued reminders to

its PDMRs in advance of close periods (when RB’s results would be

announced) that they were prohibited from trading during such periods.

The Authority further accepts that RB’s annual certification process

required all PDMRs to consider whether they adhered to RB’s Code of

Conduct (including its insider trading policy).

5.6.
However, for the following reasons, the Authority is satisfied that RB failed

to comply with LR9.2.8R:

Breaches of the Model Code

(1)
Paragraph 3 of the Model Code states that PDMRs must not deal in

shares of the company without obtaining clearance to deal in

accordance with paragraph 4 of the Model Code.

(2)
The processes in place at RB were such that it was possible for the

PDMRs in certain instances (e.g. trading other than through RB’s

share plan administrator) to deal in RB shares without having

sought clearance (for example, where their shares were held by a

third party custodian and/or the transactions did not concern RB’s

share plan).

(3)
RB placed an over-reliance on the share plan administrator to notify

RB when dealing had taken place.

(4)
PDMR A’s share dealing on four occasions between 9 March 2010

and 4 September 2012 took place without clearance being obtained.

(5)
Although the Authority notes the possibility that he failed to do so,

PDMR B states that he sought and obtained clearance for his share

dealing on 3 and 4 December 2008. It has not been possible to

verify this by reference to documents due to RB’s failure to the keep

adequate records of the same as required by paragraph 6 of the

Ensuring awareness and understanding of the Model Code

(6)
While there was an expectation that the PDMRs would comply with

RB’s share dealing policy, the Model Code and DTR, the importance

and necessity of doing so was not reinforced or emphasised to the

PDMRs on any formal or regular basis during the relevant period

with the exception of RB’s reminders to its PDMRs in advance of

close periods and the annual certification process.

(7)
RB failed to issue any other reminders or training in relation to the

clearance and notification requirements of the Model Code and the

need to comply with it. It therefore failed to ensure that all of its

PDMRs were aware of the application of the Model Code to different

types of share dealing and of their ongoing obligations to comply

with it and the DTR.

(8)
PDMR A was unaware that pledging shares as security for a loan

constitutes “dealing” within the Model Code definition, and was

therefore
unaware
that
the
consequent
requirements
and

obligations regarding clearance and notification also applied.

Reliance on knowledge and experience of PDMRs

(9)
There were few if any requirements imposed on the PDMRs to

ensure they took all proper and reasonable steps to secure their

own compliance with the Model Code. It appears there was an

assumption that the PDMRs were already familiar with, or would

take steps to familiarise themselves with, their obligations under

the Model Code and DTR.

(10) RB placed an over-reliance on the knowledge and experience of its

PDMRs generally and the fact that its senior executives, including a

number of individuals who were subsequently designated as PDMRs,

had since 1999 been required to seek clearance for dealing in RB’s

shares.

Adequacy of share dealing policy and practice

(11) RB’s processes were such that they were inadequate in terms of

enabling it to identify or monitor trading other than through its

share plan administrator and it therefore failed to identify in a

timely manner that breaches of the Model Code had occurred.

(12) RB did not review its PDMR share dealing policy during the relevant

period to identify and mitigate risks arising from it. It therefore

failed to identify the potential risks arising from situations where

PDMRs held shares with custodians, other than in their own names

or where dealing would take place other than through RB’s share

plan administrator.

(13) If a PDMR’s shares were not held in his name or were held on his

behalf by a third party custodian, the apparent safeguards offered

by the share plan administrator (and relied upon by RB) would not

be available because the share plan administrator would not

process dealing in those shares. The lack of written clearance would

not preclude such dealing, and there would be no automatic

confirmation of dealing to RB after it occurred. During the relevant

period RB did not give any or adequate consideration to the risks

posed in such instances and did not have any procedures in place to

deal with them.

(14) These risks crystallised with the result that share dealing by PDMR

A breached the Model Code by his share dealings on four occasions

between 9 March 2010 and 4 September 2012 and it is not possible

to determine on the basis of RB’s records whether PDMR B sought

and obtained clearance and subsequently notified RB of his share

dealing on 3 and 4 December 2008, as he was required to.

(15) Despite the requirement in RB’s share dealing policy for PDMRs to

complete an “Intention to Deal” form when seeking clearance to

deal, it appears that an informal practice was sometimes adopted

whereby PDMRs sought clearance orally instead. PDMR B recalls

seeking clearance during a discussion with the CEO and is unsure

whether a written form was also submitted.

(16) Paragraph 6 of the Model Code stipulates that a listed company

must maintain a record of the response to a request for clearance to

deal, and of any clearance given, and both must be provided to the

PDMR. PDMR B stated that he may have received clearance for the

share dealing in December 2008 either orally or by email although it

has not been possible to confirm which was the case.

5.7.
The failures set out above also constitute breaches of Listing Principles 1

and 2 as they applied during the relevant period as RB:

(1)
Failed to take reasonable steps to enable its directors to understand

fully their responsibilities and obligations under the Model Code, in

breach of Listing Principle 1; and

(2)
Failed to take reasonable steps to maintain adequate procedures,

systems and controls to enable it to comply with its obligations

under LR9.2.8R in breach of Listing Principle 2.

Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules

5.8.
Having eventually become aware of the dealing by the two PDMRs

referred to above, RB failed to make the required notifications to the

market as soon as possible and, in any event, by no later than the end of

the business day following receipt of the information, in breach of

DTR3.1.4R.

5.9.
The notifications which were made to the market did not contain all of the

requisite information, in breach of DTR3.1.5R, as they did not provide the

precise date and place of the dealing, details of the price (a nominal value

was provided in one instance) and the dates RB became aware of the

share dealing.

6.
SANCTION

6.1.
The Authority considered it appropriate in all the circumstances of the

case to impose a financial penalty on Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc.

6.2.
The principal purpose of imposing a financial penalty is to promote high

standards of regulatory and market conduct by deterring persons who

have committed breaches from committing further breaches, helping to

deter other persons from committing similar breaches and demonstrating

generally the benefits of compliant behaviour.

6.3.
The relevant period during which the conduct in issue took place straddles

both the old and new penalty regimes and, as stated at paragraph 2.7 of

the Authority’s Policy Statement 10/4, when calculating a financial penalty

in such cases the Authority will have regard to both regimes.

6.4.
The Authority adopted the following approach in this case:

(1)
Calculated the financial penalty for the breaches from 1 July 2005

to 6 March 2010 by applying the old penalty regime;

(2)
Calculated the financial penalty for the breaches from 6 March 2010

to 8 October 2012 by applying the new penalty regime; and

(3)
Added the penalties calculated under the old and new penalty

regimes to determine the total financial penalty applicable to the

entirety of the relevant period.

Financial penalty under the old penalty regime

6.5.
The Authority’s policy on the imposition of financial penalties relevant to

the misconduct prior to 6 March 2010 is set out in the version of Chapter

6 of DEPP that was in force prior to that date. For the purposes of

calculating the financial penalty under the old penalty regime, the

Authority considered the factors set out below:

(1)
The significant period during which the various breaches occurred,

from 1 July 2005 to 6 March 2010;

(2)
The failings in RB’s internal processes including:

(a)
The absence of any reinforcement of the need to comply with

the share dealing policy and the Model Code;

(b)
The absence of any training to assist understanding of the

requirements of the Model Code;

(c)
The consequent failure to comply with the share dealing

policy, in the form of the breaches of the Model Code which

took place in connection with PDMR B’s share dealings on 3

and 4 December 2008, which went undetected by RB for a

considerable period; and,

(d)
The failure to review the share dealing policy and to put in

place measures to identify and mitigate the risks arising from

it, particularly with regard to shares held by third parties on

(3)
The breaches may undermine public confidence that the affairs of a

premium listed company are in order;

(4)
During the relevant period the Authority published a number of

documents regarding PDMRs and the importance of complying with

the Model Code, including a statement published on 9 January 2009

reminding companies and their PDMRs that any grant of security

over their shareholdings is dealing under the Model Code which

must be notified to the market.

(5)
The need for a strong deterrence with regard to failures in listed

companies’ compliance with the Listing Rules, the Model Code and

the Disclosure and Transparency Rules including failures to require

the compliance of their PDMRs with the Model Code.

6.6.
The Authority also had regard to the following factors:

(1)
The breaches were not deliberate or reckless;

(2)
None of the dealings took place on the basis of inside information;

(3)
RB did not benefit financially from the misconduct;

(4)
RB did not dispute the facts and cooperated fully with the

Authority’s investigation;

(5)
RB did take some steps to make PDMRs aware of the Model Code –

for example, by circulating a copy to them in July 2005 and by

making it available on the intranet – and issued reminders to staff

in advance of close periods reminding them that they were

prohibited from dealing;

(6)
None of the breaches caused any significant loss or risk of loss to

investors, and no financial crime took place as a result of the

breaches;

(7)
No previous disciplinary action has been taken against RB;

(8)
RB immediately brought the breaches to the attention of the UKLA

(via its broker); and

(9)
As noted above, RB took a number of remedial actions on its own

initiative.

6.7.
Having regard to all the circumstances and the factors set out above, the

Authority considered that the appropriate financial penalty under the old

penalty regime was £350,000.

6.8.
As Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc agreed to settle at an early stage of the

investigation it qualified for a 30% (stage 1) discount. The financial

penalty under the old penalty regime is therefore £245,000.

Financial penalty under the new penalty regime

6.9.
Under the new penalty regime the Authority applies a five step framework

to determine the appropriate and proportionate level of financial penalty.

DEPP 6.5A sets out the details of the five-step framework that applies in

respect of financial penalties imposed on firms.

6.10. For the purpose of DEPP6.5A.1, Step 1, the Authority seeks to deprive the

company concerned of the financial benefit derived directly from the

breach. RB did not benefit from the breaches described above. The Step 1

figure is therefore £0.

Step 2: The seriousness of the breach

6.11. For the purpose of DEPP 6.5.A.2, Step 2, the Authority determines a

figure to reflect the seriousness of the breach. This is usually based on a

percentage of the company’s revenue from the relevant product or

business area, unless this is not an appropriate indicator, in which case

the Authority will determine an appropriate alternative.

6.12. In this case revenue is not an appropriate indicator and accordingly the

Authority considered that the appropriate indicator from which to assess

the seriousness of the breaches was the value of the transactions

undertaken by PDMR A between 9 March 2010 and 4 September 2012 as

they fall within the new penalty regime.

6.13. The Authority considered that a 0-20% penalty range was appropriate to

ensure that the penalty properly reflected the seriousness of the breaches

and the relevant levels are as follows:

(1)
Level 1 – 0%

(2)
Level 2 – 5%

(3)
Level 3 – 10%

(4)
Level 4 – 15%

(5)
Level 5 – 20%

6.14. The Authority is of the view that the level of seriousness is level 2, in

particular, because of the following:

(1)
There is potential for breaches such as those in this case to reduce

investor confidence in the markets if the ability of a premium listed

company to adhere to its listing obligations is called into question,

particularly with regard to ensuring the transparency of share

dealing by its PDMRs (DEPP 6.5A.2G(6)(f));

(2)
The length of time during which RB had inadequate procedures,

systems and controls is significant, as is the lapse of time before RB

became aware of the share dealing by the PDMRs (DEPP

6.5A.2G(7)(b));

(3)
The breaches were not deliberate or reckless (DEPP 6.5A.2G(8), (9)

and (11)(f)); and

(4)
There is no information to suggest that there was a significant loss

or risk of loss to investors or other market users (DEPP

6.5A.2G(11)(a)).

6.15. The value of PDMR A’s share transactions was approximately £8,423,807.

Therefore the financial penalty after Step 2 is £421,190.

Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors

6.16. At Step 3 the Authority may increase or decrease the amount of financial

penalty to take account of any mitigating or aggravating factors. In

accordance with DEPP 6.5A.3(1) any adjustment must be made by way of

a percentage of the Step 2 figure.

6.17. There are no aggravating or mitigating factors in this case.

6.18. The penalty after Step 3 is therefore £421,190.

Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence

6.19. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A the Authority may increase the penalty if it

considers that the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the

company that committed the breach, or others, from committing further

or similar breaches.

6.20. The Authority considered that the Step 3 penalty was sufficient to achieve

deterrence. The penalty after Step 4 is therefore £421,190.

Step 5: Settlement discount

6.21. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5A.5, if the Authority and the company concerned

agree the amount of the financial penalty and other terms, the amount of

the penalty will be reduced to reflect the stage at which agreement is

reached, in accordance with DEPP 6.7.

6.22. The Authority and Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc reached agreement at

Stage 1 and therefore a discount of 30% applies to the Step 4 penalty.

6.23. The penalty after Step 5 is therefore £294,800 (rounded down to the

nearest £100).

Conclusion on financial penalty

6.24. The Authority considered that combining the penalties reached under the

old and new penalty regimes produced a financial penalty which was

appropriate and proportionate, and consistent with the Authority’s

statements that the new penalty regime may lead to increased penalty

levels.

6.25. The Authority therefore imposes on Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc a financial

penalty of £539,800 (after the Stage 1 settlement discount and rounding

the figure down to the nearest £100).

7.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Decision maker

7.1.
The decision which gave rise to the obligation to give this Notice was

made by the Settlement Decision Makers.

7.2.
This Final Notice is given under, and in accordance with, section 390 of

the Act.

Manner of and time for Payment

7.3.
The financial penalty must be paid in full by RB to the Authority by no

later than 27 January 2015, 14 days from the date of the Final Notice.

If the financial penalty is not paid

7.4.
If all or any of the financial penalty is outstanding on 28 January 2015,

the Authority may recover the outstanding amount as a debt owed by RB

and due to the Authority.

7.5.
Sections 391(4), 391(6) and 391(7) of the Act apply to the publication of

information about the matter to which this notice relates. Under those

provisions, the Authority must publish such information about the matter

to which this notice relates as the Authority considers appropriate. The

information may be published in such manner as the Authority considers

appropriate. However, the Authority may not publish information if such

publication would, in the opinion of the Authority, be unfair to you or

prejudicial to the interests of consumers or detrimental to the stability of

the UK financial system.

7.6.
The Authority intends to publish such information about the matter to

which this Final Notice relates as it considers appropriate.

Authority contacts

7.7.
For more information concerning this matter generally, contact Dave

Edmondson (direct line: 020 7066 6896 / fax: 020 7066 6897) of the

Enforcement and Market Oversight Division of the Authority.

Financial Conduct Authority, Enforcement and Market Oversight Division


ANNEX A

The regulatory provisions relevant to this Final Notice as they were in force at 8
October 2012 are set out below. Previous versions of the below provisions issued
since 1 July 2005 included certain differences which do not impact on the
contents of this Final Notice. Subsequent changes are not reflected here.

LR7.2.1R - The Listing Principles in force during the relevant period

Listing Principle 1: “A listed company must take reasonable steps to enable its
directors to understand their responsibilities and obligations as directors.”

Listing Principle 2: “A listed company must take reasonable steps to establish
and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to comply with its
obligations.”

LR 9.2 - Compliance with the Model Code

LR9.2.8R: “A listed company must require every person discharging managerial
responsibilities, including directors to comply with the Model Code and to take all
proper and reasonable steps to secure their compliance.”

LR9 Annex 1 - The Model Code (R)

Introduction

“This code imposes restrictions on dealing in the securities of a listed company
beyond those imposed by law. Its purpose is to ensure that persons discharging
managerial responsibilities do not abuse, and do not place themselves under
suspicion of abusing, inside information that they may be thought to have,
especially in periods leading up to an announcement of the company’s results.

Nothing in this code sanctions a breach of section 118 of the Act (market
abuse), the insider dealing requirements of the Criminal Justice Act or any other
relevant legal or regulatory requirements.”

Paragraph 1: Definitions

“1)… (c) dealing includes: (v) using as security or otherwise granting a charge,
lien or other encumbrance over the securities of the company;

…(f) restricted person means a person discharging managerial responsibilities…”

Paragraph 3: Dealing by restricted persons

“3) A restricted person must not deal in any securities of the company without
obtaining clearance to deal in advance in accordance with paragraph 4 of this
code.”

Paragraphs 4-7: Clearance to deal

“4) (a) A director (other than the chairman or chief executive) or company
secretary must not deal in any securities of the company without first notifying
the chairman (or a director designated by the board for this purpose) and
receiving clearance to deal from him.

…. (e) Persons discharging managerial responsibilities (who are not directors)
must not deal in any securities of the company without first notifying the
company secretary or a designated director and receiving clearance to deal from
him.

5) A response to a request for clearance to deal must be given to the relevant
restricted person within five business days of the request being made.

6) The company must maintain a record of the response to any dealing request
made by a restricted person and of any clearance given. A copy of the response
and clearance (if any) must be given to the restricted person concerned.

7) A restricted person who is given clearance to deal in accordance with
paragraph 4 must deal as soon as possible and in any event within two business
days of clearance being received.”

DTR3.1

Notification of transactions by persons discharging managerial
responsibilities

DTR 3.1.2R: “Persons discharging managerial responsibilities and their
connected persons, must notify the issuer in writing of the occurrence of all
transactions conducted on their own account in the shares of the issuer, or
derivatives or any other financial instruments relating to those shares within four
business days of the day on which the transaction occurred. [Note: Article 6(4)
Market Abuse Directive and Article 6(1) 2004/72/EC]”

DTR 3.1.3R: “The notification required by DTR 3.1.2 R must contain the
following information:

(1) the name of the person discharging managerial responsibilities within the
issuer, or, where applicable, the name of the person connected with such a
person;

(2) the reason for responsibility to notify;

(3) the name of the relevant issuer;

(4) a description of the financial instrument;

(5) the nature of the transaction (e.g. acquisition or disposal);

(6) the date and place of the transaction; and

(7) the price and volume of the transaction. [Note: Article 6(3) 2004/72/EC]

Notification of transactions by issuers to a RIS

DTR 3.1.4R: “(1) An issuer must notify a RIS of any information notified to it in
accordance with:

(a) DTR 3.1.2 R (Notification of transactions by persons discharging managerial
responsibilities);

…(2) The notification to a RIS described in paragraph (1) must be made as soon
as possible, and in any event by no later than the end of the business day
following the receipt of the information by the issuer.

DTR 3.1.5R: The notification required by DTR 3.1.4 R must include the
information required by DTR 3.1.3 R together with the date on which the
notification was made to the issuer.”

A “person discharging managerial responsibilities” is (in accordance with section
96B(1) of the Act):

“(a) a director of an issuer:

(i) registered in the United Kingdom that has requested or approved
admission of its shares to trading on a regulated market; or

(ii) not registered in the United Kingdom or any other EEA State but has
requested or approved admission of its shares to trading on a regulated
market and for whom the United Kingdom is its Home Member State; or,

(b) a senior executive of such an issuer who:

(i) has regular access to inside information relating, directly or indirectly,
to the issuer; and

(ii) has power to make managerial decisions affecting the future
development and business prospects of the issuer.”