1

Thomas Ward has referred this Decision Notice to the Upper
Tribunal where the parties will present their respective
cases. Any findings in this Decision Notice are therefore
provisional and reflect the Authority’s belief as to what
occurred and how it considers the behaviour of Thomas
Ward should be characterised. The Tribunal will determine
what (if any) is the appropriate action for the FCA to take,
and will remit the matter to the FCA with such directions as
the Tribunal considers appropriate to give effect to its
determination. The Tribunal’s decision will be made public
on its website. No allegation of wrongdoing is made against
Hennessy Jones Limited, Mark Stephen, James King or City
Administration Limited in this Decision Notice.

DECISION NOTICE

1.
ACTION

1.1.
For the reasons given in this Notice, the Authority has decided to:

(1)
impose on Mr Thomas Ward a financial penalty of £416,558 pursuant to

section 63A(1) of the Act; and

(2)
make an order pursuant to section 56 of the Act prohibiting Mr Ward from

performing any function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by

an authorised person, exempt person or exempt professional firm.

2.
SUMMARY OF REASONS

2.1.
Pensions are a traditional way of saving and investing money in a tax-efficient

way for retirement. The value of someone’s pension can have a significant impact

on their quality of life during retirement and, in some circumstances, may affect

whether they can afford to retire at all. It is of paramount importance that

consumers of financial services can have confidence that persons exerting

significant influence at authorised firms are accountable to the regulator and have

been approved as fit and proper.

2

2.2.
The Authority considers that between 3 July 2014 and 1 February 2016 (the

“Relevant Period”), Mr Ward performed the role of a director of Financial Page Ltd

(“FPL”), an authorised firm. He did so without being approved by the Authority to

perform the CF1 (Director) controlled function (the “Director Function”). Mr Ward

knew, or could reasonably be expected to have known, that he was performing a

role for which he required approval, and knew that if FPL applied for his approval,

the Authority was unlikely to grant the application. By acting as a director of FPL

in these circumstances, Mr Ward acted without integrity. Further, Mr Ward acted

without integrity whilst performing this role.

2.3.
FPL is a small firm that, during the Relevant Period, was authorised by the

Authority with permission to conduct regulated activities, including advising on

investments (excluding Pension Transfers) and arranging (bringing about) deals

in investments. Andrew Page was the sole appointed director and approved

person at FPL during the Relevant Period, with approval to perform the controlled

functions of CF1 (Director), CF10 (Compliance Oversight), CF11 (Money

Laundering Reporting) and CF30 (Customer). Mr Ward was not an appointed

director of FPL or an approved person. He nevertheless played a key role in

directing and managing FPL during the Relevant Period.

2.4.
Between around July 2014 and July 2015, FPL used the Pension Review and

Advice Process. This process was based on a pension switching advice model, the

development of which was initiated and influenced by a third party, HJL. The

Pension Review and Advice Process involved third party service providers

(including HJL) performing functions on FPL’s behalf (the Outsourced Functions),

with little meaningful oversight by FPL. The process was structured to result in

customers who met certain pre-set criteria being advised to switch their pensions

to SIPPs investing in high risk, illiquid assets not regulated by the Authority (the

Loan Notes and, from November 2014, the Bond). HJL had a significant financial

interest in the Loan Notes, which was not disclosed to customers. Mr Ward

introduced Mr Page to HJL and played a critical role in FPL’s adoption and use of

the Pension Review and Advice Process. In agreeing that FPL should adopt the

Pension Review and Advice Process, Mr Ward and Mr Page were motivated by the

prospect of receiving significant personal financial benefit.

2.5.
During the Relevant Period, Mr Ward was a de facto director of FPL. A de facto

director is an individual who acts as a director without having been appointed to

that position validly, or at all. The Authority considers that Mr Ward acted as a

director for the following reasons:

3

(1)
Mr Ward was central to FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension Review and

Advice Process.

(2)
Mr Ward directed Mr Page to carry out tasks or refrain from performing

certain actions, and Mr Page followed these directions. Conversely, Mr Page

rarely provided Mr Ward with instructions or commented on his work. He

also did not raise objections to any actions that Mr Ward took, or directed

that third parties take, during the Relevant Period.

(3)
Mr Ward acted with a degree of autonomy that could only be attributed to

a director, and he and Mr Page kept one another updated.

(4)
Mr Ward controlled FPL’s professional working relationships with key third

parties. He acted as the FPL representative through whom both HJL and

the SIPP Provider communicated with FPL.

(5)
Mr Ward assumed responsibility for a number of key initiatives during the

Relevant Period, which he drove forward with little or no involvement from

Mr Page. He instructed third parties to act on his instructions and signed a

document purportedly in his capacity as a director/authorised signatory of

FPL. He also led negotiations with regard to expanding FPL’s business.

(6)
Mr Ward performed a number of important functions for FPL, including

making payments from its bank account.

(7)
Mr Ward was remunerated on a similar basis to Mr Page, who referred to

Mr Ward as his business partner during an interview with the Authority.

(8)
Mr Ward took steps to control and influence the content and flow of

information that FPL disclosed to the Authority. He encouraged Mr Page to

withhold important information from the Authority and deliberately drafted

communications, and instructed Mr Page to provide communications, to

the Authority that were false and/or misleading.

2.6.
The Authority considers that Mr Ward knew, or could reasonably be expected to

have known, that he was performing a role for which he required approval, and

chose not to seek such approval from the Authority. In particular, Mr Ward:

(1)
has over 30 years’ experience in the UK financial services sector, during

which time he was an approved person for nearly nine years, performing

management or director roles at three regulated firms, including a role in

compliance;

(2)
worked for the SFA, a predecessor body to the Authority, supervising

regulated firms;

(3)
confirmed to the Authority in interview that he understands what

controlled functions are and the need for approval when performing them;

and

(4)
was aware that, if FPL applied for approval for him to perform the Director

Function, the Authority would take into account his disciplinary history and

criminal record, and that there was therefore a material risk that the

Authority would not grant the application.

2.7.
The Authority considers Mr Ward’s misconduct to be especially serious because,

whilst performing the role of a director of FPL, he acted without integrity:

(1)
he had a detailed understanding of the Pension Review and Advice Process

and knew that HJL had a material financial interest in the Loan Notes

which was not disclosed to customers. However, Mr Ward recklessly closed

his mind to the obvious conflict of interest presented by HJL’s involvement

in the Pension Review and Advice Process and its financial interest in the

Loan Notes, and to the risk that unsuitable advice might be given to FPL’s

customers, and was instrumental in FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension

Review and Advice Process;

(2)
he disregarded the interests of FPL’s customers and showed a willingness

to enrich FPL, himself and third parties at their expense;

(3)
he regularly requested approval from HJL for his actions during the

Relevant Period. He was also prepared to take instructions from HJL in

relation to aspects of FPL’s business over which HJL should not have had

influence, including in relation to the investment of FPL’s customers’

pensions. By acting in this way, Mr Ward placed the interests of HJL above

the interests of FPL’s customers; and

(4)
he took deliberate steps to control and influence the content and flow of

information that FPL disclosed to the Authority. He encouraged Mr Page to

withhold important information from the Authority and deliberately drafted

communications, and instructed Mr Page to provide communications to the

Authority, that were false and/or misleading. If the information provided to

the Authority had been accurate and not misleading, the Authority would

5

have intervened in FPL’s business earlier and the potential impact upon

FPL’s customers would have been reduced.

2.8.
Section 63A(1) of the Act gives the Authority the power to impose a penalty on a

person that knowingly performs, or could reasonably be expected to have known

that they were performing, a controlled function without approval. For the reasons

set out above, the Authority considers that, during the Relevant Period, Mr Ward

acted as a de facto director of FPL, that he thereby performed the Director

Function, and that he knew, or could reasonably be expected to have known, that

he was doing so without approval from the Authority.

2.9.
The Authority considers that it is appropriate to impose a significant financial

penalty on Mr Ward. This will send a clear deterrent message to those who think

they can avoid the regulatory consequences of their actions by performing

controlled functions without the necessary approval. It also supports the

Authority’s regulatory objective of securing an appropriate degree of protection for

consumers.

2.10. The Authority therefore has decided to impose a financial penalty on Mr Ward in

the amount of £416,558 pursuant to section 63A(1) of the Act.

2.11. Further, the Authority considers that Mr Ward is not a fit and proper person to

perform any function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by an

authorised person, exempt person or exempt professional firm. Accordingly, the

Authority has decided to make a prohibition order pursuant to section 56 of the

Act.

3.
DEFINITIONS

3.1.
The definitions below are used in this Notice.

“the Act” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000

“the Authority” means the body corporate previously known as the Financial

Services Authority and renamed on 1 April 2013 as the Financial Conduct

the “Bond” means the 10-year bond issued by an unquoted UK company

incorporated in November 2014 into which FPL's customers’ pensions were

invested

6

“CAL” means City Administration Limited, the third party service provider that

performed the Outsourced Functions on behalf of FPL between October 2014 and

“COBS” means the Conduct of Business Sourcebook, part of the Handbook

“DEPP” means the Authority’s Decision Procedure and Penalties manual, part of

the Handbook

“Director Function” means the CF1 (Director) controlled function which, in

accordance with SUP 10A.6.7R, in respect of a firm that is a body corporate (other

than a limited liability partnership), is the function of acting in the capacity of a

director (other than a non-executive director) of that firm

“EG” means the Authority’s Enforcement Guide

“FPL” means Financial Page Ltd

“FSCS” means the Financial Services Compensation Scheme

the “Handbook” means the Authority’s Handbook of rules and guidance

“HJL” means Hennessy Jones Limited, now known as Reditum Capital Limited. FPL

signed a contract with HJL on 6 December 2013 for HJL to become an IAR of FPL,

and HJL was registered with the Authority as such between 11 September 2014

and 2 July 2015. HJL introduced customers to FPL between July 2014 and July

2015. HJL also performed the Outsourced Functions on behalf of FPL between July

2014 and October 2014

“IAR” means Introducer Appointed Representative

“Loan Notes” means the investments, which involved 10-year loans to funds

incorporated in Mauritius and managed by a Mauritian company, into which FPL’s

customers’ pensions were invested

“Mr Page” means Andrew Mark Thomas Page

“Mr Ward” means Thomas Henry Ward

“Outsourced Functions” means the functions outsourced by FPL to the Service

Providers under the Pension Review and Advice Process, including the functions

described at paragraph 4.3(2) of this Notice (but not including the functions

carried out by HJL in its role as introducer)

7

“Pension Review and Advice Process” means the process described in paragraph

4.3 of this Notice that FPL used between July 2014 and 10 July 2015

“Pension Switch” means the movement of funds from one personal pension

scheme to another where no safeguarded benefits are involved

“Pension Transfer” has the meaning given in the Handbook, and includes the

movement of funds from an occupational pension scheme to a personal pension

scheme (in this case a SIPP)

“Relevant Period” means 3 July 2014 to 1 February 2016

“Service Providers” means collectively HJL and CAL

“SFA” means Securities and Futures Authority

“SIPP” means self-invested personal pension

“SIPP Provider” means the firm providing the SIPP account

“Software” means the automated client management system that was used by the

Service Providers during the Pension Review and Advice Process to manage

customer information and generate Suitability Reports for customers

“Suitability Report” means the report which a firm must provide to its client under

COBS 9.4 which, among other things, must explain why the firm has concluded

that a recommended transaction is suitable for the client

“SUP” means the Supervision manual, part of the Handbook

“the Tribunal” means the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber)

“Underlying Investments” means the Loan Notes and/or the Bond

“the Warning Notice” means the warning notice given to Mr Ward dated 5 March

4.
FACTS AND MATTERS

4.1.
FPL is a small firm based in Oswestry, Shropshire. It was directly authorised by

the Authority on 3 July 2014 with permission to conduct regulated activities,

including advising on investments (excluding Pension Transfers) and arranging

(bringing about) deals in investments. On the same date, Mr Page was approved

by the Authority to perform the controlled functions of CF1 (Director), CF10

(Compliance
Oversight),
CF11
(Money
Laundering
Reporting) and CF30

(Customer).

4.2.
Mr Ward’s job title at FPL during the Relevant Period was Head of Operations.

However, FPL did not apply to the Authority for his approval and he was not

approved to perform any controlled functions on behalf of FPL during the Relevant

Period.

4.3.
During the Relevant Period, FPL used the Pension Review and Advice Process.

This process was based on a pension switching advice model, the development of

which was initiated and influenced by HJL. The Pension Review and Advice

(1)
involved HJL sourcing leads from lead generation companies and

introducing customers to the Firm;

(2)
involved the Service Providers being provided with FPL’s logo and

letterhead and the electronic signature of Mr Page (a qualified financial

adviser) so that they could perform functions on FPL’s behalf. The

Outsourced Functions included:

(a)
contacting customers that had been introduced to FPL by HJL;

(b)
conducting fact-finds with these customers;

(c)
inputting the results of those fact-finds into the Software, an

automated client management system designed to produce

Suitability Reports;

(d)
sending the Suitability Reports to the customers; and

(e)
calling the customers to ask whether they wished to proceed in

accordance with FPL’s advice;

(3)
was structured to result in customers who met certain pre-set criteria

approved by FPL being advised to switch their pensions to SIPPs investing

in high risk, illiquid assets not regulated by the Authority (the Loan Notes

and, from November 2014, the Bond). HJL received 5% of the sums

invested in the Loan Notes, which was not disclosed to customers; and

(4)
involved little meaningful oversight by FPL of HJL’s activities as an

introducer and of the Service Providers’ performance of the Outsourced

Functions. FPL had little contact with customers, had no involvement in

generating or issuing Suitability Reports to customers and did not carry out

any substantive review of the advice provided to customers, whether

before Suitability Reports were sent to customers or at all.

4.4.
Mr Page and Mr Ward agreed that FPL should adopt the Pension Review and

Advice Process in March 2014 and the first recommendations were made to FPL’s

customers to switch or transfer their pensions under that process in August 2014.

HJL performed the Outsourced Functions on behalf of FPL between July 2014 and

October 2014, and CAL performed the Outsourced Functions on behalf of FPL

between October 2014 and July 2015.

4.5.
During the Relevant Period, FPL advised 860 customers to switch or transfer their

pension funds to SIPPs investing in the Underlying Investments through the

Pension Review and Advice Process. This amounted to approximately £31 million

of customer funds.

4.6.
On 16 July 2017 FPL entered liquidation. The FSCS declared FPL in default on 22

March 2017 and is investigating claims made by FPL’s customers. As at 17 May

2018, the FSCS had paid over £1.7 million in compensation to FPL customers as a

result of loss suffered upon transferring or switching their pensions to the

Underlying Investments.

Mr Ward’s disciplinary history

4.7.
Mr Ward was previously a director and an approved person at a large financial

services group, where he was employed as Head of Operations. He was dismissed

from that role in October 1999 following an internal disciplinary process, the

content of which later became the subject of criminal proceedings. In 2001, he

was prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned for six counts of obtaining a money

transfer by deception.

4.8.
The SFA initiated an investigation into Mr Ward’s conduct and subsequently

commenced proceedings to expel Mr Ward from its register. The case was

transferred to the Authority following the changes to the regulatory structure

brought about by the implementation of the Act. The Authority considered taking

action to prohibit Mr Ward on the grounds that his criminal conviction and the

surrounding circumstances indicated that he was dishonest and unfit to carry out

functions in relation to any regulated activity. However, having considered the

matter, the Authority concluded that Mr Ward was unlikely ever to be granted

approved person status in the future (in the event that an application was made

for his approval) and therefore that the risk he posed to consumers was low.

4.9.
On 22 April 2002, the Authority wrote to Mr Ward to inform him that, although it

had decided to take no further action, it held on record the documentation

relating to the SFA investigation and that, in the event that an application was

made for his approval to carry out any activity, those matters would be

considered and taken into account.

Mr Ward’s role in FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension Review and

4.10. Mr Ward introduced Mr Page to HJL in December 2013 and after that time played

a critical role in FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension Review and Advice Process.

4.11. On 8 March 2014, Mr Ward informed Mr Page in an email that HJL had a pension

switching advice model. He explained that, were FPL to apply this model, he

would provide Mr Page with packaged customer files and all supporting

documentation and that all Mr Page would then be required to do was to put FPL’s

name to the advice that would be provided to customers. The customer files and

supporting documentation were to be provided to Mr Ward by HJL. Mr Ward told

Mr Page that the business could generate ‘ridiculous’ amounts of income and Mr

Page responded that this had ‘just made my day’.

4.12. Mr Page and Mr Ward subsequently agreed that FPL should adopt this pension

switching advice model (as the Pension Review and Advice Process). In order to

do so, FPL needed to be directly authorised by the Authority and so Mr Page

submitted an application for FPL’s authorisation, which was received by the

Authority on 9 April 2014. FPL started to use the Pension Review and Advice

Process once its application was approved by the Authority, in July 2014.

4.13. Once Mr Page and Mr Ward had agreed that FPL should adopt the Pension Review

and Advice Process, Mr Ward was heavily involved in the preparations undertaken

by FPL to start to use the process. For example, he met the designer of the

Software, informed the SIPP Provider that FPL would commence submission of

advised pension switching cases imminently, reviewed documents to be used in

the process and acted as the conduit between Mr Page and HJL. Once FPL had

adopted the Pension Review and Advice Process, Mr Ward had an important role

in FPL’s use of the process, in particular through his control and management of

FPL’s interactions with HJL and the SIPP Provider (see paragraph 4.16 below).

4.14. FPL received from the SIPP Provider an advice fee of 3% of a customer’s pension

assets when a Pension Switch or Pension Transfer to the SIPP was completed. FPL

would then pay the relevant Service Provider a proportion of the fees for its role in

the Pension Review and Advice Process. For any customers who opted to have

ongoing servicing, FPL would also receive an annual fee of up to 0.5% of the

customer’s pension assets paid by the SIPP Provider from the customer’s pension

assets. Between September 2014 and January 2016, FPL received £1,154,692 in

advice/ongoing servicing fees. FPL paid over £52,000 of its fees to HJL and over

£679,000 to CAL for their roles in the Pension Review and Advice Process.

Mr Ward’s role at FPL

4.15. In interview with the Authority, Mr Ward gave several different descriptions of his

role at FPL, stating that he was a consultant, secretary, administrator or junior

clerk. However, the Authority considers that Mr Ward in fact exerted significant

influence and control over FPL and assumed responsibility for a number of the key

aspects of FPL’s business. He was also remunerated on a similar basis to Mr Page,

the only formally appointed director, who referred to Mr Ward as his business

partner during an interview with the Authority. As such the Authority considers

that Mr Ward was a de facto director of FPL.

4.16. Mr Ward controlled and managed FPL’s interactions with HJL and the SIPP

Provider. The matters described below demonstrate the importance of the role he

performed:

(1)
communications between FPL and key individuals at HJL were conducted

almost exclusively by Mr Ward (and in many instances Mr Page was not

copied into correspondence);

(2)
the SIPP Provider communicated primarily with Mr Ward and was

accustomed to acting on his instructions. Mr Ward led negotiations with the

SIPP Provider in relation to a number of matters, including:

a)
the novation of customers to FPL from another financial adviser that

had adopted the same pension switching advice model; he also

drafted the novation letters and offered to guide the SIPP Provider

through the process;

b)
the frequency and format of servicing fees charged to customers;

and

c)
the reinvestment of customers’ investment returns in the Loan

Notes;

(3)
Mr Ward led negotiations with the SIPP Provider and HJL about proposals

to
switch
customers’
investments
between
different
Underlying

Investments;

(4)
on 10 April 2015, Mr Ward agreed with the SIPP Provider that it would act

on his instructions regarding the investment of customers’ funds. He later

personally gave the instruction to transfer customers’ funds into the Bond;

and

(5)
Mr Ward demanded that any issues the SIPP Provider identified relating to

FPL’s customers should be directed to him, and the SIPP Provider did in

fact contact Mr Ward, rather than Mr Page, when issues arose.

4.17. Mr Ward assumed responsibility for a number of FPL’s key business initiatives

during the Relevant Period and performed a number of important functions. In

particular, he:

(1)
made payments from FPL’s bank account on at least two occasions;

(2)
led discussions with other SIPP providers with a view to using their

services and expanding FPL’s business;

(3)
signed a document in what was purported to be his capacity as a

director/authorised signatory of FPL;

(4)
discussed compliance issues with FPL’s compliance consultant, including in

relation to the advice provided to customers. He also informed the

compliance consultant that it could report back to either him or Mr Page;

(5)
sat on FPL’s three-member investment committee, which Mr Page

explained in interview made decisions on ‘everything really about what we

were trying to do’;

(6)
contacted and negotiated with third party financial advisers in an effort to

expand the business; and

(7)
attended important meetings with Mr Page and led a number of them on

FPL’s behalf.

4.18. There is little contemporaneous evidence of Mr Ward seeking or receiving

instructions from Mr Page. In fact, Mr Page did not comment on or raise

objections to any actions that Mr Ward took, or directed that third parties take,

during the Relevant Period. The Authority considers that, during the Relevant

Period, Mr Ward exerted a level of influence and control over Mr Page and FPL that

could only have been exerted by a director. In particular, Mr Ward:

(1)
frequently instructed Mr Page to carry out tasks and on occasion told him

not to do things that Mr Page was planning to do – such as sending a

pension valuation to a customer;

(2)
drafted correspondence to FPL’s compliance consultant and directed Mr

Page to send it for him;

(3)
instructed Mr Page to ensure that money started to flow into another

business with ties to HJL so that FPL did not upset its relationship with

HJL; and

(4)
dominated the conversation during meetings between Mr Ward, Mr Page

and the Authority.

4.19. Mr Ward’s role was also reflected in the way he was remunerated. In particular,

he was remunerated on a similar basis to Mr Page in that:

(1)
after paying the Service Providers for their role in the Pension Review and

Advice Process, 50% of the fees retained by FPL were paid to Mr Ward. The

remaining 50% were paid to Mr Page, after a deduction to meet FPL’s

running costs;

(2)
FPL received a loan of £25,000 which was shared equally between Mr Page

and Mr Ward with the intention that the loan would be repaid by

commissions generated by FPL; and

(3)
Mr Page and Mr Ward considered buying identical luxury company cars that

would be funded by FPL. However, it was not financially viable for FPL to

do so for tax purposes due to the size and cost of the car proposed by Mr

4.20. In addition to Mr Ward’s remuneration, a purported agreement between FPL and

Mr Ward for the transfer of FPL’s clients to Mr Ward further suggests that Mr

Ward’s status at the firm was not that of a secretary, administrator or junior clerk.

The copy of the agreement seen by the Authority is in draft. It is dated 14

January 2015 and is unsigned, but Mr Page subsequently indicated that both he

and Mr Ward considered it to be binding. The agreement states that in the event

of a cessation of FPL’s business, including if FPL entered administration, Mr Ward

would have “custodianship” of all FPL customers with fund values in their SIPPs

over £50,000 and that Mr Ward could introduce those customers to an alternative

financial adviser.

Mr Ward’s knowledge/awareness that he was undertaking a controlled

function which required him to be approved

4.21. Mr Ward has over 30 years’ experience of working in the financial services sector

in the UK. This experience includes working as an approved person for nearly nine

years, performing management or director roles at three regulated firms,

including a role with responsibilities for compliance. He also worked at the SFA,

supervising regulated firms, and confirmed to the Authority in interview that he

understands what controlled functions are and the need for approval when

performing them.

4.22. For the reasons described in paragraphs 4.15 to 4.20 above, the Authority

considers that Mr Ward performed the role of a director in relation to FPL’s

business. Mr Ward was aware that Mr Page was the principal of FPL and that he

could not be seen by the Authority to make decisions or control activities. In

certain respects, Mr Ward was careful to influence matters behind the scenes, as

is apparent from his involvement in FPL’s communications with the Authority (see

paragraphs 4.30 to 4.42 below). However, in other aspects of FPL’s business he

was less guarded and prepared to direct and manage matters more openly, such

as his communications and directions to the SIPP Provider on behalf of FPL.

4.23. Had FPL applied to the Authority for Mr Ward to be approved to perform the

Director Function, there was a material risk that the Authority would not have

granted the application given Mr Ward’s disciplinary history (described at

paragraphs 4.7 to 4.9 above), and in particular given his criminal conviction,

which arose from the performance of his role at another financial services firm.

The Authority considers that Mr Ward must have been aware of this risk in light of

his previous work experience and the letter he received from the Authority on 22

April 2002.

4.24. For the above reasons, the Authority considers that during the Relevant Period, Mr

Ward knew, or could reasonably be expected to have known, that he was

performing the Director Function and that he chose not to seek approval because

he knew he was unlikely to be approved for such a role. In performing the

Director Function in such circumstances, Mr Ward acted without integrity.

Lack of regard for customers’ interests

4.25. Throughout the Relevant Period, Mr Ward disregarded the interests of FPL’s

customers. He was aware that HJL had initiated and influenced the development

of the pension switching advice model (which FPL adopted as the Pension Review

and Advice Process) and that the process involved the Service Providers

performing the Outsourced Functions without any meaningful involvement or

adequate oversight by FPL. He was also aware that HJL had a material financial

interest in the Loan Notes, that this was not disclosed to customers, and that the

Pension Review and Advice Process was structured to result in customers being

advised to switch their pensions to SIPPs investing in the Underlying Investments.

However, he closed his mind to the obvious conflict of interest presented by HJL’s

key role in the Pension Review and Advice Process and its financial interest in the

Loan Notes, and to the risk that unsuitable advice might be given to FPL’s

customers, and was instrumental in FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension Review

and Advice Process.

4.26. Mr Ward had sight of pension alerts issued by the Authority which suggested that

the Pension Review and Advice Process was not compliant with the Authority’s

rules. Rather than use this as an opportunity to review the Pension Review and

Advice Process, he deliberately disregarded the alerts and stated to HJL that they

were ‘meaningless’ for FPL.

4.27. Mr Ward took instructions, and sought approval, from HJL for a number of the

actions that were then taken by FPL, including in relation to the way in which

FPL’s customers’ pension savings should be invested. By acting in this way, Mr

Ward placed the interests of HJL above the interests of FPL’s customers. In

particular, Mr Ward:

(1)
took instructions from HJL in relation to the novation of customers to FPL

from another financial adviser that had adopted the same pension

switching advice model;

(2)
asked HJL to approve his proposal to transfer customers’ investments from

the Loan Notes to other investments (including the Bond), in a number of

which HJL also had a material financial interest; and

(3)
gave HJL a say in how FPL’s customers’ funds should be allocated and

demonstrated that he was prepared to follow HJL’s instructions.

4.28. Mr Ward played a key role, including reviewing draft communications, in FPL’s

decision to use an ‘opt out’ letter to seek customers’ consent to transfer the cash

in their SIPPs to the Underlying Investments and to reinvest customers’ interest

payments from the Underlying Investments. FPL used an ‘opt-out’ letter even

though not all of FPL’s customers had ongoing servicing arrangements with FPL.

FPL has only been able to provide the Authority with a draft of this letter. The

draft letter informed customers that they could contact FPL if they required

further advice on the course of action proposed by FPL, but that if they were

happy with FPL’s proposal, they did not need to do anything and FPL would invest

their cash/interest accordingly.

4.29. Notwithstanding efforts by FPL to contact customers to check receipt, it was

obvious that some customers might not see the ‘opt out’ letters, or realise that

they needed to respond if they did not consent to the course of action proposed

by FPL in the letters. However, Mr Ward ignored the interests of customers, in

particular the risk that cash and interest in customers’ pensions would be invested

in the Underlying Investments without customers’ consent.

Misleading the Authority

4.30. Mr Ward encouraged Mr Page to mislead the Authority and was involved in the

provision of misleading information to the Authority on more than one occasion.

20 August 2014 New Business Register

4.31. The Authority contacted Mr Page by telephone and email on 7 August 2014. In the

email, the Authority drew Mr Page’s attention to two alerts that had been issued

by the Authority relating to pension switches and SIPPs. Mr Page was also asked

in the email to provide a detailed new business register setting out “all business”

the firm had arranged via a SIPP, including confirmation of whether advice had

been provided. Mr Page forwarded the email to Mr Ward five minutes after

receiving it.

4.32. On 18 August 2014, Mr Page emailed Mr Ward a list of 15 customers to whom

advice had been given in FPL’s name under the Pension Review and Advice

Process and in respect of whom the application to switch/transfer had been

received by the SIPP Provider. Despite this, on 19 August 2014, Mr Ward drafted

a new business register, for provision to the Authority, which contained only six

entries in total (along with some details of ongoing advice given to a seventh

customer). None of the entries on the draft new business register related to

advice given to customers under the Pension Review and Advice Process. Instead

they related only to advice which had been provided by Mr Page between

September 2012 and March 2014 (before FPL was directly authorised by the

Authority).

4.33. It was clear from the Authority’s correspondence with Mr Page, including the

email containing its request for information and links to the two alerts (which was

forwarded to Mr Ward), that the Authority was interested in FPL’s advice in

relation to SIPPs. However, the Authority considers that Mr Ward deliberately

omitted relevant information from the draft new business register in an attempt to

mislead the Authority about the type of business the firm was conducting, and in

particular to prevent the Authority from finding out that customers were being

advised to switch their pensions to SIPPs investing in the Loan Notes. Mr Page,

after making minor amendments to the six entries and removing the information

relating to the seventh customer, provided the Authority with the new business

register on 20 August 2014.

4.34. Mr Ward instructed Mr Page not to tell the Authority that one of the companies

providing leads to HJL was apparently cold calling prospective customers.

4.35. On 1 September 2014 the Authority called Mr Page to discuss information that the

Authority had received which suggested that customers were being cold called on

4.36. During the course of his call with the Authority, Mr Page emailed Mr Ward to ask

about a lead generation company mentioned by the Authority. Mr Ward sent

several emails in reply confirming that the lead generation company provided

leads to HJL. Mr Ward’s emails included the following:

(1)
“Don’t know [the lead generation company]. Checking now but I would say

(2)
“They are a lead provider and provide leads to [HJL]. Not direct to us – so

don’t use this info yet!!!!! I am still digging!!!!”

(3)
“WE have not – our introducer may have – again im [sic] still digging so

don’t open to them yet!!!!!”

(4)
“This is ok I believe. As its [sic] not us so we can deflect the flak!!!! If

Needed!!!! But its [sic] not life threatening issue I don’t think mate!!!! Are

they being bastards or ok?”

(5)
“…[the lead generation company] DO COLD CALL Clients/prospects

apparently.”

(6)
“We can say that we will check with our introducer [HJL] to see if they use

this company and if they do we will investigate further and if we do not

receive an acceptable reply we will drop them immediately.”

(7)
“But try and work it that [HJL] use a large number of lead providers and

we don’t always have details of all of them! DONT [sic] SAY THAT THEY

COLD CALL MATE.”

4.37. In sending these emails, Mr Ward deliberately sought to influence the provision of

information by FPL to the Authority. He did so by instructing Mr Page to withhold

the fact that a firm generating leads on behalf of FPL had apparently been cold

calling customers. The Authority considers that, given his experience in financial

services, Mr Ward must have known that the Authority would have expected to be

told this information, especially in the context of a call from the Authority about a

particular lead generation company.

4.38. Mr Page confirmed to the Authority during the telephone call that the lead

generation company did introduce customers to HJL, but he did not tell the

Authority, either during the call or afterwards, that it apparently cold called.

Further, the Authority has not been provided with any evidence to suggest that Mr

Ward or Mr Page took any steps to confirm whether the lead generation company

mentioned by the Authority did actually cold call or to ensure that it did not do so.

5 September 2014 email

4.39. On 3 September 2014, the Authority emailed Mr Page a link to an alert issued by

the Authority that advised customers to ignore any cold calls from firms offering a

free pension review. The alert warned that these reviews are typically used to

persuade customers to move their pensions into SIPPs invested in unregulated

investments. On the same day, the Authority sent Mr Page an email containing

links to the two alerts that it had drawn to his attention on 7 August 2014. Mr

Page forwarded both of these emails to Mr Ward.

4.40. On 4 September 2014, Mr Ward prepared a draft email for Mr Page to send to the

Authority. Mr Ward’s draft email commented on the three alerts that the Authority

had drawn to Mr Page’s attention. As Mr Ward knew, the draft email contained

misleading information about the business model FPL had adopted (i.e. the

Pension Review and Advice Process). Mr Page then sent the email to the Authority

on 5 September 2014, having made only minor and cosmetic amendments to Mr

Ward’s draft.

4.41. The email was misleading as it:

(1)
stated that FPL did not use lead generation companies as part of its

business model and, despite the alert drawn to Mr Page’s attention on 3

September 2014 which specifically mentioned cold calling concerns, failed

to mention that one of HJL’s lead generators apparently used cold calling;

(2)
stated that FPL did not use the services of unauthorised firms when Mr

Ward knew that HJL was not authorised, at the time was not an IAR of FPL,

and played an important role in the Pension Review and Advice Process;

(3)
stated that FPL did not consider investments in unregulated products such

as overseas property, forestry or store pods. While FPL did not consider the

suitability of investing in these products directly, Mr Ward knew that the

Pension Review and Advice Process was structured to result in customers

being advised to switch their pensions to SIPPs investing in the Loan

Notes, which were issued by a company in Mauritius, and that the Loan

Notes were not regulated by the Authority; and

(4)
gave the impression that Mr Page reviewed customers’ circumstances

before issuing initial pension review reports and that FPL followed this up

with a telephone call to establish whether a customer would like to

proceed, when in fact these functions at that time were performed by HJL

with little oversight from Mr Page.

4.42. As a result of the information provided to the Authority, in August and September

2014 the Authority considered FPL to be a ‘low risk’ firm and FPL was not

scheduled for further contact for a number of months. If the information provided

to the Authority had been accurate and not misleading, the Authority would have

asked for further information about FPL’s pension advice process and the Loan

Notes, and would have intervened at an earlier time.

5.
FAILINGS

5.1.
The statutory and regulatory provisions relevant to this Notice are referred to in

Performance of a controlled function without approval

5.2.
On the basis of the facts and matters described above, the Authority considers

that during the Relevant Period Mr Ward knowingly performed, or had such

knowledge and experience that he could reasonably be expected to have known

that he was performing, the Director Function without approval.

5.3.
The Authority considers that Mr Ward was a de facto director of FPL as he:

(1)
was central to FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension Review and Advice

Process;

(2)
influenced the actions of Mr Page. He directed Mr Page to carry out tasks or

refrain from performing certain actions. Mr Page followed these directions.

Conversely, Mr Page rarely provided Mr Ward with instructions or

commented on his work and did not raise objections to actions taken by Mr

Ward (whether directly or through third parties);

(3)
acted with a degree of autonomy that could only be attributed to a

director, and he and Mr Page kept one another updated;

(4)
managed and controlled FPL’s professional relationships with key third

parties, including HJL and the SIPP Provider. In particular, Mr Ward

personally instructed the SIPP Provider to transfer customer funds into the

Bond and acted as the FPL representative through whom both HJL and the

SIPP Provider communicated with FPL;

(5)
took responsibility for key initiatives, including leading negotiations to

expand FPL’s business, with little or no involvement from Mr Page. He

instructed third parties to act on his instructions and signed a document

purportedly in his capacity as a director/authorised signatory;

(6)
performed a number of important functions for FPL, including making

payments from its bank account;

(7)
was remunerated on a similar basis to Mr Page, who referred to Mr Ward

as his business partner; and

(8)
took steps to control and influence the content and flow of information to

the Authority on a number of occasions.

5.4.
The Authority considers that Mr Ward knew, or could reasonably be expected to

have known, that he was performing a role which required approval, given his

experience and understanding of the Authority’s requirements, and that he chose

not to seek approval from the Authority for such a role. In particular, Mr Ward:

(1)
was an approved person for nearly nine years, performing management or

director roles at three regulated firms, including a role in compliance;

(2)
worked for the SFA, during which time he supervised regulated firms;

(3)
confirmed to the Authority in interview that he understands what

controlled functions are and the need for approval when performing them;

(4)
was aware that the SFA had initiated proceedings to expel him from its

register and that the Authority had considered prohibiting him from

performing functions in relation to any regulated activity; and

(5)
was aware that, if FPL applied for approval for him to perform a controlled

function, the Authority would take into account his disciplinary history and

criminal record, and that there was therefore a material risk that the

application would not be successful.

Lack of fitness and propriety

5.5.
The Authority considers that Mr Ward demonstrated a lack of integrity during the

Relevant Period and that, as a result, he is not a fit and proper person to perform

any function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by an authorised

person, exempt person or exempt professional firm. In particular, Mr Ward:

(1)
knowingly performed, or had such knowledge and experience that he could

reasonably be expected to have known that he was performing, the

Director Function without approval, and chose not to seek such approval

from the Authority, as referred to above;

(2)
recklessly closed his mind to the obvious conflict of interest presented by

HJL’s key role in the Pension Review and Advice Process and its significant

financial interest in the Loan Notes, and to the risk that unsuitable advice

might be given to FPL’s customers, and was instrumental in FPL’s adoption

and use of the Pension Review and Advice Process;

(3)
disregarded the interests of FPL’s customers and showed a willingness to

enrich FPL, himself and third parties at their expense;

(4)
placed the interests of HJL above the interests of FPL’s customers. He took

instructions from HJL, and in practice regularly requested approval from

HJL, for his actions during the Relevant Period, including in relation to

aspects of FPL’s business over which HJL should not have had influence

(for example, in relation to where and in what proportions FPL’s customers’

pensions should be invested); and

(5)
took deliberate steps to control and influence the content and flow of

information that FPL disclosed to the Authority. Mr Ward encouraged Mr

Page to withhold important information from the Authority and deliberately

drafted
communications,
and
instructed
Mr
Page
to
provide

communications to the Authority, that were false and/or misleading.

6.
SANCTION

6.1.
The Authority considers it is appropriate to impose a penalty on Mr Ward under

section 63A(1) of the Act in respect of the fact that he knowingly performed, or

could reasonably be expected to have known that he was performing, a controlled

function without approval.

6.2.
The Authority’s policy for imposing a financial penalty is set out in Chapter 6 of

DEPP. In respect of conduct occurring on or after 6 March 2010, the Authority

applies a five-step framework to determine the appropriate level of financial

penalty. DEPP 6.5B sets out the details of the five-step penalty framework that

applies in respect of financial penalties imposed upon individuals in non-market

abuse cases.

Step 1: disgorgement

6.3.
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.1G, at Step 1 the Authority seeks to deprive an individual

of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach where it is practicable to

quantify this.

6.4.
Mr Ward derived direct financial benefit from the advice fees and ongoing

servicing fees generated from customers who switched their pensions to SIPPs

investing in the Underlying Investments. The amount received by Mr Ward during

the Relevant Period totalled £214,878. In addition, Mr Ward received £33,225

after the Relevant Period which the Authority considers is directly attributable to

Mr Ward’s misconduct during the Relevant Period.

6.5.
The Authority has charged interest on Mr Ward’s benefit at 8% per year from

receipt to the date of this Notice, amounting to £69,254.

6.6.
Step 1 is therefore £317,358.

Step 2: the seriousness of the breach

6.7.
Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.2G, at Step 2 the Authority determines a figure that

reflects the seriousness of the breach. That figure is based on a percentage of the

individual’s relevant income. The individual’s relevant income is the gross

amount of all benefits received by the individual from the employment in

connection with which the breach occurred, and for the period of the breach.

6.8.
The period of Mr Ward’s breach was from 3 July 2014 to 1 February 2016. The

Authority considers Mr Ward’s relevant income for this period to be £214,878. As

noted above, Mr Ward received £33,225 after the Relevant Period which the

Authority considers is directly attributable to Mr Ward’s misconduct during the

Relevant Period. Therefore, the Authority considers Mr Ward’s relevant income is

£248,103.

6.9.
In deciding on the percentage of the relevant income that forms the basis of the

Step 2 figure, the Authority considers the seriousness of the breach and chooses a

percentage between 0% and 40%. This range is divided into five fixed levels

which represent, on a sliding scale, the seriousness of the breach; the more

serious the breach, the higher the level. For penalties imposed on individuals in

non-market abuse cases there are the following five levels:

Level 1 – 0%

Level 2 – 10%

Level 3 – 20%

Level 4 – 30%

Level 5 – 40%

6.10. In assessing the seriousness level, the Authority takes into account various

factors which reflect the impact and nature of the breach, and whether it was

committed deliberately or recklessly. The Authority considers the following factors

to be relevant:

Nature of the breach

6.11. The Authority considers that throughout the Relevant Period Mr Ward failed to act

with integrity (DEPP 6.5B.2G(9)(e)).

6.12. Had Mr Ward been approved the Authority could have taken action against him

pursuant to section 66 of the Act. Mr Ward’s conduct during the Relevant Period

fell below the standards expected of persons performing controlled functions in

relation to regulated activities. For the reasons set out in paragraph 5.5, Mr Ward

demonstrated a lack of integrity in performing his role at FPL. Accordingly, had Mr

Ward been approved to perform the Director Function, the Authority could have

imposed a penalty on him for breaching Statement of Principle 1 of the

Statements of Principle for Approved Persons: An approved person must act with

integrity in carrying out his accountable functions. (DEPP 6.5B.2G(9)(q)).

6.13. Mr Ward is an experienced industry professional with over 30 years’ experience

working in financial services and was previously a director and an approved

person, and therefore could reasonably be expected to have known that he was

performing a controlled function without approval (DEPP 6.5B.2G(9)(r)(i) and

(iii)).

Deliberate misconduct

6.14. Mr Ward knew, or had such knowledge and experience that he could reasonably

be expected to have known, that he was performing a controlled function without

approval, and chose not to seek such approval from the Authority (DEPP

Level of seriousness

6.15. DEPP 6.5B.2G(12) lists factors likely to be considered ‘level 4 or 5 factors’. Of

these, the Authority considers the following factors to be relevant:

(1)
Mr Ward’s conduct whilst performing the Director Function without

approval caused a significant risk of loss to individual customers (DEPP

6.5B.2(12)(a));

(2)
Mr Ward failed to act with integrity (DEPP 6.5B.2(11)(d)); and

(3)
Mr Ward’s misconduct was committed deliberately (DEPP 6.5B.2(12)(g)).

Mr Ward knew, or could reasonably be expected to have known, that he

was performing a role for which he required approval but chose not to seek

such approval from the Authority because he knew he was unlikely to

receive it.

6.16. Taking all of these factors into account, the Authority considers the seriousness of

the breach to be level 5 and so the Step 2 figure is 40% of £248,103.

6.17. Step 2 is therefore £99,241.

Step 3: mitigating and aggravating factors

6.18. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.3G, at Step 3 the Authority may increase or decrease the

amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any

amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which

aggravate or mitigate the breach.

6.19. The Authority considers that there are no factors that aggravate or mitigate the

breach.

6.20. Step 3 is therefore £99,241.

Step 4: adjustment for deterrence

6.21. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.4G, if the Authority considers the figure arrived at after

Step 3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the breach, or others,

from committing further or similar breaches, then the Authority may increase the

penalty.

6.22. The Authority considers that the Step 3 figure of £99,241 represents a sufficient

deterrent, and so has not increased the penalty at Step 4.

6.23. Step 4 is therefore £99,241.

Step 5: settlement discount

6.24. Pursuant to DEPP 6.5B.5G, if the Authority and the individual on whom a penalty

is to be imposed agree the amount of the financial penalty and other terms, DEPP

6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have

been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the Authority and the

individual reached agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the

disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step 1.

6.25. No settlement discount applies.

6.26. The Step 5 figure is therefore £99,200 (rounded down to the nearest £100).

6.27. The Authority therefore has decided to impose a total financial penalty of

£416,558 (including the Step 1 disgorgement figure of £317,358) on Mr Ward in

respect of the fact that he knowingly performed, or could reasonably be expected

to have known that he was performing, a controlled function without approval.

6.28. The Authority has had regard to the guidance in Chapter 9 of EG (the relevant

provisions of which are set out in Annex A to this Notice).

6.29. For the reasons set out in paragraph 5.5 of this Notice, the Authority considers

that Mr Ward’s conduct during the Relevant Period demonstrates a lack of

integrity and that he is not a fit and proper person.

6.30. The Authority therefore considers it is appropriate and proportionate in all the

circumstances to prohibit Mr Ward from performing any function in relation to any

regulated activity carried on by an authorised person, exempt person or exempt

professional firm.

7.
REPRESENTATIONS

7.1.
Annex B contains a brief summary of the key representations made by Mr Ward,

and by HJL as a person given third party rights in respect of the Warning Notice

under section 393 of the Act, and how they have been dealt with. In making the

decision which gave rise to the obligation to give this Notice, the Authority has

taken into account all of the representations made by Mr Ward and HJL, whether

or not set out in Annex B.

8.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

8.1.
This Notice is given under section 57 and section 63B of the Act and in accordance

with section 388 of the Act.

Decision maker

8.2.
The decision which gave rise to the obligation to give this Notice was made by the

Regulatory Decisions Committee.

The Tribunal

8.3.
Mr Ward has the right to refer the matter to which this Notice relates to the

Tribunal. Under paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper

Tribunal) Rules 2008, Mr Ward has 28 days from the date on which this Notice is

given to him to refer the matter to the Tribunal. A reference to the Tribunal is

made by way of a signed reference notice (Form FTC3) filed with a copy of this

Notice. The Tribunal’s contact details are: Upper Tribunal, Tax and Chancery

9730; email: fs@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk).

8.4.
Further information on the Tribunal, including guidance and the relevant forms to

complete, can be found on the HM Courts and Tribunal Service website:

8.5.
A copy of Form FTC3 must also be sent to the Authority at the same time as filing

a reference with the Tribunal. A copy should be sent to Helen Tibbetts at the

Financial Conduct Authority, 12 Endeavour Square, London E20 1JN.

8.6.
Once any such referral is determined by the Tribunal and subject to that

determination, or if the matter has not been referred to the Tribunal, the

Authority will issue a final notice about the implementation of that decision.

Access to evidence

8.7.
Section 394 of the Act applies to this Notice.

8.8.
The person to whom this Notice is given has the right to access:

(1)
the material upon which the Authority has relied in deciding to give this

Notice; and

(2)
the secondary material which, in the opinion of the Authority, might

undermine that decision.

Third party rights

8.9.
A copy of this Notice is being given to each of Andrew Page, FPL, HJL and CAL as

third parties identified in the reasons above and to whom in the opinion of the

Authority the matter is prejudicial. Each of those parties has similar rights to

those mentioned in paragraphs 8.3 and 8.8 above, in relation to the matters

which identify him/it.

Confidentiality and publicity

8.10. This Notice may contain confidential information and should not be disclosed to a

third party (except for the purpose of obtaining advice on its contents). In

accordance with section 391 of the Act, a person to whom this Notice is given or

copied may not publish the Notice or any details concerning it unless the

Authority has published the Notice or those details.

8.11. However, the Authority must publish such information about the matter to which

a decision notice or final notice relates as it considers appropriate. The persons to

whom this Notice is given or copied should therefore be aware that the facts and

matters contained in this Notice may be made public.

Authority contacts

8.12. For more information concerning this matter generally, contact Helen Tibbetts

(direct line: 020 7066 0656) at the Authority.

Tim Parkes
Chair, Regulatory Decisions Committee

ANNEX A

1.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1.1.
The Authority’s objectives are set out in Part 1A of the Act, and include the

operational objective of securing an appropriate degree of protection for

consumers (section 1C).

1.2.
Section 56(1) of the Act provides that the Authority may make a prohibition order

if it appears to it that an individual is not a fit and proper person to perform

functions in relation to a regulated activity carried on by (a) an authorised person,

(b) a person who is an exempt person in relation to that activity, or (c) a person

to whom, as a result of Part 20, the general prohibition does not apply in relation

to that activity.

1.3.
Section 56(2) of the Act provides that a ‘prohibition order’ is an order prohibiting

the individual from performing a specified function, any function falling within a

specified description or any function. Section 56(3)(a) provides that a prohibition

order may relate to a specified regulated activity, any regulated activity falling

within a specified description or all regulated activities.

1.4.
Section 63A of the Act provides that if the Authority is satisfied that a person

(“P”) has at any time performed a controlled function without approval and at that

time P knew, or could reasonably be expected to have known, that P was

performing a controlled function without approval, it may impose a penalty on P

of such amount as it considers appropriate. For the purposes of this section P

performs a controlled function without approval at any time if at that time P

performs a controlled function under an arrangement entered into by an

authorised person (“A”), or by a contractor of A, in relation to the carrying on by

A of a regulated activity; and the performance by P of the function was not

approved under section 59.

2.
RELEVANT REGULATORY PROVISIONS

Supervision manual

2.1.
SUP sets out the relationship between the Authority and authorised persons, and

includes in SUP 10A rules and guidance in respect of the Director Function.

2.2.
SUP 10A.6.7R provides that, in respect of a firm that is a body corporate (other

than a limited liability partnership), the Director Function is the function of acting

as a director (other than a non-executive director) of that firm.

30

The Handbook’s Glossary

2.3.
For the purposes of SUP 10A, a “director” is defined in the Handbook’s Glossary

as, in relation to (among other things) a body corporate:

(1)
Any person appointed to direct its affairs, including a person who is a

member of its governing body; and

(2)
In accordance with section 417(1) of the Act:

(a)
A person occupying in relation to it the position of a director (by

whatever name called); and

(b)
A person in accordance with whose directions or instructions (not

being given in a professional capacity) the directors of that body are

accustomed to act.

2.4.
EG sets out the Authority’s approach to exercising its main enforcement powers

under the Act.

2.5.
Chapter 7 of EG sets out the Authority’s approach to exercising its power to

impose financial penalties and other disciplinary sanctions.

Decision Procedure and Penalties manual

2.6.
The Authority’s policy for imposing penalties is set out in Chapter 6 of DEPP.

ANNEX B

REPRESENTATIONS

Representations received from Mr Ward

1. Mr Ward’s representations (in italics), and the Authority’s conclusions in respect of

them, are set out below:

Medical condition

2. Mr Ward has had a medical condition since the start of the Authority’s investigation

which has hindered his ability fully to make representations on the Warning Notice.

He disagrees with the entire content of the Warning Notice and would have provided

more detailed representations if he was in better health.

3. The Authority has had regard to Mr Ward’s submission that he has a medical

condition that has affected his ability fully to make representations. The Authority

notes that, notwithstanding this submission, Mr Ward has been able to make

representations, which the Authority has duly taken into account. Further, the

Authority gave Mr Ward the opportunity to make further written representations, but

he has not done so. In all the circumstances, the Authority considers that Mr Ward

has been given a fair opportunity to make representations on the Warning Notice.

4. The Authority knew of Mr Ward’s alleged misconduct more than three years before it

gave him the Warning Notice. Therefore, in accordance with section 63A(3) of the

Act, the Authority is time-barred from imposing a financial penalty.

5. The limitation period started to run in August 2014, when Mr Page discussed matters

connected with the Pension Review and Advice Process with the Authority.

6. The Act was amended by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 so that,

for misconduct occurring after 25 July 2014, a six-year limitation period applies.

Therefore, the three-year limitation period only applies to that part of Mr Ward’s

misconduct which occurred prior to 25 July 2014 (i.e. the misconduct occurring

between 3 July 2014 and 25 July 2014).

7. In any event, the Authority does not accept that it either knew of Mr Ward’s

misconduct, or had information from which the misconduct could reasonably be

inferred, in August 2014 such that the limitation period would start to run from that

date. The Authority’s discussions with Mr Page around that time concerned the

matters described at paragraphs 4.30 to 4.42 of this Notice. The Authority was not

aware from these communications that FPL had adopted and was using the Pension

Review and Advice Process. Further, the misconduct in question is Mr Ward’s

performance of the Director Function without approval, and at no point did Mr Page

refer to Mr Ward’s involvement in FPL’s business in his discussions with the Authority.

Therefore, the Authority had no information at that time indicating that Mr Ward was

performing the Director Function, and so the limitation period did not start to run

then. Instead, it started to run on 3 June 2015, which was when the Authority

visited FPL and became aware of the extent of Mr Ward’s role at FPL.

Mr Ward’s performance of the Director Function

8. Mr Ward denies that he performed the role of a director of FPL. He performed a

number of administrative tasks whilst working at FPL, always under instruction from

Mr Page. Mr Page has confirmed to the Authority on a number of occasions that Mr

Ward only ever acted on his instruction and never gave, or intended to give, the

impression that Mr Ward was a director of FPL.

9. Mr Ward denies that he acted with autonomy. He kept Mr Page updated with all

matters he was asked to deal with. Mr Page sat next to Mr Ward in the office,

listened to everything that was going on and gave verbal instruction constantly. He

checked Mr Ward’s work and commented when necessary regularly during the day.

He did not need to raise concerns over Mr Ward’s actions as these were always

carried out following his instructions.

10. The fact that Mr Ward was a representative of FPL does not mean he was capable of

making decisions. In all companies, employees and consultants converse on behalf of

the company.

11. Mr Ward denies that he controlled anything within FPL’s business or its third party

relationships. Mr Ward instructed third parties in accordance with Mr Page’s

instructions, which he mostly gave whilst sitting next to Mr Ward in the office.

12. The document Mr Ward signed was a non-disclosure agreement with a pension

trustee that Mr Page and he personally were investigating the possibility of

purchasing. He did not sign as a director or authorised signatory of FPL but in his

own right as a potential purchaser.

13. The Authority is merely assuming that, because Mr Page once referred to Mr Ward as

his business partner, Mr Ward must have played a bigger role within FPL. Mr Ward’s

remuneration on a similar basis to Mr Page was transparent and was only for a 12-

month period, which was then to be renegotiated with Mr Page. Further,

remuneration is not a sign of control of a company. Many companies have staff who

exert no control but are paid large salaries and benefits.

14. For the reasons given in paragraph 2.5 of this Notice, which are based on the facts

described in paragraphs 4.10 to 4.20 of this Notice, the Authority considers that Mr

Ward did perform the role of a director at FPL during the Relevant Period.

15. The Authority does not agree that Mr Ward merely performed administrative tasks

under Mr Page’s instruction. The matters described at paragraphs 4.16 and 4.17 of

this Notice indicate that he performed far more important functions than mere

administrative tasks, and there is little contemporaneous evidence of Mr Page giving

him instructions, either in writing or verbally, until after the Authority visited FPL in

June 2015. The Authority has also not identified any evidence of Mr Ward receiving

instructions from Mr Page in relation to third parties.

16. In contrast, the Authority has identified numerous occasions where Mr Ward gave

written instructions to Mr Page, including those summarised in paragraph 4.18 of this

Notice. The Authority also notes that Mr Page and Mr Ward worked from separate

offices for most of the week, and so disagrees with Mr Ward’s submission that Mr

Page would have given verbal instructions and listened to what Mr Ward was doing

because they were sitting next to each other.

17. In respect of Mr Ward’s submission that the fact that he was a representative of FPL

did not mean he was capable of making decisions, the Authority considers that the

matters described at paragraphs 4.16 and 4.17 of this Notice demonstrate that Mr

Ward was responsible for a number of important functions at FPL.

18. The Authority notes that the non-disclosure agreement was produced in FPL’s name

and that both Mr Ward and Mr Page signed it as ‘director/authorised signatory’ of

FPL. The agreement was addressed to FPL only, the signature block stated ‘Agreed

on behalf of Page Wealth’, a trading name of FPL, and there was no mention of Mr

Page or Mr Ward as individuals. The Authority therefore considers that the evidence

supports its view that Mr Ward signed the non-disclosure agreement as a

director/authorised signatory of FPL.

19. The Authority considers that, overall, Mr Page’s interview evidence indicates he

considered Mr Ward to be his business partner or a fellow director at FPL, and that

this is supported by the fact that he referred to Mr Ward as his business partner in

interview.

20. The Authority considers that Mr Ward was remunerated on a similar basis to Mr Page

throughout the operation of the Pension Review and Advice Process, not just for 12

months. The Authority considers that how Mr Ward was paid reflects the senior role

that Mr Ward played in FPL’s business.

Mr Ward’s involvement in the Pension Review and Advice Process

21. Mr Ward confirms he introduced HJL to Mr Page, but denies that he was responsible

for FPL’s adoption and use of the Pension Review and Advice Process. He did not

have, and did not need to have, a detailed understanding of the process and merely

ensured that it ran smoothly following Mr Page’s decision to adopt it.

22. After he introduced HJL to Mr Page, Mr Page rejected HJL’s initial business

proposition. Sometime later HJL approached Mr Page again, with a different business

proposition. Mr Page then played a fundamental role in the development of the

process with a number of third parties.

23. The pension switching advice model adopted by FPL was designed either by a law

firm that acted for HJL or by another third party service provider and Mr Page was

involved in designing the Suitability Reports used in the Pension Review and Advice

Process. Advice was given through a robo-advice model signed off by Mr Page, using

the Software, and it did not matter who operated that system.

24. Mr Ward denies that he disregarded the interests of FPL’s customers and showed a

willingness to enrich himself, FPL and third parties at customers’ expense. He also

had no influence over the investment of FPL’s customers’ pensions at any time, and

his interactions with HJL were standard interactions with a product provider.

25. At the start of the Authority’s investigation, all of FPL’s customers had received

market beating returns and lower fees as they were advised by Mr Page. The fees

charged by FPL for the services it provided under the Pension Review and Advice

Process were its standard fees.

26. The Authority considers that Mr Ward was closely involved in FPL’s adoption of the

Pension Review and Advice Process, and that this is evident from the description of

his actions leading up to FPL’s adoption of the process at paragraphs 4.10 to 4.13 of

this Notice. The Authority also considers that Mr Ward had a good understanding of

the Pension Review and Advice Process as he reviewed the documentation used in the

process before it was adopted by FPL and provided an explanation of how it operated

in interview with the Authority.

27. Mr Page’s first meeting with HJL was in early December 2013 and on 6 December

2013 Mr Page signed an IAR agreement with HJL, for HJL to provide introductions to

FPL. The Authority considers this action to be contrary to Mr Ward’s assertion that Mr

Page rejected HJL’s initial business proposal. After signing that contract, Mr Page and

Mr Ward made preparations for FPL to conduct business with HJL, with Mr Ward

managing the relationship with HJL. The Authority also considers that Mr Page had

limited involvement in the development of the pension switching advice model as

another IFA firm had already adopted it by the time Mr Ward mentioned the model to

Mr Page in March 2014.

28. Mr Ward has not provided any evidence to support his assertion that the pension

switching advice model was designed by the law firm that acted for HJL, and the

evidence seen by the Authority suggests the law firm did not design the model but

instead just provided advice on particular issues relating to it. The Authority

acknowledges that individuals at another third party service provider were involved in

developing the pension switching advice model, but considers that HJL initiated, and

were also involved in, the development of the model. The Authority also

acknowledges that Mr Page reviewed and approved a template of the Suitability

Reports used in the Pension Review and Advice Process. However, as explained in

the below paragraph, this was not sufficient to ensure that the process was

compliant.

29. The Authority considers that, where certain aspects of an advice process are

automated, it is still necessary for the authorised person to provide adequate

oversight and have appropriate controls in place to ensure that the advice provided is

suitable, and that the set parameters are being applied in practice and are sufficient

to ensure that customers receive appropriate and personalised advice. The Pension

Review and Advice Process involved the use of an automated client management

system, yet there was a lack of adequate oversight by FPL of the Service Providers’

performance of the Outsourced Functions. Further, a key feature of robo-advice

models is that they are clear on the face of them that a level of automation is being

used so the customer is reasonably able to understand the nature and risks of the

service being offered and take investment decisions on an informed basis. However,

there was no such disclosure in this case and, in fact, the impression given was the

reverse.

30. The matters described at paragraphs 4.25 to 4.29 of this Notice support the

Authority’s view that Mr Ward disregarded the interests of FPL’s customers and

placed HJL’s interests above theirs. The Authority considers that the evidence shows

that Mr Ward was involved in the decision-making in respect of FPL’s customers’

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investments. For example, he was a member of FPL’s investment committee, had

discussions with HJL regarding customers’ investments and was involved in the

proposed transfer of customers’ investments from the Loan Notes to other

investments (including the Bond). The Authority also does not consider that his

interactions with HJL were standard interactions with a product provider, as Mr Ward

took instructions from HJL and asked HJL to approve FPL’s proposal in respect of

customers’ investments.

31. The Authority does not dispute that FPL charged the same fees to all its customers.

In respect of Mr Ward’s submission regarding the performance of the Underlying

Investments, the Authority notes that, as at 17 May 2018, the FSCS had paid over

£1.7 million in compensation to FPL customers as a result of loss suffered upon

switching or transferring their pensions to SIPPs investing in the Underlying

Investments. Further, even if the Underlying Investments performed well, this would

not negate the Authority’s conclusions regarding the failings of the Pension Review

and Advice Process and the suitability of the advice given.

Mr Ward’s knowledge that he was performing the Director Function

32. Mr Ward denies that he did not apply for approval to perform a controlled function

because it was unlikely that the Authority would grant the application. It is an

assumption that the Authority was unlikely to grant the application, which is not

justified as an application was never made. FPL did not apply for approval for him as

he was not performing the role of a director.

33. The Authority considers there was a material risk that it would not have granted an

application for Mr Ward’s approval because of Mr Ward’s disciplinary history and, in

particular, the nature of his criminal conviction which, as it involved a dishonesty

offence, indicates he may not be fit and proper. Further, the Authority considers that

Mr Ward would have been aware of this given that the Authority wrote to him in 2002

to inform him that, in the event that an application was made for his approval to

carry out any activity, these matters would be considered and taken into account.

34. In addition, the Authority considers that, given Mr Ward’s professional experience,

disciplinary history and knowledge of controlled functions, Mr Ward knew, or could

reasonably have been expected to have known, that he was performing a controlled

function.

Misleading the Authority

35. Mr Ward denies that he took deliberate steps to control and influence the content and

flow of information that FPL disclosed to the Authority.

36. The Authority considers that Mr Ward did take deliberate steps to control and

influence the information disclosed by FPL to the Authority on the basis of the facts

and matters described in paragraphs 4.30 to 4.42 of this Notice.

Prohibition order

37. Mr Ward did not commit any misconduct and so contests the proposed prohibition

order.

38. For the reasons set out in paragraph 5.5 of this Notice, the Authority considers that

Mr Ward’s conduct during the Relevant Period demonstrates a lack of integrity and

that he is not a fit and proper person and that a prohibition order is therefore

justified.

Representations received from HJL

39. HJL’s representations (in italics), and the Authority’s conclusions in respect of them,

are set out below:

The development of the Software and the pension switching advice model

40. HJL did not develop the Software or the pension switching advice model. They were

instead designed by two individuals at another company independent of HJL

(“Company A”).

41. The Authority accepts that HJL did not create the Software, and that it was instead

created by two individuals at Company A. However, the Software was developed at

the request of HJL. HJL initially sought an efficient way to provide customers with a

pension comparison, to see whether the customer’s existing pension charges were

reasonable. A system was developed by Company A in around 2011/2012 in line with

this request. This system was an early version of the Software.

42. In 2013, HJL asked Company A whether an advice model could be “bolted on”. HJL

staff assisted Company A to understand the products that would be recommended

through the Software so that Company A could develop the triggers for the advice.

HJL also led the creation of the templates of the documents which were used in the

Pension Review and Advice Process and which enabled a complete, fully advised

38

pension switch. The Authority therefore considers that HJL initiated and influenced

the development of both the Software and the pension switching advice model.

HJL did not process leads obtained through unlawful cold calling

43. HJL was at no time involved in cold calling activities itself. All clients introduced to the

Firm were obtained by lead generation businesses through a generic financial

promotion process, which did not involve the lead generator in identifying any specific

investment or a specific provider of investment services. To the extent the activities

of the lead generators involved unsolicited real-time financial promotions, those

promotions were exempt from the financial promotion restriction in section 21(1) of

the Act by virtue of Article 17 of the Financial Service and Markets Act 2000 (Financial

Promotion) Order 2005.

44. The Authority has not found that HJL unlawfully cold called customers. Instead, the

Authority has found that Mr Page did not tell the Authority during the telephone call

on 1 September 2015 that FPL had evidence that a lead generation company

mentioned by the Authority apparently cold called. Further, the Authority has not

been provided with any evidence to suggest that Mr Ward or Mr Page took any steps

to confirm whether the lead generation company mentioned by the Authority did

actually cold call or to ensure that it did not do so.

Other entities were involved with the use of the Software during the Relevant Period but

have not been addressed in the Warning Notice to the same extent as HJL

45. HJL discharged its limited processing functions for the period July to October 2014. At

other times in the Relevant Period these functions were discharged by CAL, however,

HJL is named frequently throughout the Notice.

46. Each of the relevant entities that were involved in the Pension Review and Advice

Process are mentioned to the extent necessary to describe the facts and matters

relied on in reaching the decision to take the action set out in paragraph 1.1 of the

Notice. The fact that HJL is mentioned more often than CAL is partly a reflection of its

greater role in the Pension Review and Advice Process, in particular, its role in the

development of the model on which the process is based, its lead generation

activities, its role in relation to the products recommended through the process, and

its financial interest in those products. In addition, the fact that HJL is named

frequently throughout the Notice is a reflection of Mr Ward’s interactions with the

company, which are relevant to the Authority’s conclusion that he performed the

Director Function at FPL without approval and that, in doing so, he acted without

integrity.

47. There is no reason why HJL should not be anonymised. The Notice would achieve

what it is intended to achieve even if HJL is not identified by name. HJL’s commercial

interests will be significantly harmed if it is named in the Notice.

48. HJL had a central role in the Pension Review and Advice Process. In particular, it

initiated and influenced the development of the pension switching advice model,

brought the model to the attention of the Firm through Mr Ward, performed the

Outsourced Functions and had a material financial interest in the Loan Notes.

Further, as mentioned above, Mr Ward’s interactions with the company are relevant

to the Authority’s conclusion that he performed the Director Function at FPL without

approval and that, in doing so, he acted without integrity. In these circumstances,

the Authority considers it appropriate to mention HJL by name so that its findings,

and the factual background (including the key parties involved), can be easily

ascertained by the recipient of the Notice, as well as by any other reader of the

Notice. In addition, the Authority considers it possible that HJL could be identified

from the description of the matters contained in the Notice even if anonymised as the

Authority’s Financial Services Register names HJL as an IAR of FPL between 11

September 2014 and 2 July 2015, and the Authority considers it is necessary to

include detail in the Notice about HJL, including that it was an IAR and the time

period that it was registered as an IAR, in order to explain the relationship between

HJL and FPL. As such, the Authority considers it unlikely that HJL will be materially

prejudiced as a result of being referred to by its name in the Notice.